ABSTRACT

International migration for employment and domestic labour market development: the Jordanian experience.

Ian J. Seccombe

Following a review and evaluation of previous research in the field of international migration for employment, it is argued that the extent to which such migration is beneficial depends critically on how it is organized and by whom. The development of Jordan's traditional image as a regional labour supplier is traced from the early twentieth century and is explained largely in terms of a response to repeated economic and political crises. A case study of the Kuwait labour market is used to demonstrate the recent (post-1978) collapse in Jordanian labour migration and to establish the changing character of the international labour market.

The central role assumed by international emigration for employment in the Jordanian economy and the problems and policy constraints which that places on labour market management are illustrated. An attempt is made to identify scarce skills and to assess the development and utility of the government's policy response towards labour shortages.

The scale and characteristics of labour inflows into the Jordanian labour market are established. This reveals the complex role of immigrant workers in an emigrant economy and demonstrates the need for a substantial revision of the 'replacement' labour migration model. The parallel themes of primary labour emigration and secondary labour immigration are explored in a detailed case study of local labour markets and agricultural development in the East Jordan Valley.

A concluding chapter summarises the problems of manpower planning and of labour market information gathering under conditions of heightened uncertainty.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT AND DOMESTIC LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENT: THE JORDANIAN EXPERIENCE.

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DECLARATION

I declare that the contents of this thesis have not previously been submitted at this or any other university.

Ian J. Seccombe.

Ian J. Seccombe,
November 1983

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ABBREVIATIONS

Note that a list of periodical abbreviations is included in the bibliography.

AMINCO	American Independent Oil Company
BAPCO	Bahrain Petroleum Company
BMEO	British Middle East Office
CBJ	Central Bank of Jordan
d.	dunum
DOS	Department of Statistics
EGC	East Ghor Canal
EGCP	East Ghor Canal Project
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ILCF	International Labour Compensatory Facility
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMP	International Migration Project
IOR	India Office Records
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations
JD	Jordanian Dinar
JVA	Jordan Valley Authority
JVC	Jordan Valley Commission
KD	Kuwait Dinar
KOC	Kuwait Oil Company
MEED	Middle East Economic Digest
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOL	Ministry of Labour
MPHS	Multi Purpose Household Survey
MPS	Manpower Planning Section
NPC	National Planning Council
PDQ	Petroleum Development Qatar
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PRO	Public Record Office
RSS	Royal Scientific Society
SR	Saudi Riyals
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNRWA	United Nations Relief Works Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDL	United States Department of Labor
VTC	Vocational Training Corporation
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic

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Several institutions and many individuals have contributed to the development of this research in various ways. To list these might be invidious and I hope that a general expression of thanks will be accepted as a token of appreciation. A number of individuals must however be singled out.

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PREFACE

This preface outlines the aims and structure of the thesis, sketching the methods employed, the data sources utilised and the research problems encountered.

The author's interest in the processes and effects of international labour migration dates initially from an investigation of agricultural change in the East Jordan Valley conducted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of an M.A. in the Geography of the Middle East at the University of Durham (Seccombe, 1980 and 1981).[1] This raised a variety of issues concerned not only with the impact of labour emigration, but also with the approach of contemporary research towards international labour migration. These issues seemed to offer considerable scope for further research.

Consequently an attempt is made here (chapter 1) to evaluate research approaches towards international emigration for employment and, having demonstrated various limitations inherent in those approaches, to specify an alternative framework. In defining the latter the views of Adler (1980, 1981) are examined.[2] Adler argues that labour emigration cannot be evaluated in isolation from the government's broader development strategy. Specifically, the extent to which international labour migration is beneficial (or detrimental) depends critically on how it is organized and by whom (Adler, 1980). A principal concern of this research is to present an analysis of the policy decisions towards emigration for employment, taken by the Jordanian authorities, and of the constraints acting on

those choices. In so doing we present a detailed case study of Jordan's participation in the international labour market and the effects that this has had on the domestic economy in general and on the Jordanian labour market in particular. The results are however of relevance not only to the specific Jordanian situation but also to the more general question of what sort of effects the decision to export labour (or more frequently the decision not to restrict labour outflow) may have on a country of emigration.

The main body of this thesis is divided into two parts; the first (chapters 2-5) considers the development and characteristics of Jordanian emigration for employment, while the second (chapters 6-9) examines the impact of that emigration on the domestic labour market. The structure and data sources of these two parts are briefly outlined in the following paragraphs.

An important theme, to which little attention has been paid in the current literature, is that of the historic evolution of patterns of emigration for employment in the Middle East. With this in mind chapter 2 outlines the extant international labour markets (in both the Arab Gulf and the Levant) of the early twentieth century, examining the basis for, and characteristics of, (Trans-) Jordanian participation in those labour markets.

There are considerable data constraints in reconstructing the characteristics of international labour migration in this period and the result should perhaps be regarded as tentative. This analysis has been based in the first place on the records and correspondence of the British mandate administration in Palestine and

Transjordan, held at the Public Records Office (PRO) and the records of the Residency and Agencies in the Persian Gulf held at the India Office Records (IOR). Both sources have limitations in their filing and classification systems, and seemingly important documents have not survived. In addition the 'thirty year rule', whereby such material is withheld from public inspection for a minimum of thirty years, is an important constraint on this investigation since the period 1952-4 saw a crucial transition in the re-direction of Jordanian migration 'streams' towards the Gulf. From the mid-1950's an increasing volume of statistical material is available, including the early censuses of Kuwait (1957 and 1965) and of Jordan (1961) together with arrivals and departures data. The reliability of these records is evaluated where appropriate.

Chapter 3 brings this analysis of Jordanian emigration for employment up to date with a detailed survey of labour outflows in the post-war (June 1967) period, using a variety of published and unpublished source material. The problems faced in obtaining and evaluating such information were not inconsiderable and a significant constraint on the research has been the continued delay in releasing the 1979 Jordanian census results. Although the author was able to utilise raw data from the Department of Statistics' 2.1% sample of census returns, that remains an unsatisfactory substitute. The Ministry of Labour (MOL) proved an important source of unpublished material both on Jordanian emigration and on the Jordanian labour market, and the Amman Employment Office permitted me access to its

records for 1981 and 1982. Despite this assistance from some Jordanian authorities, empirical data on a number of important questions was not available (as is made clear in chapters 7 and 8). Consequently one important product of this research is to indicate those areas in which it would be useful for future data gathering efforts to be focussed.

Access to Jordanian government records is restricted in the extreme and, although the author obtained a number of crucial committee reports, interpretation of policy decisions has been based primarily on inference from a range of 'published' policy documents. Additional information was obtained from press and other commentary sources. Needless to say, the vast majority of this material was available only in Arabic. The inferences made from these multifarious statistical and documentary sources were discussed and developed during a long series of interviews with key personnel in the Jordanian administration.

A number of the themes introduced in chapters 2 and 3 are further developed in the following two chapters through a detailed case study of Jordanian immigration into Kuwait. The establishment and characteristics of the Jordanian migration 'stream' is outlined and the demographic maturation of the Jordanian community is detailed (chapter 4). Although Kuwait has a relatively complete censal data base, the delayed release of the 1980 Kuwait census was an unforseen handicap. Recent trends in Jordanian immigration and employment in Kuwait are considered in chapter 5 which utilises the detailed work permit records of Kuwait's Ministry of Labour for the period 1976-81. The latter confirms the evidence presented earlier

(chapter 3) of a significant decline in Jordanian emigration for employment. This is contrasted with immigration and employment trends among other immigrant groups in Kuwait and an explanation for that decline is advanced.

The second half of this thesis (chapters 6-9) is concerned with the impact of Jordanian participation in the international labour market on domestic economic development in general and on the Jordanian labour market in particular. In chapter 6 we present an overview of the Jordanian economy and of domestic employment patterns, demonstrating the central role assumed by international migration for employment. It is argued here that participation in the international labour market has compromised Jordan's development options. The subsequent chapters examine in detail the effects of this participation on the Jordanian labour market. Although manpower shortages are deemed to be a major disruption stemming primarily from labour emigration (chapter 7), the specification of those manpower shortfalls has not been attempted by the MOL. Using data collected by the author in the Amman Employment Office, an attempt is made to identify skill scarcity. The development of the government's policy response towards labour shortages is outlined and its utility assessed.

Manpower shortages have been seen (Birks and Sinclair, 1980a) as the catalyst for a further international labour flow, into traditionally labour-exporting economies.[4] The processes, characteristics and implications of such 'replacement' migration have been almost entirely ignored and its theoretical treatment wholly inadequate.

In chapter 8 we demonstrate the complex character of labour flows into Jordan and suggest a substantial refinement of the 'replacement' labour model.

Establishing the scale and nature of labour inflows presented a series of problems similar to those encountered in assessing the level of Jordanian emigration. Official data are difficult to obtain and presented in an aggregate form because of the sensitivity with which this issue is treated. In addition, utilisation of available data is handicapped by procedural changes of the late 1970's and by the discriminatory treatment of different nationalities. Aggregate MOL data was supplemented by material obtained in interviews with contractors in the construction sector, together with a major survey, conducted by the author, of work permits issued by the Amman Employment Office in October 1982-January 1983. These two surveys were important in establishing wage-rate differentials between Jordanian and non-Jordanian employees since there is no official wage rate data for the private sector.

A second neglected theme in contemporary research considered in chapter 8 is the participation of women in international labour migration. The characteristics and role of immigrant women working in Jordan are discussed and integrated into our critique of the 'replacement' migration model.

Chapter 9 draws together the twin themes of primary labour emigration and secondary labour immigration by examining the response of an expanding regional labour market (the East Jordan Valley) to the national labour

supply constraint. The latter is a relatively self-contained region of the country which, because of its economic and strategic importance, has been more extensively covered by census enumerations (1961, 1973, 1978 and 1979) than any other area of the country. The author was provided with full access to the unpublished results of the 1978 census (a pilot for the national census of 1979) by the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) and limited access was granted by the Department of Statistics (DOS) to the 1979 enumeration returns. This data was supplemented by a variety of JVA records and independent consultants reports. During a series of visits to the Dier Alla area the author was able to interview (with Abdul Hameed Musa and Akram Steitieh of the Faculty of Agriculture, University of Jordan) immigrant workers and farmers, gathering valuable data on working conditions and living standards.

The author spent some considerable time in the Amman Employment Office during 1981 and early 1983 while collecting data on labour emigration and completing the immigrant workers survey. At the same time this provided an opportunity to observe the work of the Employment Office at first-hand and to discuss procedural problems in detail with those involved. These discussions and observations are drawn upon in the final chapter (10) which advances proposals for improving labour market information. The problems and policy constraints imposed on countries of emigration by their participation in the international labour market, as evidenced by the Jordanian case, are summarised.

In summary the principal aims of this thesis are fivefold:

(i) to critically evaluate approaches towards international labour migration and to indicate the directions in which such research could proceed (chapter 1);

(ii) to build a comprehensive picture of contemporary Jordanian participation in the international labour market and place this in its historical context (chapters 2-5);

(iii) to evaluate the formulation of, and constraints on, Jordanian government policy towards labour migration in general and human capital resources in particular (chapters 6 and 7);

(iv) to demonstrate the complex role of immigrant labour in an emigrant economy and to reformulate notions of 'replacement' migration (chapters 8 and 9);

(v) to review the problems of labour market information gathering and of labour market management under conditions of enhanced uncertainty (chapter 10).

Notes

Notes will be found at the end of each chapter. Complete publishing details of works referenced in these notes are provided in the bibliography which appears at the end of this thesis.

1. Seccombe, I.J. (1980) 'Jordanian labour migration: the impact on domestic development' (Unpublished dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an M.A. in the Geography of the Middle East, University of Durham); and (1981) Manpower and migration: the effects of international labour migration on agricultural development in the East Jordan Valley, 1973-80.

2. Adler, S. (1980) Swallow's children - emigration and development in Algeria; and (1981) A Turkish conundrum: emigration, politics and development, 1961-80.

3. I am particularly grateful to Baqr an-Najjar, Department of Sociology, University of Durham, who generously allowed me to use this material.

4. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980a) International migration and development in the Arab region. pp. 86-9.

PART I : INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION

1.1 Preface

1.1.1 Although the literature on international labour migration has grown substantially in recent years, its theoretical content remains constrained (Pryor, 1981).[1] In his review of so-called 'theories' of international migration for employment, Böhning (1978) suggests that the field is littered with muddled and obscure models that are accessible only to the introspection of their authors. Indeed Böhning concludes that if a theory of international labour migration exists at all then it must be in a 'parlous' state.[2]

In part this lack of conceptual clarity derives from the tendency to borrow explanatory formulations from the literature an internal migration and to apply them, almost wholesale, to international labour migration. This has been a significant characteristic of the limited contribution which geographers have made to research in international labour migration (Clarke, 1979).[3] Findlay (1980) suggests that geographers have been concerned either to identify, at the international scale, the regularities recognized in classic internal migration studies (notably those of Ravenstein, 1885, 1889; Stouffer, 1940; Lee, 1966), or to examine the interrelationship between mobility at different scales.[4] Both approaches are essentially inductive and reductionist in nature. Moreover, the reliance on normative statistical inference to discern between alternative

hypotheses of causation is largely inappropriate in the context of structurally-based and historically determined phenomena.

Woods (1982) also recognizes that geographical analysis of international labour migration has been limited and often obscurantist.[5] He suggests moreover that most theories of aggregate scale international labour migration are founded in economic theory.

Given this lack of theoretical and methodological consensus it seems pertinent to introduce this study with a brief review of the contributions and limitations of selected approaches to international labour migration. An alternative approach focussing on policy formulation and implementation will then be specified. This will be elaborated in the course of the following chapters. The second half of this introductory chapter provides an overview of contemporary international migration for employment in the Middle East.

1.1.2 Approaches to both international and internal migration can be broadly divided into two groups: (i) causative and (ii) evaluative. The former, causative approach, examines the <u>determinants</u> of migration. At the macro-scale this includes an analysis of receiving/sending area characteristics and, at the micro-scale, focusses on the migration decision-making process. The evaluative approach is concerned with the <u>effects</u> of migration on both the labour importing and exporting areas, particularly in terms of demographic, social and economic change. At the behavioural level the evaluative approach considers the migrants (and their households) from the viewpoints

of discrimination, assimilation and adaptation.

These approaches are neither exclusive nor comprehensive. Both have been adopted from neo-classical and radical stances. In this review we will outline the macro-scale approaches of each in turn, considering their contribution to the study of international migration in the Middle Eastern context. A detailed consideration of behavioural approaches lies beyond the scope of this work.

1.2 Orthodox Theories

1.2.1 Kindleberger and the equilibrium approach

Until the late 1960's approaches to international labour migration were firmly rooted in conventional economic theory and articulated in the context of post-1945 labour flows between the Mediterranean basin and the industrialized core of Western Europe. In particular they sought to combine elements of traditional resource allocation theory and the Lewis model (1954) of dynamic growth with unlimited supplies of labour.[6] This approach, exemplified by Kindleberger's (1967) analysis of the role of labour supply in Europe's post-war growth, considers labour migration as a means of improving resource allocation for all concerned.[7]

The equilibrium approach envisages a four-fold contribution to the development process of the labour supplying states. Firstly the remittance of workers earnings abroad would remove the nation's foreign exchange constraint, permitting greater productive investment and stimulating aggregate demand. Secondly human capital invested in migrant workers would be enhanced by their

acquisition of industrial skills abroad, skills which would be available to the domestic economy on their return. Thirdly, by reducing levels of unemployment in the domestic economy international migration would enhance productivity and have beneficial income distribution effects. Finally, migration would act as a 'safety valve', providing an outlet for those whose socio-economic and political aspirations could not be met in the domestic economy.

As late as 1973 Hume set out these 'benefits' of the migration system and described labour outflows as "... a neat solution to the unemployment problem ..." for labour supplying economies.[8] Concomitantly access to a reserve labour supply was, for the labour-importing countries, crucial in sustaining export-led growth by keeping down wages and prices while maintaining profits and investments.

The unreality of the neo-classical assumptions which underlie this equilibrium approach have been consistently refuted (see section 1.3). Before considering these however we will examine an alternative, the human capital approach, also set within the neo-classical framework.

1.2.2 The human capital approach

Although human capital theory has its origins in the writings of Adam Smith it only came to the fore in economic research with the publication of Theodore Schultz's seminal article in 1961.[9] In brief the concept recognizes the ability and capacity of individuals to earn income as a form of capital, that is human capital. Investment in such capital (by the individual and/or the state) can enhance

the stock of human capital through investment in health improvement, in education and in training.

Although primarily associated with evaluating investment in education (Becker, 1964), the concept has been applied to international labour migration (Sjaastad, 1962) and particularly to the 'brain drain' phenomenon.[10] Migration is seen as an investment, by both the migrant worker and his (or her) country of origin, with the expectation that future earnings (abroad) will outweigh the social and private costs. As in the 'equilibrium' approach migrants are assumed to be responding to differences in economic opportunity as expressed by wage rate differentials or, in Todaro's (1976) reformulation, to expected earnings differentials.[11]

In practice the human capital approach is dependent on the use of cost-benefit analysis to calculate social and private rates of return to migration. As such it suffers from the same analytical difficulties as those of computing returns to investment in education.[12] In particular there is the common difficulty of identifying and evaluating certain costs/benefits and, the need to reduce all costs (including psychic costs of the individual and problems of economic dependence and enhanced uncertainty for the state) and benefits to a common <u>monetary</u> denominator.[13]

Despite these analytic difficulties and the rigorous data requirements of cost-benefit analysis a number of such studies have been conducted in the Middle East in recent years.[14] These have a tendency to deal with very specific cases for which some of the appropriate data is available (e.g. Hadley (1977) confines his study to

Egyptian school teachers in Saudi Arabia) and to make seemingly implausible or unverifiable assumptions (regarding for example the propensity to remit). The neglect of externalities reduces the utility of such cost-benefit studies in evaluating social costs and benefits. The results inevitably indicate very high private rates of return to migration, but are hardly a satisfactory causative explanation nor a valid tool in evaluating the impact of emigration.

The practical difficulties of applying rate of return analysis to migration are compounded by the neo-classical assumptions reminiscent of those with which the equilibrium approach is imbued. Thus wage rates are assumed to reflect marginal product (rather than to be structurally determined) and migration to be a purposive-rational behaviour predicated on wage rate differentials. Thus, according to Harris and Todaro (1970), migration is stimulated by "... rational economic considerations of relative benefits and costs ..."[15] Böhning's (1978) succinct criticism of this position is worth reiterating: "... cost-benefit models beloved by neo-classical economists have the marginal man juggling with a pocket calculator to compute present values of investment in moves to alternative locations."[16] The recognition of market imperfections (including information constraints and the operation of selectivity) considerably weaken the value of rate of return analysis. The latter, abstracted from consideration of the social relations of production, leaves the migration process largely unexplained.

1.2.3 Manpower assessment

A second, less rigorous, approach stemming from human capital investment theory is that of manpower assessment. The latter assumes that economic growth will generate a demand for labour to be met by supply from education and training.[17] As an evaluative approach it is clearly applicable to a labour market in which migration plays a significant role. The manpower assessment comprises four main steps: (i) the identification of base year sectoral employment distribution; (ii) the calculation of additional employment (net of attrition) generated by imputed sectoral growth targets and productivity assumptions; (iii) the conversion of manpower requirements into education/training requirements; (iv) the comparison of manpower demand and supply and formulation of recommendations.

Initially outlined by Herbert Parnes (1962) and used in the OECD's Mediterranean Regional Project, the manpower assessment approach aims to facilitate manpower requirements forecasting and the identification of specific labour supply problems.[18] Flexibility is imparted through the simulation of a range of growth targets, productivity assumptions and attrition (including migration) rates.

The technique of manpower assessment has been criticised on analytic grounds. Firstly, the assumed direct relationship between economic growth and labour demand minimises the role of technology change and substitution effects. Secondly, the approach can be criticised for assuming that particular occupations require specific educational attainment and although this problem can be

reduced by applying broad educational attainment ranges it does understate the role of on-the-job and informal training.

Despite these criticisms the approach is central to the two most comprehensive studies of international labour migration in the Middle East region. Adopted in a relatively simple form in the ILO's International Migration Project (Birks and Sinclair, 1980a), it was later developed into a sophisticated computer projection model by the World Bank and used in predicting manpower requirements and levels of migration in the Middle East and North Africa over the period 1975-85.[19]

The use of the latter as an evaluative and predictive tool has been criticised particularly for its lack of sensitivity to non-economic factors (Fergany, 1982).[20] Nevertheless it does have certain limited uses as a broad evaluative and analytical tool in the assessment of human capital investment and migration patterns in strictly defined (or precisely varied) situations.

1.3 Critical Theories

1.3.1 Empirical studies concerning the effects of labour migration to advanced capitalist economies have largely discredited the traditional beneficial view of international labour migration. These critical studies have focussed on the disparity between the private benefits and social costs of international labour flows, arguing that social costs may greatly outweigh private and social benefits. Specifically, the investment and income distribution effects of remittances anticipated by advocates

of international migration have proved elusive.

Foreign earnings have been primarily used to finance consumer goods imports and as such may exacerbate inflation and be socially divisive. Secondly, return migrants have not been a source of industrial skills. Those who do return have seldom acquired skills which are appropriate to the domestic economy (because of the occupations in which the majority were employed) or which they are reluctant to utilise on return.[21] Thirdly, migration does not necessarily reduce aggregate unemployment, indeed the selective nature of the migration process may exacerbate existing labour market distortions. Finally, with regard to aspirations it is equally plausible to suggest that by exposing the population to foreign standards of living and work patterns, migration may generate rather than appease those aspirations (Piore, 1979).[22]

Criticism of the traditional view of international labour flows has been associated with radical economists and articulated in the framework of capitalistic development, that is as an element in the theories of economic imperialism (Frank, 1978; Amin, 1976).[23] Thus Frank (1969) examines international migration in terms of core/periphery and metropole/colony tensions. It is a viewpoint summed by Castles and Kosack (1973) as "... neo-colonialism extracts capital from the under-developed countries in various ways ... the transfer of human resources in the form of migrant workers is an important part of this transaction. Migration belongs to neo-colonialism's system for exploiting the wealth of the Third world."[24]

1.3.2 The role of labour flows in sustaining the international capitalist economy has been combined at a second level with Marxist theory of class exploitation.[25] Emphasis is placed on the characteristic role of immigrant labour as essentially low wage labour, entering the class structure of the labour importer in a disadvantaged position because of their subordinate economic role and racial characteristics. At the same time immigrant workers are seen to play an important role in the maintenance of capital's control over labour by exerting a downward pressure on wage levels and by undermining the job security, organization and solidarity of the domestic working class.

In this context international labour migration has been incorporated into the structure of labour market segmentation theory (Edwards, Reich and Gordon, 1975), particularly by Piore (1979).[26] The latter rejects 'income differential' explanations of the migration process for their failure to explain the spatial and temporal patterns associated with specific labour flows. Labour market segmentation emphasises the role of social and historical process in structuring employment opportunities. Thus Piore suggests that migrant behaviour can be better understood "... in terms of the specific attributes of the jobs available to migrants and the meaning attached to those attributes in the social context in which work is performed."[27] Migrant workers are recruited for secondary labour market occupations whose characteristics (low wage, unskilled, tenuous occupations in peripheral economic sectors) make indigenous workers increasingly reluctant to accept them. The temporary and often clandestine status of

the immigrant workers forces them to accept such employment. The recruitment of immigrant workers can thus be used to control the domestic labour force and maintain the low wage status of such occupations. This structural approach thus provides an explanation as to why immigration continues despite unemployment in the labour receiving economy and emphasises the role of recruitment in determining the spatial and temporal patterning of labour flows.

1.3.3 Portes (1981) has criticised the 'dualist' framework with which the labour market segmentation approach has been imbued. There is a tendency to regard immigrant workers solely as a source of low wage labour.[28] In contrast Portes argues that structurally distinct modes of immigrant incorporation can be defined and he recognizes primary and secondary labour market immigration. Primary labour market immigration is distinguished by the following characteristics:

(i) it occurs through legal channels and is either promoted or discouraged by explicit changes in immigration laws;

(ii) workers are hired according to ability rather than ethnicity;

(iii) immigrants have occupational mobility choices comparable to indigenous manpower; conditions of employment and remuneration are non-discriminatory;

(iv) primary sector immigration functions as a means of overcoming inelasticities in the domestic labour supply.

In contrast secondary labour market immigration is characterised by:

(i) a tenuous juridicial status ranging from illegal to temporary;

(ii) workers are hired not according to skills but to ethnicity; their juridicial status confers advantages upon the employer in terms of employment conditions and remuneration;

(iii) immigrants are hired for transient and short term occupations in which vertical mobility is restricted;

(iv) secondary labour market immigration functions not as a supplement to the domestic labour force but as a means of disciplining it.

This distinction between primary and secondary labour market immigration is useful in the Middle East since, as we will see later (section 1.5) labour migration in this region is characterised by the complete range of occupations involved. However Portes' model itself suffers from the oversimplification of the dualist mode. Ryan (1981) recognizes a heuristic conception of the dual labour market in which elements of continuity prevail and in which there are several disadvantaged or secondary segments at various levels of the labour market structure.[29] Differential returns to labour of a given quality may be no less at the professional than at the unskilled end of the occupational spectrum.

The framework of in-market segmentation provides a valuable insight in a region in which public sector employment features large and where labour market structures reflect varying policies towards, and attitudes amongst, national and non-national workers.

Hitherto, labour market segmentation theory has

only been considered as operating within the structure of the domestic labour market. Relations between segments of different domestic labour markets within an international labour market have not been examined. Without anticipating the arguments which will follow, it is apparent that certain elements in the emerging international labour market of the Middle East can only be explained in terms of a segmentation process operating at the international scale in parallel with domestic labour market segmentation.

1.4 An alternative approach: policy as a central issue

1.4.1 Although the various approaches to international migration for employment reviewed above attempt in one way or another to evaluate the processes of, and returns to, labour migration, they have invariably ignored an essential component of that evaluation. As Adler (1980) remarks: "The question of whether migration benefits the countries and individuals involved, and to what extent, is critically dependent on how it is organized and also by whom."[30] Although there have been numerous studies of labour immigration policy (primarily conducted in North America, Western Europe and Southern Africa) systematic discussion of its counterpart, emigration policy, is seriously neglected.

There is a tendency in the migration literature to treat emigration policy almost as a post-script in which recommendations are propounded in a political and historical vacuum, ignorant of extant strategy and the constraints imposed upon it and its formulation. The adoption of an apparently laissez-faire approach is frequently dismissed

as an explicit absence of policy directives (Richards and Martin, 1983).[31] This neglect of emigration policy is attributed by Adler (1980) to the implicit assumption that, since the international labour market is effectively controlled by the labour-importing states, the question of policy should be approached from the perspective of the immigration countries. While the level of emigration for employment may be demand determined it is apparent, as Paine (1974) argues, that countries of emigration are faced with an immediate policy decision; that decision is not the extent of participation in the international labour market, but the extent of government intervention in that participation.[32] It is clear that a variety of stances have been taken, ranging from prohibition through selective regulation and laissez-faire to positive incentives and emigration 'packages'. Clearly these options play an important role in determining the pattern, composition and processes of labour emigration.

Notable exceptions to the general neglect of emigration policy as it concerns international migration for employment in the Middle East are Adler's analyses of emigration policies in Algeria (1980) and Turkey (1981); Dessouki's (1982) treatment of 'shifts' in Egyptian emigration policy over the period 1952-78 and Kim's (1982) case study of Korean collective contract migration to the Middle East.[33] These are all cases in which state intervention in emigration for employment has played a marked role.

1.4.2 Since the effects of international migration for employment impinge directly on the availability and

deployment of national resources, namely human capital, emigration policies cannot be considered in isolation. Although Höpfner and Huber (1978) assert that emigration policies are determined in the main by ad hoc and short term considerations, they are nevertheless influenced by, and in the longer term are an influence on, the broader development strategy adopted by the government.[34] The evaluation of emigration policies must therefore be examined in the context of an evolving development strategy.

From the development standpoint emigration policies have two primary functions:

(i) to safeguard national development interests; and

(ii) to maximize the returns from migration to the benefit of these development interests.

Both areas of concern are represented in the two subdivisions of emigration policy which we can define as:

(i) management policies;

(ii) structural policies.

These are represented diagrammatically on figure 1.1.

Management policies can be defined in relatively narrow terms as those policies which are primarily concerned with the short term organization and functioning of the migration process. These include what might be termed the 'classic' concerns of emigration policy, namely protecting the legal status and rights of nationals working abroad. In addition the management of emigration may involve intervention in the recruitment process itself to prevent the abuse of nationals by unscrupulous recruiting agents and to control the withdrawal of scarce skills. A further set of policy measures concern the channelling

FIG. 1.1 INFLUENCES ON, AND ASPECTS OF, LABOUR EMIGRATION POLICY.



of workers' remittances into productive investment in order to restrain their inflationary tendencies and unfavourable balance of payments effects.

Structural policies cover the range of medium and long term measures that can be adopted by a labour supplying country to regulate external migration so that returns to participation in the international labour market are maximized and its effects coincide with national development goals.

As such these policies are more broadly defined and concern both the determinants of emigration and its effects on social and economic conditions in the country (or region) of origin. Structural policies therefore impinge rather more closely on the government's wider development strategy. In the long term a successful development programme must aim to negate the adverse economic determinants of labour emigration through the adjustment of regional and sectoral employment structures.

Structural emigration policies have, in the short term at least, a primarily relief function; that is they seek to reduce the pressures imposed by international labour migration on for example domestic production, on patterns of investment and on the costs and availability of labour. Such policies are largely ameliorative in nature, for example in tackling skill shortages through the promotion of vocational training and the manipulation of participation rates. They may involve policies designed to encourage or discourage emigration of specific groups.

In the longer term structural emigration policies must aim to stabilize the flow of labour and remittances to

enable more reliable prediction and the formulation of long term resource policies. The attainment of these objectives may involve the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral manpower agreements.

1.4.3 In the following analysis we will be concerned to illustrate the ways in which the Jordanian authorities have viewed international migration for employment and to examine the evolution of both the characteristics of emigration and of emigration policy over time in the light of Jordan's overall development strategy. In doing so we will make policy a central element in our analysis, rather than an ancillary outcome.

It is important to distinguish between policy formulation and policy implementation. In developing countries the gap between these two stages is significant. Delays in the implementation of policy in what is a volatile international labour market may ensure an almost irrevocable mismatch between policy formulation and contemporary requirements.

This mismatch arises to some extent from the fragmented responsibility for migration issues within the administrative and legislative structure. It also reflects an inadequate labour market information base; the utility of labour market signals is clearly undermined by poor quality data collection and by the excessive time lags between data collection and dissemination. As a result policy decisions are either delayed or taken in an information vacuum and repeatedly modified. A secondary aim of our analysis will therefore be to examine the availability and quality of labour market data and to discuss

its effect on policy formulation and implementation. The possibilities of improving that data base, within existing resource allocations, will be explored.

Before proceeding to our analysis of Jordanian participation in the international labour market of the Arab region we will briefly outline some salient features of that labour market.

1.5 International labour migration in the Middle East: an introductory overview

1.5.1 The major characteristics of contemporary international labour migration in the Middle East have been detailed by a number of comprehensive reviews (Birks and Sinclair, 1980a; Pennisi, 1981; Serageldin et al., 1983)[35] drawing in the main on the pioneering research of the International Migration Project (Durham University, 1977-79) conducted under the auspices of the ILO's World Employment Programme (Birks and Sinclair, 1977b).[36] The aim of this overview is to outline trends in international migration for employment and to isolate some of the critical policy issues identified in the recent literature. Our treatment here will be highly aggregate and will introduce only a minimum of statistical material since the bases of such data are frequently subject to numerous caveats. A number of the themes introduced here will be revisited in detail later in the text.

1.5.2 Inter and intra-regional manpower flows within and into the Arab region were first precipitated by the exploitation of oil resources in the late 1940's (Seccombe, 1982).[37] However the scale and significance of that movement has dramatically accelerated over the last

ten years (1974-83) in the wake of the major oil price increases of 1973-74 and 1979. While this effectively removed the financial constraints on economic growth in the main oil-exporting economies and enabled the formulation of spectacular development programmes, it also heralded a new era of labour-constrained development (Sherbiny and Serageldin, 1982).[38]

Accelerated economic growth and the implementation of these development plans was, in view of the limited supply and quality of indigenous human capital, inevitably dependent on the availability of expatriate labour. The supply of the latter was facilitated by the prevalence of a laissez-faire attitude (Richards and Martin, 1983) towards labour emigration throughout the labour-surplus, capital-poor, economies of the region.[39]

The indigenous labour force of the oil-exporting states is restricted by their relatively small demographic base and by the young age structure of their populations. This domestic labour force is further constrained by the very limited participation of women in modern sector employment (Youssef, 1977; Shaw, 1983).[40] Pennisi (1981) suggests that women (including non-nationals) account for only 5-12% of modern wage employment in the oil-exporting states.[41] An additional factor which has contributed to the growing dependence on expatriate labour has been the articulation, through effectively sinecure public sector employment, of state policies towards income distribution; a process succinctly described by Benton (1979) as the: "... transformation onto a higher plane, through 'modern' means, of the emir's traditional role as

dispenser of wealth and assistance ..."[42] This predilection for non-productive employment and the promotion of a 'rentier' ethos is reinforced by the structure and emphasis of the prevailing education system (see Birks and Rimmer, forthcoming 1984).[43]

1.5.3 In the capital-surplus conditions of the mid-1970's the inflow of immigrant workers expanded rapidly; from 0.82 Mn. in 1970 (Farrag, 1975), the number rose to 1.82 Mn. in 1975 and an estimated 2.7 Mn. in 1980 (Birks and Sinclair, 1982c).[44] By 1975 expatriate workers already contributed almost half (48.7%) of total employment in the capital-rich countries. Available evidence suggests that this expatriate:indigenous labour ratio has increased during the late 1970's.[45] A contention which would support Birks and Sinclair's thesis (1979d) that economic development in the capital-rich states is following a markedly dualist pattern; a pattern characterised by the increasing withdrawal of nationals from productive modern sector employment, sustained and engendered by international labour flows.[46]

In both 1975 and 1980 the regional labour market was dominated by the manpower requirements of Saudi Arabia, which absorbed some 42.5% of the total immigrant workforce and, to a lesser extent, by Libya (18.3%). The scale of this dependence is however greatest in the smaller Gulf states, notably the United Arab Emirates (UAE) where migrants accounted for 84.8% of total employment (in 1975), in Qatar (81.8%) and in Kuwait (69.4%).

The overall reliance on immigrant labour is repeated in almost all economic sectors (with the notable

exception of traditional fishing and agriculture) and at all occupational levels. Dependence on immigrants is most significant in the higher skill occupations. In 1975 non-nationals accounted for over 80% of professional/ technical employment; 63% of skilled and 47% of semi-skilled employment.[47] Nevertheless it is important (particularly in projecting future manpower requirements) to recognize that a large proportion (47%) of immigrants were employed in unskilled occupations, particularly in the construction sector (where non-nationals accounted for 73% of employment). During the late 1970's structural developments in the economies of the capital-rich states have increased the demand for more highly skilled manpower, indeed the World Bank have projected that between 1975 and 1985 requirements for professional-technical occupations will have increased by 170% compared to a rise of only 53% in semi-skilled and 48% in unskilled labour. As a result of the continued mis-match between manpower requirements and indigenous labour supply, the size of the migrant labour force is projected to grow to 4.3 Mn. workers by 1985.

1.5.4 The growth in the expatriate workforce has been accompanied by the development of significant immigrant communities with the settlement of migrant workers' dependents in the host countries. In 1975 the estimated 1.82 Mn. migrant workers were accompanied by 1.7 Mn. dependents and, in the smaller Gulf states (particularly Kuwait, UAE and Qatar) non-nationals were already a majority of the total population. The demographic maturation of these immigrant communities poses a number of crucial policy issues for the labour-importing countries.

The latter have become increasingly sensitive to the growth of such communities which are seen to pose a threat to national culture and identity (Rumeihey, 1981) in addition to increasing the costs of providing physical infrastructure and social services to meet their requirements.[48] More critically, the alienation and disenfranchisement that immigrant communities are subject to (Farah, Salem and Salem, 1980),[49] poses a threat to the internal security and political stability of their largely conservative host regimes (Halliday, 1980; Ibrahim, 1982; Khoury, 1982).[50] Indeed it has been suggested by some observers (notably Serageldin, Socknat and Birks, 1983) that capital investment decisions may be increasingly tempered by the need to compromise between the demands of economic diversification, based on increased manpower immigration, and the requirements of internal security.[51]

This apparent conflict between the aims of growth and security is seen by some (Abu-Lughod, 1983) as the catalyst for recent developments in both the processes and patterns of labour supply in the international labour market (see section 1.5.8).[52] Although such arguments are convincingly expressed this discussion has been conducted within an almost entirely conjectural framework. Attempts to evaluate international migration for employment have been invariably frustrated by the continued absence of consistent and reliable labour market data.[53] As a result much of the research, and indeed of the contemporary literature as a whole, has been dominated by the need to quantify the magnitude and identify the broad characteristics of labour flows on a regional basis. Only a minimum

of empirical research has been conducted in the labour-importing states themselves. In this context An-Najjar (1982, 1983) has detailed the social and economic problems experienced by a sample of immigrant workers in Kuwait, and has examined the attitudes and perceptions of the Kuwaiti government and of the indigenous population.[54]

Before considering recent developments in the structure of international labour flows we will return to the extant position of the mid-1970's.

1.5.5 International migration for employment has had a diverse but equally ubiquitous impact on the economy and policy of the labour-supplying states. The nature of that impact depending largely on the structure of the domestic economy and labour market, the magnitude and characteristics of emigration and the effectiveness of government intervention.

In the mid-1970's the non-oil exporting Arab states provided some 72.5% of migrant labour in the region. In particular Egypt (21.9%), the Yemen Arab Republic (15.9%) and Jordan (14.6%) accounted for over half of the total expatriate labour force and some 72% of all Arab migrant workers.[55]

The composition of immigrant communities by nationality varied from country to country and in the smaller Gulf states the Arab dominance gave way to a significant labour input from the Indian sub-continent. In 1975 Asian labour accounted for over 60% of total immigrant employment in Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE.

The static manpower demand/supply approach adopted by most observers seeks to explain this pattern of migration

as a simple reflection of the inequitable distribution of capital and labour over relatively short distances (Dodgeon, 1978).[56] The existence of such regional discontinuities may be necessary but it is not in itself a sufficient condition to explain contemporary patterns of migration which are structurally based (see chapter 8) and historically determined (see chapters 2 and 4).

By 1975 labour exports had become extensive with over 40% of the Jordanian, and 24% of the North Yemeni (YAR), manpower stocks employed abroad. Furthermore, even where aggregate manpower exports were relatively small (for example in 1975 only 4% of the Egyptian and less than 1% of the Sudanese domestic labour force were employed abroad) there was a disproportionate withdrawal of highly skilled manpower. Serageldin et al. (1983) estimate that while only 4.2% of available unskilled labour was working abroad, some 13% of the professional and technical manpower stock had emigrated.[57] In the Jordanian case this had risen to almost 60%, compared to 33% of unskilled workers. This disproportionate withdrawal of high level manpower has become a major disadvantage for the labour-supplying states through the aggravation of extant labour market problems. Inflexibility within the labour market and training system has ensured that even relatively small withdrawals of manpower can have a disproportionate impact on production. The emergence of critical skill shortages in a number of labour-supplying states has stimulated domestic wage inflation (see chapter 7). In response to these labour shortfalls and higher wage rates a second, compensatory flow, of non-national labour into traditionally

labour-exporting economies (particularly Jordan and North Yemen) has occurred. This 'replacement' migration adds a further skein of internationalization to the regional labour market. (The largely unresearched concept of replacement labour migration is subject to a detailed examination in chapters 8 and 9 below). In addition the employment of non-national 'contract' labour in these economies represents a further restructuring of the international division of labour by the requirements of international capital (see Hill, 1983 and below, chapter 8).[58]

Within the labour-supplying economies the existence of labour market segmentation is seen to have exacerbated the effects of selective manpower withdrawals (Birks and Sinclair, 1979d) and may have reduced or even negated the impact of labour emigration on unemployment.[59]

The withdrawal of labour to more remunerative employment in urban areas (Meyer, 1983) and to employment abroad has also had a disruptive impact on the traditional sectors of labour-supplying economies.[60] Swanson (1979) illustrates the effects of labour withdrawal on levels of agricultural production and patterns of rural land-holding in North Yemen, while Donaldson (1979) comments on the loss of manpower from Oman's traditional fishing sector.[61] Important changes in social structure, and particularly in the role of women in production are identified by Myntti (1978) in North Yemen.[62] Khafagy (1983) examines similar changes in the role of women, for example in decision-making and in the control of income, in an Egyptian village.[63]

1.5.6 Divergence between the social and private returns

to participation in the international labour market are perhaps most readily apparent in the growing disenchantment expressed by the main Arab labour-exporting states with the contribution of workers' remittances to economic growth and development. Remittances have been of major importance in the balance of payments accounts of the labour-supplying economies since the mid-1970's, growing from $560 Mn. in 1974 (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, YAR and PDRY) to an estimated $3,530 Mn. in 1978.[64] Although net receipts now appear to be static (in money terms) their impact on balance of payments has not diminished. By 1977 workers' remittances accounted for 30% of the cost of imports and some 80% of the value of merchandise exports (Swamy, 1981).[65] In the extreme case of North Yemen the reliance on repatriated earnings is absolute (Fergany, 1980); in 1977 the ratio of net remittances to total goods exports and total imports was 5,449% and 140% respectively.[66] The effect of this capital inflow on foreign exchange shortages has clearly been ambivalent. Furthermore its potential as a source of savings and investment capital has been far from realized. Unlike other foreign exchange receipts remittances are a personal income transfer and as such have proved particularly difficult to mobilize for productive investment.

Although only limited empirical research has been conducted on the utilization of workers' remittances, available evidence affirms that the marginal propensity to consume remittance income is high. The latter is primarily directed towards the purchase of land, housing and consumer durables.[67] Ali (1981) adds that a significant proportion

of remittances may be used in debt repayment.[68] This excess liquidity has a direct impact on demand-led inflation. Furthermore the high import content of this consumption has an adverse impact on the balance of trade and on the marketing of domestic products.[69]

While the expenditure of remittances offers benefits to the consuming individuals and households, there are inherent dangers in the reliance on an uncertain income which is not rooted in, and has not contributed to, the development of a sound productive base. These drawbacks are compounded by the uncertainty associated with a source of income which is susceptible to external control. The continued receipt of remittances are not only dependent upon employment policies in the labour importing economies, they are also influenced by the demographic development of migrant communities with its influence on the propensity to remit.[70]

1.5.7 Ibrahim (1982) argues that the flows of manpower and capital generated by the investment of oil revenues, have created a new Arab social order characterized by a greater degree of socio-economic interdependence than the Arab world has experienced in any other period.[71] Inter-dependence is the antithesis of Fergany's (1980) earlier contention that the Arab labour-supplying states are increasingly <u>dependent</u> upon the capital rich labour-importers for both <u>income</u> (remittances and aid) and <u>employment</u>.[72] This dependence is increased by the uncertainty which surrounds future levels of remittances and by the ability of the capital-rich states to manipulate the international supply of labour. Recent developments in the

structure and pattern of international labour flows, to which we referred earlier and with which we conclude this overview, are seen as a reflection of the increasing control exercised by labour importers over the international supply of labour.

1.5.8 Since 1975 there has been a significant diversification in the supply of labour to the capital-rich states; a diversification which has been accompanied by developments in the recruitment process itself. This change in the pattern of labour migration has been marked by a rapid growth in the immigration of non-Arab, primarily Asian, labour. Between 1975 and 1980 the number of Asian expatriate workers employed in the Arab region rose by 18% p.a. (compared to a 6.4% p.a. increase among Arab migrants), expanding their share of total non-national employment from 19.8% to 28.7% in 1980.[73] There have been two components in this influx of Asian manpower. Firstly, the mid-1970's saw a rapid rise in the inflow of labour from the Indian sub-continent. Indian and Pakistani labour in particular was supplied to the Gulf states via a network of private and government recruiting agents able to match available supply with specific demands.[74]

This development in the pattern of migration has been explained within two frameworks. Firstly, Birks and Sinclair (1980a) emphasised the shortfalls in Arab labour supply which had developed in the mid 1970's and which were seemingly apparent in the skill shortages and domestic wage inflation experienced in countries like Jordan and North Yemen; together with the withdrawal of traditional labour suppliers (Iraq and Iran) as domestic

development increased internal employment opportunities.[75] According to the Birks and Sinclair thesis this shortfall was taken up by the readily available, low cost, labour supply in the Indian sub-continent.

An alternative explanation, emphasising shifts in demand rather than shortfalls in supply, is propounded by Abu-Lughod (1982) and Khoury (1982) among others.[76] This shift in demand arises from the need to reduce the economic cost and to minimize the growing contradictions of an essentially permanent expatriate Arab community with moral claims on the state but without political rights. Abu-Lughod distinguishes between the lower Gulf (where Indian sub-continent labour had already been dominant in the mid-1970's) and Kuwait where she claims the growth in Asian immigration marks a real discontinuity in labour market policy, a claim not borne out by the historical evidence presented below (chapter 2).

As we emphasised earlier these contentions have been based on an analysis not of annual migrant flows but of immigrant stocks in a few selected years. As a result important characteristics such as differential rates of labour force stability have been ignored. Furthermore this data has been in an aggregate form, distinguishing simply between Arab and Asian expatriates, ignoring within group variations. Later (chapter 5) a more comprehensive analysis of annual (1977-81) labour inflows and turnover rates will be presented.

A more advanced stage in the formalization of labour recruitment and deployment is represented by the second component in the diversification of labour supply. This

comprises the very rapid increase in employment of South-East Asian labour, primarily from the Republic of Korea (Kim, 1982) and from the Philippines (Stahl, 1982; Lazo et al., 1982).[77] Birks and Sinclair (1982c) estimate that the employment of South-East Asian manpower increased by 62% p.a. between 1975 and 1980, and rose to 6% of the total expatriate workforce.[78] Their employment has been closely associated with the success of South-East Asian contracting firms in penetrating the Middle-Eastern market, particularly in its construction sector. This 'collective contract' or 'project-specific' migration (Böhning, 1982) is distinct in that the provision of manpower is only one element in a complete project package.[79]

This form of migration is most highly developed in the Korean practice. Over 98% of all Korean workers in the Middle East in 1980 were employed by Korean construction firms, the majority on a standard one year contract (Kim, 1982). Additionally however rising labour costs have encouraged Korean firms to recruit non-Korean Asians (notably Filippinos, Thais, Indonesians and Malays) for employment on their projects. Dependents are prohibited from accompanying the migrant workers who are under the direct control of their employers throughout the contract period; that is, the employer is obliged to provide food, shelter, medical services and recreational facilities on a work camp basis. Initially this work camp approach was chiefly associated with 'enclave' industrial developments (for example at Jubail and Yenbo in Saudi Arabia; at Jebel Ali in Dubai and Umm Said in

Qatar). There has however been a steady increase in the number of collective contracts awarded on non-enclave construction projects and, particularly for Filipinos, in the service sector.

The advantages of this controlled immigration for the capital-rich labour-importers are clear. The minimization of the social and political implications of hosting large Arab immigrant communities appears to offer a solution to the dilemma of growth versus security. As a result the share of South-East Asian manpower in the total immigrant labour market is projected (Serageldin et al., 1983) to rise to 12% by 1985 as the regional labour market becomes increasingly biased on social, economic and political grounds against Arab labour (Birks and Sinclair, 1980b).[80] The political overtones of this argument may have been overstated. The diffusion of collective contract migration to traditionally labour-exporting Arab economies, particularly Egypt (Hill, 1983) and Jordan (see below chapter 8), suggests that greater emphasis should be placed on the changing nature of international contracting and the evolving structure of economic development.[81]

1.5.9 Some of the leading issues and recent trends in international labour migration in the Middle East have been outlined in this review. Despite the dearth of empirical research in this field it is apparent that both labour suppliers and labour receivers, if that distinction can be retained, have experienced a range of unforseen and largely deleterious social and economic consequences. For the capital-poor labour-exporting Arab states their

essentially passive participation in the international labour market has not been the panacea envisaged in the early 1970's. Although it is increasingly felt that the policies of laissez-faire are now redundant, the alternatives being formulated may be quite inappropriate in the face of a vacillating international labour market. This then is the regional milieu in which we consider the experience of one of these capital-poor states, namely the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

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PART II : JORDANIAN EMIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT

CHAPTER TWO

JORDANIAN LABOUR MIGRATION : THE HISTORICAL LEGACY, 1920-66

2.1 Preface

2.1.1 Recent studies of international labour migration in the Arab region have, without exception, focussed on the period since, or immediately prior to, the 1973-74 oil price increases.[1] In doing so they have tended to ignore the labour market and patterns of migration that existed prior to the exploitation of oil resources and the interaction of the early oil industry with that 'traditional' labour market.

This chapter aims to place contemporary Jordanian participation on the international labour market in its historical context. In order to achieve this we will first consider the parallel patterns of labour migration in the Arab Gulf and in the Levant which co-existed during the early twentieth century. Subsequently we will examine the integration of these two labour markets in the period 1948-66.

2.2 Tradition and change: Migration to the Gulf during the early twentieth century

2.2.1 Until the mid-1930's labour migration in the Gulf region was primarily seasonal and, in some cases, forced in nature. The demand and supply of manpower in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reflected the twin pillars of the region's economy. Pelly (the Political Resident at Bushire, 1947-51) records that in this period there had been: "... only two industries from which they [the Sheikhs] could squeeze tribute or participate in profit, pearling and slaving ..."[2] The volume of labour involved in this seasonal migration was not inconsiderable. Kelly

(1968) suggests that, in the mid-nineteenth century, anything from 30,000 to 40,000 men worked on the pearling banks of the lower Gulf (Bahrain and the Trucial coast) alone.[3] In addition estimates from the Kuwait residency suggest that up to 10,000 labourers were involved in the seasonal migration to the Kuwait pearl banks from the date gardens of southern Iraq.[4]

Some indication of the scale and pattern of this movement is provided by Biscoe (the Political Resident at Bushire, 1929-32). The latter records that: "... as the pearling season [May to September] approaches each year there is a great migration to the Trucial coast - off which some of the best banks lie - from Oman, as many as 5,000 coming from the Batinah tribes with perhaps 2,000 more from other districts ..." In addition Biscoe suggests that about 15,000 'local' divers went out from Bahrain each season and estimated that: "... about 100,000 men from the whole Gulf are employed on the banks every year."[5]

This seasonal migration was not always undertaken voluntarily. Prideaux (Political Resident at Bushire, 1924-27) records that: "... in the pearling industry there is always a demand for diver recruits on account of the strenuous nature of the life and it is not a new thing for returning pilgrims to bring one or two fresh slaves from Mecca ..."[6] Boyes (H.M.S. Triad, 1929) was of a similar opinion, he suggests that at least 2,000 slaves from the Batinah were sent to the Trucial coast each pearling season.[7] Loch (Political Agent in Bahrain, 1932-37) writing as late as 1935 reports that some 21,000 slaves were still engaged on the pearling banks of the Trucial Coast.[8]

2.2.2 By the mid-1930's however the international pearl trade had collapsed and a series of poor seasons forced the Gulf pearl industry into a depression from which it never recovered. In May 1932 the divers at Bahrain refused to go out to the banks because of the low capital advances offered to them as a result of the previous year's poor harvest. In subsequent rioting at Manama two divers were killed by police and another five seriously wounded. Captain Prior (Political Agent in Bahrain, 1929-32) wrote: "... these divers number some thousands of ruffians and semi-savages from a dozen different countries, without any families present to restrain them. The danger of leniency is at once apparent ... unless an improvement in the pearl market takes place before next year the industry will be bankrupt and untold misery caused to thousands who have no other livelihood."[9]

The revival did not occur and in 1935 only 360 boats and 11,550 men went out from Bahrain.[10] In 1936 Loch wrote to Fowle (Political Resident at Bushire, 1932-39) that the financial depression and fall in value of pearls was leading to: "... a desire of the owners of slaves along the Trucial Coast to get rid of them (even at a sacrifice in price) in order to save the cost of maintaining them."[11]

2.2.3 The subsequent decade witnessed a significant transformation in the traditional pattern of labour migration to the Gulf. Coincident with the collapse in pearling an increasing proportion of local Arab labour, including possessed slaves, began to find employment in the nascent oil industry. In Bahrain the Bahrain Petroleum Company's

(BAPCO) employment of 'native' daily rate workers grew from 600 to 700 in April 1936 to 2,100 in 1939 and 6,400 in 1944.[12]

During the same period there was, despite the Saudi anti-slave trade legislation (1936), a gradual recrudescence of slaving. In 1938 Howes (Political Officer, Trucial Coast 1938-40) reported the sale of between one and two thousand slaves in the Buraimi oasis.[13] At the same time increasing numbers of slaves were imported from Persian Baluchistan. Fowle recorded that: "During the last ten years, owing to the unpopularity of the Persian administration in Persian Baluchistan and adverse economic conditions, there has been a regular exodus of Baluchis often with their wives and children to the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, particularly to the Batinah. Here they are free from Persian administration but find it very difficult to make a living ..."[14]

A relationship between slavery and the developing oil industry is clearest in the case of Qatar. In the first half of 1951 some 61 slaves had presented themselves at the British Agency for manumission, a reflection in itself of their belief that they could find employment to support themselves and their families.[15] However Jacomb (Political Officer at Doha) revealed that it was not possible to free such slaves without generating considerable ill-feeling and suggested that the problem should be approached cautiously to avoid alienating the ruling family. It is clear that this ill-feeling had arisen in part because slaves had become an increasingly valuable asset following the establishment of Petroleum Development Qatar

Ltd. (PDQ). Jacomb makes this clear in his report when he states that: "Ever since PDQ started work in Qatar they have employed slaves owned by Qataris (and in some cases by Trucial Coast Sheikhs and their subjects). The Company do not of course do this by choice, the slave is to them one of many people applying for work ..." Thus potential employees would arrive with a note from one of the Sheikh's relatives recommending the bearer for employment. The Company were of course obliged to hire the man without questioning. Jacomb's report continues: "... I found that the possessed slaves working for the Company received their pay from the paymaster but almost at once had to hand over between 80 and 95% to an agent of their master. It was therefore obvious that the slaves were farmed out as a source of income ..."[16]

2.2.4 Despite the revival in slaving the demand for labour in the Gulf, particularly for skilled and semi-skilled manpower, soon outstripped the local supply. Indeed in Bahrain the oil company (BAPCO) had begun to import Indian labour on a significant scale from 1935.[17] Similarly in Kuwait where Audsley recommended the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) to improve living and working conditions for its predominantly Indian staff since "... they will have to rely upon a large community of Indians for many years to come in view of the certainty that Arabs in general and Kuwaitis in particular will not provide, in sufficient numbers, the employees required for skilled and semi-skilled occupations".[18]

By 1950 the major construction programmes of the oil companies were completed. Evans (Political Agent in

Kuwait) reporting this slowdown in construction activity went on to suggest that: "... future employment prospects will depend on the use to which the Sheikh will put his royalties ..."[19] Nevertheless the established dependence on immigrant labour was to remain, as Audsley had predicted.

2.2.5 From this preliminary discussion it is apparent that by the late 1940's an extensive pattern of international migration for employment was already in existence and that pattern of employment was built in part on former traditions of labour migration and labour recruitment. We will explore some of these features in greater depth below (Chapter 4.2).

This 'tradition' of migration did not encompass Levantine Arab labour except in very specific circumstances (see Chapter 4.2.2). It cannot be inferred however that such labour was immobile. In the following sections we turn our attention to the Levant and consider the patterns of labour flows which were developing within that region over the same period (pre-1950). Subsequently we will consider the factors which led to an integration of these two 'international' labour markets and will describe the characteristics of Jordanian participation in that international labour market.

2.3 Transjordanian labour migration, 1920-48

2.3.1 Although a tradition of seasonal labour migration existed both within and between the vilayets of the Ottoman empire, (Trans-) Jordanian participation in migration for employment within the Levant remained relatively insignificant prior to the establishment of the British Mandate for Palestine in 1920. Analysis of this phase of (Trans-)

Jordanian labour emigration is considerably constrained by data limitations. Nevertheless the period 1920-48 can be sub-divided, largely on the basis of events in Palestine, into four distinct periods of incorporation into the international labour market. Our discussion commences with the period 1920-36.

2.3.2 Transjordanian labour in Palestine, 1920-36

The Transjordanian economy of the early mandate years was characterized by its absence of formal capital and labour markets.[20] The labour force was overwhelmingly unskilled and primarily engaged in subsistence agriculture and nomadic pastoralism, two sectors characterized by considerable under-employment and unemployment. In the mid-1920's Transjordan had begun to 'export' a small grain surplus to Palestine and Syria but this remained on an irregular and informal basis.[21] Annual and seasonal variations in labour demand stemmed largely from fluctuations in the levels of winter precipitation which were a major determinant of harvesting labour.

The establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine was a major influence on this 'traditional' pattern of employment and of labour demand. The expansion of Palestine's economic and social infrastructure during the late 1920's and early 1930's (for example the construction of Haifa harbour) attracted manpower from all parts of Palestine and Greater Syria.[22] A second impetus to this growing demand for wage labour came from the renewed scale of Jewish immigration and capital investment following the depression of 1926-28.[23] In particular the expansion of citriculture was predicated on the exploitation of cheap,

unskilled Arab labour in seasonal picking, sorting and packing employment. Antoun (1965) has commented on the importance of labour migration in this period. In examining the external relations of a dryland agricultural village in north-west Transjordan he argues that: "Kufra al-Ma has been characterized by long-distance mobility since the establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine. A large majority of the villagers worked in Palestine on three or more separate occasions. Many used to leave after the harvest or during drought seasons to spend three or more months in Haifa or Tel Aviv ..." Labour migration to Palestine was characterized as sporadic and largely dependent on the level of the previous harvest and the prospects for the forthcoming season. Antoun confirms that migrants overwhelmingly took unskilled employment in construction, fishing and harvesting, for which the monetary returns were small.[24]

Clearly then the late 1920's saw the increasing formalisation of the labour market within Palestine and the absorption of local Arab labour into the wage economy, presenting an opportunity for surplus external Arab labour to supplement its otherwise meagre employment opportunities. The 1931 Census of Palestine provides some limited data on immigrant labour from Transjordan.[25] However this enumeration was undertaken in November when the demand for casual labour in citriculture and other agricultural enterprises were low. Data on nationality indicates that 2,693 Transjordanians were temporarily resident in Palestine, somewhat smaller than the Syrian immigrant population (3,461). There were significant differences between the two groups, in particular

the Syrians were primarily drawn from the Druse community and had a relatively 'normal' demographic structure, with a sex ratio of 131.2, in contrast almost 70% of the Transjordanians were male (sex ratio 228), and those males aged 20-45 accounted for almost 40% of all Transjordanian immigrants (the same cohorts represented only 26% of the Syrians). Furthermore the Transjordanian immigrants were, despite the season, predominantly enumerated in rural locations, only 35% being recorded in urban areas (compared to 63% of Syrians). There is then some general evidence to suggest that Transjordanians were, in the early 1930's at least, involved in seasonal and rural labour migration.

Despite the paucity of statistical data, documentary evidence confirms that the period 1928-1936 saw an increasing incorporation of Transjordanian manpower (primarily from the dryland agricultural areas of the north-west) into Palestine's labour market. A major stimulus to this incorporation was the stagnation of agricultural production in these areas during the early 1930's when Transjordan suffered a cycle of impoverished harvests and almost continuous drought conditions.[26] The country's economic position is graphically portrayed in the Monthly Situation Report filed by Glubb for December 1933 in which he records that: "... the whole desert is strewn with the carcases of dead animals and forms a most depressing spectacle. There seems to be no doubt that this country, on top of commercial depression and financial stringency, is suffering a cycle of years of scarce rainfall ..."[27]

For many the introduction of relief works during these years provided their initial entrée into the 'wage'

economy. In December 1933 Transjordan's Legislative Council, had made available funds for the establishment of a relief works programme, providing employment (primarily on road construction or improvement and well drilling) and income for otherwise destitute bedouin. By March 1934 over 1,000 bedouin from the Beni Hasan were employed on six road construction projects. Glubb reports that despite its modest size the programme was a considerable success and "... has undoubtedly saved considerable numbers from death by starvation and exposure. I most sincerely hope that if funds are available the experiment may be repeated next winter ..."[28]

Continued drought exacerbated Transjordan's economic crisis through its depressing effect on customs revenue (following the collapse of grain exports) and tax collection. The authorities were continually obliged to remit the taxes gathered early in the year. In March 1934 the Quarterly Situation Report explains that: "... the majority of taxpayers in Transjordan have been impoverished by a succession of poor harvests and repeated losses of livestock."[29] In 1936, when over 70% of tax collected had to be remitted, Cox (the British Resident in Amman, 1924-39) reported that: "The present year is the worst agricultural year which we have suffered since the details of the country's situation have been known ... some parts of the country have been so badly hit that relief works will again be necessary ..."[30]

In contrast the same period saw considerable economic expansion on Palestine's coastal plain. Notestein and Jurkat (1945)[31] have shown the effect of this capital

investment in directing internal labour migration from central Palestine and the highlands towards the coast. Employment opportunities for unskilled labour on public and semi-public corporations were predominantly filled by Palestinian Arab manpower which had a considerable price advantage over comparable Jewish labour. According to Taqqu (1977) this wage differential exceeded 100% in the case of unskilled labour. Jewish claims to higher rates of pay seemed untenable to the employing authorities who avoided them.[32]

This wage differential arose not least from the oscillation of Arab labour between two modes of production, in subsistence agriculture and as casual labour in urban areas. Taqqu suggests that it was: "... usual for Fellahin to maintain even tiny holdings in their villages and to supplement their agricultural income by placing themselves in the labour market in slack periods. Even landless peasants continued to reside in the countryside to a significant extent, earning their livelihood through ... sharecropping, tenancy and wage labour."[33]

At the same time economic conditions in Syria and Transjordan had stimulated the recruitment of non-Palestinian Arab labour at wage rates which undercut even the local Arab manpower. By the mid 1930's more than 25% of the Jaffa porters were Transjordanian, who were employed for handling bulk cargoes and paid at exceptionally low rates. Similarly 20% of stevedores in Jaffa port were Syrian or Egyptian.[34] Taqqu traces labour unrest among Palestinian Arab manpower in the ports of Haifa and Jaffa

during 1935 directly to quarrels between Harawani labour and local manpower whose wages were being under-cut. Industrial action by the Palestinian Arab labour force eventually led to the deportation of the Harawani labourers and their replacement by immigrants from Nablus.[35]

2.3.3 Labour flows and the Palestine Arab Revolt, 1936-39

This outlet for surplus Transjordanian labour was however short-lived. The announcement of further Palestine Labour Immigration Schedules in May 1936 and the subsequent Arab boycott and revolt (1936-39) had significant implications for a Transjordanian economy and labour market which had become increasingly dependent on the level of economic activity in Palestine.

From May 1936 the Palestine labour market (and indeed export market) was effectively closed to Transjordanian labour. In some areas the effect was devastating. In June 1936 the British Resident in Amman (Cox) reported that relief work was being provided extensively in Transjordan because of widespread unemployment and destitution induced by the: "... complete failure of the cereal crops in the southern part of Transjordan and in other areas by the return to Transjordan of many persons who normally found employment in Palestine as porters and labourers ..."[36] The Monthly Situation Report for September 1936 commented that: "Transjordan finds herself in a financial strait-jacket because the bad agricultural season has made it necessary to estimate for a short-fall in revenue of some £P. 46,000; the closing of the Palestine labour market and the resulting poverty in certain areas has called for the provision of £P. 16,255 on relief works ..."[37]

This is an early and clear demonstration of the problems induced by reliance on a volatile external labour market.

The imposition of travel restrictions during the 1936-39 crisis also prevented the flow of Palestinian labour into Transjordan. This had comprised two elements. Firstly a small number of Palestinians had been seconded from the Government of Palestine to the Transjordanian administration.[38] Secondly, and on a larger scale, there had been a significant though irregular influx of harvesting labour from Syria and Palestine into Transjordan.[39]

The volume and characteristics of this occasional movement are undocumented. Both 1922 and 1931 were relatively good harvest years in Transjordan in which such labour migration might be expected to have occurred and hence to be revealed in the Census of Palestine which attempted to enumerate Palestinians residing abroad.[40] Only a small scale migration is recorded (1,859 in 1922 and 1,328 in 1931) however. Since the enumerations were undertaken in October and November respectively, they are a poor guide to seasonal labour migration. The 1931 Census does provide data on the area of origin within Palestine of those residing temporarily in Transjordan. This suggests that the movement was localised in nature since over 70% originated from the central districts of Beisan, Nablus, Jerusalem, Jericho and Ramallah. In 1939 the coincidence of a large cereal harvest in Transjordan with the continued travel restrictions prevented this usual inflow of labour and led to an unprecedented increase in the daily wage rate paid to harvesting labour (of 275 mils).[41]

2.3.4 Labour migration and labour shortages, 1939-45

The onset of the 1939-45 war led to further changes in the regional demand for labour with the expansion of military construction and supply work in both Palestine and Transjordan from 1941.

The emergence of significant labour shortages in Palestine by 1942 and the consequent wage inflation, encouraged the military to authorize the importation of unskilled Arab labour from Transjordan, Syria and Egypt.[42] Estimates of the volume of this labour immigration range from 15,000 to 20,000 persons. The exact size of the Transjordanian contingent within this labour force remains unclear (it is known however that they were an important source of rail workers and represented over 10% of all rail workers in 1943).[43]

The re-opening of the Palestinian labour market to Transjordanian manpower had concomitant implications for the development of the domestic, Transjordanian, labour market.

During the early war years the British were increasingly dependent on local tribes for manpower. In November 1941 over 6,000 bedouin were employed on road construction in the Aqaba area alone.[44] Such employment was of mutual benefit following the widespread decimation of livestock herds during the severe winter of 1941-42. For many this military employment was simply an extended version of earlier relief works programmes. An additional 8,000 bedouin (mainly Beni Hasan) were engaged by the military in the northern districts.[45] Such employment did not

however disrupt traditional social and political relations as appears to have occurred in Palestine. Indeed to some extent such relationships were reinforced by the military's use of local sheikhs in their recruitment drive. Initially friction had arisen when tribal sheikhs and village leaders saw that their role as patrons was threatened by these employment opportunities and an infusion of capital over which they exercised no control. The Political Situation Report for November 1941 explains that: "During the early stages of the work in Ma'an considerable trouble arose from the fact that the more important tribal sheikhs obtained no benefit from the undertakings, they were too distinguished to labour themselves and no one was prepared to pay them for doing nothing." Intimations that the sheikhs might attempt the withdrawal of their men from the works led to a compromise through which tribal notables were 'employed' as overseers: "... on the condition that they remain permanently on the work, use their influence to prevent friction and that the tribe to which they belong produces an adequate quota of labour."[46]

The coincidence of three good harvest years (1941-1943) and the conditions of regional labour shortage had important implications for the military authorities. The latter recognized that the return of local labourers to their villages of origin for the duration of the harvest would leave their strategic construction projects with considerable labour shortages. By the end of April 1946 manpower employed by the military in the northern districts of Transjordan (where it had been transported from villages

around Amman, Salt, Madaba and Mafraq) had already fallen by over 3,000 as wage rates paid to harvesting labour rose to a record 400 mils/day.[47] Negotiations with the Free French authorities in Damascus over the supply of unskilled Syrian labour to supplement this seasonal deficit failed to resolve the issue. In the south however employment levels on the Aqaba and Ma'an works were maintained by the recruitment of destitute bedouin from the Hejaz, which had been suffering a severe drought.[48]

This same seasonal manpower crisis arose again in 1943. The large price differential for cereals between Transjordan and Syria encouraged the proliferation of a strong black market network and enabled landowners to pay harvesting labour at 900 mils/day.[49]

The experience of Transjordan during the war years, the maintenance of seasonal labour demands and the continued authority of traditional elites contrasts markedly with the Palestinian experience during this period. In Palestine the mobility of labour had bypassed traditional channels of recruitment and undermined the village elites. Continued disorders in Palestine and the growing influx of refugees in the post 1946 period exacerbated Transjordan's immediate post-war unemployment problem deriving from the reduction in military and government employment (both in Transjordan and in Palestine) which coincided with a renewed cycle of severe droughts (particularly in 1946 and 1947). Alternative, non-agricultural employment opportunities were limited. There was a large influx of candidates for enlistment into the Arab Legion and some construction

employment with IPC and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline.[50]

2.4 Post 1948, the search for new employment opportunities

2.4.1 The patterns of temporary and relatively short distance migration that existed within the Levant during the early twentieth century were curtailed by the 1936-39 Arab Revolt. Although the 1939-45 war led to renewed regional labour migration and was an important phase in the development of a wage labour force in the Transjordanian economy, it was but a short interregnum.

If the 1936-39 revolt marks the break with one tradition (albeit short lived) of international migration for employment, then the 1948 Palestine war heralded a new / tradition. The flood of an estimated 450,000 refugees into the new, but equally impoverished, Kingdom of Jordan was to generate the scale of that movement while the emergence of renewed manpower demands on the Arabian Peninsula were to determine its direction.

Antoun (1979) suggests that following the 1948 Palestine war long distance labour migration turned, to some extent, to the north (to Damascus and Beirut), but the main movement was 'internal', towards the East Bank in general and to Amman in particular. Nevertheless even this flow was a mere trickle compared to the former migration to Palestine.[51]

In December 1949 the 'Additional law no. 49' stipulated the citizenship rights of all 'Jordanians' and provided for the provision of Jordanian passports to the Palestinian refugees, thus allowing them freedom to

travel to other Arab countries.[52] Despite this the scale of emigration for employment built up only slowly during the 1950's, indeed the entry of Arab refugees was restricted by other Arab countries who argued that their absorption into new areas would undermine the Arab bargaining position vis-a-vis Israel and endanger the right to return.

Concomitantly manpower demands from the nascent oil / industry in the Arab Gulf states provided few opportunities for Levantine manpower. Analysis of oil company employment rosters for BAPCO, PDQ and KOC over the period 1932-48 has shown that early skilled and semi-skilled employment was dominated by Persian and Indian sub-continent labour. The BAPCO roster for 1948 reveals that 83% of the skilled and semi-skilled labour force was from the Indian sub-continent. Similarly in KOC, Indian manpower accounted for 88% of such labour in 1948. Although the majority of unskilled manual labour derived from local Arab sources and was hired on a daily basis, there was a surprisingly high level of unskilled immigrant labour. In 1948 some 26% of KOC's unskilled labour was imported from India.[53] In the late 1940's KOC's labour force expanded rapidly, increasing from 1,901 in January 1947 to 18,046 in January 1949 but it was not until later in 1949 that the employment of Palestinian Arab labour was considered, following the prompting of the British Agency.[54]

This limited involvement by Palestinian and Transjordanian manpower in the expanding Gulf labour market reflects a number of factors. Firstly, during the previous

decade and the early 1940's, when the demand for immigrant labour had been established in the Gulf, Transjordanian (and Palestinian Arab) labour was, as we have seen above (section 2.3), increasingly drawn into the expanding wage economy of coastal Palestine. Employment in the economy of Palestine had considerable advantages for Transjordanian labour over the uncertainty and cost constraints on migration to the Gulf, not least their ability to maintain links with the domestic rural economy with ease. Thus, even during the 1936-39 crisis in Palestine when this outlet for surplus labour was effectively closed, the Transjordanians did not find an alternative in the already expanding Gulf labour market. In addition to the endogenous factors restricting labour movements to the Levant itself, must be added the fact that they were simply not recruited, even as unskilled labour.[55]

The pattern of labour recruitment in the Gulf during this period was the outcome of the competing aims of the Government of India and the major oil companies. The latter were determined to recruit predominantly Persian labour which had the advantages of relatively low cost, easy accessibility and, while offering a range of skills, it was not covered by restrictive labour legislation unlike the major alternative (Indian) manpower source.[56] At the same time the Government of India in the form of the British Political Agents resident in the Gulf sheikhdoms, and particularly in Bahrain, were determined to minimise the employment of Persians whom they regarded as an instrument in Persia's geopolitical ambitions over the Gulf sheikhdoms.[57] Additionally these Political Agents were anxious to promote

Indian interests on the Arab side of the Gulf, to justify the maintenance of their Agencies from Government of India funds. The latter was achieved by stressing the role of the Agencies in securing Indian employment in the area and in facilitating the payment of remittances to India.[58]

In sum few Jordanians or Palestinians were employed in the Gulf during the 1930's and a migration 'chain' had not been established. As a result the surplus 'Jordanian' labour which became available after the 1948 war had no base from which to take advantage of the expansion in that labour market until their active recruitment during the mid-1950's.

2.4.2 In the early 1950's an opportunity for more significant 'Jordanian' labour migration appeared. In late 1949 it had been suggested (by the Foreign Office), that Nuri Said's threat to expel the Iraqi Jews could represent an opportunity to replace them with Arab refugees from Jordan. In a confidential memorandum to the British Chancery in Baghdad the Foreign Office suggested that: "The economic disadvantage to Iraq caused by the removal of a useful element in its population could, to some extent, be reduced by bringing in Palestinian Arab townsmen in their place."[59] The plan was swiftly rejected as impractical by the Chancery, arguing that any exchange scheme would soon lose its voluntary nature. In addition it had already been pointed out that the real difficulty lay in absorbing the thousands of Palestinian refugee families formerly dependent on agricultural employment.[60]

More concrete moves were made in 1953 when Iraq granted a number of civil rights to the estimated 6,000 Palestinian refugees who had settled there. In the same

year Jordan and Iraq concluded an agreement for the unrestricted movement of population between the two countries.[61] Plascov (1981) reports that the latter led to a flood of unskilled labour migration to Iraq and a rapid policy reversal on the part of Iraq which already had a large unemployment problem in Basra and Baghdad.[62] Nevertheless Iraq's shortages of skilled and semi-skilled manpower continued. The brief and ill-fated Arab Federal Union, between Jordan and Iraq (January-July 1958) re-affirmed the right of free transfer of labour, which aimed to ameliorate Iraq's skilled labour shortages.[63] The overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in the Baghdad Revolution meant the dissolution of the Union and the termination of this agreement. The subsequent deterioration in relations between the two countries acted as a bar to further labour flows. In 1961 the Jordanian census recorded only 2,356 'Jordanians' living in Iraq.

Despite the limited opportunities Plascov (1981) has argued that the Jordanian authorities continued to promote emigration, particularly from the West Bank, for overtly political motives. He suggests that emigration, by removing "... the bitter, unemployed, young, ..." perpetuated the influence of more conservative elements who remained behind.[64] However the bulk of emigration from the West Bank in this period was essentially an internal movement, directed to the East Bank and to Amman itself which had received a disproportionate share of investment.[65] Nevertheless by the late 1950's increasing numbers, particularly of skilled and professional workers, were

finding employment in the developing oil economies, notably Kuwait, where substantial investments were being made in social and economic infrastructure. Emigration for employment from among the refugee population was aided in part by UNRWA's 'placement service' which circulated lists of refugees with details of qualifications, experience and age throughout the region. Hacker (1960) notes a net out-migration from Jordan of 5,100 in 1957, commenting that: "... even if small numerically, the effects are detrimental to Jordan. Except for those who have deep roots in Jordan, the most skilled peoples in the fields of education, medicine, nursing, engineering, for example, are being drawn to surrounding countries, notably Kuwait, where salaries are at least three times what they are in Jordan."[66] By 1957 there were an estimated 14,100 Jordanians and Palestinians living in Kuwait. The characteristics of this early international migration to Kuwait will be discussed in detail below (Chapter 4.3).

The following sections examine the pattern of international migration from Jordan established during the 1950's as evidenced by the 1961 Census results.

2.5 The evolution and characteristics of primary labour migration: 'Jordanians' abroad in 1961

2.5.1 The 1961 Census of Population provides the earliest systematic data from which the volume, characteristics and spatial pattern of 'Jordanian' labour migration in the post-1948 period can be established. The census enumerated 'Jordanians' resident abroad when: '... their nearest next of kin in Jordan was a member of the household enumerated or, if a whole household was detected as temporarily abroad,

through a vacant house or neighbours.'[67]

This methodology undoubtedly resulted in significant under-enumeration and distortion, particularly when the emigration involved whole families. Data regarding the characteristics of those resident abroad elicited from neighbours or remaining relatives is likely to be imperfect, particularly with regard to occupational and education variables. Furthermore the term 'temporarily abroad' remains undefined and no data is presented on length of residence abroad. These inadequacies and potential sources of error should be borne in mind throughout the ensuing discussion. The following section will establish the spatial pattern of migrant origins and destinations before proceeding to examine their demographic, social and economic characteristics.

2.5.2 Migrant destinations and emigration rates

The 1961 census records a surprisingly low level of international emigration from Jordan. Some 62,863 'Jordanians' were enumerated as resident abroad in November 1961, a figure which represents only 3.8% of the total population. Furthermore the pattern of emigrant destinations was dominated by Kuwait which accounted for over 50% of the total abroad. Disaggregation of this crude data and the mapping of emigration rates (emigrants per 1000 inhabitants) for each of the 28 enumeration sub-districts reveals a marked spatial concentration of emigration and specific regional destination patterns (table 2.1 and figure 2.1).

The West Bank sub-districts clearly dominate the pattern of emigration, accounting for 79.9% of all 'Jordanians' abroad in 1961 (Nablus and Jerusalem alone accounted for

FIG. 2·1(a) RATES OF EMIGRATION FROM JORDAN BY SUB-DISTRICT, 1961.



Source: table 2·1. For key to sub-districts see fig. 2·1(b).

FIG. 2·1(b) JORDAN : 1961 CENSUS DIVISIONS.



SOURCE: Department of Statistics (1964) First Census of Population and Housing.

77.4%). Particularly high rates of out-migration are recorded from the sub-districts of Tulkarm (134.9), Nablus (90.7), Salfit (84.1), Ramallah (72.9) and Jenin (71.2). This data can be further disaggregated into its urban and rural components (table 2.2). Comparison of the emigration rates for selected towns and their adjoining rural sub-districts reveals a relatively constant emigration rate. In most cases the rate of emigration is only slightly lower (10-15%) in rural areas, and in Ramallah the rural rate is marginally higher than the urban rate.

With the exception of Hebron emigration can be regarded as a 'district-wide' event rather than a specifically urban or rural phenomenon. In the case of Hebron however the urban rate of emigration (32.0) is considerably higher than the rural rate (4.6). The explanation for this lies in the fact that there were few refugee camps in the Hebron district. Furthermore, in 1954 of 45,784 persons receiving UNRWA rations in Hebron district some 60.2% lived in the town itself.

Turning to the East Bank sub-districts, it is evident that emigration rates are both lower and spatially more concentrated. Only Ramtha (34.1) and urban Amman (27.5) recorded even moderate levels of out-migration. Over much of the East Bank recorded emigration was negligible. The southern districts of Mazaar and Tafila have emigration rates of only 1.5 and 3.7 per thousand respectively. Similarly in the north at Jarash (3.9); Kura (4.6); Ajlun (4.5) and rural Amman (5.0), all reveal extremely low rates of emigration. In addition emigration from the East Bank was a primarily urban phenomenon. In all areas the rate

of emigration from urban centres is significantly higher than the corresponding rural sub-district rate.[68] Compare, for example, urban Amman (27.5) and rural Amman (5.0), similarly Salt Town (15.5) and the Balqa rural sub-district (3.9).

Two points emerge from this examination of the spatial pattern of international emigration in the period to 1961. Firstly its generalisation throughout the West Bank districts and secondly its spatial localisation, primarily in urban areas, on the East Bank. These spatial characteristics confirm the contention that, in the period 1948-1961, the majority of emigrants from Jordan were Palestinians (refugees and non-refugees). Direct emigration from the West Bank districts (particularly from Nablus and Jerusalem) was concomitant with a second, internal, migration stream to the East Bank and subsequently international emigration from that area (only a relatively small number of refugee households migrated directly to Amman from 1947 onwards). Comparing the 1952 and 1961 census results it is possible to infer that net emigration (predominantly internal) from the West Bank was 21.5% of its 1952 urban population and 19.0% of its rural population.[69] Results of the 1960 social survey of Amman indicate that over 30% of the city's population had originated from areas of Palestine which, in May 1948, had fallen under Israeli control. This is confirmed by Hacker's survey finding that 57.2% of a sample population in 1957 had arrived in Amman during the period 1948-51.[70]

Those areas of the East Bank which received limited numbers of refugees, primarily the area south and east of

Amman, had correspondingly low rates of emigration in the subsequent period. The majority of refugees and internal migrants arriving on the East Bank settled either in the main urban locations (Amman, Zarka, Irbid, Salt) or in the rural areas of the north-east.[71] It is clear therefore that the pattern of internal migration and refugee settlement during the period 1948-61 provides an explanation for the localisation of international emigration source areas on the East Bank.

Despite the inferred similarity in the social origins of emigrants from both East and West Banks, examination of the matrix (table 2.3) of destination countries by the emigrants' district of enumeration demonstrates that the two areas give rise to dissimilar emigration 'streams'.

Emigration from the West Bank districts is dominated by long distance international migration and is directed primarily to the Arabian Peninsula states of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.[72] Together with the Arab Gulf states (Qatar, Bahrain and the Trucial Coast) these accounted for 78.0% (24,001) of emigrants from the Nablus district, 51.3% from Hebron and 46.2% from Jerusalem. In all three cases the majority of emigrants went to Kuwait, including 70.2% (21,628) of emigrants from Nablus (30.2% from Hebron and 39.9% from Jerusalem). In contrast more proximate Arab states (Syria, Lebanon and Egypt) received few West Bank emigrants. Only 9.6% (2.958) from Nablus and 11.6% (2,079) from Jerusalem were accounted for by these destinations. In Hebron the proportion was however much higher at 26.9%.[73]

Emigration 'streams' originating in the East Bank districts were markedly more 'local' in character and

directed more significantly to Syria and Lebanon. The moderately high level of emigration from Ramtha sub-district, noted above, was primarily directed to Syria and Lebanon which accounted for 41.4% of emigrants from the Ajlun district. Concomitantly only 22.5% went to the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf States (including 12.4% to Kuwait). While the proportion of emigrants from Amman going to these states was higher, at 32.7% (including 23.2% to Kuwait), it was still relatively low compared to the West Bank districts. At the same time 39.5% of emigrants from Amman district were in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. This pattern is repeated in both Balqa and Karak (where only 7.2% of emigrants were in Kuwait), although they have low emigration rates. In the case of Ma'an a pattern of 'local' migration also persisted, 62.9% of those abroad were residing in Saudi Arabia.

This discontinuity in emigration pattern is, given the limited and imperfect data available, difficult to account for. It can however be suggested that early relations between the UNRWA Placement and Training Schemes with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia may have directed the 'West Bank' migration stream to those countries. There would have been a lag in the participation of East Bank districts in that migration pattern. In addition the patterns of East Bank emigration may have been 'distorted' by the maintenance, among Transjordanians, of traditional migration patterns.

The following section will consider the demographic characteristics of emigrants and spatial variations in that demographic profile.

2.5.3 The demographic characteristics of emigration, 1961

The 1961 Census provides limited data on the demographic composition of those residing abroad by district of origin. The population profile of 'Jordanians' residing abroad in 1961 is presented in figure 2.2. This clearly exhibits the characteristics typically associated with a predominantly emigrant worker population. Specifically, there was a marked absence of dependants, those under age 10 represented only 17.7% of the emigrant population, in addition only 1.3% were aged over 60. The population profile is dominated by the age cohorts 20-29 which account for 44.2% of total emigrants, the majority (82.0%) of whom were males. There is a marked sex imbalance, with a high sex ratio of 343.3. Finally the crude participation rate of 56% confirms the predominant 'migrant worker' hypothesis.

Examining these demographic characteristics on a disaggregated basis reveals some, though limited, differences between districts (see figure 2.3). The East Bank districts of Ajlun, Balqa and Karak had more definite features of an emigrant worker population. That is a low proportion of dependants (the percentage under 10 was 10% or less and the proportion of females less than 20%), concomitantly males aged 20-39 were high, reaching 71.7% in Karak. In contrast the West Bank districts (together with Amman) have features of a more demographically developed profile. In particular the proportion of the population under 10 was relatively high (ranging from 14.3% in Jerusalem to 18.6% in Hebron) and the proportion of females was also higher (21.9% in Nablus and 30.0% in Amman).

This brief review of rather crude demographic data

FIG. 2·2 AGE/SEX STRUCTURE : JORDANIANS ABROAD, 1961.



SOURCE: as fig. 2·1

FIG. 2:3 AGE / SEX STRUCTURE : JORDANIANS ABROAD BY SUB-DISTRICT, 1961



SOURCE : as fig. 2:1b

would seem to support the inference that emigrants from the West Bank (and Amman) were drawn largely from the refugee population. Such an interpretation would account for their higher proportion of dependants. In contrast emigrant workers from the East Bank districts appear to be drawn from a more limited population. This discontinuity in demographic profile supports the hypothesis inferred from the spatial pattern of emigrant streams, that is, emigration from the East Bank districts (excluding Amman) was 'distorted' by the inclusion of a high proportion of Transjordanians.

Having established that significant regional differences in migration characteristics and patterns existed in 1961, the discussion now turns to the characteristics of emigrants as a whole and the likely impact of their emigration on the labour market. The following two sections will consider, respectively, the educational and occupational features of 'Jordanian' emigrants.

2.5.4 Social and economic characteristics of emigration, 1961

The 1961 census provides an eight-fold classification of both migrant and non-migrant populations by their highest class of education completion. The classification ranges from those with no formal education completion through elementary and secondary school graduates to tertiary education. However the data is not disaggregated by age cohort and includes those currently enroled together with graduates and drop-outs. Clearly the bias against the younger age groups in the demographic profile of the emigrant population will distort the proportion of that

population in the lower education categories since there are few migrants currently enroled at the elementary stage. In addition the census records that some 9,130 (14.5%) of 'Jordanians' abroad were attending educational institutes and were included in the classification at their current (1961) level of enrolment. Although that stage of enrolment cannot be determined from the census results it can be inferred that a high proportion were in tertiary education instutes. Since, in 1961, Jordan had no domestic tertiary education institutes, those wishing to pursue higher education were obliged to do so abroad. Among male emigrants 9.2% (4.0% for females) were graduates of, or currently enroled in, tertiary education. The comparable proportion among the domestic population was 0.46% for males (0.25% for females).

Despite these data imperfections it is clear that considerable educational selectivity occurred, with emigration. Emigration rates (per 1000 inhabitants) by education level are shown on table 2.4. This confirms the increase in emigration propensity with educational attainment, particularly at the secondary level. For those with secondary education completion the emigration rate jumps to 315.3 per thousand for males (and 159.6 for females) compared to 106.8 for males (90.3 females) for those with incomplete secondary education (1-4 years secondary). In addition there were more 'Jordanians' abroad with tertiary education completion, or enroled in tertiary education, than in the domestic population.

Despite this the majority of Jordanians abroad had only limited educational attendance; 44.5% of male

and 62.3% of female emigrants had received no formal education or had an incomplete elementary education. This data can be disaggregated by broad destination regions (see table 2.5). This shows a high rate of emigration by those with tertiary education to Europe, where they account for 24.7% of male emigrants (26.0% of female) and to the Americas (11.1% of males and 11.2% of females). This is an indication of the relatively high level of Jordanian enrolment in higher education in the U.S.A. and in West Germany. The majority of 'Jordanian' emigrants to Europe were educated indeed only 24.6% of males (33.8% of females) had less than complete elementary education. In contrast however those migrating to the Americas were predominantly of limited education. Indeed 49.8% of males and 51.5% of females had either no formal education or incomplete elementary education. This reflects the long established movement of unskilled and largely agricultural labour from predominantly Christian villages of Palestine to Central and South America. The 1922 Census of Palestine recorded that Central and South America was the destination for 9,086 Palestinian emigrants. Together with some 3,441 emigrants to the U.S.A. they accounted for 59.1% of all Palestinians recorded as residing abroad in 1922.

By 1961 however the majority of those emigrants with limited education qualifications were residing in other Arab, primarily Gulf Arab, states in which unskilled employment opportunities were available. Some 46.3% of male (63.8% of females) 'Jordanians' in other Arab states had either not attended or not completed elementary

education. Nevertheless a further 40.0% had received partial or complete secondary education. The following section will consider the occupational characteristics of emigration in more detail.

From this brief discussion two points can be drawn. Firstly, while emigration was selective of the educationally qualified it was not exclusively so, a high proportion of emigrants, in South/Central America and particularly in other Arab states, were ill-educated. Secondly, the pattern of emigrant destinations also distinguishes between the education levels, there was a high emigration rate of the better qualified 'Jordanians' to Europe and North America.

2.5.5 The contention that emigration was skill-selective and reflected specific manpower demands in the labour importing states will be examined using data from the 1961 census on the occupational distribution of emigrants.

The census records that 56.0% (35,174) of 'Jordanian' emigrants were economically active, of whom 95.7% were males. The crude labour force participation rate of emigrant males (aged 10-59) was high at 81.6%. In addition the majority (81.3%) were in other Arab states. Thus although occupational data in the census does not distinguish between individual countries it is clearly a reflection of their employment structure in the Arab states and particularly in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia which accounted for 71.7% of Jordanian emigrants within the region.

Comparison of the crude (1 digit) occupational groups of emigrant workers with the domestic labour force

appears to confirm that more highly skilled labour was disproportionately represented within the emigrant population (table 2.6). Professional and technical occupations accounted for 11.6% of males abroad and an additional 14.2% were in clerical occupations. This compares with 3.0% and 4.1% respectively in the domestic labour force. Among females the bias was particularly marked, 63.8% of those in active employment were accounted for by the professional and technical category. This is a result of the predominance of the teaching profession among emigrant women workers (45.0%). The occupational structure of women abroad was particularly limited, five occupations accounted for 86% of employment.

Overall the dominant occupational group was that of 'craftsmen, production and process labour' (43.8% of emigrant workers). However this category subsumes a wide range of occupational skills and educational requirements which makes further determination of skill levels difficult. In order to evaluate skill levels in more detail it is necessary to re-classify available occupational data (3 digit) on the basis of their inferred educational requirements. (The implicit assumptions made in re-grouping occupational data on this basis are examined in appendix I). The results of this re-classification are compared (table 2.7) with the domestic occupational distribution.

It is clear from this re-classification that a disproportionate number of those working abroad were from professional and skilled occupations. Particularly

notable is the high level of professional workers (A-1) comprising 1.0% of the total emigrant male workforce compared to 0.3% of the domestic labour market. Similarly sub-professional and technical occupations (B) represent 7.1% of those abroad compared to 2.1% of the domestic labour force. The latter reflects the high rate of emigration among school teachers who represented 5.8% of emigrant workers. Finally there was also a disproportionate employment abroad of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers (C-2), 13.4% of males abroad compared to 8.6% of the domestic workforce. The latter were dominated by mechanics and electricians who represented 7.5% of all emigrant workers.

Although the labour market for emigrant males was less occupationally restricted than that of females, it was dominated by employment in the construction sector (24.7% of the total). The majority of workers in this sector were unskilled labourers. Indeed the proportion of unskilled (D) manpower among emigrant 'Jordanian' males was surprisingly high (45.1%). The comparable figure for the domestic labour force (59.6%) included a large agricultural sector which was generally absent from the emigrant employment pattern.[74] This is not to deny that the rate of emigration amongst professional and skilled workers was particularly high (see table 2.8), but it contradicts Birks and Sinclair's contention that: "... the majority of migrants before 1973 were found in either clerical or more skilled jobs ..."[75]

2.5.6 The pattern and characteristics of emigration identified on the basis of the 1961 census data are largely the result of the spatial concentration of refugees from the 1948 conflict. The majority of displaced persons

went, according to Abu-Lughod (1980): "... at least temporarily into those parts of Palestine still in Arab hands, namely what later came to be called the Gaza strip and the West Bank."[76] The U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine estimated that some 280,000 (80% of the total) refugees took up residence on the West Bank and a further 70,000 moved to the East Bank either directly or indirectly.[77] Al-Arif contends that by 1952 some 70.8% of the displaced persons (and their descendants) were still on the West Bank.[78]

Given the spatial origins and the social characteristics of emigrants in 1961 it is clear that the majority were unskilled Palestinians (primarily refugees) for whom employment opportunities (particularly in agriculture) in Jordan were limited. The IBRD mission to Jordan estimated open unemployment in 1955 to be at least 16.5%, however among the refugee population it was in all probability much higher.[79] An UNRWA survey of 1953 indicates that among male refugees (aged 15-65) some 40-50% were without employment, a proportion confirmed by Hacker's survey (1957) of Amman. In addition, of those who were economically active a high proportion had only seasonal or part-time occupations.[80]

According to the 1961 census results the unemployment rate had fallen to 6.8%, this is almost certainly an under-estimate representing only those not reporting occupations and says nothing of the extent of under-employment. In addition to those recorded as without occupations a surprisingly high proportion (9.0% of males

aged 15-64)were classified as economically inactive but not in education.[81] While this includes those who were incapacitated it is also a measure of the extent to which workers were 'discouraged'. The 'discouraged worker' concept suggests that having failed to secure employment over a long period the pursuit of such employment may itself be abandoned. Given this effect the open unemployment rate in 1961 can be adjusted upwards to circa 14-15%. In addition a large proportion of the workforce had only seasonal employment or were under-employed. The Jordan Development Board's programme for 1962-7 comments that: "... nearly one-third of the labour force is regularly unemployed ..."[82] Similarly the 1960 Social Survey of Amman found that 22% of economically active males were only employed on a part-time basis.[83] The evidence presented here would suggest that international migration was one response to this high rate of unemployment.

2.6 On the eve of war: Jordanian migration for employment, 1961-66

Despite its considerable limitations the 1961 Census marks a hiatus in systematic data collection on 'Jordanian' labour migration and we have dwelt on that data at some length. In the ensuing period the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in June 1967 and the political uncertainties of the early 1970's have ensured a dearth of demographic data.

In the previous section it was established that, accepting the census results as a minimum, there were at least 28,600 'Jordanians' working in the region by late 1961. For subsequent years however there is no Jordanian

material referring specifically to labour emigration. Nevertheless, indirect evidence suggests a significant growth in the volume of emigration.

Firstly, Jordanian arrivals and departures data indicate an increase in gross departures of 'Jordanians' from 86,600 in 1959 to 343,000 in 1966 (table 2.9). Net flows are consistently outward and rise markedly over the period. The proportion of these departures which were for employment cannot be discerned from the available data. Despite this it can be inferred that they do represent an increase in emigration for employment since the level of recorded remittances to Jordan increased by 15.1% per annum over the period 1961-66.[84]

In addition to this indirect evidence, the Kuwait census of April 1965 revealed a considerable increase in the rate of immigration (at 20.1% p.a. 1961-65) and employment of 'Jordanians' which reached 36,027.[85] It can be assumed, with reasonable certainty, that the distribution of 'Jordanian' migrant workers indicated by the 1961 census, remained relatively constant over the four years to 1965. Thus by applying the same pattern of distribution to the known data for Kuwait in 1965 it is possible to derive an estimate of total 'Jordanian' emigrant employment in 1965. In 1961 Kuwait accounted for 63.3% of 'Jordanian' migrant workers in the region, applying this to the 1965 enumeration of 36,000 an estimate of total 'Jordanian' employment in the region of circa 56,800 can be derived. This increase of 12.1% p.a. would provide a figure of 71,000 on the eve of the June 1967 war.

Thus by mid-1967 there was already a high level of 'Jordanian' labour migration within the region. This estimate of 71,000 emigrant workers would represent about 15% of domestic employment (which for both East and West Banks was circa 475,000) more than double the rate of emigration for employment in 1961.[86]

In its introduction to the Seven Year Programme for Economic Development (1964-70), the Jordanian Development Board had recognized the importance of emigration for employment and anticipated an increase in what it regarded as the already "... large number of Jordanians employed in other countries ..."[87] The lack of restriction imposed on emigration for employment makes it clear that during this period such emigration was regarded as an ostensible method of aleviating the high levels of unemployment and under-employment which continued to prevail.

2.7 Conclusion: Migration and crisis, Jordanian labour emigration 1920-66

This chapter began by outlining developments in the Gulf labour market in the pre-oil and early oil periods (circa 1900-50), and its establishment as a primary destination for emigrant labour. The growing demand for immigrant manpower in the Arab Gulf region was paralleled by the gradual incorporation of Transjordanian labour into the expanding economy of Palestine under the British Mandate.

Labour migration to Palestine has been characterized here as temporally intermittent and is seen largely as a response to repeated crises in the dryland agricultural economy. It is equally apparent that the Transjordanian

administration relied heavily on such emigration as an aid in its drought relief programme. As a result the closure of the Palestinian labour market in the late 1930's was a severe blow to a Transjordanian economy already weakened by a series of drought years.

The provision of relief works in the late 1930's and subsequently the demand for local labour during the 1939-45 war were identified as important factors in the establishment of a wage labour force within the Transjordanian economy. This wage labour was dramatically enlarged by the influx of Palestinian refugees in 1948-49 into the highlands of eastern Palestine (the 'West Bank') which were to come under Jordanian administration.

After the 1948 Palestine war the pattern and characteristics of emigration for employment were radically altered and throughout the 1950's and early 1960's overtly political motives joined the economic imperative of maintaining high rates of labour emigration, particularly from the West Bank sub-districts. By 1966 Jordan's 'tradition' as a major supplier of skilled and semi-skilled labour to the Gulf states and her reciprocal dependence on worker remittances, was already well entrenched.[88]

In the following chapter (3) we will trace the subsequent acceleration of emigration for employment in the wake of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, during which labour emigration becomes less a response to crisis than an accepted tenet of economic policy.

Notes

1. For example see: Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980b) Arab Manpower: the crisis of development.

2. Lt. Col. J.C. Pelly (Political Resident in Bahrain, March 1947-51), 'Notes on Jacomb's report', 5.2.1951. PRO, FO 371/91360.

3. Kelly, J.B. (1968) Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880. p. 366.

4. Lt. Col. H.R.P. Dickson (Political Agent in Kuwait, May 1929-February 1936) to Lt. Col. T.C. Fowle (Political Resident at Bushire, July 1932-August 1939), 21.12.1934. IOR, R/15/5/191.

5. Lt. Col. H.V. Biscoe (Political Resident at Bushire, November 1929-July 1932), 'Slavery and the Bahrain pearl industry', report to the Government of India, 18.3.1930. IOR, R/15/3/311.

6. Lt. Col. F.B. Prideaux (Political Resident at Bushire, April 1924-January 1927) to Colonial Office, 29.5.1926. IOR, R/15/1/225.

7. Lt. H. Boyes (H.M.S. Triad) to Lt. Col. C.J. Barrett (Political Resident at Bushire, April 1929-November 1929), 24.8.1929. IOR, R/15/1/226.

8. Lt. Col. P.G. Loch (Political Agent in Bahrain, November 1932-April 1937) to Fowle (Bushire), 19.12.1935. IOR, R/15/1/226. Loch gives the distribution of slaves as: Abu Dhabi 2,000; Dubai 2,500; Sharjah 600; Ajlun 400; Umm al Qaiwan 250; Ras al Khaimah 1,200. He adds that "... slaves having no masters and working in the pearling industry are almost double that number ..." Thus we have an estimate of over 21,000 slaves and indentured divers working the Trucial Coast banks.

9. Cptn. C.G. Prior (Political Agent in Bahrain, April 1949-November 1932) to Biscoe (Bushire), 30.6.1932. IOR, R/15/2/848.

10. Rumaihi, M. (1976) Bahrain: social and political change since the first world war. p. 46.

11. Loch (Bahrain) to Fowle (Bushire), 16.1.1936. IOR, R/15/1/226.

12. Smith (BAPCO) to Loch (Bahrain), 27.4.1936. IOR, R/15/2/1717, and M.T. Audsley (Labour Adviser, BMEO Cairo), 'Report on a visit to Bahrain, January 1949', 22.4.1949. PRO, FO 371/74942.

Growth in employment of non-contract daily rate BAPCO workers 1939-1948

Year	Bahraini	Iraqi	Baluchi	Iranian	Muscati	Saudi	Omani	Others
1939	2097	15	24	312	7	29	10	9
1940	1844	11	21	241	6	24	8	9
1941	1283	8	8	183	5	22	9	7
1942	2204	7	9	272	6	23	9	8
1943	2084	7	7	246	4	18	7	8
1944*	6370	4	8	1000	19	49	8	63
1945	2934	2	12	395	47	31	7	38
1946	3119	2	27	342	149	19	5	18
1947	3776	5	61	496	252	15	4	31
1948	4184	5	48	479	199	13	21	18

* Includes construction labour

Source: M.T. Audsley, April 1949. PRO, FO 371/74942.

13. Cptn. J.B. Howes (Political Officer for the Trucial Coast, 1938-1940) to Fowle (Bushire), 14.1.1939. IOR, R/15/2/603.

14. Fowle (Bushire) to Secretary of State for India, 5.6.1939. IOR, R/15/2/603.

15. Biscoe (Bushire), 18.3.1930. IOR, R/15/3/85, "... it is universally known throughout the Gulf that the British authorities do grant manumissions to any slave applying for it ... the reason that more do not do so is that in the large majority of cases the domestic slave is little worse off than the free man ..." By the end of the 1930's this was clearly no longer the case and the number of manumissions increased rapidly.

16. Jacomb (Political Officer, Doha) to Pelly (Bahrain), 20.1.1951. PRO, FO 371/91360.

17. Smith (BAPCO) to Loch (Bahrain), 24.8.1936. IOR, R/15/2/1717.

18. Audsley (BMEO Cairo), 'Report on a visit to Kuwait'. PRO, FO 371/74942.

19. Evans (Political Agent in Kuwait), 'First economic report on Kuwait', 31.3.1950. PRO, FO 371/82047.

20. For contemporary accounts of the political and economic uncertainty which surrounded Transjordan during this period see: Philby, H. St. John (1924) 'Transjordan'. JRCAS, vol. 11 (4) pp. 296-312, and Peake, F.G. (1939) 'Transjordan'. JRCAS, vol. 26 (3) pp. 375-96.

21. See the quarterly customs and excise reports for 1929/30-1934/35. PRO, FO 371/17880 E5587.

22. The development of the Palestine labour market is comprehensively examined in Taqqu, R.L. (1977) 'Arab labor in Mandatory Palestine, 1920-1948'. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University).

23. In particular the collapse of the Polish currency in 1925 substantially reduced investment in Palestine. In 1927 Jewish emigration from Palestine exceeded the number of immigrants by some 2,000 as employment opportunities shrank with the collapse of the building trade.

24. Antoun, R.T. (1965) 'Conservation and change in the village community: a Jordanian case study.' Human Organization, vol. 24 (1) pp. 4-10.

25. Government of Palestine (1933) Census of Palestine 1931. (Report compiled by E. Mills, Commissioner for Migration and Statistics) see tables xi-xiv.

26. Taqqu, R.L. (1977) op. cit. pp. 53-68, cites the same factors as stimulating internal migration within Palestine away from the central highland areas. Antoun, R.T. (1965) op. cit. cites the collapse of the communal 'musha' landownership system as an additional factor increasing the mobility of households and individuals.

27. Glubb to Colonial Office, 'Monthly report on the administration of the deserts of Transjordan for the month of December 1933'. PRO, FO 371/16860 E1194.

28. Glubb to Colonial Office, 'Monthly situation report for January 1933'. PRO, FO 371/16860 E1459. The conditions of the Transjordanian bedu during this period are discussed in: Epstein, E. (1938) 'The bedouin of Transjordan: their social and economic problems'. JRCAS, vol. 25 (2) pp. 228-36, and, Glubb, J.B. (1938) 'The economic situation of the Transjordan tribes'. JRCAS, vol. 25 (3) pp. 448-59.

29. Glubb to Colonial Office, 'Quarterly situation report for Transjordan, March 1934'. PRO, FO 371/17880 E3669. Section 64 (4) of the Tithe Estimation Regulations (1927) provided for the remission of Tithe where "... the crops have been affected by an act of God preventing profit therefrom ..." See: Seton, C.R.W. (1931) Legislation of Transjordan, 1918-30.

30. Cox (British Resident, Amman) to Colonial Office, 'Monthly situation report for June 1936'. PRO, FO 371/18963 E4201.

31. Notestein, F.W. and Jurkat, E. (1945) 'Population problems of Palestine.' The Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, vol. 23 (4) pp. 307-52.

32. Taqqu, R.L. (1977) op. cit. pp. 66-7.

33. ibid. pp. 62-3.

34. Report of the Committee on 'Conditions of labour at present existing in the port of Jaffa', April 1935. PRO, CO 733/292/75094.

35. Taqqu, R.L. (1977) op. cit. p. 146. The Hauran region, which included north-west Transjordan, and its impoverishment during the late nineteenth century is discussed in Schiler, L.S. (1981) 'The Hauran conflicts of the 1890's: a chapter in the rural history of modern Syria.' IJMES, vol. 13 (4) pp. 159-79.

36. Cox to Colonial Office, 'Quarterly situation report for Transjordan, June 1936'. PRO, FO 371/18963 E6905.

37. 'Monthly situation report for September 1936.' PRO, FO 371/18963 E7012.

38. See Peake, F.G. (1939) op. cit. Despite the 'Non-Transjordan Officials discharge law' of 1929 (see Seton, C.R.W. op. cit.) in 1935-6 only 60% of government officials (including the Arab Legion) were Transjordanian nationals. Of 237 non-Transjordanians over 40% were Palestinians. See Hacker, J.M. (1960). Modern Amman: a social study. Table 3.1, p. 25.

39. 'Monthly situation report for May 1939.' PRO, FO 371/23247 E4696.

40. Government of Palestine (1923) 'Report and general abstracts of the Census of Palestine, 1922.' Compiled by Barron, J.B. and, Government of Palestine (1933) op. cit.

41. See note 39.

42. The Employment Committee estimated a reduction of Palestinian Arab agricultural labour by 57,000 over the period 1940-44. PRO, CO 733/469/76284.

43. See Taqqu, R.L. (1977) op. cit. pp. 159-93.

44. 'Political situation report for November 1941.' PRO, FO 371/31382 E876.

45. 'Political situation report for March 1942.' PRO, FO 371/31382 E1087.

46. See note 44.

47. 'Political situation report for April 1942.' PRO, FO 371/31382 E3394.

48. 'Political situation report for June 1942.' PRO, FO 371/31382 E4452.

49. 'Political situation report for June 1943.' PRO, FO 371/31382 E4678.

50. 'Political situation report for March 1947.' PRO, FO 371/36215 E3048. The IBRD mission to Jordan in 1955 estimated that over 61,000 refugees were unemployed. Furthermore the 1951 Wage Survey conducted by the Ministry of Economy shows the substantial fall in wage levels in the West Bank sub-districts:

Sector	Daily wage rate 1947 (Palestine mils)	1951 (Jordanian fils)
Food production	535	160
Construction	641	250
Transport	739	190

(note that 1 mil = 1 fil). IBRD (1957) The economic development of Jordan.

51. Antoun, R.T. (1979) Low-key politics: Local level leadership and change in the Middle East. p. 24.

52. Official Gazette, no. 1009, 1 February 1950, p. 47.

53. Employment data is derived from Audsley's report on visits made to the Persian Gulf Agencies dated 1.4.1949. PRO, FO 371/74942. See also correspondence between successive BAPCO Managers and the Political Agent in Bahrain over the period March 1936-June 1944. IOR, R/15/2/1717 and 1719.

54. See Evans' (Kuwait) memo to the manager of KOC and AMINCO dated 14.3.1949. IOR, R/15/5/318.

55. In his reply (dated 25.3.1949) to Evans' enquiry concerning their willingness to employ Palestinian labour, William Morris (Aminco, Acting Manager) stated that: "We had not broached this matter ourselves since we had supposed that employment of such individuals would be forbidden by the Political Agreement existing between His Majesty's Government and ourselves ..." The nature of that agreement remains confidential, however the correspondance clearly points to the political control exercised over manpower recruitment.

56. For details of the advantages of Persian labour see Anderson (BAPCO) to Major T. Hickinbotham (Political Agent Bahrain, October 1943-March 1945), 13.6.1944. IOR, R/15/2/1719. The restrictions on employment of Indian manpower are discussed in Fowle (Bushire) to Loch (Bahrain), 31.12.1935 and in Dudley (Protector of Emigrants, Bombay) to Smith (BAPCO), 17.6.1937. IOR, R/15/2/1717.

57. This question is considered in detail below, chapter 4.2.

58. In 1938 Prior (Bushire) wrote to Weightman (Political Agent at Bahrain, October 1937-October 1940) asking for evidence with which to counter the Government of India's claim that Indian interests on the Arab side of the Gulf were diminishing and that there was therefore little justification for the continued expenditure of Indian funds on those Agencies. Prior to Weightman, 17.9.1938, IOR, R/15/2/344. Weightman's reply stressed the increasing employment opportunities for Indians and the resulting flow of remittances and trading opportunities, Weightman to Hay 6.4.1938 and to Prior 18.10.1939. IOR R/15/2/344.

59. Foreign Office to Chancery Baghdad, 5.9.1949. PRO, FO 371/75152 E9114.

60. Chancery Cairo to Foreign Office, 22.9.1949. PRO, FO 371/75152 E11795, and Chancery Baghdad to Foreign Office, 14.7.1949. PRO, FO 371/75152 E9114.

61. Plascov, A. (1981) The Palestinian refugees in Jordan 1948-57. p. 179.

62. Chancery Baghdad to Foreign Office, 14.7.1949. PRO, FO 371/75152 E9114.

63. Shwadran, B. (1958) 'Union of Jordan with Iraq and recoil.' Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 9 (12) pp. 370-93. And: Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Kingdom of Iraq, June 10, 1947. Reprinted in Middle East Journal, vol. 1 (4) pp. 449-51.

64. Plascov, A. (1981) op. cit. p. 46.

65. For an account of economic development in Jordan prior to the 1967 war see Mazur, M.P. (1979) Economic growth and development in Jordan. pp. 17-80, and IBRD (1957) op. cit.

66. Hacker, J.M. (1960) op. cit. p. 64.

67. Department of Statistics (1965) Census of Population and Housing, 1961. vol. 4, p. 87.

68. Despite this Antoun indicates that labour migration (both internal and international, primarily to Beirut and Kuwait) from Kufr al-Ma had increased markedly between 1960 and 1965. The social and economic consequences of labour emigration (despite its relatively limited scale) on the rural sector were clear. In particular he suggests that labour shortages had increased the proportion of land left fallow and that the village's livestock holdings were considerably reduced by the lack of labour available for shepherding. See Antoun, R.T. (1979) op. cit.

69. Internal migration to the East Bank was particularly high from Hebron district. Comparison of the 1952 and 1961 census results shows an absolute fall in the population level by some 4.9% (assuming a rate of natural population increase which was spatially and temporally constant). This is an additional factor in the relatively low level of direct international emigration from Hebron compared to the other West Bank districts. Ministry of National Economy (1953). 1952 Census of Housing: Statistics for administrative divisions and principal towns.

70. Ministry of Social Affairs (1963) Social survey of Amman, 1960. pp. 53-4 and, Hacker, J.M. (1960) op. cit.

pp. 62-4. See also Samha, M.A. (1980) 'Migration of refugees and non-refugees to Amman, 1948-77.' Population Bulletin of ECWA, no. 19, pp. 47-68.

71. See UNRWA (1954) 'A map of the geographic distribution of refugees eligible for UNRWA assistance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', in Plascov, A. (1981) op. cit. appendix 10. Plascov (p. 34) reports a conversation with Sir Alec Kirkbride who recalled that in Karak and Tafila "... they would not have them and very few refugees stopped in the south. They were amost thrown out ..." The 1961 Census suggests that "... many of those reported abroad from Amman district were probably reported by families originally from the West Bank". (Methods Report, p. 88.)

72. Only a small number of 'Jordanians' were recorded in Saudi Arabia (4,217), further only 74.2% came from the West Bank districts (compared to 31,739 in Kuwait of whom 92.2% were from these districts). This may reflect the fact that less than four years earlier, in April 1957, there had been wholesale deportations of Palestinians from Riyadh and Dhahran following the implication of a number of Palestinians in an Egyptian backed plot to assasinate King Saud. After 1961 however it is likely that their employment would have increased in Saudi Arabia following the further deterioration in Saudi-Egyptian relations and the mass expulsion of Egyptian workers in 1961 and 1962. See Holden, D. and Johns, R. (1982) The House of Saud. p. 195 and 221.

73. West Bank emigrants also comprise the majority of long distance, extra-regional, destinations. In particular they account for 88.2% of the 7,506 emigrants recorded as residing in the Americas, primarily Central and South America. Lutfiyya describes the development of an emigration stream to North America from the West Bank during the early years of the present century. The first emigrant to the United States left Baytin in 1903, his success prompted others to follow in rapid succession. An important motive was the avoidance of compulsary military service in the Ottoman army. Lutfiyya also suggests that the movement was organized by a Christian Arab in Ramallah. Lutfiyya, A.M. (1966) Baytin, a Jordanian village: a study of social institutions and social change in a folk community. pp. 122-8.

74. 5.2% of emigrant workers were recorded as agricultural workers. This is surprisingly large given the employment structure of the major destination countries and may reflect a disparity between occupation prior to departure (and therefore that recorded by the remaining relatives) and the subsequent occupation adopted in the country of residence abroad.

75. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1978c) Country case study - Jordan. p. 29.

76. Abu-Lughod, J. (1980) 'Demographic characteristics of the Palestinian population: relevance for planning Palestine Open University.' p. 16.

77. United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. (1949) Final report of the U.N. Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East.

78. See Hagopian, E. and Zahlan, A. (1974) 'Palestine's Arab population: the demography of the Palestinians.' Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 3 (4), pp. 32-73.

79. IBRD (1957) op. cit. p. 10 and pp. 441-4.

80. See Hacker, J.A. (1960) op. cit. pp. 87-8.

81. Department of Statistics (1965) op. cit. vol. 2, table 6.5.

82. Jordan Development Board (1961) Five Year Program for Economic Development, 1962-67. p. 13.

83. Ministry of Social Affairs (1963) op. cit., p. 89.

84. Central Bank of Jordan. Annual Report (various issues). See also Swamy, G. (1981) International migrant workers' remittances: issues and prospects. The multiple regression model developed by Swamy (based on Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia) has shown that the number of migrant workers abroad and their wages explain over 90% of the variation in remittance inflows.

85. 'Jordanian' labour emigration to Kuwait is examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 below.

86. National Planning Council. (n.d.) Three Year Development Plan, 1973-75.

87. Jordan Development Board. (n.d.) Seven Year Program for Economic Development, 1964-70. p. 26.

88. Remittances were approximately equal to, or greater than, merchandise exports (and re-exports) from 1960-66:

Year	Merchandise exports and re-exports	Remittances from Jordanians working abroad
1960	3.95	6.23
1961	5.27	5.24
1962	5.92	6.20
1963	6.56	6.17
1964	8.73	9.28
1965	9.91	9.14
1966	10.40	10.57

All values are in JD. Mn.

Source: Department of Statistics (1971) Statistical Yearbook, 1970, various tables.

Table 2.1

Number of emigrants by sub-district and crude emigration rate, 1961

Sub-district	Number of emigrants: Male	Female	Total	District as % total	Crude emigration rate (per 1000)
1. Hebron	1214	368	1582	2.5	13.4
2. Jenin	4579	1057	5636	8.9	71.2
3. Nablus	8861	2571	11432	18.2	90.7
4. Salfit	1712	279	1991	3.2	84.1
5. Tubas	369	53	422	0.7	20.3
6. Tulkarm	8495	2781	11276	17.9	134.9
7. Bethlehem	2452	834	3286	5.2	60.0
8. Jericho	636	217	853	1.4	13.3
9. Jerusalem					
Urban	2424	1144	3568	5.7	59.0
Rural	1568	344	1912	3.0	41.2
10. Ramallah	6813	1491	8304	13.2	72.9
West Bank Sub-total	39123	11139	50262	79.9	62.5
11. Madaba	160	45	205	0.3	7.4
12. Zarka	968	288	1256	2.0	12.0
13. Ma'an/ Aqaba	131	36	167	0.3	6.2
14. Salt/ Balqa	360	82	442	0.7	6.8
15. Ajlun	137	15	152	0.2	4.5
16. Irbid	1325	341	1666	2.7	17.8
17. Amman					
Urban	4887	1902	6789	10.8	27.5
Rural	150	22	172	0.3	5.0
18. Jarash	70	22	92	0.2	3.9
19. Kura	103	8	111	0.2	4.6
20. Mafraq	190	102	292	0.5	11.5
21. Ramtha	629	24	653	1.0	34.1
22. Bani Kinana	185	95	280	0.4	18.8
23. Shuna Shamalya	108	22	130	0.2	5.9
24. Karak	99	26	125	0.2	16.8
25. Mazaar	13	3	16	-	1.5
26. Tafila	45	8	53	0.1	3.7
East Bank Sub-total	9560	3041	12601	20.1	14.0

Source: Department of Statistics (1962-3) First Census of Population and Housing, November 1961. Interim reports, vols. 2-10, various tables (author's calculations).

Note : Those recorded abroad from scattered tents have been added to the district centre where appropriate.

Table 2.2

Emigration rates for selected towns and rural areas (per 1000 inhabitants), 1961

District of origin	Urban rate of emigration	Rural rate of emigration
West Bank:		
Bethlehem	63.1	54.2
Ramallah	69.3	74.2
Tulkarm	155.2	128.2
Nablus	96.6	86.8
Hebron	32.0	4.6
Jenin	94.6	66.1
Jerusalem	59.0	41.2
East Bank:		
Amman	27.5	5.0
Salt	15.5	3.9
Irbid	27.8	6.8
Zarka	12.1	10.2

Source: As Table 2.1 (Author's calculations)

Table 2.3

Emigration by source and destination, 1961

District	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia	Arab Gulf States	Iraq	Syria	Lebanon	Libya	Egypt	Others*	Total	% Total
Nablus	21,628	1,980	393	1,000	1,106	1,056	124	796	2,674	30,757	48.9
(% district total)	70.3	6.4	1.3	3.3	3.6	3.4	0.4	2.6	8.7	100	
Jerusalem	7,152	877	253	764	375	1,140	167	564	6,631	17,923	28.5
	39.9	4.9	1.4	4.3	2.1	6.4	0.9	3.1	37.0	100	
Hebron	477	273	61	131	115	75	24	234	192	1,582	2.5
	30.2	17.3	3.9	8.3	7.2	4.7	1.5	14.8	12.1	100	
Ajlun	420	309	32	61	723	676	31	160	964	3,376	5.4
	12.4	9.1	1.0	1.8	21.4	20.0	1.0	4.7	28.6	100	
Balqa	82	45	8	25	35	61	3	40	143	442	0.7
	18.6	10.2	1.8	5.7	7.9	13.8	0.6	9.0	32.4	100	
Amman	1,951	613	192	360	1,010	1,295	110	660	2,231	8,422	13.4
	23.2	7.3	2.3	4.3	11.9	15.4	1.3	7.8	26.5	100	
Karak	14	15	5	5	33	25	3	37	57	194	0.3
	7.2	7.7	2.6	2.6	17.0	12.9	1.5	19.1	29.4	100	
Ma'an	15	105	-	10	1	10	-	8	18	167	0.3
	9.0	62.8	-	6.0	0.6	6.0	-	4.2	10.8	100	
Total	31,739	4,217	944	2,356	3,398	4,338	462	2,499	12,910	62,863	100
% total	50.5	6.7	1.5	3.8	5.4	6.9	0.7	4.0	20.5	100	

Source: Department of Statistics (1964) First Census of Population and Housing, November 1961: Final Results. Vol. 1, table 5.2, pp. 316-8. (Author's calculations)

Notes:

78.2% of emigrants to 'other' countries are accounted for by seven destinations:

		District	No.	As % of district total
West Germany	2812	Nablus	1134	(3.7)
		Jerusalem	486	(2.7)
		Amman	702	(8.3)
		Ajlun	388	(11.5)
U.S.A.	2453	Jerusalem	1857	(10.4)
		Amman	326	(3.9)
		Nablus	167	(0.5)
		Ajlun	49	(1.5)
Brazil	2258	Jerusalem	1834	(10.2)
		Nablus	327	(1.1)
Venezuela	976	Jerusalem	628	(3.5)
		Nablus	305	(1.0)
Colombia	724	Jerusalem	645	(3.6)
		Nablus	58	(0.2)
Turkey	623	Ajlun	177	(5.2)
		Amman	176	(2.1)
		Nablus	117	(0.3)
		Jerusalem	77	(0.4)
Austria	246	Amman	81	(1.0)
		Nablus	77	(0.2)
		Ajlun	33	(1.0)

Table 2.4

Emigration rate by education level, 1961

(per 1000 population)

Highest class of education completion	Emigration Rates: Male	Female
Nil completion	30.8	9.6
1-5 years elementary	51.9	17.2
6 years elementary	98.7	38.6
1-4 years secondary	106.8	90.3
5 years secondary	315.3	159.6
1-2 years technical	143.4	119.5
1-3 years University)) 4 years + University)	1260.2	293.5

Source: ibid, table 5.6, pp. 327-8 (Author's calculations)

Table 2.5

Emigrant destinations by educational level, 1961

Highest class of education completion	Destinations: (% distribution) Arab Male	Arab Female	European Male	European Female	Americas Male	Americas Female
Nil completion	23.5	48.0	13.0	22.5	26.0	39.8
1-5 years elementary	22.8	15.8	11.6	11.3	23.8	11.7
6 years elementary	12.4	8.1	7.0	4.4	11.0	8.9
1-4 years secondary	20.2	14.8	18.3	14.2	18.8	17.9
5 years secondary	14.2	9.8	25.0	20.1	9.2	10.2
1-2 years technical	0.6	0.7	0.4	1.5	0.1	0.4
1-3 years University	4.0	1.8	17.7	15.7	5.3	3.8
4+ years University	2.3	1.0	7.0	10.3	5.8	7.3

Source: loc. cit. (Author's calculations)

Table 2.6

Occupational group of emigrants (Arab states only) and non-migrants, 1961

Occupational Group	Emigrants No.	%	Non-migrants No.	%
Professional, technical and related	3,006	11.6	16,029	4.1
Administrative, executive and managerial	190	0.7	2,287	0.6
Clerical	3,668	14.2	15,948	4.1
Sales	1,604	6.2	26,706	6.8
Agricultural workers	1,295	5.0	138,173	35.4
Mining and quarrying	64	0.3	7,752	2.0
Transport and communications	2,722	10.6	21,466	5.5
Craftsmen, production and process labour	11,323	43.8	111,814	28.7
Other workers	1,974	7.6	49,803	12.8
TOTAL	25,846	100.0	389,978	100.0

Source: Department of Statistics (1964) op. cit. Vol. I, table 5.9 and Vol. II, table 6.8 (Author's calculations)

Table 2.7

Occupational structure of emigrant and non-migrant populations, 1961

Occupational Category	Emigrant Population				Non-migrant Population			
	Male		Female		Male		Female	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
A-1	336	1.0	8	0.8	1,089	0.3	38	0.2
A-2	367	1.2	-	-	4,726	1.3	92	0.4
B	2,263	7.1	544	56.8	7,666	2.1	4,759	22.2
C-1	9,051	28.5	83	8.7	100,388	28.1	944	4.4
C-2	5,447	17.1	89	9.3	30,896	8.6	4,896	22.9
D	14,347	45.1	214	24.4	213,145	59.6	10,690	49.9
Total	31,807	100.0	958	100.0	357,910	100.0	21,419	100.0

Source: ibid. Vol. I, table 5.8 and Vol. II, table 6.7 (Author's calculations).

Table 2.8

Emigration rate by occupational category, 1961 (per 1000)

Occupational Category	Male	Female
A-1	314.9	210.5
A-2	77.7	-
B	295.2	114.3
C-1	90.2	87.9
C-2	176.3	18.2
D	73.0	21.9
Total	88.9	44.7

Source: as table 2.7 (Author's calculations)

Table 2.9

Jordan: gross departures and net flows of Jordanian nationals, 1959-66

Year	Departures	Net flow (000's)
1959	86.6	-1.7
1960	134.9	-14.7
1961	150.4	-12.7
1962	205.7	-37.5
1963	186.2	-21.6
1964	213.6	-24.9
1965	278.0	-32.6
1966	343.5	-22.3

Source: Department of Statistics (1969) Statistical Yearbook, 1968, Tables 28-9.

CHAPTER THREE

RECENT PATTERNS OF JORDANIAN LABOUR MIGRATION: ACCELERATION AND RETRENCHMENT, 1967-83

3.1 Preface

3.1.1 In the previous chapter we emphasised that the 1961 Census marks a hiatus in the availability of data concerning Jordanian emigration for employment. Until the 1979 enumeration results are released in full this will remain the case. In this chapter we present a variety of statistical and documentary evidence in an attempt to establish the volume and trends of post-June 1967 international labour flows.

Establishing the level of emigration for employment from a developing country is inevitably fraught with difficulty. In the Jordanian case statistical deficiencies are compounded by the need to define carefully the terms 'Jordanian' and 'Jordan'. An array of ill-defined and contradictory estimates of the number of emigrant workers have been published over the last ten years (see Appendix II). Official calculations made in labour exporting states tend to exaggerate outflows of workers by inflating estimates of clandestine emigration and by including dependants. Jordan is no exception. Apparently high levels of emigration produced in the late 1970's were made to support Crown Prince Hassan's contention that the terms of trade between capital and labour were markedly in the former's favour. Hassan's speech at the 1977 International Labour Conference called for the payment of compensation to the labour-supplying countries and for an agreement to

regulate the flow of labour "... in a manner compatible with the interests of contributing and recipient countries ..."[1]

The majority of unofficial estimates are derived from government sources, their statistical bases are seldom defined nor is the distinction between 'emigrant' and 'emigrant worker' made explicit. More importantly the failure to distinguish between 'Jordanian' and Palestinian sub-populations is a significant constraint since the assumption that all 'Jordanians' had emigrated from the East Bank leads to serious over-estimation of the level of out-migration from, and future return to, the East Bank.

Israeli occupation of the West Bank in June 1967 and Jordan's internal struggle with the fidaiyyun in the period to late 1971, have ensured a continued dearth of demographic data. No full population census was held between 1961 and 1979; the results of the latter remain unavailable in November 1983. In addition the continued influx of population from the Israeli Occupied territories and from Lebanon (particularly in 1975) together with the defective recording of vital statistics make normal demographic estimation techniques subject to a substantial margin of error.[2]

3.1.2 The disparate nature of the available data restricts this analysis to broad estimates rather than the presentation of precise figures. Nevertheless, on the basis of this data we suggest that the period 1967-83 can be sub-divided into three distinct phases:

(i) 1967-73, a period of considerable political, economic and demographic upheaval culminating in the dramatic

oil price increases of the October war, the stimulus to expanded labour flows;

(ii) 1974-78, a boom in Arab manpower demand in the wake of the oil price increases;

(iii) 1979-83, a recession in the international demand for 'Jordanian' manpower.

3.2 Demographic upheaval and political uncertainty; labour migration between the wars, June 1967-October 1973

3.2.1 The occupation of the West Bank by the Israeli Defence Forces in June 1967 resulted in the exodus of an estimated 250,000 Arab refugees to the East Bank of Jordan by December 1967.[3] According to Campbell (1968) this outflow included a disproportionate number of former refugee camp inhabitants and was occupationally selective. Unskilled agricultural labour and the urban unemployed featured large.[4]

Despite the seemingly limited economic opportunities for such manpower on the East Bank and the further displacement of population from the East Jordan Valley during the ensuing border conflict (the War of Attrition, 1968-70) unemployment did not increase dramatically. Indeed some economists, notably Mazur (1979), have argued that the rate of unemployment may have fallen during the short-lived and largely artificial economic recovery of 1968-69.[5] In particular the expansion of the Jordanian armed forces, facilitated by the financial aid agreed at the Khartoum Arab Summit of September 1967, increased employment by more than 28,000 between late 1967 and mid-1970.[6] This increase alone was equivalent to some 40% of the recent manpower influx. Additional employment was generated by a housing

construction boom and by the expansion in public sector employment (civilian).

Equally significant in this minimisation of unemployment was the growth in emigration from the East Bank. Indeed the National Planning Council suggested, in its programme for recovery (1973-75), that the renewed stimulus given to labour emigration was a major economic repercussion of the war.[7] In the three years prior to 1967 average annual net departures of 'Jordanians' were 26,600 (from both parts of the Kingdom). In the three years after 1967 the average annual net departures (from the East Bank only) had risen to over 28,000. Data from the 1970 Kuwait census confirms this increase in the rate of departure from Jordan. During 1967-68 net arrivals of 'Jordanians' in Kuwait amounted to over 57,000 compared to a net inflow in 1966 of only 847 and of 2,300 in 1969.[8]

This increasing rate of emigration was accelerated by the civil conflict of 1970-71 (between the Palestinian resistance movement and the Jordanian military) and by the ensuing sector-wide economic collapse.[9] Arrivals and departures statistics for 1971 are however a poor indication of this movement, distorted as they were by administrative chaos and by the border closures with Iraq (July-October 1971) and Syria (July 1971-November 1972).[10]

As in previous periods the difficulty lies in deriving the number of emigrant workers from these aggregate departure statistics. In 1969 (January-April) the Department of Statistics conducted a survey of departures which indicates the motivation of some 103,974 'temporary'

emigrants.[11] The results of this survey indicate that 25.8% (26,787) of departures can be regarded as emigrant workers (an additional 5.2% were abroad for commercial and official duties). Applying this ratio to the net departures figure for 1967-70 implies that around 6,000 emigrants (net) were leaving for employment each year, compared to only 3,000-4,000 in the 1961-66 period (table 3.1). Adding this to the estimated 71,000 working abroad on the eve of the June 1967 war brings the 1970 total up to circa 83,000.[12] Thus by 1970 up to 20% of the estimated East Bank labour supply (i.e. including emigrant workers) of 423,000 were already working abroad.[13]

Although the geographical distribution of 'Jordanian' emigrant workers was still dominated by Kuwait that dominance was giving way with the growth in employment opportunities in other oil-rich states, particularly in Saudi Arabia. The 1970 Kuwait census does not distinguish between 'Jordanians' and Palestinians, simply providing an aggregate economically active population of 41,415. Assuming that the relative distribution in the 1975 census had prevailed in 1970 then 82.7% of this aggregate would have been 'Jordanians' (i.e. including West Bankers). This would imply a fall in Kuwait's share of the emigrant 'Jordanian' population from 63.3% in 1965 to 41.3% in 1970.

Earlier (Chapter 2.5.2) it was shown that although the majority of emigrants in 1961 held de jure Jordanian citizenship they were drawn primarily from the Palestinian population of the West Bank. This raises a problem in the post-1967 period since figures which refer to 'Jordanians' abroad do not necessarily reflect emigration

from the East Bank. It is argued here that this problem does not assume a particular importance until after the 1967-72 period. The growth in emigration over 1967-72 largely involved former West Bank inhabitants and was not a real withdrawal of manpower from the East Bank labour market. In the post-1972 period however emigration does lead to a progressive withdrawal from that labour supply. Thus after 1972 it is increasingly important to distinguish East Bank emigrants from the aggregate 'Jordanians and Palestinians' abroad.

Between 1970 and 1973 it is likely that the rate of emigration for employment remained relatively static as net departures data suggest. Unfortunately there is no other data source with which to confirm or refute this.

3.2.2 The fourth Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 had a dramatic effect on the Jordanian economy and brought migration for employment to the fore in Jordanian and international economic planning. The period 1974-83 can be sub-divided into two distinct phases:

(i) 1974-78, a continuous and rapid expansion in the rate of Jordanian labour emigration occurred which was consistent with international trends;

(ii) 1979-83, the late 1970's and early 1980's have witnessed a slump in emigration for employment and the waning of Jordan's image as a supplier of manpower.

The remainder of this chapter will consider these two periods in some detail.

3.3 The boom in emigration for employment, 1974-78

3.3.1 The dramatic increases in world oil prices which

occurred between October 1973 and January 1975 were to stimulate a rapid escalation in the rate of emigration for employment from the East Bank. Regional labour demands surged upward as oil revenues were increasingly disbursed into capital investment projects with a high construction content in the immediate post 1973-74 years. The major increase, by 156%, in Saudi public expenditure came in 1974/5-1975/6 (table 3.2) when investment reached Saudi Riyals (SR) 81.8 Bn. compared to SR. 18.0 Bn. in 1973/4. Similarly in Kuwait government expenditure rose from Kuwaiti Dinars (KD.) 53.6 Bn. in 1973/4 to KD. 93.7 in 1974/5. The rapidity of this increase in capital expenditure and its coincidence throughout the Arab Gulf states was responsible for the enormous growth in regional labour demands. At the same time the withdrawal of a significant proportion of the traditional labour supply from Iran and Iraq (because of the oil-engendered labour demands in their domestic economies), increased the pressure on the remaining Arab labour exporters.[14]

3.3.2 Reference to departures figures from the East Bank shows that net outflow increased from 34,500 in 1972 to 100,900 in 1977. The main increase in the level of emigration came in 1975-76, parallel with the lag in oil revenue disbursements, and peaking at 754,800 departures in 1977 (table 3.3). Determining an appropriate ratio of emigrant workers to apply to these gross departure figures is problematic (see below section 3.3.3).

More direct evidence of an expansion in the departure of skilled and semi-skilled manpower is seen in

the number of trade proficiency certificates issued to prospective emigrants by the Ministry of Labour (Amman) as a testimony of their skill level. Between 1973 and 1975 the number of certificates issued increased by 186% from 1,685 to 4,820, remaining at this level until 1978 (table 3.4). Certifications provide only a partial illustration of the level of worker emigration since, by their very nature, they were not sought by unskilled workers nor by professional manpower (or even by all skilled workers).

3.3.3 The International Migration Project (IMP) attempted to identify the number of emigrant workers from the East Bank in 1975 on the basis of extant documentary evidence in the region's labour importing states. Having established an estimate for 'Jordanians and Palestinians' working abroad, of 264,717, it was then necessary to extract the proportion of that total which derived from the East Bank labour market. This problem was apparently resolved by assuming the Ministry of Labour's estimate of 150,000 'Jordanians' abroad in 1977 to be substantively correct and equally applicable to 1975, then 57% of the 'Jordanians and Palestinians' working abroad were from the East Bank.[15]

There are a number of flaws in this procedure. Firstly, it is internally inconsistent. The same Ministry of Labour estimate is rejected in the researchers discussion of the geographic distribution of 'Jordanian' emigrant workers because "... of the uncertainty regarding its derivation".[16] Secondly, and more importantly, the

assumption that East Bank emigrants (whether Jordanian or Palestinian) can be derived from an estimate which refers to 'Jordanians' is erroneous since both Jordanians and Palestinians (West Bank and East Bank residents) have had the option of de jure Jordanian citizenship since 1949.[17] Earlier we established that the majority of 'Jordanians' in Kuwait enumerated by the Jordanian census of November 1961 had originated from West Bank sub-districts. The 1975 Kuwait census, which purports to distinguish between Jordanian and Palestinian sub-populations, indicates that almost 85% of the 204,170 'Jordanians and Palestinians' held de jure Jordanian citizenship. Clearly then an estimate of 'Jordanians' (de jure) working abroad, cannot be used to determine out-migration from the East Bank population. This confusion between de jure citizenship and actual place of origin would imply that Birks and Sinclair have overestimated East Bank emigration for 1975. This over-estimate led them to conclude that the rate of emigration for employment had peaked in 1975 (and that 46% of the modern non-farm civilian sector workforce were working abroad).[18] Furthermore, the assumption that the rate of emigration had already peaked enabled them to claim that Anani's estimate for 1977 was appropriate to the 1975 figure which they required.

Finally there is the question of reliance on Ministry of Labour estimates which are seldom well defined. Anani's estimate (1977) referred simply to 'Jordanians' working abroad, Birks and Sinclair assume that this implies an East Bank origin (whether Jordanian or Palestinian).

However such an inferrence is rejected by the Ministry of Labour themselves. In their discussion of labour emigration Anani and Jaber (1980) state that estimates of 'Jordanian' manpower abroad must be based on the population of both the East and West Bank. The same report criticizes the International Migration Project for confining its estimate to the East Bank and argues that the assumption that 57% of 'Jordanians and Palestinians' abroad were Jordanian (East Bank) was arbitrary, thus ignoring Birks and Sinclair's assertion that it had been based on Anani's own estimate.[19]

Ministry of Labour estimates of emigrant workers are far from consistent. In 1976 the then Minister of Labour (Issam Ajlouni) suggested that there had been 300,000 'Jordanian citizens' working abroad in the previous year.[20] In 1977 however the Ministry's under-secretary (Jawad Anani) refuted this by announcing that there were 150,000 'Jordanians' working abroad. Further, the Ministry's recent report (1980) ignores both previous estimates and gives credence to an estimate made by Hussein Yahya that 75% (198,400) of 'Jordanians and Palestinians' working abroad were de jure Jordanian citizens and that 143,200 of this sub-total derived from the East Bank.[21]

Later (section 3.3.5) we will examine a method of estimating net East Bank labour emigration using preliminary results from the November 1979 census which will avoid inferences regarding citizenship. In the meantime a benchmark estimate for the number of East Bank labourers abroad in 1975 is still required.

Despite our criticism of the International Migration Project's detailed assumptions, their estimate of the scale of labour migration from the East Bank conforms with other available evidence. Arrival and departures statistics show a net outflow over the period 1970-75 of 173,500. Applying an appropriate crude participation rate to this net outflow enables an estimate of net worker outflows to be calculated. Three estimates of the crude participation rate amongst 'Jordanian and Palestinian' populations abroad are available from the censuses of Kuwait (April 1975), Saudi Arabia (1974) and the United Arab Emirates (December 1975), of 23.0%, 27.7% and 44.3% respectively. The Saudi estimate can be rejected since its utility is impaired by considerable imperfections in the enumeration.[22] The Kuwait figure is also unlikely to be representative of the overall 'Jordanian' community because of the long history and special character of that immigration (see Chapter 4). Thus a crude participation rate midway between these two estimates (the UAE figure being more representative of Jordanian and Palestinian communities in the other recent labour importing countries, Libya, Qatar and Oman) of 35.5% is adopted here. This implies a net worker emigration from the East Bank between 1970 and 1975 of 58,000. Adding this to our previous estimate of emigrant workers in 1970 provides a total emigrant workforce of 141,000 by 1975. A similar estimate, 139,000 is calculated by the World Bank on the basis of data from the labour importers.[23]

The relative conformity between these independent estimates suggests that the number of emigrant workers

from the East Bank in 1975 lay in the range of 135-150,000. Comparing this with our previous 83,000 in 1970 implies an increase of between 47,000 and 67,000, that is a net emigration of circa 9,500-13,500 per annum.

3.3.4 The increased rate of emigration in the early and mid 1970's was accompanied by changes in the pattern of emigrant destinations. The dominance of Kuwait throughout the earlier history of 'Jordanian' emigration to the Peninsula up to the late 1960's gave way as demand from Saudi Arabia and the lower Gulf States increased.

Four independent sources have estimated the geographical distribution of 'Jordanians' in 1975 (table 3.5). The Multi-Purpose Household Survey (MPHS) January-April 1975 surveyed 2,850 households (with a population of 17,373) of whom some 3,436 (19.8%) were recorded as abroad.[24] Unfortunately the sample structure was biased towards those aged 20-29 (68.1% of the sample) and as a result an over-large proportion (53.5%) of those recorded as resident abroad were so for educational purposes. The source does not provide disaggregated statistics on those abroad by reason of absence by destination. The distribution presented here has been obtained by extracting those abroad in other Arab states (51.8% of the total) and then removing from that total those resident in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq since these accounted for 96% of Jordanian students in other Arab states in 1974-75.[25] The distribution of the remaining 1,017 emigrants among the main labour importing states is still at variance with estimates produced by the Ministry of Labour and by the International Migration Project for the same year. In particular the

MPHS survey appears to give undue prominence to the UAE and Libya as destinations. This variance may result from the fact that the MPHS was conducted on a household basis and therefore ignores cases where the entire family is absent. Such a situation is least likely in the late labour importers such as Libya and the UAE.

The remaining distributions are similar, showing the dominance of the Saudi labour market; its share of 'Jordanians' ranging from 50% to 66%. 'Jordanian' labour emigration was clearly dominated by two destinations, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which together accounted for between 75 and 84% of total emigrant workers. Only a small proportion, from 5.5 to 7.3% were attracted to the lower Gulf.[26]

3.3.5 Estimates of the level of East Bank labour emigration in the post 1975 period have even less accuracy than those for 1975 since few, if any, are based on official statistics. The majority of estimates (Appendix II) simply extrapolate from 1975 at various assumed growth rates. In preparing its estimates for the current Five Year Plan (1981-85) the Manpower Planning Section (MPS) of the National Planning Council assumed that emigration had continued at an annual rate of 10,000 to 12,000 throughout the late 1970's (and projected a rate of 8-10,000 over the plan period).[27] The Ministry of Labour estimate that in 1980 there were 305,400 'Jordanian citizens' working abroad, of whom 261,500 were in the Arab labour importing countries. Neither the basis for this estimate nor the proportion deriving from the East Bank are stated.[28]

Preliminary results released from the November 1979 Census of Population and Housing provide a basis for estimating more accurately the volume of labour emigration from the East Bank over the period 1975-80 using a residual approach.

The 1975 East Bank population has been estimated at 1,810,500 on the basis of a backcast from the 1979 census result.[29] This 1975 population includes an unknown number of non-Jordanian immigrant workers. The 1975 Labour Force Census enumerated 2,228 non-Jordanian workers, however this census did not cover the agricultural sector.[30] In addition an estimate made in Cairo suggests that there were 5,000 Egyptians working in Jordan in 1975, compared to the 280 recorded in the census.[31] On this basis it is suggested that there were perhaps 6,500-7,000 non-Jordanians working in Jordan which, with a high crude participation rate, suggests a total non-Jordanian population of around 7,500.[32] Removing the immigrant element from the population total provides a base year (Jordanian) population of 1,803,000. Assuming conditions of nil net migration then natural increase at the prevailing rate (3.9%) over four years would have increased the 'Jordanian' component of the population to 2,102,200 by 1979.[33]

Preliminary results from the 1979 Census indicate an East Bank population of 2,147,100, however this includes a (by now) substantial non-Jordanian element which must be deducted. During 1979 the Ministry of Labour issued some 26,415 work permits (first time issues and renewals)

to immigrants, however it was recognized that a majority of immigrants were working clandestinely. In 1980 when the Ministry announced an amnesty period for immigrant workers before a tightening of regulations, the number registering (over 50,000) indicated that only 35% had been holding work permits.[34] Applying this ratio to the 1979 official work permit issues suggests that there had been 75,450 non-Jordanians in employment. This would accord with the Ministry's estimate that there were at least 60,000 foreign workers by 1978.[35] In addition however there were a large number of unregistered Syrians. Since Syrians are exempted from the usual residence regulations they were not compelled to apply for such permits in 1980. The Ministry of Labour estimates that there were up to 30,000 Syrians working in Jordan in 1979.[36] Thus the total economically active non-Jordanian population was circa 105,450. This must be adjusted to include resident dependants. Evidence from the East Jordan Valley indicates a crude participation rate of 79%.[37] This requires a downward revision since only unskilled migrants (with the lowest propensity for dependant accompaniment) were recorded in the region. Despite this the rate remains high (compared for example to the Syrian or Egyptian populations in Kuwait in 1975) at 65%.[38] Applying this ratio to the non-Jordanian working population indicates that the total non-Jordanian population in 1979 was approximately 163,300 (table 3.6).

Comparison of the net 'Jordanian' population in 1979 of 1,983,800 with the expected result of 2,101,200

indicates a deficit of 117,400 in the East Bank population, a figure which accords well with the recorded net departure figure of 119,400 (December 1975-November 1979). The number of emigrant workers must be derived from this. An increase in the crude participation rate for East Bank emigrants, over the 1975 estimate (33.5%), would be justified since in the mid and late 1970's it became increasingly difficult for dependants to accompany emigrant workers in the labour importing countries. Kirwan (1982) suggests that a rate of 42% applied to Jordanian emigrants in the late 1970's.[39] This implies that there were between 50,000 and 51,000 emigrant workers, that is an annual outflow of circa 12,000 to 13,000 per annum over the period 1975-79.[40]

The World Bank project (Serageldin et al., 1983) predicted that the number of 'Jordanians' working abroad would increase by 72,100 over the period 1975-80. Of this total it was assumed however that 23% would be generated by the already emigrant population (see Chapter 4.4). Thus net worker emigration from the East Bank alone would have been 55,500, a rate of emigration which is confirmed by the evidence presented here.

3.3.6 The pattern of emigrant destinations shows further changes in the 1974-80 period. An increasing bias towards Saudi Arabia has been noted by the Ministry of Labour. According to Anani and Jaber (1980): "In the last five years about 75% of the additional outflow of Jordanians went to Saudi Arabia."[41] The recently completed Royal Scientific Society (RSS) survey of current and return

migrant households in Amman (conducted in mid-1980) confirms this changing pattern of migrant destinations in the late 1970's. The distribution of 'current' migrants from the survey (table 3.7) indicates that almost 60% were in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore the data reveals a continued decline in the importance of the Kuwait labour market as a destination for 'Jordanian' workers. The latter accounted for only 13.1% of current (1980) migrants compared to 16.1% of returnees (note that 59.8% of returnees had returned since 1974).[42] This would seem to confirm Al-Moosa and McLachlan's (1982) contention that the standing of Kuwait compared with other labour importers, in terms of perceived net gains available to immigrant workers, had declined from the late 1970's. They suggest that in 1982: "... Kuwait offered a less rewarding situation than the United Arab Emirates, and that in consequence there was movement of selected grades of skilled employees from Kuwait to the UAE." In addition they report that: "... Kuwait was failing to attract workers of adequate quality by 1981." Problems of rising property rents were likely to affect 'Jordanians' most seriously because of their low crude participation rate in Kuwait and the fact that it was family accommodation which was most affected by rising rentals.[43] The RSS survey also indicates the increasing proportion of East Bank emigrants working in the UAE, which accounted for 14.4% of current migrants (and 11.5% of returnees) compared with between 5% and 7% indicated previously for 1975.[44]

3.4 The recession in emigration for employment, 1979-83

3.4.1 The previous section has shown that, in aggregate, emigration for employment over the period 1975-79 continued at a rate of circa 12,000 per annum. Substantive evidence suggests however that in the later years of this period, and in the early 1980's, there has been a significant and rapid reduction in the rate of labour emigration. In a report to USAID in 1979 McClelland argued that an increase in the rate of return migration among migrant workers was imminent: "... it appears that the total number of Jordanian workers in the Gulf states has probably levelled off and may very likely be declining ..."[45] Indeed crude arrivals and departures data indicate a net inflow to the East Bank of 185,800 'Jordanians' between 1978 and 1982. Trends in crude arrivals/departures statistics may conceal contrary patterns for specific sub-populations, nevertheless when reviewed in combination with other available evidence this does suggest a real decline in emigration for employment. Supporting evidence comes from trade proficiency certification issues presented previously (table 3.4) which show a 40% reduction during the period 1978-81.

Additionally a decline in the number of Jordanian emigrant workers leaving is shown by the Ministry of Labour's issues of work visas to those seeking employment in Saudi Arabia. This source indicates a 66.7% decline in work visa issues over the period 1979-82 (table 3.8).[46] Similarly in Kuwait the number of 'Jordanians' receiving new work permits has fallen by 64%, 1977-81 (see Chapter 5.2).

These falling levels of work permit issues have occurred over a period in which labour importing countries have tightened up on visa and work permit regulations; it is therefore most unlikely that such trends reflect any increase in clandestine migration levels.[47]

The recently completed RSS survey of migrant and returnee households conducted in Amman during 1980 provides a basis on which the annual level of 'Jordanian' labour migration can be based in the post-1979 period. This survey has shown the distribution of current emigrants to be: 59.2% in Saudi Arabia; 14.4% in the UAE and 13.1% in Kuwait. Ministry of Labour data on the 'intended' destinations of those applying for trade proficiency certificates confirm the predominance of Saudi Arabia which accounted for 66.9% in 1980 and 58.2% in 1981.[48] Using the RSS distribution and the known level of emigration to Saudi Arabia (from the work permit issues in Jordan) the scale of East Bank manpower exports can be guaged. The results of this exercise indicate a substantial collapse in the rate and volume of East Bank labour emigration from 8,950 in 1980 to only 4,100 in 1982 (table 3.8).[49] Such a collapse is particularly significant given that the National Planning Council (NPC) had projected a stable level of 8-10,000 emigrants for the Five Year Plan period (1981-85). In addition it was contrary to the Ministry of Labour's expectations. In May 1981 Jawad Anani (Minister of Labour) stated that: "The number of migrant workers to the peninsula is expected to <u>increase</u> from the 1980 level ..." (emphasis added).[50]

3.4.2 In addition to the changes in the pattern and volume of East Bank emigration over the period 1975-82 discussed in the preceding sections, available evidence points to important developments in the occupational structure of emigrant workers. Not surprisingly such occupational data is, at best, fragmentary. Nevertheless crude occupational data on emigrants to Saudi Arabia is available (1978-81) from Ministry of Labour files. Prior to that however it will be necessary to rely on the MPHS results for 1975. Although as a household survey this is biased against professional and higher skill manpower (since they have greater opportunities to enable dependants to accompany them, thus removing the entire household from the survey) this will not be a significant constraint in the current context since the RSS (1980) survey with which it will be compared was made on the same basis.

The occupational characteristics of East Bank emigrants in 1975 and 1980 as ascertained from these two surveys are compared on table 3.9. It is clear that emigration has become increasingly skill selective. The proportion of emigrants in the professional and technical manpower category had increased to 40.6% in 1980 from the already high level of 31.5% in 1975. At the same time unskilled labour (using occupational categories 7/8/9 as a surrogate) has fallen from 51.0% in 1975 to 27.7% in 1980. This trend is confirmed by comparison of the 1980 data for current emigrant workers and returnees. This indicates that unskilled manpower forms a much higher proportion of returned workers (39.2%) than of current

emigrants (27.7%). At the same time the proportion of professional and technical manpower is significantly higher among current emigrants (40.6%) than among returnees (21.2%). A more detailed breakdown of occupational groups in the 1980 survey is provided by table 3.10.

This evidence of greater skill selectivity is further substantiated by Ministry of Labour data on the occupations of those emigrants going to Saudi Arabia over the four year period 1978-81 (table 3.11). Professional and technical manpower has increased both its relative and absolute share, from 8.7% in 1978 to 24.7% in 1981 (395 to 737 emigrants). A further increase occurred in the administrative manpower category (growing from 1.9% to 7.3%). Concomitantly unskilled and semi-skilled (manual) workers have declined by 61% from 3,314 to 1,287, accounting for only 43.2% of emigrants in 1981 compared to 73.3% in 1978.

3.4.3 It is clear from this evidence that, as the level of 'Jordanian' emigration has been falling since the late 1970's, the decline has focussed primarily at the unskilled and semi-skilled levels while skilled and professional manpower has maintained or increased its absolute (and relative) share. Data from the RSS survey concerning the educational attainment of current emigrants and returnees substantiates this hypothesis. Among the latter some 37.7% had an educational standard of preparatory or less (including 10.7% illiterates) compared to 28.3% of current emigrants at this level (and only 2.7% illiterate). It is clear therefore that unskilled and relatively ill-educated

'Jordanians' have found increasing difficulty in penetrating the international labour market. The factors behind this falling regional demand for 'Jordanian' manpower will be explored below (Chapter 5) together with its implications for the domestic labour market (Chapter 7 and 8).

3.5 Conclusion: international migration for employment, the rise and fall of a Jordanian tradition

In the previous chapter (2) we emphasised that emigration for employment had already assumed the prominence of a 'tradition' in the Jordanian economy by the early 1960's. As such, increases in the rate of emigration were regarded by successive Jordanian administrations (as by their Tansjordanian predecessors) as an expedient means of reducing the labour surpluses which seemed an inevitable accompaniment to repeated economic and political crises. This traditional 'beneficial' view of emigration for employment became further entrenched during the multiple crises of the years 1967-71 which had left Jordan politically isolated and economically vulnerable.

During the mid-1970's the surge in labour demand among the oil-rich states of the Arab Gulf and the Peninsula, precipitated an even greater commitment to emigration for employment as the pattern of migration, and the occupational structure of the emigrant population, diversified. This commitment was consummated by the growing return of workers' remittances and by the continued dependence on these same labour importing countries for economic aid.

By the late 1970's however the scale of labour

emigration had become such that Jordan began to experience severe domestic labour shortages. Indeed our estimate of net labour outflow (of over 50,000) during the 1976-80 period represents a loss of more than 35% of the expected growth in domestic labour supply.[51] Emigration for employment rather than being a response to crisis was becoming a crisis in itself. (In part III we will examine the nature of this crisis and the policy response to it.)

The concomitant growth in domestic labour requirement and primary labour exports were the catalyst for a secondary migration stream which directed non-Jordanian labour into Jordan.[52] In the final section of this chapter we have identified a recession in 'Jordanian' labour emigration during the early 1980's and a narrowing in the occupational range of emigrant workers. Despite this recession, secondary labour immigration to Jordan has continued to burgeon.

The convergence of a slump in primary labour exports and the continued growth in secondary labour immigration suggest that Jordan may soon be faced with the need to revise current social, economic and ultimately political strategies. Developments over the last fifty years in Jordan's political economy suggest that a solution to such a slump will not be so readily available as in the 1930's.

In the following two chapters (4 and 5) we will examine in detail a number of the themes introduced here through a case study of 'Jordanian' labour in Kuwait. The first of these chapters concerns the establishment of that migration stream and the role of 'Jordanians' in the Kuwait labour market in the period to 1975.

Notes

1. ILO (1978) International Labour Conference, 63rd Session, Geneva 1977 : Record of Proceedings. pp. 14/1-5.

2. Department of Statistics (1978) Statistical Yearbook, 1977. Arrivals and departures data show a net inflow of 23,376 Lebanese in 1975-76 compared to 4,573 in 1973-74.
On the accuracy of vital statistics see:
Westinghouse Health Systems (1977) National health planning in Jordan phase two : health policy strategy. Appendix A.

3. Abu-Lughod, J. (1980) 'Demographic characteristics of the Palestinian population: relevance for planning Palestine Open University.' pp. 24-5. The High Commission for Refugees had recorded 200,000 arrivals by August 1967.

4. Dodd, P. and Barakat, H. (1968) River without bridges: a study of the exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab refugees. Campbell, D.R. (1968) 'Jordan: the economics of survival.' Journal of International Affairs, vol. 23(2) pp. 121-3.

5. Mazur, M.P. (1979) Economic growth and development in Jordan. pp. 82-3.

6. The Institute for Strategic Studies (1967) The Military Balance 1967-8. pp. 35 and 45.

7. National Planning Council (n.d.) The Three Year Development Plan 1973-75. See Chapter 18.

8. See below Chapter 4.4.

9. Axelrod, L.W. (1978) 'Tribesmen in uniform: the demise of the Fidaiyyun in Jordan, 1970-71.' Muslim World, vol. 68(1) pp. 25-45.

10. Arab Report and Record (1977) pp. 376 and 409.

11. Kanovsky, E. (1976) Economic development of Jordan. pp. 91-131.

12. This is smaller than the estimate made for the early 1970's by Pennisi, G. (1981) Development, manpower and migration in the Red Sea region. However the latter includes an estimate (not stated) of those leaving clandestinely. Pennisi also suggests that his estimate (100,000) has a margin of error of plus or minus 20%.

13. Farrag, A.M. (1975) 'Migration between Arab countries.' Estimates 125,327 Jordanians and Palestinians working abroad in 1970, however the sources used for this estimate were of varying dates (1968-75) and include a number of

crude estimates, most notably for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In the latter Farrag suggested that there were 6,640 workers from each of four nationalities, Omanis, Syrians, Palestinians and Jordanians. The total also includes Palestinian (8,100) 'migrant workers' in Lebanon.

14. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980a) International migration and development in the Arab region. p. 29.

15. Estimate made by the then Under-Secretary for Labour, Jawad Anani (1977) 'Jordan plugs the brain drain, tackles immigration problems.' The Middle East, no. 32 (June) pp. 99-100.

16. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980a) op. cit. pp. 47-8.

17. Abu-Lughod, J. (1980) op. cit. takes the extreme view that all 'Jordanians and Palestinians' recorded in the labour importing states were of Palestinian origin. She assumes that any Jordanian (East Bank) emigrants would be negated by Palestinians who were recorded as Syrian and Lebanese citizens. This would effectively deny indigenous Jordanian labour migration from the East Bank, a conclusion which cannot be supported.

18. In later research papers Birks and Sinclair have revised their estimate of 'Jordanian and Palestinian' migrant workers downward by 50,000 to 214,717. See Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1982c) 'The socio-economic determinants of intra-regional migration.' Table 2, p. 737. However, they do not indicate the proportion of this reduction accounted for by the 'Jordanian' or East Bank component. With regard to the distribution of Jordanian and Palestinian workers abroad this reduction is aimed solely at Saudi Arabia.

19. Anani, J. and Jaber, T.A. (1980) 'Jordan's experience and policies in the field of reverse transfer of technology.' p. 12.

20. MEED, vol. 20 (40) 1 October 1976, p. 16. 'Figures of expatriate labour released.'

21. Yahya, H.A. (1980) 'Human capital migration from labour rich Arab states to oil rich Arab states and the consequences for the Jordanian economy.' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Oklahoma State University.) Using an estimate of 'Jordanian and Palestinian' migrant workers derived from Birks and Sinclair (but increased to 266,000) Yahya achieves the division between 'Jordanian' and Palestinian workers on the basis of the estimated distribution of the 'Jordanian' and Palestinian population in the source locations. He then assumes that since 21% of the source population resides on the West Bank then they must contribute 21% of emigrant

workers. Summing East and West Bank totals he suggests that 75% of 'Jordanians and Palestinians' abroad were 'Jordanians'. Yahya thus makes the untenable assumption that rates of labour emigration were constant under differing economic, political and demographic regimes. In addition he has used the un-adjusted (pre-1979) estimate of the East Bank population and has not accounted for the presence of non-Jordanians.

Source Location	Source Population (000's)	% distribution	Emigrant workers (000's)	% distribution
East Bank	1,900.0	54.0	143.3	54.0
West Bank	730.0	21.0	55.1	21.0
Gaza Strip	433.0	12.0	32.7	12.0
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon	463.0	13.0	34.9	13.0
Total	3,526.0	100.0	266.0	100.0

Source: based on Yahya, H.A. (1980) op. cit. table 4, p. 23.

22. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1979d) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Libyan Arab Jamahirya: the key countries of employment. pp. 9-15.

23. Serageldin, I. et al. (1983) Manpower and international labour migration in the Middle East and North Africa. Table 1.2, p. 7.

24. Department of Statistics. (1976) The Multi-Purpose Household Survey (Jordanians Abroad) January-April 1975.

25. Ministry of Education, (1975) The Statistical Educational Yearbook, 1974-75. pp. 292-3.

26. Data on the UAE is only available for the period 1975-78:

Year	No. of work permits issued
1975	127,938
1976	239,555
1977	226,509
1978	164,401

Source: Abu Dhabi, Department of Planning (1980) UAE Statistical Yearbook 1979. Table 32 (Arabic).

However work permit issues for Abu Dhabi alone are available from 1974 and illustrate the later peak in labour inflows to the lower Gulf. Note that these figures include an unknown number of renewed work permits.

Year	No. of work permits issued
1974	41,491
1975	46,439
1976	42,383
1977	77,646
1978	132,059
1979	112,539
1980	105,700
1981	122,874

Source: ibid. (1982) UAE Statistical Yearbook 1982. Table 17 (Arabic).

27. Manpower Planning Section, National Planning Council (1981) 'Supply and demand of labour to 1985'. p. 8 (Arabic).

28. Anani, J. and Jaber, T.A. (1980) op. cit. p. 13 and table 5.

29. Department of Statistics (1980) Preliminary results of the census of population and housing, November 1979. (Arabic).

30. idem. (1975) Results of the Labour Force Census, 1975. Table 20, p. 161.

31. See Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1978c) Country case study - Jordan. p. 31.

32. For a detailed consideration of immigrant labour in Jordan see Chapters 8 and 9 below.
Official estimates of the inflow differ significantly (as do those for outflow) even within the Ministry of Labour. Thus, according to the Minister of Labour, Issam Ajlouni there were in 1976 ".., about 5,000 foreign workers in Jordan". MEED, vol. 20 (40) 1 October 1976, p. 16. In contrast the Under-Secretary, Jawad Anani (1977) in an unpublished paper, 'The labour situation in Jordan', indicates that there were "... about 25 thousand non-Jordanians employed in Jordan in 1975. That figure escalated to about 60 thousand in 1976 ..." p. 3.

33. Department of Statistics (1979) Jordan Fertility Survey, 1976. (Volume I, Principal Report). See also Abu-Jaber, K. et al. (1979) 'Levels and trends of fertility and mortality in Jordan'.

34. MEED, vol. 24 (32) 8 August 1980, p. 22; (34) 22 August 1980, p. 27; (37) 12 September 1980, p. 41.

35. MEED, vol. 24, 'Special Report: Jordan'. p. 29.

36. Estimate by Mhmd. Abdul Hadi, Director of Research (to 1982) at the Ministry of Labour, personal communication March 1980. This is an increase on the Ministry's estimate of 20,000 reported by The Middle East, no. 32 (June 1977) p. 100.

37. See chapter 9 below for a case study of immigration to the Jordan valley.

38. See below Chapter 8.4.

39. Kirwan, F. (1982) 'Labour exporting in the Middle-East: the Jordanian experience.' Development and Change, vol. 13 (1), pp. 63-89.

40. Note that Jordan has received an increasing number of immigrants from the Occupied West Bank over the last five years. Israeli statistics indicate an increase in net outflow to Jordan:

Year	Net outflow
1976	-16,253
1977	-11,922
1978	-14,696
1979	-17,400
1980	-24,152

Source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (1976) Quarterly Statistics of the Administered Territories. vol. 5 (4), table A/2 (and subsequent volumes).

Since it is not permitted to leave the West Bank with school age children a high proportion of the net outflow must be of single male workers some of whom may subsequently contribute to the East Bank outflow.

41. Anani, J. and Jaber, T.A. (1980) op. cit., p. 14.

42. Royal Scientific Society (Forthcoming, 1984) 'Worker migration abroad: socio-economic implications for households in Jordan.' Based on a sample survey of 1,800 households from five income strata conducted in mid 1980. Preliminary results were provided by Dr. Tariq at-Tell, Economics Research Department, November 1981 and January 1983.

Samha's survey (1977) of migrant households in Amman (1,355) captured some 136 'return' migrant households of whom 41% had resided in Kuwait and 19% in Saudi Arabia. Samha's survey also shows that over 90% of return migrants in Amman had not been born in the city, an indication that return migration may contribute to urban growth in general and to primate city growth in particular. Samha, M. (1979) 'Migration to Amman: patterns of movement and population structure.' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham.) Tables 4.2 and 5.10.

43. Al-Moosa, A. and McLachlan, K.S. (1982) 'Wage patterns among the foreign labour force in Kuwait.' The Arab Gulf Journal, vol. 2 (2), pp. 55-66.

Saudi Arabia imposed restrictions on families from January 1978, new regulations sought to restrict the entry of dependents to those of specific professional occupations and those who earnt more than SR. 4,000 per annum. See Arab News, 18 January 1978, p. 4 and 30 August 1980, p. 3. Subsequently the Ministry of Interior introduced a campaign to deport dependents who had violated these restrictions, Arab News, 1 December 1980, p. 1.

44. Work permit issues in the UAE by nationality are only available for the period 1976-78, this data appears to

show a fall in the number of Jordanians and Palestinians. However these figures should be interpreted with caution since they include both new and renewed work permits:

	1976	1977	1978
Jordanian	4,454	3,282	2,671
Palestinian	3,280	3,251	2,311

Source: As note 26.

Unpublished results from the December 1975 Census indicated an economically active population of 12,000 'Jordanians and Palestinians'.

45. McClelland, D.H. (1979) 'Worker migration and labour remittances - Jordan.'

46. Ministry of Labour, Annual Report (Arabic). For the years 1978 to 1981. Data for 1982 were obtained from unpublished Ministry files. The initial rise in work permit issues for Saudi Arabia, 1978-79, is not particularly significant since it reflects in part the improved efficiency and awareness of the scheme introduced in 1978. The Ministry stopped recording departures to Libya when they fell below 100 in 1981. This decline in emigration to Libya corroborates the RSS survey which shows that Libya accounted for 16.3% of returnees but only 4.5% of current migrants.

47. Saudi Arabia's crackdown on illegal immigrants began in 1978 when Prince Naif (Ministry of Interior) announced a two month amnesty for clandestine workers to legalise their status, prior to an intensive campaign of arrests and deportations by the newly created Illegal Aliens Combat Force (Arab News, 19 April 1978, p. 4, 'Illegal aliens face mass arrest'; 11 July 1978, p. 4, 'Ministry unveils operation to hunt down illegals'; 24 August 1978, p. 2, 'Meeting weighs co-ordination in hunting illegal residents'). At the same time stiff penalties were introduced for those aiding or employing 'illegals' with fines ranging from SR. 1,000-10,000 and prison sentences from 1-4 weeks (Arab News, 3 April 1979, p. 2, 'Heavy fines for employing illegals'). Statistics are sparse but it is known that six campaigns were conducted in the three years 1978-81 and that 56,000 'illegals' were deported during the first three months of the 1979 campaign (Arab News, 11 March 1979, p. 2, '38,000 deported in past six weeks'; 23 June 1979, p. 2, 'Over 60,000 illegals deported'; 22 October 1979, p. 2, '500 deported every month in Riyadh'). These campaigns were held after the annual pilgrimage season since the latter has been the traditional entre to the Saudi labour market. In late 1978 press reports argued that shortages of unskilled labour were arising because of the deportations (Arab News, 28 August 1978, p. 2). Additional restrictions were imposed on workers with legal status. From 1977 the passports of foreign

workers were to be retained by their sponsors to prevent movement within the Kingdom (Arab News, 30 May 1977, p. 4, 'Naif cracks down on foreign labour defection'). Later, in 1980, Naif announced new labour regulations for the construction sector, contractors were to produce bank guarantees before importing workers. These guarantees ranged from SR. 100,000 for 1-20 workers up to SR. 500,000 for 1-100 workers. The aim of this graded scale was to dissuade companies from introducing labour in excess of their requirements and then 'selling' such labour to other contractors (Arab News, 22 January 1980, p. 1, 'Naif announces new labour rules').

Similar campaigns have been conducted in the other Gulf States. In 1980 Kuwait expelled 18,000 illegal aliens during the first three months of its campaign (Arab News, 14 April 1981, p. 4, 'Kuwait to expel illegal residents'). In the UAE 'illegals' were granted a four month amnesty from February 1980 prior to a deportation campaign (Arab News, 12 January 1980, p. 3, 'UAE unveils new labour law on status of alien workers', 18 February 1980, p. 3, 'Illegal workers warned to obey UAE labour rules'; MEED, vol. 24 (22) 30 May 1980, p. 3, 'Qatar joins Gulf immigration crackdown'.

48. Ministry of Labour (1981) Annual Report, 1980. Table 11, p. 67 and 1981 table 11, p. 63. Note that an increasing proportion appear to apply for these certificates without intending to work abroad. In 1980 26.3% stated their intended work place to be within Jordan, by 1981 this had risen to 29.5%. Note that in 1975 some 31% had stated Libya as their destination.

49. This accords well with Jawad Anani's recent admission that labour exports had fallen in 1982 to an estimated 5,000 (all destinations). See Anani, J. 'Labour exports not the problem.' Jerusalem Star, vol. 1 (25) 20 January 1983, p. 1-3.

Increases in the total number of 'Jordanians' working abroad will be somewhat greater than these estimates because of those workers who originate from the 'Jordanian' community already abroad.

50. Anani's comments are quoted in MEED, vol. 25 (19) 8 May 1981, p. 22, 'Planning a workforce for the future.'

51. The expected growth in domestic labour supply over the period 1976-80 was itself highly optimistic and based on a number of implausible assumptions. See: National Planning Council (1976) 'Labour force in Jordan.' The 35% shortfall calculated here may be an under-estimation, for specific sectors labour shortages would have been much greater. The assumptions of the NPC paper (Ghawi and Masri) will be considered in detail below, see Chapter 7.

52. The concepts of primary and secondary labour migration are explored in Chapter 8 below.

Table 3.1

Jordan: gross departures and net flows of Jordanian nationals, 1967-71 (000's)

Years	Departures	Net flow
1967	331.1	-24.0
1968	374.5	-30.3
1969	386.0	-27.5
1970	394.5	-26.0
1971	362.7	-21.5

Source: Department of Statistics (1972) Statistical Yearbook, 1971. Tables 36-37. Statistical Yearbook, 1963. Tables 28-29.

Table 3.2

Saudi Arabia: Government revenue and expenditure 1969/70-1979/80 (Bn.Saudi Riyals)

Year	Revenue	Expenditure
1969/70	5.7	5.0
1970/71	8.0	6.3
1971/72	11.1	8.1
1972/73	15.3	9.9
1973/74	41.7	18.0
1974/75	100.1	32.0
1975/76	103.4	81.8
1976/77	136.0	128.3
1977/78	130.7	138.0
1978/79	131.5	148.0
1979/80	211.2	188.4

Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1981) Annual Report 1400 (1980). Table 1, p. 2.

Table 3.3

Jordan: Gross departures and net flow of Jordanian nationals, 1972-81

(000's)

Year	Departures	Net flow
1972	379.7	-34.5
1973	464.5	-16.5
1974	583.4	-35.5
1975	655.1	-39.5
1976	715.8	-82.8
1977	754.8	-100.9
1978	584.6	-31.0
1979	639.5	+102.0
1980	642.9	-9.7
1981	669.5	+62.3

Source: Department of Statistics (1982) Statistical Yearbook 1981. Tables 7-8. And, Statistical Yearbook 1976. Tables 42-3.

Table 3.4

Jordan: Issues of trade proficiency certificates, 1973-81

Year	Number of certificates
1973	1685
1974	n.a.
1975	4820
1976	4132
1977	4910
1978	4223
1979	3943
1980	3624
1981	2547

Source: Ministry of Labour, annual reports for 1978 to 1981, various tables (Arabic).

Table 3.5

Geographic distribution of 'Jordanian' emigrant workers 1975: various estimates

Destination Country	1975 % distribution				
	Birks and Sinclair	Ecevit	Pennisi	M.P.H.S.	Ministry of Labour
Saudi Arabia	66.1	69.8	50.0	31.1	53.5
Kuwait	18.0	19.0	25.0	26.9	28.7
U.A.E.	5.5	2.6	5.0	22.8	7.3
Libya	5.3	5.2	10.0	16.6	2.5
Qatar	2.3	0.7	-	1.7	2.8
Oman	0.6	1.0	-	-	2.5
Bahrain	0.2	0.3	-	0.9	1.2
Iraq	1.9	1.2	-	-	-
Others	0.1	0.2	15.0	-	1.5
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No.	264,717	250,700	210,000	137,000	261,500

Source: (1) Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1978c) p. 34.
(2) Ecevit, Z.H. (1979) p. 5.
(3) Pennisi, G. (1981) table III-8.
(4) Department of Statistics (1976) MPHS, 1975; table 3.
(5) Anani, J. and Jaber, I. (1980) table 5.

Table 3.6

Estimated 'Jordanian' emigration from the East Bank, 1975-79 (000's)

Year	East Bank Population	Estimated non-Jordanian Population	Resident 'Jordanian' Population	Hypothetical 'Jordanian' Population	Deficit 'Jordanians'	'Jordanian net arrivals and departures (December 1975-November 1979)
1975	1810.5	7.5	1803.0	1803.0	-	-6.9
1976	1889.3	35.0	1854.3	1873.0	19.0	-82.8
1977	1971.6	80.3	1891.3	1946.4	55.0	-100.9
1979	2147.1	163.8	1983.8	2101.2	117.4	+102.2
						-119.4 net deficit

Notes: (1) East Bank population is derived from Department of Statistics (1981) Statistical Yearbook, 1980. Table 2.

(2) Non-Jordanian population is estimated on the basis of known work permit issues adjusted to account for non-registration of Syrian and clandestine employment of other workers.

(3) Hypothetical population increase assumes a constant growth rate of 3.9% p.a. and nil net migration.

(4) Central Bank of Jordan (1980) Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 16 (10), Table 22.

Table 3.7

Geographic distribution of current and returned 'Jordanian' emigrant workers in 1980

Destination Country	% distribution: current migrants	Returnees
Saudi Arabia	59.2	41.5
Kuwait	13.1	16.1
United Arab Emirates	14.4	11.5
Libya	4.5	16.3
Qatar	2.7	2.4
Oman	1.6	4.3
Bahrain	0.5	1.7
Iraq	1.3	1.8
Others	3.2	4.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Source: Royal Scientific Society (forthcoming, 1984). 'Worker migration abroad: socio-economic implications for households in Jordan.' Unpublished draft tables.

Table 3.8

'Jordanians' receiving work permits for employment in Saudi Arabia and Libya, 1978-82 and estimated total outflow 1980-82

Year	Work Permit issues: Saudi Arabia	Libya	Estimated total East Bank labour emigrants 1980-82
1978	4,523	484	-
1979	7,310	107	-
1980	5,303	203	8,950
1981	2,982	n.a.	5,050
1982	2,435	n.a.	4,100

Source: Data for 1978-81 are derived from Ministry of Labour Annual Reports, various tables (Arabic). 1982 data is from the unpublished records of the Department of Employment, Amman (Arabic). For the basis of the estimated total East Bank emigrant workers see text.

Table 3.9

Occupational structure of East Bank emigrant workers 1975 and 1980

Occupational Group	% distribution: MPHS 1975	RSS 1980 Current emigrants	RSS 1980 Returnees
Professional, technical and related workers	31.5	40.6	21.2
Legislative officials and government administrators	2.5	4.8	2.9
Clerical and related workers	6.8	17.0	7.7
Sales workers	4.0	3.1	10.3
Service workers	3.6	1.7	2.5
Agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry and fishermen	0.6	0.5	1.1
Production and related workers, transport equipment workers and labourers	51.0	27.7	39.2
Armed Forces and other unclass-ified workers	-	4.6	15.1
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
(Number)	(952)	(545)	(556)

Source: (1) Department of Statistics (1976) MPHS, 1975. Compiled from tables 5A/B, for Arab and Middle Eastern countries only.

(2) Derived from data in Saket, B. (1982), annex 2 and 3.

Table 3.10

East Bank emigrant workers 1980: distribution by occupation of current emigrants and returnees

Occupational Group	Current emigrants: Number	%	Returnees: Number	%
Architects, engineers and related	48	8.8	39	7.0
Medical, dental, vetinary and related workers	11	2.0	6	1.1
Accountants	31	5.7	16	2.9
Teachers	99	18.2	39	7.0
Professional, technical and related workers n.e.c.	32	5.9	18	3.2
Legislative officials and government administrators	26	4.8	16	2.9
Clerical and related workers	93	17.0	43	7.7
Sales workers	17	3.1	57	10.3
Service workers	9	1.7	14	2.5
Agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry and fishermen	3	0.5	6	1.1
Production and related workers, transport equipment workers and labourers	151	27.7	218	39.2
Armed Forces	16	2.9	22	3.9
Others	7	1.3	50	9.0
Unclassified	2	0.4	12	2.0
TOTAL	545	100.0	556	100.0

Source: As table 3.9 note (2).

Table 3.11

East Bank emigrants to Saudi Arabia by occupational group 1978-81 (% distribution)

Occupational Group	1978	1979	1980	1981
Professional and Technical	8.7	9.2	8.3	24.7
Administrative	1.9	2.0	5.0	7.3
Clerical	12.0	12.2	6.8	15.8
Sales	0.2	2.4	1.3	2.3
Services	1.1	1.3	4.8	3.0
Agriculture	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.7
Industry and Transport	40.0	36.9	33.2	24.2
Unclassified	33.3	33.2	37.6	19.0
TOTAL number	4,523	7,310	5,303	2,987

Source: As table 3.8

CHAPTER FOUR

JORDANIANS IN KUWAIT, A CASE STUDY: (1) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIGRATION STREAM, 1948-75

4.1 Preface

4.1.1 The following two chapters (four and five) present a detailed case study of international labour migration to one of the major labour-importing economies of the region, namely the State of Kuwait. In this case study we focus primarily (but not exclusively) on the characteristics and role of Jordanians within that labour market. Since Kuwait's labour market (or at least its immigrant component) is essentially competitive, it would be misleading to consider Jordanians in isolation from the development of other groups within the labour market.

Kuwait can no more be regarded as typical than any other of the labour-importers. However its relatively comprehensive censal data base provides an opportunity to examine the development of the immigrant labour market and its response to changes in supply and demand conditions over the period 1940-81. This could not be attempted for any other labour-importing state in the Middle East. Furthermore, access to the complete series of Kuwaiti government (Ministry of Labour) statistics on the immigrant labour force for the period 1976-81 enables this research to extend beyond the impasse imposed on previous researchers restricted to the 1975 Kuwait census results. As a result of the relatively aggregate presentation of data in that census, such research has concentrated on a dualistic division between national and non-national (immigrant)

sectors of the labour market.[1] Here (chapter 5) we will examine differences in employment characteristics within the immigrant sub-population. In doing so we will explore the competition between nationalities at various occupational levels and consider the response of different groups to changes in the level and nature of labour demand in Kuwait. Current trends in the Kuwaiti demand for 'Jordanian' labour and the changing occupational characteristics of 'Jordanians' in Kuwait are assessed in terms of their likely impact on the domestic (Jordanian) labour market.

In this first chapter (4) we will consider the development of both the immigrant labour market and the immigrant community in Kuwait (to 1975). As an introduction however we will return to the historical theme introduced in chapter two and will examine the role of recruitment in determining the pattern and timing of labour flows. This process will be illustrated with reference in the first instance to Bahrain, for which more complete documentary evidence is available. The subsequent sections will examine the development of 'Jordanian' migration to Kuwait since 1948.

4.2 The role of recruitment and the establishment of migration patterns

4.2.1 Earlier (chapter 2.2) it was demonstrated that the period 1930-48 had witnessed a radical and rapid transformation in the prevailing pattern of Gulf labour flows. The predominance of seasonal labour flows during the annual pearling season had collapsed in the early 1930's following the disruption of the international pearl market.

At the same time however new patterns of labour flow were being established to meet the demands of the nascent oil industry. Demand for unskilled labour was considerable and an effective wage war was fought between the competing oil companies.[2] Although unskilled labour was mainly recruited locally, on a daily basis, the companies were compelled to seek their semi-skilled and skilled manpower requirements from outside the immediate Gulf region. Analysis of the labour rosters of the major oil companies has shown that such employment was dominated by Persian and Indian sub-continent labour.

4.2.2 This early migration pattern had not involved Jordanian, Palestinian or indeed any other non-Peninsula Arabs. In the late 1930's however a number of Palestinians had been recruited, through newspaper advertisements, for employment in Kuwait's Mabarakiyah school.[3] In 1939 the latter was staffed by a Palestinian headmaster and eight Palestinian assistant masters. A visiting BMEO official (Vallence) reported that the Palestinians were the only teachers of any ability in Kuwait and recommended the recruitment of at least eight more as a matter of urgency. The remaining teaching staff were simply untrained graduates from the school itself.[4]

In 1943 however this early connection between Kuwait and Palestine was disrupted when the Egyptian government announced its willingness to subsidize Egyptian teachers who worked abroad. Kuwait's Director of Education (Abdul Aziz Shimlan, himself an Egyptian) subsequently cut the salaries of his Palestinian staff by 15% in order to force their resignation and replacement by Egyptians. By

December 1943 eleven Egyptians had taken up their posts with fifteen more already recruited in Cairo. Wakelin (BMEO) reports that the Egyptians were the only foreigners teaching in Kuwait.[5]

This example clearly illustrates the strategic role of active recruitment by employers, or their agents, in establishing migration streams.[6] Once such a stream has become established these origins may be lost since the flows are self-sustaining, that is, information flows generated by the migrants themselves tend to obscure the employer's recruitment efforts.

The following section will briefly develop this theme, that active recruitment by an employer is an essential catalyst in the evolution of particular migration patterns, using an example based on correspondence between the Political Agent in Bahrain and the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO).

4.2.3 The inflow of skilled and semi-skilled Indian labour to Bahrain from the mid-1930's is a function of BAPCO's recruitment policy, a policy largely directed by the motives of the local British political advisers. The latter were concerned about the growing immigration of Persians and their possible role as an instrument in the Persian claim of sovereignty over the Bahrain islands. At the same time however the Company's recruitment and employment of Indians was constrained by the provisions of the Indian Emigration Act and by the Indian Workmen's Compensation Act (1923). Fowle (Political Resident at Bushire, 1932-39) suggested to Loch (Political Agent in Bahrain, 1932-37) in 1935 that: "... it is possible that, in order to

avoid conforming to the legal requirements in the case of Indian labour, the Company might instead recruit only foreign labour such as Persians ... any tendency in that direction should be checked."[7] In July 1936 the Protector of Emigrants (Bombay) obliged the Company to open a formal labour recruiting office in Bombay. The demand for labour was expanding rapidly with the refinery construction programme (1936-37). In August 1936 Smith (BAPCO's local manager) wrote to the Political Agent suggesting that the Company was willing: "... to give all Indians who arrive here, without having gone through the proper channels, contracts which the Protector of Emigrants will approve."[8] In other words BAPCO was prepared to take on the responsibility of, and pay guarantees for effectively illegal Indian immigrants.

In a memorandum to BAPCO in April 1937 the Political Agent reminds the Company of their position: "The Resident mentioned ... the question of the replacement of Persians and Iraqis in the Bahrain Petroleum Company by Indians. He thought that, other things being equal, as soon as the temporary rush is over, Indians should be employed as far as possible in the place of Persians ..."[9] Smith, replying for the Company, assures the Political Agent that: "... instructions have been issued that Iranians are to be laid off first when numbers are reduced on completion of the refinery construction and other work ..."[10]

By this time the spontaneous immigration of Indians had become significant. Dudley (Protector of Emigrants Office, Bombay) in correspondence with the manager of BAPCO

writes (1937) that: "... many of the Bahrain Petroleum Company's employees are obtaining local 'No Objection Permits', from the Political Agent for their dependants, relatives or friends to enable them to go to Bahrain ..."[11] The number of Indian nationals registering annually in Bahrain with the Agency had grown from 459 in 1930 to 1,689 in 1938; increasing from 584 in 1935 to 1,161 in 1936 following the opening of BAPCO's recruiting office in Bombay.[12] By 1941 the community was large enough for the British to consider the establishment of an Indian school. Prior (Political Resident Bushire, 1939-46) advised the Political Agent: "... I have discussed the matter of the education of children of Indians employed in Bahrain with representatives of the Indian community. They are all in favour of having a primary school ... staffed from the Indian Education Department ..."[13]

The recruitment of Persian labour was, for BAPCO, administratively easier, less constrained by regulations and more cost-effective than that of Indians. In 1944 at the start of an expansion phase BAPCO's new manager (Anderson) informed the Political Agent (Hickinbotham) of the Company's intention to recruit more Persian labour and enquired whether there would be any objection to this.[14] The Political Agent's reply was unusually swift: "Any measures which will be likely to increase the permanent Persian population of Bahrain would be regarded with strong disfavour by the Bahrain government for political and other reasons. His Highness is already disturbed by seeing a large number of Persians in Bahrain; many of whom have only appeared recently ... The Bahrain government

does not wish men who are recruited for particular work to remain here under any circumstances. It is likely that many of them could easily find occupations in Bahrain when no longer required by the Company but it is not the prospect of their remaining here without employment which causes concern to the government, it is the prospect of increasing the number of Persians in these islands ..."[15] A few days later Hickinbotham reinforced this stand more directly: "... you will undertake that Persian labour imported by you will not be permitted to remain in Bahrain after the completion of the work for which it was imported ..."[16]

By 1948 Indian manpower completely dominated the monthly paid roster (that is the skilled and semi-skilled labour force) as illustrated by table 4.1. It is also apparent from an examination of applications for 'No Objection Permits' and from a survey by Weightman (Political Agent in Bahrain, 1937-40) that the occupational structure of this Indian sub-continent labour had become increasingly diverse and had spread from construction and administration into the services and trading sectors.[17] Indeed Belgrave (Chief British Adviser to Bahrain) reports in a letter to Pelly (Political Resident in Bahrain, 1947-51) that: "... it may interest you to know that there are now 215 shops in Manama bazaar occupied by Indians ..."[18]

4.2.4 A number of pertinent points emerge from this brief discussion. Firstly the essential stimulant to labour flows is active employer recruitment, thus while labour force supply and demand factors are necessary they are not sufficient in themselves to determine the flow of labour.

Secondly, the motives behind particular recruitment activities may not be immediately apparent nor are they necessarily those of the employer. In this case the recruitment of Indians reflects the desire of the Foreign Office to restrain the growth in Persian immigration and of the local Political Agents to ensure the continued interest of the Government of India in the Gulf for their own purposes.[19] Thirdly it illustrates the rapidity with which a migration stream can be established and become self-sustaining.[20]

This evidence would seem to confirm Piore's (1979) argument (developed in the N. American context) that it is recruitment activities which explain the timing and pattern of particular labour flows.[21] We will return to this point in our ensuing discussion of Jordanian migration to Kuwait during the period 1948-57.

4.3 Recruitment and early labour flows: 'Jordanian' migration to Kuwait, 1948-57

4.3.1 Prior to 1948 the predominantly agricultural communities of Transjordan and of eastern Palestine, generated little international labour migration beyond the specific flows within the Levant referred to earlier (chapter 2.3). This was despite the growth in skilled and semi-skilled manpower resources that had occurred as a result of the expansion in education and training facilities under the Mandate (particularly in Palestine).[22] In 1945 some 13,000 Palestinian Arabs were engaged in skilled and semi-skilled office or manual positions in the Mandate Government's administrative and technical departments.[23]

This low level of international labour migration was

radically altered by the 1948 Arab defeat in Palestine. With the flood of refugees into Jordan the promotion of their employment became a priority issue both within and outside Jordan. In March 1949 the Foreign Office requested all of its Political Agents in the Gulf region to report their: "... urgent observations on possibilities of absorbing a proportion of the Arab refugees in the Persian Gulf states bearing in mind that a high proportion of these refugees are dependants ..." The request went on to ask: "... what are the long term economic possibilities of absorbing them on land or in occupations other than oil ..." and specifically asked to what extent local managers of British and American oil companies would be prepared to consider refugee labour on a short or long term basis.[24]

This request was forwarded by the Political Agent in Kuwait to the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) and to the American Independant Oil Company (AMINCO).[25] William Morris (AMINCO's acting manager) replied positively: "... while our present operations are quite limited in extent we will definitely be interested in the employment of Palestinian Arabs later on. We anticipate that such employment will preferably be on a long term basis." Similarly KOC replied: "... we are prepared to employ from 300 to 500 skilled labourers from among the Arab refugees ..."[26]

The attitude of these oil companies and of other employers (notably in administrative and clerical work),[27] was at variance with that of the Sheikh of Kuwait. In a confidential telegram to Hay (the Political Representative at Bahrain) Jackson (Political Agent in Kuwait) presented the Sheikh's view as: "... while sympathizing he finds

it difficult to acept any number of refugees. There are no suitable opportunities for them as settlers ..." Jackson adds that, in his own opinion, "... there are already enough Palestinians here whose influence will be diverted increasingly against the British presence ..."[28]

This attitude caused the BMEO considerable consternation. The latter were critical of the recruitment of some fifty-four Egyptian teachers (see section 4.2.2 above on the establishment of this link in the 1930's) in September 1949 for work in Kuwait. The BMEO complained that: "... there are of course obvious advantages to Kuwait in this close liaison with the well established and highly organized Egyptian education system but it occurs to us that it is a pity that such large demands should be made on Egypt at a time when there is a shortage of teachers in Egypt itself and when there are considerable numbers of experienced Palestinian Arab teachers available ... you may think it worthwhile to encourage the Kuwait authorities to seek further among the Palestinian refugees who are available."[29]

It is apparent then that rates of spontaneous migration by the refugees, even those with skills in demand in the Gulf States, was relatively limited. Jackson, despite his fears over the arrival of Palestinians in Kuwait, described their inflow as a "... mere trickle ..." This is confirmed by table 4.2 which shows that only 520 arrived between February 1948 and February 1950. Abu-Lughod (1980) estimated that less than 4% of 'displaced' persons were, in 1952, living outside the countries adjacent to Palestine.[30] The direction and timing of this early

migration was essentially stimulated by the various recruitment activities of the British authorities, which were later formalised in the UNRWA Placement Service (May 1951), and by some personal contacts.[31] Badran (1982) argues that it was this system of collective recruitment which was: "... highly instrumental in activating the collective movement of Palestinian workers to the oil countries."[32] The bulk of such recruitment was of skilled and semi-skilled manpower and was, initially, for single males only. The KOC in its agreement to take on Palestinian labour made clear that: "... we will only be able to provide accommodation for the actual employees and will not be able to make provisions for dependants or relatives ..."[33]

4.3.2 As with Indian labour in Bahrain the migration stream rapidly diversified and became self-sustaining. By the time of Kuwait's first population census in 1957 (February) there were some 14,100 'Jordanians and Palestinians' in Kuwait, of whom 19.2% were below the age of 15 years. Furthermore the Jordanians and Palestinians (most of whom came from the West Bank, see section 2.5 above) represented almost 17% of Kuwait's immigrant population of 83,548 and 12.5% of the non-Kuwaiti labour force.[34]

The 1957 Kuwait Census provides data on the length of residence by nationality for the period 1947-57 in single years. This census data provides the basis for a crude retrospective estimation of immigration during that period. This has however a number of limitations, in particular there is a notable discrepancy between the total enumerated non-Kuwaiti population and those providing data on length of residence. This discrepancy amounts to 12.4% of the

enumerated population. Fortunately the data is most reliable for Jordanians and Palestinians of whom almost 90% provided length of residence data (see table 4.2).[35]

This data shows that prior to 1951 the composition of labour flows continued their pre-war pattern with a predominance by the 'traditional' labour suppliers, notably Iran, Iraq, Oman and the Indian sub-continent. In the period to 1951 these account for 80% of immigrants to Kuwait. Subsequently however their share fell to 55% over the period 1951-54.

Of the non-Kuwaiti s enumerated in 1957 only 6.4% had entered prior to 1947 in contrast to 52% arriving in the three year period 1954-57. This rapid growth in labour inflows was stimulated by the expansion in public and private construction work stemming, in part, from the Land Purchase Scheme of the mid-1950's.[36]

The number of Jordanian and Palestinian immigrants increased only slowly over the period 1947-51 and accounted for only 11.6% of non-Kuwaiti arrivals during that period. In 1952 however the number of Jordanian and Palestinian arrivals leapt by almost 125%, compared to the overall increase in immigration of 42%. Over the following three years (1952-55) Jordanian and Palestinian arrivals accounted for 22.4% of the total inflow and, in a number of years (notably 1952 and 1953) were the single largest immigrant group.

4.3.3 While the 1948 defeat was important in initiating the availability of Palestinian (and to a lesser extent Jordanian) manpower, their active recruitment by employers determined the volume, pattern and timing of the initial

migration stream to Kuwait in the period to 1954. Subsequently the rapid growth in demand for labour and the foothold that Palestinian and Jordanian manpower had established enabled them to consolidate their migration stream in the late 1950's and early 1960's. In this way their inflow to Kuwait increased by over 200% between 1957 and 1961 compared to an overall increase of 72%.[37] An important element in this expansion was Kuwait's removal, in 1958, of entry requirements for Palestinians and Jordanians, a move which followed the deaths of a number of Palestinians trying to enter Kuwait illegally. The result was a large influx of Palestinians in 1959 and the temporary re-imposition (until 1960) of the entry controls. In the following section we will consider the growth and establishment of the 'Jordanian' community in Kuwait in the period 1957 to 1975.

4.4 Migration transition: the shift from migrant labour to immigrant community, 1957-75

4.4.1 The rapid growth in Kuwait's population and the changing balance between national and non-national components of that population have been the subject of much demographic research and will not be dwelt on here.[38] In this section attention will focus primarily on the characteristics of the 'Jordanian' immigrants and their demographic development over the period 1957-75 using consecutive census results.

4.4.2 The results of Kuwait's first Census of Population, conducted in February 1957, revealed that the 'Jordanian and Palestinian' population in Kuwait was still relatively small (14,100) despite the events of 1948. Nevertheless it had increased to a level commensurate with Kuwait's

traditional labour suppliers, namely Iran (18,800) and Iraq (16,140). The demographic characteristics of the 'Jordanian' immigrants were broadly similar to those of the other major labour suppliers. The high sex ratio (355.0) shows the strong male bias (78%) in the population inflow and the crude participation rate is estimated at 75%.[39] The low level of dependant accompaniment was further emphasised by the concentration of immigrants in the working age cohorts, less than 20% of the population being aged under 15 years.

While these characteristics are typical of migrant worker populations, it is significant to note that the sex ratio was somewhat lower than the overall non-Kuwaiti sex ratio of 438.4. This may reflect the occupational structure of the 'Jordanian' inflow, with a higher than average proportion of professional and skilled workers able to support their dependants in Kuwait. Further of course it reflects the political background to emigration from the West Bank. An important element in this high dependant accompaniment was the level of female immigration. From 1952 onward 'Jordanian' females had accounted for over 25% of annual female arrivals, in 1955 this had risen to 31%.[40]

The rate of labour inflow to Kuwait continued to increase during the late 1950's. In May 1961 the non-Kuwaiti population was enumerated at 159,712, an increase of 23.3% per annum since 1957. The immigration rate for 'Jordanians' was significantly greater than the mean, at 27.6% per annum with a population total of 37,327. By 1961 'Jordanians' had become the largest single immigrant group, accounting for 23.4% of the total non-Kuwaiti population.

In addition to 30,990 'Jordanians' some 6,337 immigrants were separately recorded as 'Palestinian'. The latter presumably distinguishes between those having emigrated from Jordan and those coming via Gaza, Lebanon and Syria (and not carrying Jordanian passports).

Earlier (chapter 2.5) it was shown that the Jordanian census of November 1961 recorded 31,739 'Jordanians' in Kuwait. The contention that this was an under-enumeration is confirmed by comparing the Kuwait Census results with subsequent arrivals and departures data for the period June to December 1961.[41] The latter records a net inflow of 4,725 'Jordanians' (excluding those Palestinians arriving from other locations) which suggests that by November 1961 there were at least 35,000 'Jordanians' in Kuwait.[42] This scale of inflow is further confirmed by length of residence data in the Kuwait Census of 1965. Adding those who arrived during the period 1957-1961 (as recorded in 1965) to the 1957 census result provides a 1961 population of 34,380.[43]

Part of the increased rate of immigration during the early 1960's was related to a replacement effect induced by the repatriation of a large number of Iraqis from Kuwait. This was precipitated by growing political tension between Kuwait and Iraq (following the abrogation of Kuwait's treaty relationship with Britain) culminating in June 1961 with the Iraqi declaration that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq.[44] During the twelve month period following this declaration some 22,000 Iraqis left Kuwait.

The inflow of 'Jordanian' females continued to be

significant in the late 1950's. The 'Jordanian' female population increased from 3,095 (1957) to 11,741 (1961), accounting for 37.2% of the overall increase. In consequence the 'Jordanian' sex ratio had fallen to 217.9. This is similar to falls experienced by other labour suppliers, sex ratios for Lebanese, Indian and Egyptian migrants were of a similar scale at 216.1, 213.3 and 244.0 respectively. In addition the crude participation rate had fallen to circa 56% with an estimated 17,774 'Jordanians' in active employment.

The April 1965 Kuwait Census shows a continued large growth (11.5% per annum since 1961) in the immigrant population to 247,280 despite the fall in Iraqi residents. The 'Jordanian' population again dominated the growth in the immigrant community, increasing by 20% per annum over the period to 77,712, some 31.4% of non-nationals. Data on length of residence shows that much of this increase was recent, 16.6% (12,918) had been resident in Kuwait for less than one year (see table 4.3). Furthermore 41% of those who had arrived in the period since the 1961 Census were females. Hence the continued reduction in the sex ratio to 177.9.

Data from the 1965 Census concerning the age distribution of 'Jordanians' provides further indication of this increased dependency ratio. The proportion of the population under 15 years had increased to 35.3% of the total, compared to 19.7% in 1957. While this development in the age/sex structure is significant it is not exceptional. Table 4.4 reveals that other immigrant groups, notably the Lebanese, Egyptian and Pakistani, had similar proportions of their population under 15 (37.1%, 31.2% and

32.0% respectively) and an increased female share (38.6%, 47.4% and 35.0% respectively).

Nevertheless the continued dominance by the age cohorts 20-24 and 25-29 suggests that single male worker migration was still the prevalent mode. The number of active 'Jordanians' increased to 36,000, but their crude participation rate had fallen to 46.4%. There is a continued absence of school age children (cohorts 5-9 and 10-14) compared to the 0-4 age group. Sinclair (1977) asserts that in this period there were strong disincentives to migrant workers wishing to bring a family into Kuwait, in particular he cites the: "... limited educational opportunity for the children of expatriates." During the academic year 1969/70 only 33% of school-age Palestinian and Jordanian males (29% of females) were attending schools.[45]

4.4.3 The period 1965-1970 is particularly significant in the development of a 'Jordanian' immigrant 'community' in Kuwait and it is this period which can be characterised as the 'migration transition'.

The 1970 census reveals a growth in the non-Kuwaiti population to 391,266 (9.6% per annum over 1965).[46] The increase in the number of 'Jordanians' continued to be above the overall rate of increase (at 13.7%) and accounted for 48.6% of the total growth in non-Kuwaitis.

Data on length of residence points to the significance of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent loss of the West Bank in stimulating this further migration to Kuwait. Table 4.5 shows that 41.6% of those enumerated in 1970 had arrived since 1967. Furthermore arrivals and departures data indicate a net inflow of 34,398 'Jordanians' in 1967

and a further 23,023 in 1968 (compared to a net arrival of 847 in 1966 and 2,325 in 1969). It is particularly significant that of 'Jordanian' arrivals in the period 1967-1968 some 64.2% were female.[47]

Following the age group 0-4 in 1965 over the inter-censal period (i.e. to age 5-9) reveals an increase of 50% in the cohort size from 16,305 to 24,494 in 1970. Similarly the cohort aged 5-9 in 1965 (7,757) increased by 55% to 12,039 in 1970 (aged 10-14). This increase in cohort size is unlikely to be simply the result of improved census coverage since the consecutive census results appear internally consistent in the case of 'Jordanians' and to concur with arrivals and departures data for the same period. There is therefore strong evidence of family migration and settlement in Kuwait after the events of 1967. This is a marked contrast with the immediate post 1948 migration experience, a reflection of the importance of primary worker migration in the establishment of migration streams.

By 1970 the proportion of the 'Jordanian' population under age 15 had grown to 50.4%, a level which was greater than that for any other immigrant group (see table 4.6). Concomitantly the proportion of females had increased to 45.9% with a sex ratio of 117.9. The increase in 'Jordanian' employment in Kuwait was significantly lower than the overall population increase. By 1970 there were 42,000 'Jordanians' employed in Kuwait, an increase of only 3.1% p.a. since 1965. The crude participation rate had fallen to 28.4%. Female employment (3,850) was limited, their crude participation being only 5.7%. In contrast the crude participation of males was relatively high at 47.7%.

The contention that the Jordanian and Palestinian immigrant community in Kuwait had undergone a 'migration transition' and, to a greater extent than other expatriate groups, were settling more permanently in Kuwait, is given added weight by examining the extent of population turnover in the inter-censal periods. Annual nationality-specific attrition rates can be calculated for the three periods 1961-1965, 1965-1970 and 1970-1975 on the basis of length of residence data. For each period the ratio of persons of residence five or more years in the later census (e.g. 1970) to the total resident in the previous enumeration (e.g. 1965) enables the derivation of a crude annual decrement rate for each nationality.

Decomposition of this crude decrement rate into its constituent parts (mortality, emigration and naturalization) involves a greater degree of uncertainty since mortality statistics are notoriously unreliable and are not available by nationality. Since emigration is undoubtedly the major determinant of the attrition rate variations in mortality by nationality (due to differing age/sex composition, access to health facilities and occupational characteristics) will be of limited significance. Hill (1969), using burial statistics to supplement official mortality records, has provided adjusted non-Kuwaiti mortality rates for the three inter-censal periods.[48] Naturalization is also assumed to be effectively zero during this period since in 1970 less than one per cent of non-Kuwaitis were naturalized, by 1975 this had increased to only 1.4%.[49] Data limitations necessitate two additional assumptions:

(1) that emigration rates are independent of age,

(2) emigration rates are independent of the duration of residence itself.

Crude emigration rates calculated by this method are shown on table 4.7. Significant variations, both between nationalities and over time, in the extent of population turnover are revealed. The most dramatic development has been the drop in turnover among the 'Jordanian' population from a high rate of 102 per 1000 in 1961-65 to 10 per 1000 in 1970-75. This arises not least from the changing age composition of the 'Jordanian' population and the increase in the proportion under age 15.

The high rate of emigration (102.4) among 'Jordanians' in the initial period 1961-1965 confirms the migrant labour hypothesis. The events of the 1965-1970 period and the large inflow of dependants after June 1967 resulted in a substantial reduction in emigration to 37.0 in 1965-1970 and 10.5 in 1970-1975. These rates are lower than for other immigrant groups, confirming that by the mid-1970's 'Jordanians' were a (semi-) permanent community significantly different from other groups.

4.4.4 The final inter-censal period for which data has been released covers the years 1970-1975 and constituted a period during which the characteristics of demographic settling among the Jordanian and Palestinian population have been reinforced. While the overall growth rate of non-Kuwaitis had fallen to 5.9% per annum that for 'Jordanians' continued to be above the mean at 6.7% per annum.

In contrast to previous periods however the growth in 'Jordanians' was not primarily the result of continued

net in-migration. Indeed arrivals and departures data indicate a net outflow (of circa 4000-4500 per annum) in the period since 1972. It is clear that the 'Jordanian' community in Kuwait was growing primarily as a result of natural increase. Available data on births by nationality for the mid 1970's indicate that between 9,300 and 9,600 'Jordanians' were born in Kuwait each year (that is between 43 and 51% of all live births to non-Kuwaitis).[50] In addition the 1975 census results show that 45% of 'Jordanians' (91,928) had been born in Kuwait, that is 58.8% of all non-Kuwaitis born in the country. Finally, 72.9% of 'Jordanians' resident in Kuwait for less than five years (in 1975) were aged under 10. At the same time 67.3% of 'Jordanians' enumerated in 1975 had been resident for more than five years.

As a result of these developments the proportion of 'Jordanians' aged under 15 had increased to 53.6% of the total (see table 4.8). Furthermore over the period 1969/70 to 1974/75 'Jordanian' enrolment in government schools had increased from 13,108 to 31,912 (an increase of 19.4% per annum). This compares with the moderate increase in the previous period (1964/5-1969/70) of 8.5% per annum. 'Jordanians' took an increasing share of total non-Kuwait enrolments, from 37.7% in 1969/70 to 47.3% in 1974/5.[51]

An additional factor which increased the dependency ratio was the fact that females continued to grow at a rate greater (7.3% p.a.) than that for males (6.1% p.a.). As a result the sex ratio had fallen to 111.7 by 1975, lower than that for most immigrant groups.

The increased proportion of school attenders and the

growth in the female population, of whom only 4,144 were economically active (a crude activity rate of 4.3%), led inevitably to a further reduction in the crude participation rate (to 23.3) and in the 'Jordanian' share of the non-Kuwaiti labour market (22.5%). Over the period 1970-1975 'Jordanian' employment increased by only 2.7% per annum.

4.4.5 This section has considered the growth and demographic development of the 'Jordanian' population in Kuwait over the period 1957-1975. A transition in the pattern of 'Jordanian' migration has been shown to have occurred during this period (see figure 4.1). This transition was characterised by an increase in the proportion of dependants in the immigrant flows during the latter half of the period, particularly in the wake of the 1967 war. Demographic settling among the Jordanian and Palestinian population had begun prior to June 1967. The conflict had the effect of increasing the rate of settlement. A similar process was also clearly underway among some of the other immigrant groups but the rate of settling was markedly slower and the characteristics less well developed.[52]

As a consequence of this process of family migration and re-union the demographic structure of the Jordanian and Palestinian community in Kuwait was significantly different to that of other immigrant nationalities. By 1975 it is clear that the 'Jordanian' population was reproducing itself largely by natural increase rather than through an increasing rate of in-migration. Table 4.9 summarizes these demographic developments.

The emergence of a Jordanian and Palestinian 'community' in Kuwait is exemplified by the expansion of

FIG.4.1 AGE/SEX STRUCTURE: JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS IN KUWAIT 1957-1975.



SOURCE: as tables 4.2, 4.4, 4.6 and 4.8

enrolment in state schools. In 1962/3 some 6,831 Jordanians and Palestinians were enroled in public schools, by 1979/80 this had increased to 77,807. The rate of growth in enrolments increased from 8.5% per annum in the five years to 1970/71 and by 19.4% in the subsequent five year period. Further, the proportion of school places (including Kuwaitis) absorbed by 'Jordanians' increased over the period 1962/3-1979/80 from 11.5% to 27.3% (see table 4.10). At the secondary level 'Jordanians' represented, in 1979/80 31.7% of total enrolments.

This expansion in the provision of education facilities for immigrant nationalities is indicative of the growing pressure on Kuwait's social infrastructure. Heightened concern over the medium and even short term social and political consequences of hosting an expanding immigrant population have been increasingly voiced.[53] Furthermore it has been claimed that such concerns lay behind the changes in labour flow patterns that have occurred since 1975.[54] These recent labour market developments will be examined later (chapter 5.4). As an introduction to the contemporary labour market the following section will briefly trace the development of the immigrant labour market in Kuwait (1957-75) focussing on the occupational characteristics of 'Jordanians'.

4.5 Dual labour market development and the employment of 'Jordanians' in Kuwait, 1957-75

4.5.1 Kuwait's dependance on expatriate manpower resources since the mid-1940's and the factors contributing to that dependance have been elaborated by previous research.[55] This section will briefly outline the demographic and social

factors which have constrained indigenous employment levels and which provide the rationale for manpower inflows. Following this introduction attention will focus on the varying employment characteristics of the Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti labour market segments, focussing on the role of 'Jordanians' in the latter.

4.5.2 The rate of growth and respective share of employment by national group (Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti) over the period 1957-1975 are shown on table 4.11. Despite their more rapid rate of growth since 1965 the Kuwaiti share of employment has remained low, increasing from 23.3% (1965) to 29.2% (1975).

Indigenous employment levels in Kuwait are supply-constrained, by both demographic and social factors. In 1957 only 24.9% (28,373) of native Kuwaitis were actively employed. A primary cause of the low overall activity rate has been the maintenance of customary views regarding the role of women in society.[56] In 1957 98.6% of employed Kuwaitis were males, a crude participation rate of 480 per 1000. The low level of female participation outside the household has continued throughout the period of modern sector development. By 1970 recorded female employment was only 2,055 (3.1% of Kuwaiti employment).[57] Kuwait's insignificant agricultural sector has ensured that female employment in rural areas has not compensated for this minimal modern sector participation.

In addition, modern sector developments were demanding basic skills (including literacy) which Kuwaitis did not possess (even by 1975 some 44.6% of those aged

15+ were illiterate). It was therefore inevitable that the 1957 census would reveal a predominance of expatriates in the skilled and semi-skilled professions. Thus 87.2% of labour in professional and technical occupations, 59.2% in administration and 57.8% of clerical manpower were immigrants. The majority of Kuwaitis in employment were engaged in services or trade (27.0%), a relatively small proportion (39.4%) were employed as production and related labour (see tables 4.12 and 4.13). The bulk (77.5%) of such largely unskilled labour was non-Kuwaiti. This is perhaps illustrative of the aversion to manual work, despite limited educational attainment, that has been attributed to the traditional delegation of such work to particular social groups, including slaves. In the pre-oil era there was considerable seasonal in-migration of labour (primarily from southern Iraq) for employment on the Kuwaiti pearling banks.

While the majority of non-Kuwaiti manpower was, in 1957, engaged at the unskilled level (68.4%) this was not the case among 'Jordanians'. Although the 1957 Kuwait census does not disaggregate non-Kuwaiti labour according to nationality it is possible to ascertain the general characteristics of 'Jordanian' employment from the 1961 Jordanian census. Earlier (section 2.5.5) we highlighted the selective nature of emigration from Jordan. Of those 'Jordanians' working abroad in Arab countries (the majority of whom were in Kuwait) 26.5% were either in professional, technical or clerical occupations. This is considerably higher than the 14.8% of non-Kuwaiti employment in 1957. An additional 17.1% of 'Jordanians' were in skilled or semi-

skilled manual occupations. These characteristics suggest that a disproportionate share of Jordanian and Palestinian manpower in Kuwait was drawn from skilled or semi-skilled occupations.

Kuwait's demand for labour continued to expand throughout the 1960's as burgeoning oil revenues were increasingly disbursed into infrastructural investment and the provision of social and administrative services.[58] Concomitantly however the supply of Kuwaiti labour was further impeded by two related aspects of government policy. Firstly, despite the expansion of primary education and the provision of intermediate (in 1952) and secondary (1958) education levels, there has been a continued mismatch between labour market demands and the education system's emphasis on general academic studies. Thus while the expansion in enrolments at higher education levels (including the University of Kuwait from 1966) has reduced the proportion of the age cohort 15-19 entering the labour market, it has not led to the formation of an indigenous technical manpower supply.[59] At the secondary level there is an overwhelming concentration of enrolments in the general stream (which increased from 89.1% in 1970/71 to 92.0% in 1974/75), not least because this is regarded as the easiest route into the University.[60]

This mismatch is to some extent a result of the second policy decision, expounded by the 1961 constitution (Article 41), that all Kuwaiti nationals are entitled to employment in the public sector. The government has regarded the provision of public sector employment as a mechanism for effecting the distribution of growing oil revenues

(through wages and salaries). Thus the institution of a guaranteed employment policy for all nationals was accompanied by relatively high rates of pay. Sinclair (1977) suggests that the relatively poor performance of Kuwaiti males throughout the education system is a reflection of the alternative opportunities available to them almost irrespective of their academic performance. This is underlined by the fact that in 1972 31.4% of Kuwaitis employed by the government were illiterate. Sinclair goes on to infer that "The pattern of Kuwaiti enrolment in school is largely a response to the signals they receive from the labour market, in particular relative rates of pay for different jobs in the government."[61] Not only are rates of pay higher in the public sector but the differential increases with diminishing skill requirements. It is therefore seemingly logical for unskilled nationals to seek government employment, in many cases this is effectively on a sinecure basis. Thus while the formal activity rates of Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti males are roughly equal between the ages of 24 and 40 (see table 4.14) the extent of productive labour market participation among the former is questionable.

In sum the 1960's and early 1970's saw a progressive segmentation of the labour market into specifically Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti sectors. Through this process the relatively limited supply of indigenous labour became increasingly concentrated in the public sector and within that sector in unskilled or semi-skilled occupations. In 1970 eight non-technical occupations accounted for 70.6% of all Kuwaiti male employment. The census results indicate that 15,678, (26.3% of all Kuwaiti labour) were employed as

'foremen and policemen' and a further 10.1% (6,035) as building caretakers.[62] Indeed there is evidence to suggest that Kuwaiti nationals were leaving employment in the construction and manufacturing sectors for better paid and more secure employment in the public sector. Between 1957 and 1965 Kuwaiti employment had increased by 49.0%, significantly however over 60% of that increase was in community and personal services which accounted for 63.5% of economically active nationals. Over the same period there had been an absolute fall (of 10.2%) in employment in the production labour category. By 1970 the employment of Kuwaiti nationals in community and personal services (predominantly government services) had increased to 36,826 (a 44.3% increase on 1965) accounting for 68.5% of all Kuwaiti employment and for 58.1% of the growth in Kuwaiti employment. Only 2,133 nationals (3.6% of the total) were enumerated in the construction sector.

Non-Kuwaiti employment increased by 143.3% between 1957 and 1965, accounting for 77.6% of total employment. A particularly large increase occurred in the construction sector (from 8,025 to 27,584) and in services (2,053 to 57,015). The 1965 census data provides the earliest sub-division of non-Kuwaiti employment by nationality from which the labour market characteristics of Jordanians and Palestinians can be determined.

In 1965 'Jordanians' represented 25.5% of total non-Kuwaiti employment and were the largest single national group. Table 4.15 shows clearly their influential position in the labour market and confirms the inferences made from

the 1961 Jordanian census regarding the selective nature of emigration. Jordanians and Palestinians represented 42.2% of professional and technical manpower and 49.4% of clerical workers in the non-Kuwaiti labour force. The former accounted for 13.7% of all Jordanian and Palestinian manpower in Kuwait, a markedly higher proportion than most other nationalities (with the notable exception of Egyptian's whose high rate of employment at this level, 52.0%, reflects the secondment basis of their migration).[63] At the same time 46% of 'Jordanians' were classified as production and related labour, a relatively small proportion compared to the majority of other nationalities (for example: Pakistani, 72%; Iranian, 72%; Syrian, 60%; Iraq, 54%).

Between 1965 and 1970 the inflow of 'Jordanians' was, occupationally, less selective. This is reflected in their increased contribution to the production and related labour category, which grew by 33% to 16,672, compared to the overall increase in 'Jordanian' employment of 15%. By 1970 this category accounted for over 40% of 'Jordanians' in employment. The latter's share of total non-Kuwaiti employment had fallen slightly (to 24%) but they retained their prominence in the higher skill occupations, accounting for 38% of professional and technical labour and 45% of all clerical workers. The proportion of active 'Jordanians' at these skill levels had increased to 20% and 18% respectively.[64] Data on sector of employment reveals that 36% were engaged in services (rising to 91% for 'Jordanian' females).

Overall segmentation of the labour market, into Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti sectors, is further evidenced by

consideration of their sectoral employment distribution. Kuwaiti's accounted for only 6% of labour in the construction sector and 19% in manufacturing. This segmentation, into essentially non-competitive Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti sectors, is further emphasised by comparing their respective occupation/education distribution (table 4.16). Kuwaitis are clearly over-represented at the A-2 (professional arts) and C-1 (skilled and semi-skilled office) levels, and under-represented in the A-1 and B, technical occupations.

4.5.3 Between 1970 and 1975 total employment rose by 64,100, of which 57% was accounted for by the increase in non-Kuwaitis whose labour market share was 71%. Although there was a small growth in the Kuwaiti share of the labour market, the absolute number engaged in some sectors (notably construction) fell further (by 20% in construction). In contrast their service sector employment increased (by 74%) to represent 73% of all active Kuwaitis. Employment growth in this sector accounted for 83% of the increase in employment among nationals.

The 1975 occupational data has been re-classified as before (table 4.16), confirming the trends identified. Kuwaiti manpower continued to be over-represented at the A-2 and C-1 levels (the latter accounting for almost 25% of total Kuwaiti employment) and considerably under-represented in A-1, B and C-2 occupations. There has also been a marked increase (98%) in the employment of unskilled Kuwaitis, from 19,500 to 38,600, the bulk clearly absorbed in public sector employment.

By 1975 some 211,444 non-Kuwaitis were economically active in Kuwait, of whom 29% were Asians, a share which had

remained relatively constant since 1965. The non-Kuwait market continued to be dominated by 'Jordanians' (22% of the total) however the relaxation of Egyptian emigration regulations had enabled a rapid growth in the volume of Egyptian employment in Kuwait (increasing to 37,464, 18% of the total). The two other major labour suppliers were Iran (27,530, 13%) whose share had been declining (from 21% in 1970) with increased opportunities in the domestic (Iranian) labour market, and Indian (21,448, 10%). 'Jordanians' were however a particularly influential group, occupying key posts in the economy, particularly in the public sector. In 1975 the latter employed 43% of 'Jordanians' in Kuwait who accounted for 16% of all government sector employees. The varying employment characteristics and occupational structure of different nationalities will be considered in detail below (see chapter 5.4).

4.6 Conclusion: the maturation of migration streams

4.6.1 This chapter began by illustrating the role of recruitment in establishing the initial flow of primarily skilled, professional and single 'Jordanians' into Kuwait in the early post-1948 period. The collapse of unskilled labour flows from Iraq in 1961 was an important factor in the diversification and expansion of 'Jordanian' immigration in the early 1960's. This expansion was accompanied, particularly after the 1967 war, by an increasing inflow of dependants. The demographic maturation of the 'Jordanian' community in Kuwait during the 1960's, and 1970's appears to fit the four stage 'model' of maturing migration streams

outlined by Böhning (1972).[65] We have also shown that different migration streams 'mature' at different rates. The rapidity with which the 'Jordanian' migration stream has reached the stage of long duration migration, of low labour force participation and of high demands on the host, is traced to the historical and structural features which have characterized their migration.

The influential role of 'Jordanians' in the Kuwait economy is emphasised by the February 1976 survey of government civil servants.[66] This showed Jordanians and Palestinians to account for almost one-third (32.5%) of all non-Kuwaiti's in the civil service. Differentiating between Palestinians and East Bank 'Jordanians' the survey shows the dominance of the former (94%), of whom 58% had been engaged for ten or more years.

These characteristics of 'Jordanian' emigration to Kuwait are important both in terms of their impact on the Jordanian economy itself and, as we will see in the following chapter (5), in the subsequent development of 'Jordanian' employment in Kuwait in the post-1975 period.

Notes

1. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1978b) The nature and process of labour importing in the Arabian Gulf States of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the U.A.E.

2. Audsley, M.T. 'Report on a visit to Bahrain, January and February 1949', 22.4.1949. PRO, FO 371/74942. See also: 'Report of the Bahrain Agency for 1948', PRO, FO 371/74935.

3. 'Report on education in Kuwait, October 1939 (Dundas)'. IOR, R/15/5/196.

4. 'Report on education in Kuwait, October 1940 (Vallence)'. IOR, R/15/5/196. Vallence criticised the use of untrained graduates for teaching as a: "... viscious circle which can result in little success until sound education has been established at the Mabarakiyah school itself."

5. 'Report on education in Kuwait, December 1943 (Wakelin)', and 'Memorandum on education in the schools of the Government of Bahrain and Kuwait', 11.3.1945. IOR, R/15/5/197.

6. In September 1948 Palestinian teachers were again recruited for Kuwait. Highwood to British Council, 17.9.1948, mentions that: "The members of the Education Council who are summering in Lebanon have been active in appointing teachers."

7. Lt. Col. T.C. Fowle (Political Resident at Bushire, July 1932-August 1939) to Lt. Col. P.G. Loch (Political Agent in Bahrain, November 1932-April 1937), 31.12.1935. IOR, R/15/2/1717.

8. Smith (BAPCO) to Loch (Bahrain), 24.8.1936. IOR, R/15/2/1717.

9. Cptn. T. Hickinbotham (Political Agent in Bahrain, April-October 1937) to Smith (BAPCO), 12.4.1937. IOR, R/15/2/1717.

10. Smith (BAPCO) to Weightman (Political Agent in Bahrain, October 1937-October 1940), 28.12.1937. IOR, R/15/2/1717.

11. Dudley (Protector of Emigrants, Bombay) to Smith (BAPCO), 17.6.1937. IOR, R/15/2/1717.

12. The number of Indians registered at the Bahrain Agency 1930-39 was:

Year	No.	Year	No.
1930	459	1935	584
1931	534	1936	1,161
1932	576	1937	1,659
1933	571	1938	1,689
1934	567	1939*	1,588

* First nine months only.

13. Lt. Col. C.G. Prior (Political Resident at Bushire, September 1939-May 1946), personal memorandum dated 26.2.1941. IOR, R/15/2/1565.

14. Anderson (BAPCO) to Major T. Hickinbotham (Political Agent in Bahrain, October 1943-March 1945), 13.6.1944. IOR, R/15/2/1719.

15. Hickinbotham to Anderson, 21.6.1944. IOR, R/15/2/1719.

16. Hickinbotham to Anderson, 24.6.1944. IOR, R/15/2/1719.

17. Weightman to Lt. Col. W.R. Hay (Political Resident at Bushire, May 1946-May 1953), 6.4.1938. IOR, R/15/2/344.

18. C.D. Belgrave (Chief British Adviser to Bahrain) to Lt. Col. J.C. Pelly (Political Resident in Bahrain, March 1947-March 1951), 25.4.1949. IOR, R/15/2/1565.

19. Prior (Bushire) to Weightman (Bahrain), 17.9.1937. IOR, R/15/2/344 asks for evidence with which to counter the Government of India's claim that: "... Indian interest on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf is diminishing and there is therefore little justification for the expenditure of Indian funds ..." Weightman's reply (6.4.1938) stresses the importance of Indian employment in the area and the role of the Agency in promoting those interests and in facilitating the payment of remittances to India, "Quite apart from the importance to India of the air route and oil, I should like to direct attention to an increasing market for Indian products and a small but potentially increasing field of employment for Indians ..." Weightman later (18.10.1939) suggests: "That this number will increase I am firmly convinced. Oil prospects in Qatar now seem quite good and when the war is over there is bound to be development along the coast. All this means increased opportunities for the employment of Indians."

20. This interpretation of Bahrain's labour market development is contrary to that of Nahkleh (1976) who emphasised the role of BAPCO. Nahkleh traced the influx of immigrant labour to the 1938 BAPCO strike. Prior to that he claims the vast majority of workers were Bahraini "... but as a result of this strike BAPCO began to employ Indian and Iranian workers extensively ... Company officials reasoned that since these workers were not directly concerned with the country's political life they would be more loyal and docile than Bahraini workers." Furthermore he suggests that non-Bahraini workers "... accepted lower wages than his Bahraini counterpart." Nahkleh, E.A. (1976) Bahrain, Political Development in a Modernizing Society. Nahkleh tries to create the impression that BAPCO were seeking to create a segmented labour market and to play off indigenous against immigrant labour, to undermine the power of the nascent Bahraini workers movement. However the import of foreign workers has been shown here to date to before

the 1938 strike. Furthermore there is no evidence to suggest that Persians were regarded as apolitical, on the contrary BAPCO were well aware of the Political Agent's and of the Sheikh's misgivings. While Nahkleh recognises the importance of recruitment in the establishment of migration streams he does not recognise that such recruitment may be directed by authorities other than the employer. The employment of Indians appears to have been a compromise between the desire for a mobile supply of skilled and semi-skilled manpower and the restrictions imposed against Persians who were regarded as the nearest and cheapest supply. Persians could be brought over on local dhows at their own expense and examined for their suitability as employees by local BAPCO agents before hiring or rejecting them; in contrast Indians had to be given a formal contract in Bombay and passage and guarantees of good conduct paid.

21. Piore, M.J. (1979) Birds of Passage: Migrant labour and industrial societies. p. 24.

22. Indeed the Mandate authorities took steps to prevent the recruitment of Palestinian and Transjordanian labour for work in Eritrea. In June 1935 Italian contractors attempted to recruit over 1000 labourers for construction work on the Nile Dams. The Colonial Office emphasised that "such employment should be prevented" and the Government of Palestine enacted special legislation to prevent its occurrence. Downie (Colonial Office) and Randell (Government of Palestine) 4.7.1935. PRO, J/2658/1/1 and J/4038/1/1.

23. Supplement to the Survey of Palestine. Government of Palestine, June 1947.

24. Foreign Office to Hay (Bahrain), March 1949. IOR, R/15/3/318.

25. Jackson (Political Agent Kuwait) to the General Manager of Kuwait Oil Company and to the Local Representative of the American Independant Oil Company in Kuwait, 14.3.1947. IOR, R/15/3/318.

26. Morris (AMINCO) to Jackson, 25.4.1949 and KOC to Jackson, 10.4.1949. IOR, R/15/3/318.

27. For example Palestinians were employed in the Kuwait Postal Service to replace Indian labour, following the loss of their employment in the Government of Palestine as clerks. See Breach to Dredge, 23.3.1949. The Kuwait Post Office had complained of delays in delivery due to their Indian staff's ignorance of the Arabic language. IOR, R/15/3/318.

28. Jackson (Kuwait) to Hay (Bahrain), 14.3.1949. IOR, R/15/5/318.

29. BMEO (Cairo) to Jackson (Kuwait), 22.9.1949. IOR, R/15/5/318.

30. Abu-Lughod, J. (1980) 'Demographic charcteristics of the Palestinian population: relevance for planning the Palestine Open University'.

31. See: 'UNRWA, Instruction No. 27', 4.5.1951, for information on the establishment of the "Service de Placement de l'unrwa". Also see Audsley to Knight, 23.1.1951, 'Notes on the essential points of an employment exchange service'. PRO, FO 371/91418.

32. Badran, N. (1982) 'Palestinian migration: trends and socio-economic consequences'. p. 493.

33. KOC to Jackson (Kuwait) 10.4.1949. IOR, R/15/5/318.

34. Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (1959) Census of Population, February 1957.

35. Other sources of error relate to the attrition of the migrant stock due to re-migration or death in the period 1947-57 for which there is no compensatory data. This error may be minimal since the period is primarily one of in-migration, as evidenced by secondary sources, in which employment opportunities and prevailing wage rates in Kuwait were a disincentive to re-migration. In addition the political upheavals in Iraq, Palestine and India during this period added a further disincentive to return migration. Error due to mortality is expected to be limited since the immigrant population consisted largely of young males (63% of non-Kuwaitis were aged 15-39).

36. The Land Purchase Scheme was established in 1951. Large scale Government Land purchasing, for re-sale, was undertaken from 1952-3 with the primary aim of disbursing state revenues into the private sector and secondly to facilitate the reconstruction of Kuwait city. A significant effect was the influx of construction labour. Between 1957 and 1965 the labour force in construction increased from circa 10,000 to over 30,000 (1965 Census, table 7a/b) of whom 27,584 were immigrants. In 1960/61 KD. 42.9 Mn. were allocated to this scheme. Kuwait, Planning Board, Central Statistical Office (1966) Statistical Abstract 1965.

37. Only limited data has been released from the enumeration of May 1961 conducted for the Ministry of Health. Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Statistics Control Department (1962) The Population of Kuwait, 1961. Unpublished tables p. 2 (Arabic).

38. For example: Hill, A.G. (1977) 'The demography of the population of Kuwait'. Population Bulletin of ECWA, no. 13 (July). pp. 42-55.

39. Assuming non-participation of those under 12 and that only 5% of females were economically active.

40. According to the length of residence data contained in the 1957 Census. Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (1959). op. cit. Table 7a/b. (Arabic).

41. Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Statistics Control Department. 'Entry and departures figures, June to December 1961.' Unpublished tables (Arabic). This excludes the members of the Arab League's Peace Keeping Force which arrived in September.

42. Adding those Palestinians arriving from other locations suggests a total of circa 42,000.

43. Kuwait Planning Board (1967) Results of the Population census in Kuwait, 1965. (Arabic) Table 24, pp. 213-5. This is a minimal estimate because of emigration and death between 1961 and 1965.

44. For a discussion of these events see: Niblock, T. (1982) 'Iraqi policies towards the Arab states of the Gulf, 1957-1981'.

45. Sinclair, C.A. (1977) 'Education in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar: An Economic Assessment'. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham.) pp. 51-53.

46. Kuwait, Planning Board, Central Statistical Office (1972) Kuwait Population Census 1970. (Arabic).

47. idem. (1971) Statistical Abstract, 1970. Table 31, p. 60.

48. Hill, A.G. (1969) 'Aspects of the urban development of Kuwait' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham.) pp. 108-32.

49. Kuwait, Planning Board, Central Statistical Office (1981) Statistical Abstract 1980. Table 48, p. 54. The majority of naturalizations result from the marriage of Kuwaiti men and non-Kuwaiti women.

50. idem. Annual Bulletin of Vital Statistics 1974, table 18, p. 46/47; 1975 table 18 p. 52 and 1977 table 18 p. 49 (Arabic). Comparative live births for selected nationalities were:

Nationality	1974	1975	1977
Iraqi	1136	1131	1212
Syrian	1709	1990	2552
Lebanese	822	793	1029
Saudi	670	683	826
Egyptian	1123	1334	2139
Jordanian and Palestinian	9375	9319	9577
Iranian	798	871	1017
Indian	616	708	1132
Pakistani	820	986	1295

51. idem. (1981) Statistical Abstract 1980. Table 313, p. 353 and previous years. In the five years 1974/75 to 1979/80 the rate of increase in enrolments continued at this high level of 19.5% per annum. In 1979/80 Jordanians and Palestinians accounted for 55.9% of non-Kuwaiti enrolments.

52. See Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1981) 'Demographic settling amongst migrant workers'.

53. See for example Abdul Hamid Al-Attar, 'Kuwaitization v. Egyptianization'. Kuwait Daily News, 6 November 1975.

54. This view was first expressed in Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980b) Arab Manpower: the crisis of development.

55. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1978b) op. cit.

56. Azzam, H.T. (1979) 'The participation of Arab women in the labour force: development factors and policies'.

57. This is an increase on the 2.5% in 1965. The bulk of increase relates to those with educational qualifications. In 1965 29% of economically active Kuwaiti women had successfully completed intermediate or higher education, by 1970 this proportion had grown to 60.6%. This suggests that the continued expansion in female enrolments may increase labour market participation. However this is likely to provide only a long term amelioration of indigenous labour shortages in a restricted range of occupations.

58. Between 1951/52 and 1970/61 Kuwait's oil revenues increased from KD. 6.34 Mn. to KD. 158.61 Mn. and to KD. 225.33 Mn. in 1965/66 as oil production grew from 0.35 Mn. b/day to 2.36 Mn. b/day. In 1962 the government established the Planning Board to undertake systematic economic appraisal.

59. In 1975 the participation rate of Kuwaiti males aged 15-19 was only 242 per 1000.

60. There is no entry to the University from the technical stream and for those in commerce the required pass rate is higher than that from general studies. For details see: Sinclair, C.A. (1977) op. cit. pp. 282-317.

61. ibid. p. 316. On the relations between non-Kuwaiti officials and their Kuwaiti subordinates see the study by Al-Rayes, T.M. (1979) 'Authority and influence in the government civil service in the state of Kuwait' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School).

62. Kuwait, Planning Board, Central Statistical Office (1972) op. cit. Table 23, pp. 196-7 (Arabic).

63. See Dessouki, A.E.H. (1982) 'The shift in Egypt's migration policy: 1952-78'. MES, vol. 18(1) pp. 53-68.

64. Note that the proportion of Egyptians in professional and technical occupations had fallen to 35.4%.

65. Böhning, W.R. (1972) The migration of workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community. pp. 54-71. Bohning defines four phases of maturity:
First Phase:
young single workers, usually male form the bulk of the migration stream and contains a higher level of skills than the non-migrant population as a whole; their duration of stay is likely to be very short.
Second Phase:
the migration stream ages slightly, its sex composition remains unchanged but includes a higher proportion of married workers; extension of the areas of origin brings a greater variety, but lower level, of skills; duration of stay increases slightly.
Third Phase:
continuation in the ageing of the migration stream and changing in the sex composition in favour of the originally under-represented sex as married workers send for their spouses; ratio of economically active to inactive immigrants falls as children join parents abroad; duration of stay increases further; skill level is depressed further, though still on balance higher than that of the non-migrant population.
Fourth Phase:
Longer stays and a significant extent of family reunion lead to an enlargement of the immigrant population forming groups and colonies demanding 'ethnic' services and institutions staffed by their own nationals, migration thus becomes self-feeding.

66. Kuwait, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (1977). 'Survey of government civil servants, February 1976'. (Arabic). The survey enumerated some 22,633 'Jordanians and Palestinians' in the civil service.

Table 4.1

Bahrain Petroleum Company, Monthly Paid Labour Roster, 1948

Nationality	Number of Employees
Indian	238
Pakistani	35
Portuguese Indian	18
Bahraini	51
Iraqi	4
Iranian	3
Other	5

Source: M.T. Audsley, PRO, FO371/74942, April 1949.

Table 4.2

Kuwait: Length of residence at February 1957 by nationality and date of arrival

Nationality	Date of arrival: Post-Feb. 1956	1955	1954	1953	1952	1951	1950	1949	1948	Pre-Feb. 1948	Total Male	1957 Female
Jordanian and Palestinian	1,476	3,201	2,125	2,457	1,827	813	268	139	123	138	9,785	2,782
(as % of total)	(15.3)	(21.4)	(18.9)	(26.3)	(24.6)	(15.6)	(12.2)	(7.4)	(7.3)	(2.5)	(17.4)	(21.7)
Iraqi	2,361	2,415	1,999	1,583	1,304	1,426	513	450	371	1,325	10,580	3,167
Muscat/Omani	849	1,126	656	552	434	352	249	196	187	787	4,941	447
Other Emirates*	335	359	285	157	76	69	31	35	11	163	1,396	125
Saudi	110	211	109	121	94	120	57	68	64	495	1,117	332
Lebanese	1,294	1,565	1,011	912	732	319	110	45	22	29	4,793	1,246
Egyptian	284	484	365	197	111	76	12	6	5	6	770	776
Iranian	1,470	3,795	3,348	2,024	1,590	1,345	625	461	300	1,488	15,641	805
Indian	370	427	397	382	462	211	77	197	215	433	2,358	813
Pakistani	282	363	268	247	213	149	81	87	135	289	1,578	536
Others	387	508	360	495	366	249	147	193	236	405	2,020	1,326
Total	9,669	14,945	11,243	9,354	7,420	5,227	2,204	1,890	1,674	5,573	56,395	12,804

Source: Government of Kuwait (1959) General results of the 1957 Census. Tables 7a/b. (Arabic) Author's compilation.

* Includes Qatar and Bahrain

Table 4.3

Kuwait: Length of residence at April 1965, by nationality and date of arrival

Nationality	Date of arrival: Post April 1964	1963	1962	1961	1960	1959	1958	1957	Pre April 1957	Total 1965 Male	Female
Jordanian and Palestinian (% female)	12,918 (42.3)	7,884 (45.1)	9,605 (42.9)	10,581 (34.7)	7,581 (35.5)	7,556 (29.9)	4,049 (38.9)	3,777 (34.9)	13,811 (24.2)	49,744	27,968
Iraqi	3,964	2,760	3,050	1,643	1,268	1,501	1,305	1,502	8,904	15,762	10,135
Syrian	3,407	2,247	2,554	1,975	1,293	1,428	1,364	931	1,650	12,075	4,774
Lebanese	2,969	2,007	2,513	2,141	1,619	1,885	1,999	1,425	4,319	12,820	8,057
Egyptian	1,663	1,531	2,230	1,491	1,062	1,039	718	479	808	5,796	5,225
Omani	2,687	1,938	2,272	1,998	1,740	1,698	1,286	1,146	4,666	16,848	2,736
Saudi	491	271	322	373	360	368	288	293	1,866	2,881	1,751
Other Emirates*	319	152	177	156	149	151	123	116	668	1,361	650
Yemeni	256	205	299	536	278	349	345	155	212	2,693	86
Iranian	2,337	5,071	6,391	4,467	2,646	2,200	1,321	1,178	5,179	29,025	1,765
Indian	1,360	1,083	1,123	962	853	991	1,025	920	3,382	7,735	3,964
Pakistani	1,487	1,399	1,295	986	793	979	1,144	977	2,674	7,633	4,102

Source: Kuwait, Planning Board (1966) Results of the Population Census 1965. Table 24 (Arabic). Author's compilation.

* Includes Qatar and Bahrain

Table 4.4

Kuwait: Immigrant population structure by nationality, 1965

Nationality	Population under 15		% total population female	Total population
	No.	%		
Jordanian and Palestinian	27,468	35.3	36.0	77,712
Iraqi	8,137	31.4	39.1	25,897
Lebanese	7,742	37.1	38.6	70,877
Syrian	4,290	25.5	28.3	16,849
Egyptian	3,435	31.2	47.4	11,021
Omani	3,639	18.6	14.0	19,584
Saudi	1,854	40.3	37.8	4,632
Sudanese	69	16.5	18.9	418
Bahraini	313	41.9	41.0	747
Other Emirates	374	33.9	27.2	1,264
Yemeni	136	4.3	3.1	2,779
Iranian	1,923	6.3	5.7	30,790
Indian	2,947	25.2	33.9	11,699
Pakistani	3,760	32.0	35.0	11,735

Source: ibid. table 23 (Arabic). Author's compilation.

Table 4.5

Kuwait: length of residence at April 1970, by nationality and date of arrival

Nationality	Date of arrival: 1970	1969	1968	1967	1966	1965	Pre April 1965	Total 1970 Male	Female
Jordanian and Palestinian	12,603	10,297	16,901	21,628	12,258	12,418	62,601	79,934	67,762
(% female)	(52.0)	(51.2)	(49.8)	(55.8)	(50.5)	(48.1)	(37.2)		
Iraqi	4,270	3,398	4,210	3,448	2,975	3,167	17,598	23,583	15,483
Syrian	3,326	2,751	3,641	3,044	2,425	2,111	9,919	17,180	10,037
Lebanese	2,322	1,669	2,115	2,094	1,746	1,807	12,490	14,145	11,242
Egyptian	4,129	5,297	5,951	3,848	2,567	1,544	7,085	19,392	13,029
Omani	1,657	1,532	1,658	1,233	932	954	6,704	12,432	2,238
Saudi	814	638	892	765	749	811	6,228	6,025	4,872
Other Emirates*	555	375	431	340	349	357	2,255	3,433	2,085
Sudanese	103	92	123	100	91	59	142	562	211
Yemeni (A.R.)	294	223	202	195	152	190	1,107	2,026	337
Yemeni (P.D.R.)	1,254	1,037	989	761	619	553	3,391	7,839	765
Iranian	4,063	6,303	6,589	4,832	3,179	2,604	11,549	35,498	3,631
Indian	2,303	1,682	1,956	1,505	1,069	1,047	7,774	10,510	6,826
Pakistani	1,785	1,160	1,388	1,204	850	998	7,327	9,438	5,274

Source: Kuwait, Central Statistical Office (1972) General Population Census 1970. Vol. I, Table 44. (Arabic) Author's compilation.

Table 4.6

Kuwait: immigrant population structure by nationality 1970

Nationality	Population under 15		% total population female	Total population
	No.	%		
Jordanian and Palestinian	74,419	50.4	45.9	147,696
Iraq	14,132	36.2	39.6	39,066
Lebanese	11,333	44.6	44.3	25,387
Syrian	9,293	34.1	36.9	27,217
Egyptian	7,732	25.4	42.8	30,421
Omani	3,252	22.2	15.3	14,670
Saudi	4,325	39.7	44.7	10,897
Sudanese	209	28.5	28.8	733
Bahraini	362	37.5	47.3	966
Other Emirates	1,920	10.2	35.8	18,824
Yemeni	1,230	14.3	11.2	8,604
Iranian	3,658	9.3	9.3	39,129
Indian	4,419	25.3	39.4	17,336
Pakinstani	5,448	37.0	35.8	14,712

Source: ibid. Table 3 and p. 347 (Arabic). Author's compilation.

Table 4.7

Kuwait: crude emigration rates (per 1000 population) by nationality, 1961-1975

Nationality	Crude Emigration Rate (per 1000) per annum: 1961-1965	1965-1970	1970-1975
Jordanian and Palestinian	102.4	37.0	10.5
Iraqi	138.4	59.6	46.5
Lebanese	127.4	64.9	57.1
Syrian)	159.4	77.7	39.3
Egyptian)		66.9	51.1
Omani	115.4	127.5	59.5
Saudi	-	-	20.1
Yemeni	-	-	42.4
Bahrain	-	81.2	56.3
Sudanese	-	92.5	26.8
Iranian	141.4	120.5	93.1
Pakistani	80.4	70.7	33.9
Indian	69.5	62.5	25.3

Source: Derived from tables 4.3 and 4.5 above; for 1970-75 data was taken from: Kuwait, Central Statistical Office (1977) Population Census 1975. Table 48 (Arabic). Author's compilation.

Note : In the case of Saudi and Yemeni immigrants the 1970 and 1965 censuses both record higher numbers of residents of five years (or more) than were recorded in the previous census (i.e. of 1965 and 1961). This indicates the extent of under-enumeration in these two

Table 4.8

Kuwait: immigrant population structure by nationality, 1975

Nationality	Population under 10 No.	%	% total population female	Total population
Jordanian and Palestinian	87,043	42.6	47.2	204,178
Iraqi	11,546	25.6	41.2	45,070
Lebanese	8,222	33.2	46.7	24,776
Syrian	12,833	31.3	39.8	40,962
Egyptian	10,479	17.3	40.9	60,534
Omani	1,958	26.8	30.0	7,313
Saudi	4,850	38.7	47.2	12,527
Sudanese	363	23.3	27.9	1,553
Arab Gulf Nationals	1,368	33.7	50.3	4,056
Yemeni	2,876	16.8	18.0	17,163
Iranian	6,122	15.0	18.3	40,842
Indian	5,244	16.3	47.7	32,105
Pakinstani	5,698	24.8	34.8	23,016

Source: Kuwait, Central Statistical Office (1977) op. cit. vol. II, table 97 (Arabic). Author's compilation.

Note: the census does not provide data on the population under 15 as a cohort.

Table 4.9

Kuwait: summary statistical indicators of 'Jordanian' demographic characteristics 1957-1975

Year	Population Size	Annual population growth rate	As a % of non-Kuwaitis	% under age 15	Sex ratio	Crude Participation rate	Emigration rate (per 1000)
1957	14,081	-	20.3	19.2	355.0	75%	-
1961	37,327	27.6%	23.4	-	217.9	56%	-
1965	77,712	20.1%	31.4	35.3	177.9	46.4%	102.4
1970	147,696	9.6%	37.7	50.4	117.9	28.4%	37.0
1975	204,178	6.7%	39.1	53.6	111.7	23.3%	10.5

Source: text section 4.4.5

Table 4.10

Kuwait: Jordanian and Palestinian enrolment in State schools, 1962/3-1979/80

Academic Year	Male	Female	Jordanians and Palestinians as a % of total enrolment
1962/3	4,178	2,653	11.5
1963/4	4,764	3,349	11.6
1964/5	5,148	3,873	11.4
1965/6	6,304	4,945	12.3
1966/7	6,758	5,628	12.2
1967/8	7,218	6,056	11.9
1968/9	7,097	6,011	10.9
1969/70	7,210	6,197	10.4
1970/1	8,061	6,874	10.8
1971/2	9,328	8,807	12.0
1972/3	11,339	11,006	14.0
1973/4	13,421	13,146	15.7
1974/5	16,005	15,907	17.5
1975/6	19,880	19,974	19.7
1976/7	31,477	29,891	26.1
1977/8	34,485	32,911	26.6
1978/9	37,332	35,502	27.2
1979/80	40,007	37,800	27.3

Source: Kuwait, Central Statistical Office (1981) Statistical Abstract, 1980 (and preceding years). Table 313.

Note : The increase in 1976-7 relates to the integration of 'Palestinian' schools into the state school system.

Table 4.11

Kuwait: national and non-national employment growth 1957-1975

Year	Kuwaiti Employment				Non-Kuwaiti Employment				Total Employment	
	No.	% total employment	Crude participation rate	Annual growth rate %	No.	% total employment	Crude participation rate	Annual growth rate %	No.	Annual growth rate %
1957	28,373	33.2	25.0	-	57,182	66.8	61.6	-	85,555	-
1965	40,166	22.4	18.3	4.4	139,118	77.6	56.3	11.7	179,284	9.7
1970	59,634	25.4	17.2	8.2	174,720	74.6	44.7	4.6	234,354	5.5
1975	86,971	29.1	18.6	7.9	211,444	70.9	40.5	3.9	298,415	4.9

Source: Kuwait, Central Statistical Office, 1959, 1966, 1972 and 1977. op. cit. Tables 4, 7, 14 and 59 respectively (Arabic). Author's compilation.

Table 4.12

Kuwait: national and non-national distribution of occupations by ISCO grouping, 1957-75

Major list titles	% Distribution Kuwaitis				% Distribution non-Kuwaitis			
	1957	1965	1970	1975	1957	1965	1970	1975
Professional and technical	1.7	3.6	6.1	11.2	5.8	8.6	12.4	15.2
Administrative and managerial	1.9	3.5	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.8	0.7	0.8
Clerical	11.4	18.2	18.6	20.5	7.7	8.9	9.5	9.5
Sales	12.9	10.9	10.6	7.1	4.3	7.5	8.3	8.5
Services	14.9	33.2	37.6	37.8	9.1	21.8	19.6	21.5
Agricultural	2.2	1.8	1.4	4.5	1.2	2.1	1.7	1.8
Production and related	39.4	23.8	21.7	17.7	67.2	48.5	47.5	42.7
Not classified	15.6	5.0	3.0	-	3.4	0.8	0.3	-

Source: as table 4.11

Table 4.13

Kuwait: national and non-national employment by sector of employment 1957-1975

Sector of Employment	Kuwaiti					Non-Kuwaiti				
	1957	1965	1970	1975	% distribution 1975	1957	1965	1970	1975	% distribution 1975
Agriculture and fishing	603	573	802	3,983	4.6	446	1,410	3,258	3,531	1.7
Mining and quarrying	1,211	1,349	1,675	1,779	2.0	4,194	5,643	5,498	3,080	1.5
Manufacturing	1,029	1,825	6,109	2,258	2.6	5,582	16,117	25,982	22,209	10.5
Construction	378	1,264	2,188	1,756	2.0	8,025	27,584	31,484	30,500	14.4
Utilities	-	1,645	2,133	2,034	2.3	-	5,346	5,119	5,237	2.5
Wholesale and retail trade	4,151	5,129	7,298	6,327	7.3	4,073	17,916	25,715	33,232	15.7
Transport, storage and communications	1,513	2,613	2,362	4,562	5.3	2,053	7,412	9,776	11,118	5.3
Community and personal services	14,681	25,519	36,826	64,826	73.9	29,219	57,015	67,319	102,537	48.4
Unspecified	4,802	249	241	2	-	3,590	675	580	-	-
Total	28,373	40,166	59,634	86,971	100.0	57,182	139,118	174,720	211,444	100.0

Source: as table 4.11

Table 4.14

Kuwait: national and non-national crude participation rates (per 1000) by age group, 1975

Age Group	Kuwaiti		Non-Kuwaiti	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
15-19	242	16	517	93
20-24	737	131	909	178
25-29	927	137	979	247
30-34	962	64	989	278
35-39	965	33	990	315
40-44	940	26	988	377
45-49	889	23	987	380
50-54	802	18	978	370
55-59	723	16	955	270
60+	404	9	755	109
Total	712	62	920	207

Source: Kuwait, Central Statistical Office (1977) op. cit. Tables 60-61 (Arabic). Author's compilation.

Table 4.15

Kuwait: 'Jordanians' by occupational group, 1965-1970

Occupational Group	1965 Distribution of 'Jordanians' (%)	1965 Distribution of total non-Kuwaitis (%)	1965 'Jordanian' share of employment	1970 Distribution of 'Jordanians' (%)	1970 Distribution of total non-Kuwaitis (%)	1970 'Jordanian' share of employment
Professional and technical	13.7	8.3	42.2	20.0	12.4	37.8
Administrative and managerial	1.7	1.8	25.2	0.7	0.7	23.3
Clerical	15.2	7.8	49.4	18.1	9.5	44.7
Sales	5.6	7.5	19.1	8.2	8.3	23.3
Services	13.8	21.9	16.0	10.3	19.6	12.4
Agricultural	3.1	2.0	38.6	2.3	1.7	31.0
Production and related workers	46.0	49.5	23.7	40.3	47.5	19.9
Not classified	0.9	1.2	20.4	0.1	0.3	19.7
Total	36,027	141,293	25.5	41,415	173,679	23.5

Source: Kuwait, Central Statistical Office (1966 and 1972) op. cit. Tables 30 and 53 respectively. (Author's calculations)

Table 4.16

Kuwait: national and non-national distribution of employment by occupation/education group, 1970 and 1975

Occupation/ Education Group	% distribution: 1970		1975	
	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti
A-1	10.4	89.6	10.2	89.8
A-2	53.9	46.1	53.3	46.7
B	28.6	71.4	21.1	78.9
C-1	35.6	64.4	36.4	63.6
C-2	14.3	85.7	20.6	79.4
D	35.0	65.0	30.9	69.1
Total	29.1	70.9	25.4	74.6

Source: Kuwait, Central Statistical Office (1972 and 1977) op. cit. Tables 23 and 50 respectively. (Author's compilation)

CHAPTER FIVE

JORDANIANS IN KUWAIT, A CASE STUDY: (2) RECENT TRENDS, 1975-81

5.1 Preface

5.1.1 Earlier (chapter 3), using Jordanian data, we established that emigration for employment from the East Bank had peaked in the late 1970's and had experienced a sustained decline thereafter. Here (chapter 5) we complete our case study of the Kuwait labour market by examining that period (1975-81) in some detail. This will aim to describe changes in the level and characteristics of Jordanian immigration and employment, evaluating those changes in the context of contemporaneous developments among other immigrant workers. In doing so we advance an explanation for this change in the level of Jordanian emigration and examine its implications for the future employment of Jordanians abroad. Particular attention is paid to the occupational characteristics of Jordanians entering Kuwait during this period, since those characteristics are crucial in assessing (chapter 7) the impact of their departure on the domestic (Jordanian) labour market.

Developments in the structure and characteristics of the Kuwaiti labour market since 1975 have been the subject of some debate in the recent literature.[1] However, continued reliance on the 1975 census results and the delayed release of the 1980 census data has prevented an objective examination of this debate. In this chapter we utilize data contained in the Kuwaiti Ministry of Labour's annual (from 1977) reports on work permit issues.[2] Although this data has a number of limitations (for example, a

number of seemingly significant data sets are not available in disaggregated form and it cannot account for clandestine entry and employment) it nevertheless enables discussion to extend beyond the impasse of the 1975 census results.

At this point it is important to distinguish between the two categories of work permit issued in Kuwait:

(i) new work permits; these are issued by the Ministry of Labour to immigrants (in possession of a valid residence permit and fulfilling other entry requirements) on their arrival in Kuwait.

(ii) renewed work permits; although work permits may be issued for two years, they must be renewed annually.[3]

5.2 The composition and volume of work permit issues, 1975-81

5.2.1 The number of work permits issued in the immediate post-1975 years continued the seemingly inexorable rise in immigration of the previous two decades. Between 1975 and 1977 work permit issues grew by 60.3%, reaching a peak of 119,849 admissions in 1977. In the following four years however there has been a decline of 6% in work permit issues; a decline which reached its nadir in 1979 (a 12% drop on the 1977 level). Data for 1980 and 1981 show a moderate revival (7%) in the number of work permit issues (table 5.1). However this recovery may be more apparent than real, particularly in 1980.

Three important factors could have contributed to this apparent growth in work permit issues in 1980:

(i) In April 1980 Kuwait conducted its sixth census of population; in previous years disclosure of the intention to enumerate the population has had the effect of increasing

residence and work permit applications as clandestine migrants sought to regularise their position. Birks and Sinclair (1978b) noted this 'census year interference' in both 1970 and 1975.[4] A similar effect in 1980 is highly probably.

(ii) The Kuwait government was actively promoting a campaign of 'legalisation' among clandestine workers in 1980.[5] Indeed in October 1980 the Ministry of Labour had imposed a temporary ban on the issue of new work permits with the express intention of encouraging the employment of clandestine workers and their transfer to the 'legal' economy. At the same time the removal of 'quota allowances' from contracting companies was also designed to reduce the volume of new work permit issues and to assist in absorbing the "... excess of available expatriate workers ..."[6]

(iii) An alternative explanation of the increase in work permit issues relates them to a growth in capital investment following the 1979 round of oil price increases.[7] However this implies a very rapid disbursement of those oil revenues, without the time lag which followed the 1973 oil price increases. Further one might expect both new and renewed work permits to register an increase; in 1980 the recorded growth is only in new work permit issues moreover in 1981 there was a significant fall in new work permit issues. These trends seem to confirm the hypothesis of census year interference in 1980.[8]

In conclusion we assert that since 1977 the Kuwait economy has experienced a falling demand for immigrant labour. The composition and nature of this decline will

be considered in the section which follows. The focus will first be at an aggregate level comparing Asian and Arab sub-populations. Having established the general pattern of change more detailed developments within these national groupings will be examined and in particular the trends and characteristics of 'Jordanian' labour immigration. This analysis is considered in two sections; the first deals with trends in new work permit issues and the second with renewed work permits.

5.2.2 New work permit issues, 1977-81

In the five year period 1977-81 the issuance of new work permits (and hence the inferred level of (legal) labour immigration) fell by some 19.4% (table 5.2). The two sub-populations (Arab and Asian) experienced contrary trends in this period. Thus while the number of new work permits issued to Arabs fell by almost 40%, the number issued to Asians remained relatively stable (increasing by 1% over the period as a whole). See figure 5.1.

The major contraction in new work permit issues occurred in 1978 when total issues fell by 23% (14,000 fewer than in 1977). Among the Arab nationalities this recession was particularly severe with a 40% (12,000) drop in new work permit receipts. In contrast the receipt of work permits by Asians declined by only 7% (2,000) in 1978.

By 1980 the former balance in work permit receipts between the two groups (with an Arab:Asian ratio of 97.1 in 1977) had fallen in favour of Asians who received 58% and 64% of total new work permit issues in 1980 and 1981 respectively. In 1981 the Arab:Asian ratio was only 58.0

Examination of new work permit issues thus appears

FIG.5.1 KUWAIT: NEW AND RENEWED WORK PERMIT ISSUES, 1977-81.



Source: tables 5.2 and 5.3.

to confirm the conjectured view that Asian manpower has gained an increasing share of the Gulf labour market. Birks and Sinclair (1980b) suggested that in 1980 Asian labour accounted for 29% of total immigrant employment in the Gulf and projected that by 1985 this would have reached 36%.[9] However, as we stated earlier, new work permit issues are not total work permit issues, indeed since 1978 work permit renewals have accounted for over half of total work permit issues. Trends within the renewed work permit sector suggest rather more subtle labour market developments.

5.2.3 Renewed work permit issues, 1977-81

In contrast to the decline in new work permit issues the number of work permits which were renewed over the period 1977-81 increased by some 10.8% (table 5.3), though there was a decline in renewals in 1979 and 1980. Again contrasting patterns are shown by the two sub-populations. However, while the number of new work permits received by Arabs fell, their receipt of renewed work permits increased by 21%. Furthermore by 1981 renewed work permits represented over 66% of total work permit issues to Arabs, compared to 49% in 1977. Work permit renewals received by Asians remained stable over the period as a whole, though registering significant declines in both 1979 (14%) and in 1980 (12%). As a result the Arab:Asian ratio has become more biased in favour of Arabs who received 57% of total work permit renewals (compared to 52% in 1977).

5.2.4 Conclusion

The period 1977-81 has seen a significant increase in the relative share of Asian labour, with the Arab-Asian ratio falling from 103 to 92. This increasing Asian predominance

has been largely confined to new work permit issues. In contrast work permit renewals are dominated by Arabs among whom renewals have become their principal mode, increasing from 49% (1977) to 66% (1981) of their total work permit receipts. These contrasting trends suggest a growing differential in the labour force turnover rates of these two components of the labour force. Before examining this question in more detail (section 5.4) we will first examine differences within the Arab and Asian sub-groups which throw some doubt on the utility of a crude dualist (Arab/Asian) division.

5.3 Diversification of supply and stabilisation of demand, Arab and Asian labour immigration to Kuwait 1977-81

5.3.1 Turning first to Arab receipts of new work permits, it is apparent (table 5.4) that while there has been a substantial (40%) drop in the number of first time issues to Arabs, this has not been consistent in time nor across all nationalities. In 1980, as we saw earlier, the number of new work permits received by Arabs increased (by 33%), an increase which we traced to census year interference. In all other years the number of new work permit issues shows a significant fall on the previous year (see figure 5.2a). Examining individual nationalities however, we notice that two groups, the Iraqis and the 'Other Arabs', actually increase their receipt of new work permits. In the case of the Iraqis this increase is particularly significant, growing by almost 800% between 1977 and 1980. Indeed by 1980 the Iraqis had become the second largest Arab group (12.3% of new Arab immigrant workers) compared to the smallest (1.1%) in 1977 when they received only 318 new

FIG. 5.2 KUWAIT: WORK PERMIT ISSUES BY TYPE AND NATIONALITY, 1977-81.



Source: tables 5.4 and 5.6

work permits.[10] The increased level of immigration may reflect the general thawing in relations between Iraq and Kuwait in the late 1970's, particularly since the onset of the Gulf war and Iran's attacks on the Kuwaiti oil installations at Umm al-Aish in October 1981.[11] In December 1978 Kuwait's Labour Minister (Abdul Aziz Mahmoud) visited Baghdad for discussions on the exchange of labour.[12] At the same time Baghdad was exhorting skilled and semi-skilled workers abroad to return to the domestic labour market where manpower demand had grown rapidly.[13] Data on the occupational structure of those receiving new work permits (see below) shows that an increasing proportion of Iraqis entering Kuwait in the late 1970's and early 1980's had only limited skills (in 1980 64% were classified as unskilled labour) compared to only 39% in 1975. Since 1980 however the number of Iraqis has again fallen (by 34%) as a result of Iraq's general mobilisation in its war against Iran. In addition to the regular armed forces strength of circa 300,000, an estimated half million men had been mobilised in the so-called 'Popular Army' by December 1982.[14]

An increase (from a very small base) is also noted in the case of 'Other Arabs' (primarily Maghrebin) throughout this period; however by 1981 they still only represented 3% of new work permits issued to Arabs and remain relatively insignificant in terms of the whole labour market.

The remaining Arab nationalities all have substantially lower receipts of new work permits in 1981 compared to 1977. The scale of this reduction ranges from 30% for Yemeni migrants to 64% for Jordanians and Palestinians. In all

cases the major recession came in 1978 when new work permit issues fell by 40% and the 'Jordanian' receipt of work permits were cut in half. Later reductions have been less dramatic, indeed the total number of new work permits to Arabs has remained stable around 17,600 (with the exception of 1980). Despite this overall stability since 1978 the decline in the Jordanian and Palestinian cohort has continued, falling by 28% since 1978. Furthermore it is only Jordanians and Palestinians whose receipt of new work permits has been consistently downward (in the census year, 1980, they experienced no increase) across all five years. In 1977 'Jordanians' had accounted for 16% of all new work permits issued to Arabs, second only to Egyptians (60%); by 1981 their share was less than 10%, with 'Jordanians' receiving fewer new work permits than Iraqis. This evidence of declining immigration to Kuwait among Jordanians and Palestinians is entirely consistent with the Jordanian data presented above (chapter 3.4).

Finally it is important to point out that the level of Egyptian employment in Kuwait although falling by 39% from its 1977 level has remained relatively stable since 1978 (there was a large (53%) increase during the census year 1980) and still accounts for over 60% of the total new work permit issues to Arabs. Egyptian workers were neither repatriated nor was their recruitment subject to boycott as a result of Sadat's participation in the Camp David Agreement (17 September 1978) and the subsequent Israel-Egypt Treaty (26 March 1979) as some (notably Ed-Din, 1980; Socknat, 1979) had predicted.[15]

5.3.2 Trends in work permit renewals among Arabs show a contrary pattern (figure 5.2b), continuing to increase (by 21%) over the five year period (showing a small (9%) decline in 1980) and, as previously, this dates from 1978 when work permit renewals increased by 19% to their current level. There have however been significant changes in the composition of work permit renewals by nationality.

In 1977 renewals were dominated equally by Egyptians and 'Jordanians' accounting for 32% and 31% respectively. Since then the issuance of renewed work permits to Egyptians has increased by 81% to more than 16,000, their share of total renewed work permits increased to 48%. In contrast the 'Jordanians' experienced a 15% reduction (to 7,590) over the period. While most of the other Arab nationalities increased their number of work permit renewals between 1977 and 1978 the 'Jordanian' level remained static (increasing by less than 1%) and subsequently fell by 21% in 1980 (a small increase (of 444) occurred between 1980 and 1981). Despite this falling rate of work permit renewals it is important to recognize that the rate of decline has been considerably slower than that in new work permit issues. As a consequence renewals have become the dominant mode for 'Jordanians' in Kuwait; increasing from 65% of total work permit receipts of 'Jordanians' in 1977 to 82% in 1981.

Among Lebanese immigrants work permit renewals also increased (to 73%) as a proportion of their total work permit receipts; their total receipt of renewals having fallen by 9.4%. The remaining Arab nationalities all experienced a significant increase in the number (and

proportion) of work permit renewals.

Clearly the level of renewed work permits is to some extent a function of new work permit issues in the previous year. It is not possible to formulate this relationship into a simple predictive model since other factors (notably the size of the immigrant labour force of that nationality in previous years, relative turnover rates and labour force stability) are important, but for which adequate data is not available. Thus, for example, new work permit issues to 'Jordanians' and to Iraqis were at a comparable level in 1979 (2,034 and 2,248 respectively), but 'Jordanians' had a much larger number of work permit renewals in 1980 (7,146) than Iraqis (1,585), a pattern which can be attributed to the larger size of the 'Jordanian' community generating those renewals and to differences in the occupational characteristics of the two nationalities. Nevertheless, it is apparent that even in the short term a fall in the rate of new work permit issues will lead to a reduction in work permit renewals (though not necessarily of the same magnitude).

5.3.3 A consistent pattern emerging from this discussion is that reductions in the employment of 'Jordanian' workers has been more severe, with regard to both new and renewed work permits, than for other Arab nationalities. Overall, 'Jordanian' receipts of work permits fell by 32% in the five years 1977-81 (see table 5.5). The occupational changes which have accompanied this decline together with an examination of its causes will be considered below. At the same time the reduction in work permit issues to Egyptians has been markedly less extensive, indeed there

has been a 2% increase in Egyptian total work permit receipts. Iraqis have also increased their share of the Kuwaiti labour market. Thus while there has been a reduction in the Arab share of the immigrant labour market the pattern of that reduction is far from homogeneous. The following section will complete this review of trends in work permit issues by turning briefly to the Asian sub-population.

5.3.4 In contrast to the trends observed in the previous section, new work permit issues to Asians have remained stable over the period 1977-81 (increasing by less than 1%), despite falling in 1978 (by 7%) and in 1979 (by 10%). See figure 5.2a. These reductions were almost entirely due to the collapse of new work permit receipts among Iranians; falling by 55% in 1978, 42% in 1979 and 20% in 1981 (see table 5.6). This undoubtedly reflects the turmoil within Iran during this period and Kuwait's apprehension regarding any growth in its Shi'a population, most of whom are of Persian origin. In the three months November 1979 to January 1980 an estimated 18,000 Iranians were deported from Kuwait.[16] If we remove the Iranian cohort from our analysis then the aggregate trend within the Asian sub-population changes considerably; increasing by 16% over the five years rather than remaining stable.

Among the other 'traditional' Asian labour suppliers, namely India and Pakistan, the level of new work permit receipts also fell over the five year period. Indians were reduced by 29% and Pakistanis by 34%. The three traditional Asian labour suppliers (Iran, India and Pakistan) who constituted 73% of all Asian immigrants in

1977 have increasingly given way to manpower from South-East Asia. By 1981 the former only accounted for 44% of total Asian work permit receipts (having fallen by 39%). In contrast new work permit issues to South-East Asian labour (South Korean, Filipino, Thai, Malay, Chinese, Indonesian and Bangladeshi) have increased by 112%. The largest component of this South-East Asian inflow were the South Koreans who represented 61% of the total new Asian supply in 1980, increasing by 29% between 1978 and 1980. In 1980 and 1981 South Korean entrants were the largest Asian group and second only to Egyptians in their share of total new work permit issues (despite a decline in their new work permit receipts in 1981).

A significant contribution was also made by Bangladeshi immigrants, increasing by 213% in four years. The main growth has however been in 'Other Asian' (Thai, Malay, Indonesian, and Chinese) who make up the third main source of Asian work permit receipts and who increased by 269% between 1978 and 1981.

This pattern thus confirms the contention that wage increases among South Korean labour were leading to their replacement by other South-East Asian migrant workers, even within South Korean contracting firms.[17] Again it is clear that the simple Arab/Asian distinction is inadequate given the significant variations within each sub-population. This view is compounded by trends in the issue of renewed work permits to Asians which are discussed in the next section.

5.3.5 As in the case of new work permit issues discussion

of the aggregate Asian sub-population is misleading because of the dramatic changes in the Iranian community. In 1977 the latter accounted for 41% of renewed work permits issued to Asians, the subsequent 126% drop in their receipt has therefore a disproportionate effect on the Asian sub-population since all other nationalities increased over the period. Removing Iranians from the sub-population converts a static trend in work permit renewals into a 41% increase over the five years.

Despite the fall in new work permit issues to Indian sub-continent nationals in 1978 and 1979 Indian and Pakistani nationals remain the largest group receiving renewed work permits among the Asians, accounting for 65% of the total in 1981.

Issues of renewed work permits to the South-East Asian labour suppliers remain low despite a rapid increase since 1978. South Koreans grew by 184% but still only received 1,095 renewed work permits, similarly Filipinos increased by 579% from a very small base (66) in 1978. In both cases the overall increase is marked by large fluctuations, a reflection of their collective contract migration (see below section 8.3).

This consideration of work permit issues to Asians has revealed three important factors. Firstly, aggregate statistics are misleading because of the disproportionate impact of changes in the level of Iranian in-migration and renewal of work permits. Removal of Iranians from the Asian sub-population shows contrary trends to have occurred. Secondly, 'traditional' Asian labour suppliers (India and Pakistan) have, in addition to the Iranians, shown a

declining importance in new work permit issues. Their place has largely been taken up by the dramatic expansion in labour market penetration by South-East Asian manpower suppliers.

5.3.6 A number of important trends in work permit issues have been identified in this section (5.3) and are summarised here. Firstly, while work permit issues have fallen from their peak in 1977, that fall has been in terms of new work permit issues and not in the number of work permits which are renewed. Secondly the fall in new work permit issues has been markedly more severe among Arab rather than Asian nationalities. Indeed if we exclude Iranians then Asians have registered an increase in their receipt of new work permits. Finally, within the Arab group the fall in work permit receipts (both new and renewed) has been most rapid and consistent among the 'Jordanians'. Furthermore, 'Jordanian' work permit receipts are now overwhelmingly renewals rather than first time issues. These changes in the volume of labour immigration have been accompanied by developments in the occupational and employment characteristics of that labour flow. In the following section we will examine these changes in detail.

5.4 Labour force stability and rates of turnover

5.4.1 Research on Kuwait's labour market has focussed on the volume and occupational characteristics of immigrant flows while largely ignoring the extent of labour force stability and turnover rates.[18] A crude measure of labour force stability can be compiled from the available data on work permit issues. The higher the proportion of renewed work permits in total work permit issues then the greater

is the degree of labour force stability.

The inflow of new migrant workers can be seen as having two main functions:

(i) augmenting the labour force stock;

(ii) replacing attrition from that stock.[19]

Given these functions, an increase in the proportional share of renewed work permits would suggest that the rate of expansion in the labour force size is falling and hence that the degree of labour force stability is growing. Additionally, variations in renewal rates by nationality and by economic sector would provide an insight into the relative attrition rates of different nationalities and occupations.

A second measure is the ratio between the inflow and outflow of migrant workers as registered by work permit issues and cancellations, that is, labour force turnover. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Labour have only released disaggregated 'cancellation' data since 1979. This data will be examined in aggregate for the period 1976-81 and in detail for 1979-81.

The characteristics of, and relationship between, these two measures is an important indication of labour market development and may be a guide to government policy. Variations in the turnover or stability of a particular nationality could aid interpretation of changes in the size, characteristics and role of that nationality in the Kuwait labour market. The following two sections will consider firstly labour force stability and secondly labour force turnover rates, paying particular attention to the 'Jordanian' cohort.

5.4.2 Labour force stability, 1977-81

Available data on labour force stability presents a somewhat confused picture since the rate of work permit renewals (table 5.7) is distorted by the census year interference factor for 1980 discussed above (section 5.2.1).

Over the period 1977-81 it appears that, among the Arab nationalities at least, labour force stability has increased. The proportional share of renewed work permit issues having grown from 49.4% in 1977 to 66.3% in 1981 (though this is a fall from the peak of 67% in 1979).

For the Asian sub-population however renewals remain lower than new work permits at 46.6% in 1977 and 46.5% in 1981. Labour force stability varies considerably within the Asian sub-population, ranging from a low of 1.7% (South Korean in 1979) to a high of 83.7% (Iranian, 1979). South Koreans show a consistently low level of stability, although the rate has an upward trend. For Filipinos the rise has been much more rapid, from 3.4% in 1978 to 40.9% in 1981. This difference appears to stem from the high service sector element among Filipino immigrants compared to the South Korean concentration in the construction sector and their employment on fixed-term contracts. Iranians had a moderately high level of stability in 1977 (66%) which increased over the period of the Iranian Revolution (particularly high rates of renewals, 82% and 84% are recorded in 1978 and 1979). As we saw earlier the level of new Iranian immigration fell markedly in these years.

In the Arab sub-population the Iraqis had the highest rate of renewals in 1977 (81%). However, with the

subsequent growth in Iraqi immigration, particularly of unskilled labour, this rate had fallen to 36.3% in 1980. The subsequent rise in 1981 (to 53.3%) suggests a renewed stability as new Iraqi immigration is constrained by the Iraq-Iran war.

Among the remaining Arab nationalities the trend towards greater labour force stability is clear. 'Jordanians' began at a relatively high rate, 65.3% in 1977, and continued to grow to 81.5% in 1981. This is a reflection of the rapid slump in new work permit issues to 'Jordanians' and, as we will see later, the high proportion of professional and skilled manpower in the 'Jordanian' emigrant occupational structure (with their lower rates of turnover).

The labour force stability of Egyptians increased from its low start (34%) to a moderate 55% in 1981. This relatively low level of stability among Egyptians relates to the fact that the growth in unskilled Egyptian migration did not really take off until the mid-1970's with Sadat's 'infitah' policy and the coincident Kuwaiti construction boom. The Egyptian renewals rate tends to remain lower than the other Arab communities because the stream of current migrants is dominated by unskilled construction labour.[20]

In this section levels of labour force stability have been shown to vary considerably between nationalities and over time. However it is clear that 'stability', as measured by the percentage share of renewed work permits, has increased over the period, that is there is a growing tendency for those issued with work permits to have them

renewed in subsequent years. This increasing inertia among the labour force is particularly noticeable among the 'Jordanians', 82% of their work permit receipts being renewals.

The new:renewed work permit ratio is however only a partial measure of the stability in any particular nationality's contribution to the Kuwait labour market since it says nothing of the 'replacement effect', that is the extent to which work permit issues (new and renewed) are 'replacing' attrition from the labour market. The higher the ratio of work permit cancellations to work permit issues the greater the rate of turnover and replacement, and the lower the overall labour force stability of that nationality. The following section will consider a crude index of labour force turnover for the period 1976-81.

5.4.3 Labour force turnover, 1976-81

Since 1976 the Ministry of Labour's annual reports have included data on work permit cancellations presented in two categories:

(i) work permit cancellations and conversions;

(ii) work permit cancellations and departures.

The former includes work permit conversions, that is a work permit re-issued to an immigrant worker moving from one sector of employment to another. These 'converted' work permits are not disaggregated from those cancellations which do not result in immediate departure from Kuwait. Clearly this category is rather ill-suited to our purpose. The second category includes all work permit cancellations which lead to emigration from Kuwait, that is work permit expiration or cancellation following infringement of the

residence or labour code provisions. In the discussion which follows attention will focus on this category.[21]

Since 1976 there has been a rapid growth (630%) in the number of work permit cancellations and departures (hereafter simply cancellations) as shown on table 5.8. In particular a large increase was registered in 1978 when cancellations increased by 214%. This confirms our previous assertion that in the late 1970's Kuwait's decelerating economic growth was reducing the demand for immigrant labour.[22] It is also a reflection of important changes in the labour market and in particular the attempt to increase manpower circulation (and hence reduce demographic settling) through the employment of South-East Asians, with exceptionally high rates of labour turnover. The number of cancellations continued to increase in 1979 (by 48%) and in 1981 (by 18%).

For the three most recent years (1979-81) data on cancellations can be disaggregated by nationality. Table 5.9 shows that work permit cancellations were dominated by Asians. Of the total work permit cancellations in 1979 some 74% were for Asians, similarly in 1980 and 1981. The rate of growth in cancellations (1979-81) was considerably higher for Asians (32%) than for Arabs (14%). This contrast is a result of the high incidence of short-term contract-specific work permit issues to Asians and of their lower share of work permit renewals.

Using this 'cancellation' data a crude labour force turnover index for 1979-81 can be compiled by nationality. This index comprises work permit cancellations as a proportion of total work permit issues. Clearly the higher

the proportion of cancellations the greater is the rate of labour force turnover for that partricular nationality in the Kuwait labour market (table 5.10).

Although the rate of turnover among Asians is significantly higher than that of Arabs, it has fallen from 23% in 1979 to 16% in 1981. Within the Asian group the rate of turnover varies from a low of 5% among Iranians to 82% for South Koreans. The rate of turnover is particularly high for all the South-East Asian nationalities, a reflection of their fixed short-term contracts. The exceptionally low (but increasing) rate of turnover among Iranians may be a recognition of the long term status of much of the Iranian community in Kuwait and the post-revolution émigré status of many Iranians resident in Kuwait.

Among Arabs the overall labour force turnover rate is significantly lower and it tends to exhibit greater stability over the period (rising from 6.4% to 7.2%). Egyptians have a slightly higher than average rate (9.2% in 1979) which may stem from their disproportionate concentration in the construction sector which has a high rate of turnover (see table 5.11). A substantial increase (20%) is recorded in the number of 'Jordanian' work permit cancellations (compared to an overall increase among Arabs of 12%). Although the absolute number of annual cancellations among 'Jordanians' is still small (less than 500) it does confirm the previous evidence of a declining 'Jordanian' presence in the Kuwait labour market.

Unfortunately data on work permit cancellations by occupation is not available. A surrogate measure, that of wage rates, is presented on table 5.12. This data is only

available for 1980 and cannot be disaggregated by nationality. Nevertheless it is clear that labour force turnover varies by wage rate (and hence by occupation). The rate of turnover is particularly high among the low paid but falls very rapidly from 52% at wage rates under KD. 50 per month to 19% at KD. 150-99 per month. In the sub-professional and professional categories turnover rates are much lower, at 2.1% for KD. 250-99. The subsequent rise to 10.2% for those earning over KD. 300 per month is largely due to the high proportion of European and North American expatriates on short-term contracts at these levels.

5.4.4 Examination of labour force turnover rates has largely confirmed the initial evidence that a continuum of 'stability' exists. This continuum ranges from those nationalities with low rates of labour turnover (5% or less) and high stability (over 80%), typified by the 'Jordanians'; through a second group with moderate turnover rates (between 5% and 10%) and an 'excess' of renewals over new work permits (50-70%) typical of Egyptians and Pakistanis. Finally there is a third group with low labour force stability (renewals being 30% or less of total work permit issues) and very high rates of turnover (30% or more) typified by the South Koreans.

The distribution of nationalities within these three groups confirms the Birks and Sinclair 'model' of demographic settling.[23] Those nationalities with high rates of turnover having low rates of settling in contrast to the relatively large communities associated with nationalities having a high rate of labour force stability. However, increases in the level of stability need not result in an

increased rate of demographic settling.

In 1978 Kuwait announced the imposition of severe restrictions on the entry of workers dependants.[24] These restrictions are aimed at reducing the level of in-migration of workers relatives and thus to encourage the greater 'circulation' of manpower. Subsequent legislation prohibits those earning less than KD. 400 per month from obtaining residence visas for their dependant relatives. Figure 5.3 illustrates the dramatic effect of this legislation since, in 1980, only 4.8% of those receiving new work permits (and 6.3% of renewed permits) earnt the stipulated minimum salary.[25]

Additional, indirect disincentives to settle have appeared with increasing restrictions on the social welfare programme. In May 1982 the Ministry of Public Health announced that fees for medical services would have to be introduced because of rising costs. In the education sector it has been suggested (Farah et al., 1980) that recent developments increasingly discriminate against the children of expatriates.[26] Continued overloading of the public education sector has led the government to introduce a priority system for school admission based on nationality. As a result children of expatriates frequently have to enter expensive private schools. In particular this discriminates against Asian children since government education grants are only available to schools in which the teaching is in Arabic.

A recent report (MEED, 1982) claims that: "Immigrants could become Kuwait's most serious long term problem as they become increasingly resentful at their exclusion from the

FIG.5.3 KUWAIT : WAGE RATE DISTRIBUTION OF NEW IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN 1980.



SOURCE : table 5.13

comprehensive welfare system. Expatriates are not eligible for government housing (and) are severely restricted in property ownership ..." In May 1982 the National Assembly's Interior Defence Committee recommended that Muslim Arabs who had served Kuwait for at least twenty years should be granted permanent residence. The proposal has yet to be considered by the government.[27]

Available data with which to evaluate this policy change (1978) is restricted. Nevertheless the number of residence permits issued in 1979 registered a substantial decline over the 1978 level (40% for Arabs and 19% for Asians). In both cases this was a greater fall than that in the case of new work permit issues (4% for Arabs and 10% for Asians).

5.4.5 In this section we have examined in some depth recent changes in the volume and nature of labour migration to Kuwait. Before proceeding to consider concomitant developments in occupational and employment characteristics we will summarise the changes in 'Jordanian' immigration.

Since peaking in 1977 the number of work permits issued to Jordanians in Kuwait has declined dramatically. This reduction in work permit receipts has been particularly marked in the case of first time work permit issues but has also affected work permit renewals. In addition there has been a steady increase in the number of work permit cancellations and departures of 'Jordanians' from Kuwait. General trends identified in the Arab immigrant community appear to be exaggerated in the case of 'Jordanians'. In some cases (notably the Iraqis and Egyptians) the overall pattern of decline may be halted or even reversed. This

unevenness in labour market developments suggests that explaining changes in Arab immigration by reference simply to the growth in Asian immigration is inadequate. A decline in 'Jordanian' immigration and employment in Kuwait would have important implications for the Jordanian economy in general and the labour market in particular. The nature of that impact depends to a large extent on the characteristics of 'Jordanian' employment in Kuwait, a theme which will be pursued in the next section.

5.5 The employment characteristics of recent labour inflows, 1975-81

5.5.1 So far this chapter has focussed on changes in the volume and composition of immigrant labour flows by nationality. This section will examine developments in the occupational characteristics of that labour inflow over the period 1975-81. In doing so we will utilise both employment rates and employment quotients to differentiate between particular nationalities. As an introduction the following section briefly outlines the overall employment structure of recent labour inflows.

5.5.2 Employment by economic sector

The sectoral distribution of those receiving new work permits shows a similar pattern to that described for earlier periods (see chapter 4.5). However, the dominance of the construction sector is clearly declining, having fallen from 65% of new work permit issues in 1978 to only 54% in 1981. Significantly, the majority of new construction workers are of Asian origin (72% in 1981), and indeed the bulk of Asian immigrants are employed in the construction sector (see table 5.13). Nevertheless there has been a

diversification in employment among Asian immigrants, by 1981 only 61% were in construction (compared to 76% in 1978). Among Arabs the share of the construction sector has also fallen, from 47% (1978) to 42% (1981).

The changing employment structure of different nationalities can be compared through time using a simple index of diversification in which a tendency towards unity indicates increasing employment diversification (see table 5.14). The index value of 0.41 for the Asian sub-population reveals a significantly greater sectoral concentration than that of Arab immigrants (0.69) in 1978. However there is extensive within-group variance among the Asian nationalities with values ranging (in 1978) from less than 0.1 for South Koreans to 0.78 for Bengalis. Over the period 1978-81 the employment structure of Asians shows some considerable diversification, with declining construction sector employment (the 12% fall in work permits issued to Asians for construction sector employment accounts for almost all the reduction in Asian immigration between 1978 and 1979). In contrast their service sector employment increased markedly from a small base and, as a result, the index of employment diversification for Asians had risen to 0.6 by 1981. This increased diversity undermines the notion of an almost exclusive construction sector orientation of Asian immigration, the latter may simply act as the point of entry for labour which subsequently diffuses to other sectors. Such a contention is supported by the employment distribution of work permit renewals. Although personal services accounted for only 1.3% of new work permit issues to Asians (1978) they represented almost 9% of their work

permit renewals. This disparity cannot be explained simply as a function of turnover rates since the level of renewals in services (2,515) is far higher than new work permit issues (383).

Among the Arab immigrants there is considerably less variation in employment structure. The index of employment diversity ranges from a low of 0.6 for Lebanese to a maximum of 0.78 for Iraqis (in 1978). The sectoral pattern of 'Jordanian' employment varies little over the period beyond an increase in service sector employment (see table 5.15). Importantly, the decline in 'Jordanian' work permit receipts was sector-wide. This contrasts with other Arab nationalities among whom the fall in work permit receipts was largely confined to the construction (and to a lesser extent manufacturing) sector and whose work permit receipts in the trade, transport and services sectors increased over the period. The reduction in 'Jordanian' work receipts cannot therefore be the result of specific investment slowdowns nor increased Asian competition in particular sectors. The alternative, supply-side argument, will be shown to be equally fallacious later (chapter seven).

5.5.3 While consideration of major employment sectors provides an introduction to the characteristics and roles of immigrant workers in the labour market, it does not indicate the relative skill contributions of different nationalities which is our prime concern in evaluating the likely impact of labour emigration on the sending economy.

The Ministry of Labour reports provide a classification of work permit issues by major occupational groups (table 5.16 illustrates this data for 1980). The limitations of

such a classification were outlined earlier (chapter 2.5) with reference to the Jordanian census of 1961. Rather than present a conventional analysis based on major occupational groups the original occupational data has been regrouped by inferred education/skill categories as introduced previously (see appendix I) and the results of this re-classification are discussed in the following section.

5.6 Employment rates and employment quotients

5.6.1 The changes in the level of 'Jordanian' immigration and employment in Kuwait described above (section 5.3) have been accompanied by developments in their occupational characteristics and in their relative contribution to the Kuwait labour market. Both those elements have implications for the future of 'Jordanian' employment in Kuwait and for the domestic (Jordanian) labour market. This section will consider these changes using employment rates and quotients to do so.

Occupation-specific employment rates (per thousand immigrant workers) enable a comparison to be made between the relative skill content of different nationalities at one point in time or changes in one nationality through time. They do not however enable us to compare the relative contributions of different nationalities through time since overall employment rates are dependent on changes in the absolute number of economically active immigrants of each nationality.

5.6.2 The occupation-specific employment rates for 'Jordanians' in Kuwait are shown on table 5.17. Although this includes data on both 1975 and 1978-81 comparison

between the two periods is not strictly possible since the 1975 data derives from an enumeration of migrant stocks while the latter considers annual inflows (data on renewed work permits and on cancellations is not disaggregated by nationality or occupation). The employment characteristics of the stock and inflow need not be analogous because of the effect of prevailing turnover rates. Thus, for example, unskilled workers may form a higher proportion of the labour inflow than of the stock because of their higher turnover rate.

A number of changes are apparent in the 'Jordanian' labour inflow to Kuwait in the 1978-81 period. Most notably there is a significant decline in the proportion of unskilled (D) immigrants, falling from 35% in 1978 to only 11% in 1981. This decline in unskilled labour inflows may account for the increased stability in the 'Jordanian' labour force in Kuwait noted above (section 5.3). In absolute terms the unskilled labour inflow has fallen by 77%, a much greater fall than any other sector. In contrast the relative contribution of the professional (A-1), sub-professional and technical (B) and skilled/semi-skilled office (C-1) occupations has increased. Indeed the latter pair show an absolute increase despite the overall reduction in the 'Jordanian' inflow.

The skill content of 'Jordanian' employment in Kuwait in 1975 and of the 'Jordanian' labour inflow in 1980 is compared (tables 5.18 and 5.19) with that of the other main immigrant nationalities. This confirms the patterns established in the 1965 and 1970 data reviewed above (chapter 4.5); there is clearly a disproportionate

representation of 'Jordanians' in professional (A-1) and skilled office employment (C-1) compared with other nationalities. This disproportionate contribution is made clear by examining the proportion of 'Jordanians' in the total labour force at these skill levels in 1975. Thus while only 7% of 'Jordanians' were classed as A-1 manpower, they represented 34% of all immigrant labour at that level. Conversely, their contribution at the unskilled level was limited, accounting for only 8.5% of total unskilled immigrant employment.

The 1975 census data shows a high rate of unskilled immigrant employment, 382 and 303 per thousand for Asians and Arabs respectively. The labour inflow data shows a considerably higher rate of unskilled labour migration, rising to 646 per thousand for Arabs and 735 per thousand Asians (1980). Even among the 'Jordanians' the inflow rate is higher (at 346 per thousand) than in the stock (198 per thousand), though still markedly lower than other Arab nationals. This significant difference between stock and inflow is a clear confirmation of high labour force turnover at this skill level.

At the professional levels (A-1 and A-2) overall employment rates are considerably lower and show a clear dominance of Arabs (52 and 25 per thousand) at the A-1 and A-2 levels respectively (compared to 17 and 6 per thousand for Asians). Within the Arab group these professions are dominated by the 'traditional' suppliers of professional manpower notably Lebanese, Egyptian and 'Jordanian'. These three labour suppliers (together with Indians) also dominate the skilled and semi-skilled office occupations.

This section clearly shows that 'Jordanian' manpower has retained its high skill content. Since 1975, as we saw earlier (section 5.3) Kuwait has promoted the diversification of immigrant labour sources. In the following section we consider briefly the impact of this changing labour market composition on the contribution of 'Jordanians' to the Kuwait labour market relative to other nationalities.

5.6.3 As we stated earlier, employment rates cannot be used to compare the contribution of different nationalities through time. For this purpose a series of occupation-specific employment quotients have been derived from the work permit data. These are determined by dividing the occupation-specific employment rates discussed above by an overall rate for each occupational level; for example: the employment rate of Lebanese A-2 professions in 1980 (71) is divided by the overall employment rate of all A-2 immigrants in 1980 (23) to give an employment quotient (3.1). By standardizing levels of employment in the labour market through time employment quotients enable the analysis to focus on the relative contribution of different nationalities, at specific skill levels, to the Kuwait labour market. If employment was evenly distributed among all nationalities then the quotient values would cluster around unity (1.00) as each nationality would have an employment rate approximating to the overall employment rate for that skill level. The greater the divergence from unity then the higher (or lower) the relative contribution of the nationality to that skill level.

Employment quotients for 1975 and 1978-81 are

provided in appendix III. The latter clearly shows that certain nationalities have tended to dominate particular sectors and have values consistently above unity (figure 5.4).

Employment quotients indicate that the relative contribution of 'Jordanians' at the higher skill levels (A-2, B and C-1) has increased and is markedly above that of the overall Arab contribution at 4.5, 3.2 and 4.0 respectively (in 1981). In contrast their contribution to the C-2 and D levels have declined over the period and is below the overall Arab level.

Examining the labour market as a whole it is apparent that the growth in Asian labour inflows has not been confined to the lower skill occupations and their contribution has significantly increased at the A-1 professional and C-2 skilled/semi-skilled manual levels. This has drawn the Arab and Asian rates closer to unity at these skill levels (1.1 and 0.95 respectively in A-1 and 0.9 and 1.0 at the C-2 level). This tendency towards unity has also occurred in the unskilled (D) class; the employment quotient for Arabs having increased (to 0.9) with the growth in Iraqi and Egyptian unskilled labour immigration and, with the diversification of Asian labour supplies away from a predominantly unskilled position (the Asian quotient has fallen to 1.0). Contrasting with this diversification of skill content in the Asian labour inflow, that of Arabs in general, and 'Jordanians' in particular, has become increasingly concentrated.

The significant occupational difference between the 'Jordanian' (and Lebanese) manpower on the one hand and the remaining Arab and Asian labour suppliers on the other

FIG. 5.4 KUWAIT: EMPLOYMENT QUOTIENTS, 1975-81.



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FIG. 5·4 cont.



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FIG. 5.4 cont.



SOURCE: appendix III

is graphically illustrated by figure 5.5. This uses conventional cluster analysis (in which relative distance is a measure of dissimilarity) to illustrate the divergence between predominantly skilled and professional 'Jordanian' manpower and the other nationalities in which unskilled and semi-skilled labour dominates to a much greater extent.

5.6.4 In this section we have shown that in the late 1970's parallel with their falling share of the Kuwait labour market, the 'Jordanians' have become increasingly concentrated in skilled and professional occupations within that labour market. The opportunities for unskilled 'Jordanians' in Kuwait have greatly diminished with the expansion in employment of South-East Asian and Egyptian manpower. If confirmed this trend, together with the characteristics of those 'Jordanians' who continue to find employment in Kuwait (particularly their low rate of turnover), would have important implications for the Jordanian economy in general and the Jordanian labour market in particular. Before turning to these implications (chapters 6 and 7) we will examine the basis of this falling demand for 'Jordanian' manpower in Kuwait.

5.7 Conclusion: recruitment, migration and the future for 'Jordanian' manpower in Kuwait

5.7.1 This case study (chapters four and five) of Jordanian immigration and employment in Kuwait, began by highlighting the role of recruitment as an important catalyst in the timing and establishment of particular migration streams. It was shown that specific recruitment patterns do not simply arise from the resolution of labour supply and

FIG. 5.5 DENDROGRAM: IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN KUWAIT BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP, 1980.



SOURCE : table 5.1

demand with respect to marginal cost advantages of particular nationalities. Instead, the direction of recruitment may itself be an expression of personal, social or political considerations. This contention was illustrated with reference to recruitment for Kuwait's education system in the 1940's and by a brief review of BAPCO's recruiting activities in Bahrain during the 1930's.

The identification of such origins is invariably obscured by the subsequent development of migration streams and by the rapidity with which such streams become self-sustaining. The establishment of Israel and the subsequent Arab-Israeli war (1948) had the effect of 'releasing' a relatively large volume of skilled and semi-skilled Arab manpower on to the regional labour market at a time when Kuwait's demand for labour was expanding. Nevertheless there was a lag of four or five years before the development of sustained Jordanian and Palestinian labour flows to Kuwait. The timing, pattern and limited volume of this flow appears to reflect recruitment activity in the mid-1950's and its focus on skilled and professional manpower.

The substantial collapse in unskilled labour migration from Iraq after 1961 encouraged some diversification from this pattern and was an important factor in the expansion of the migration 'stream' from Jordan in the early 1960's. By 1965 'Jordanians' were the largest immigrant group in Kuwait and their movement had become self-sustaining, that is, it was no longer dependent on the stimulus of <u>active</u> recruitment.

During the early 1960's there had been a steady growth in the inflow of dependants, an inflow which, after

June 1967, became the predominant component of 'Jordanian' immigration. The period 1967-75 saw a rapid increase in the rate of demographic settling among Jordanians and Palestinians in Kuwait, a period which has been characterised here as one of 'migration transition'. An increasing number of 'Jordanians' coming to maturity in the mid-1970's had been born and educated in Kuwait. Consequently a growing proportion of social service infrastructure is being absorbed by the immigrant community, in particular by the 'Jordanians' as has been illustrated with reference to the system.

5.7.2 The second half of this case study (chapter five) has examined developments in the composition (by nationality) and occupational characteristics of recent (post 1975) labour flows. In the case of 'Jordanian' manpower the period has seen a dramatic decline (1977-81) in their receipt of both new work permits (by 64%) and work permit renewals (by 15%). The magnitude and sustained nature of their reduction contrasts with trends for most other immigrant groups. In addition it has been shown that those 'Jordanians' who are working in Kuwait tend to have a low rate of turnover, a reflection it is suggested of the continued skill selectivity in manpower flows from Jordan. In 1980 less than 35% of those 'Jordanians' receiving new work permits were in the unskilled labour (D) category, and these represented only 1.9% of all manpower entering Kuwait at that level.

Over the period 1977-81 the issuance of new work permits to Arabs declined by 40%. Concomitantly new sources of labour supply have emerged, particularly those from

South-East Asia. By 1980 the South Koreans alone took 18% of all new work permit issues. One of the main characteristics of such labour has been their high turnover rate and the continued limitation in their receipt of renewed work permits. Thus in 1980 for example, South Koreans received only 1.5% of total work permit renewals.

It is suggested here that recent developments in labour market composition are, as in previous periods, a function of recruitment and an expression of implicit policy decisions taken by the labour importing state. This conclusion will examine the rationale for such decisions and explore the implications for future 'Jordanian' labour flows to Kuwait.

5.7.3 Recent projections of labour imports (notably that of the World Bank) have consistently highlighted the greater cost-effectiveness of Asian (and particularly South-East Asian), over Arab, manpower.[28] A growing market share for such labour has been predicted. Evidence from this case study confirms that picture, with Asians taking an increasing share of new labour inflows in what is a shrinking market. At the same time the high rates of labour turnover among Asian workers suggests that Kuwait may indeed have been successful, in the short term at least, in increasing the rate of manpower circulation. Nevertheless there is some evidence that even among Asian immigrants there is a tendency for this rate of circulation to diminish over time.

In addition to its reported price advantage, Asian labour offers benefits in terms of organization and recruitment. The proliferation of private and state-run

recruiting agencies in the Asian countries contrasts with the Arab labour suppliers, from whom labour flows remain largely unstructured. At the same time there has been an increasing penetration of the international contracting market (particularly in construction) by Asian companies and corporations, who were able to introduce their own nationals into the labour market. For example, by 1981 there were an estimated seventy South Korean companies operating in Saudi Arabia alone.[29] Such recruitment offered considerable social and demographic advantages to the host country. The recruitment of single males for a specified contract period, their accommodation, in self-contained work camps their high rates of turnover and their departure on contract completion, contrasts with the problems engendered by reliance on Arab manpower with its consistently higher rates of demographic settling.

Kuwait's recruitment of the 'new' Asian labour began in 1975 when Kuwait was suffering from labour shortages due, in part, to the increasing competition (particularly from the Lower Gulf) for available supplies. As part of her programme to encourage labour inflows Kuwait had, in March 1975, relaxed entry and residence permit regulations.[30] In September 1975 the Kuwait Transport Company (KTC) signed an agreement in Dacca for the employment of Bengali drivers. The KTC commented that: "The main advantage of recruiting Bengali drivers is that they have accepted a relatively low salary of KD. 86 per month." In the same month the Ministry of Public Health recruited 600 nurses from Bangladesh. The recruitment of South-East Asian labour continued to diversify; following the visit

of South Korea's Minister of Labour to Kuwait in mid-1975 some 400 South Korean technicians arrived for dock works together with 140 Burmese labourers.[31]

This increase in South-East Asian labour has been at the expense of both Arab and other Asian labour suppliers. The mid-1970's saw increasing concern within the Indian and Pakistani governments over the exploitation of their nationals by unscrupulous recruiting agents; moves to bring these manpower flows under control have increased their price relative to South-East Asian labour.[32] In sum, the changing nature of contract awards and the methods of recruitment (changes which Arab contractors and labour suppliers have failed to respond to) again lie at the origin of new migration patterns.

5.7.4 The reduction in Arab work permit receipts has however affected certain nationalities (notably the 'Jordanians') to a greater extent than others. An understanding of why this has occurred requires us to look beyond the labour market explanation.

It is suggested here that the labour market explanation of the collapse in work permit receipts by 'Jordanians' (that is their replacement by cheaper, more readily available manpower) is underlain by the political context within which 'Jordanian' immigration to Kuwait has evolved over the post-1948 period, namely the predominance of the Palestine issue in regional affairs. The labour market explanation becomes clearly inadequate when we recognize that 'Jordanian' labour had (in 1975) a relatively limited share of employment in the construction sector (that in which Asian penetration has been greatest). Moreover the

reduction in new work permit issues to 'Jordanians' has, unlike other nationalities, been sector-wide.

The sector-wide nature of the decline in 'Jordanian' work permit receipts, and their failure to recover after 1979 is a reflection of Kuwait's de facto policy to limit the entry of Palestinians and other groups likely to disturb Kuwait's delicate political balance.[33] Examining work permits issued to those individuals who carried specifically Palestinian identity documents (as opposed to Jordanian passports), it is clear that they have suffered the greatest reduction (see table 5.20).

Kuwait's demographic composition (with 204,178 Jordanians and Palestinians enumerated in 1975, 39.1% of the non-Kuwaiti population and 20.5% of the total population) has made it rather more sensitive to the issues of Palestinian self-determination than other Gulf states where Palestinians are a minority among expatriate groups.

In August 1976 Kuwait's experiment with a 'democratic' assembly came to an abrupt end when pro-Palestinian elements in the National Assembly and the press criticised the government for its failure to condemn Syrian intervention in the Lebanese civil war.[34] In response the Amir (Sheikh Sabah al-Sakm) dissolved the Assembly, instituting press restrictions and suspending a number of critical newspapers. A government official explained: "... we don't want democracy in Kuwait to be misused and transformed into the same chaos that triggered off the Lebanese civil war ..."[35]

Shortly after these events (October 1976) the Kuwait

authorities instituted stricter restrictions to control the entry of Palestinians wishing to work in Kuwait, including the institution of a rigorous security clearance procedure. One reporter commented that: "The pressure being put on Palestinians is part of a systematic, if circumspect, attempt to remove opposition in Kuwait ..."[36]

Kuwait's uneasy internal relations with the Palestinians have continued, peaking in June 1978 with the assassination of the PLO representative Ali Yassin.[37] Despite the subsequent agreement with the PLO that Kuwait would not become an arena for conflict between Palestinian and other Arab groups or for internecine Palestinian conflict, the unease has continued.[38] In July 1981 the issue of visas and no objection certificates was suspended following a series of bomb explosions during the previous month.[39] In August 1981 seven 'Jordanians' were sentenced to life imprisonment following their conviction for terrorist offences in Kuwait.[40] More recently, in March 1982, Palestinian students clashed with Kuwaiti riot police during a demonstration against Israeli action in the Occupied Territories. According to Dorsey: "Kuwaiti citizens joined the riot police to break up the demonstration."[41]

This conflict between the immigrant 'Jordanian' community and the Kuwait authorities is reflected in a more generalised conflict between overtly 'Arab' nationalism and Kuwaiti nationalism or 'statism'. That is, there exists an antithesis between Kuwait's policies of social equity and welfare for the indigenous population, and the aspirations of immigrants (particularly Arab immigrants),

many of whom have been in Kuwait since the early 1960's or were indeed born in Kuwait but who are still alienated from the benefits of citizenship. While this antithesis is also critical of other Arab immigrants (for example over the prominence of Egyptians in administrative posts), it reaches its zenith with regard to the 'Jordanians'.[42] In sum it is argued here that the reduction in 'Jordanian' work permit receipts is a reflection of Kuwait's fears over their political aspirations in addition to the social consequences of continuing to permit the entry of migrant workers with a high rate of demographic settling. The Kuwaitis would rather treat labour as a rented commodity, a rolling stock of man-hours, which the buyer selects.

This decline in 'Jordanian' (and indeed other Arab) labour immigration to Kuwait is unlikely to be stemmed, even if Kuwait's de facto pro-Asian manpower policy were reversed.[43] The level of activity in construction has levelled off and public sector spending has been reduced, as part of a deflationary policy but also motivated by demographic considerations.[44] The decline in 'Jordanian' immigration is likely to continue, stabilising at a relatively low level. The composition of this limited immigration is likely to show an increased bias towards higher skill occupations and professions for which there is, as yet, no appropriate substitute.

An entrenchment of recent trends towards greater skill withdrawal from Jordan's modern sector labour force has important implications for the Jordanian economy and for manpower planning in Jordan. The extent to which that economy and its human capital investment programme

have been, and will continue to be, directed by participation in the international labour market (over which she has little effective control) rather than by the demands of the domestic resource base, will be considered in the next part (three) of this thesis.

Notes

1. See for example: Allesa, S.Y. (1981) The manpower problem in Kuwait.

2. Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (annual) 'Report on the issue of work permits.' (Arabic)

3. For details see: Mursi, M.A. (trans.) 'Private sector labour law no. 38 of 1964 of the State of Kuwait with explanatory memorandum and implementing decisions.'

4. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1977c) Country case study - Kuwait. p. 29.

5. MEED, vol. 24 (39) 26 September 1980, p. 32, 'Foreign firms lose labour quotas'.

6. MEED, vol. 24 (41) 10 October 1980, p. 38, 'Issue of new work permits halted'.

7. Shaw, R.P. (1979) 'Migration and employment in the Arab world: construction as a key policy variable.' ILR, vol. 118 (5) pp. 589-606. Shaw applies the concept of business cycles to fluctuations in the level of immigration, an approach which appears appropriate to this hypothesis of increased activity after the 1979 oil price increase. Shaw's study concerns the 1966-76 period, relating variations in residence permits (used as a surrogate for work permits) to fluctuations in public investment in low-income house building. It is suggested that 56% of the variation in issues is explained by the level of investment, in particular he points to the doubling in issues in 1969-70 and 1975-76 when government investment was also increased. However the original data is not provided, nor is it pointed out that 1970 and 1975 were census years. Finally the proportion of total construction activity represented by the low-income housing programme is not clear.

8. In addition the receipt of new work permits by Arabs in 1980 showed a much higher increase than that of Asians. This is contrary to previous trends and may reflect greater illegal immigration among Arabs.

9. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980b) Arab manpower the crisis of development. pp. 359-62.

10. The reduction in Iraqi immigration to Kuwait during the 1960's had been precipitated by political factors. Iraq's threat to Kuwait's sovreignty in 1961 led to the deportation of over 22,000 - between June and December 1961.

11. Financial Times, 2 October 1981, 'Iran and Iraq aim straight for the jugular', p. 3. Other air strikes were made on the border post at Abdali.

12. MEED, vol. 22 (49) 8 December 1978, p. 37.

13. MEED, vol. 24 (41) 10 October 1980, p. 12 and vol. 26 (18) 30 April 1982, p. 8, 'Low priority projects frozen in Iraq's economy drive'. Iraq's manpower problems are discussed by Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1982d) 'The challenge of human resource development in Iraq.'
On the incentives offered in the 1974 law (no. 154) to induce Iraqi professionals to return to Baghdad see: Jaber, T.A. (1982) 'Trends and prospects of brain drain from Arab countries.' p. 6.

14. Financial Times, 26 March 1982, 'Iraq: now the debts pile up'; 23 March 1982, 'Iraqis on the offensive'.

15. Amin Ez El-Din (1980) The implications of the Camp David Agreements on the movement of labour between Egypt and Israel. Indeed the Baghdad summit resolutions which called for an Arab boycott of Egypt specifically ruled out action against Egyptian migrant workers. Paragraph D of the resolution states: "The Arab countries confirm the importance of giving special case to the citizens of Egypt working in the Arab countries, looking after their interests and consolidating their Arab national belonging." Arab News, 2 April 1979, p. 1, 'Baghdad decisions'. The Saudis also assured Egyptian workers that their status would not be affected by the Arab League's boycott. Arab News, 4 April 1979, p. 1, 'Naif assures Egyptians here over status'. Note however that Hansen and Radwan recognize a decline in Egyptian secondments. They claim: "After 1977 there was a noticeable decline (in secondments). This might be explained by political developments in the area with worsening relations between Egypt and some of its neighbouring countries." Hansen, B. and Radwan, S. (1982) Employment opportunities and equity in Egypt. p. 98. See also: Socknat, J.A. (1979) 'The potential relationship of international migration for employment and a Middle East peace settlement: an assessment.' Middle East Review, vol. 9, pp. 58-64.

16. Financial Times, 25 February 1980, 'Special report: Kuwait', p. VII.

17. Kim, S. (1982) Contract migration in the Republic of Korea. Increased labour costs have led South Korean firms to recruit manpower from other countries, particularly Thais and Filipinos. See: MEED, vol. 24 (8) 2 May 1980, pp. 8-10. In 1981 the minimum wage for South Koreans sent abroad by the state organization (KODC) was lowered by 12.5% to restore competitiveness. MEED, vol. 25 (46) 13 November 1981, p.4.

18. Fergany, N. (1981) The role of Egyptian labour in the construction sector in Kuwait. Fergany briefly comments on labour force turnover but based his discussion on data for one year only (1979) and only

considers the relationship between new work permit issues and cancellations thus giving a false picture of high turnover rates. Al-Akhras, S. (1982) 'Aspects of immigrant labour-force stability in the State of Kuwait.' This is a misleadingly titled article relying on duration of residence and family size data from the 1970 census. It does not consider labour-force stability per se.

19. Attrition arises from work permit expiry, contract completion, retirement, emigration and death.

20. Hansen, B. and Radwan, S. (1982) 'Employment opportunities and equity in Egypt'. Estimate (p. 89) that in 1978 between 62,000 and 87,000 construction sector workers migrated to the oil-rich Arab states compared to 32,000 in 1973.

21. The number of 'cancellations and conversions' has remained relatively small:

1978	5,031
1979	3,027
1980	2,921
1981	n.a.

22. Data on construction permits illustrates the reduction in activity during 1978 and 1979 over the peak of 1977:

Year	Residential	Non-residential	Total (area Mn.m^2)
1975	1.8	0.4	2.2
1976	2.3	0.8	3.1
1977	3.6	1.1	4.7
1978	3.3	1.2	4.5
1979	2.8	1.5	4.3

Source: Kuwait, Central Statistical Office (1981) Statistical Abstract, 1980. Table 97.

23. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1981) 'Demographic settling amongst migrant workers.'

24. MEED, vol. 25 (33) 14 August 1981, p. 26. In September 1978 new visa cards had been introduced to cut down on forgeries. MEED, vol. 22 (39) 29 September 1978, p. 32; however the reported ban on work permit issues was denied: Kuwait Times, 6 March 1978.

25. In April 1980 the Ministry of Interior mounted a campaign to round up and deport illegal workers. MEED, vol. 24 (13) 28 March 1980, p. 40. Later in 1980 a significant change in work permit procedures was introduced when the Ministry of Labour abandoned the 'Quota System' by which foreign contractors could recruit workers directly from abroad within an allocated quota. The new regulations require all unskilled workers to be recruited internally and requests for skilled workers will require individual approval from the Ministry. MEED, vol. 24 (39) 26 September 1980,

p. 32. in October of the same year the Ministry announced a temporary ban on the issue of new work permits. MEED, vol. 24 (41) 10 October 1980, p. 38. A similar ban was enforced in October 1982; MEED, vol. 26 (43) 22 October 1982, p. 30. At the same time a new campaign against illegal residents was constituted. An amnesty for illegal residents was introduced in September; the Ministry of Interior announcing that the aim was to avoid invoking the severe penalties for residence regulations violation introduced by ammendments to the residence law in 1982. MEED, vol. 26 (37) 10 September 1982, p. 46, 'Amnesty for illegal residents'. By November some 14,780 illegal residents had left and a further 8,970 had regularised their status. MEED, vol. 26 (45) 5 November 1980, p. 39.

26. Farah, T. et al. (1980) 'Alienation and expatriate labour in Kuwait.' JSAMES, vol. 4 (1) pp. 3-40.

27. MEED, May 1982, 'Special report on Kuwait', p. 3, and p. 35, 'A short fuse on the expatriate time bomb'.

28. Serageldin, I. et al. (1983) Manpower and international labour migration in the Middle East and North Africa.

29. MEED, March 1982, 'Special report: construction and contracting in the Middle-East', see pp. 39-70.

30. Kuwait Daily News, 4 and 6 March 1975.

31. Kuwait Times, 27 September 1976 and 7 August 1977.

32. Arab Times, 17 November 1977, 'Ending Kuwait's cheap labour'. India has established an Overseas Manpower Corporation to regulate manpower flows to the Middle East and to licence recruiting agents. See: MEED, vol. 26 (1) 1 January 1982, p. 2, 'India seeks manpower controls'. In addition work permit receipts by Indians were affected by a strike in July 1978 involving some 2,000 Indians. Following a serious riot over 400 of the workers were arrested (strikes are illegal in Kuwait) and 220 deported. MEED, vol. 22 (32) 11 August 1978, p. 33 and vol. 22 (34) 25 August 1978, p. 31. In the following year Indian new work permit receipts fell by 28%.

33. Similarly in Saudi Arabia, Abu-Lughod examining length of residence data in the 1974 Saudi census argues that reluctance to admit more 'Palestinians' was already evident there in 1970. The latter shows that over 50% of enumerated 'Palestinians' had been in Saudi Arabia prior to 1970. In contrast other Arab nationalities, particularly Egyptians, had increased markedly in the 1970-73 period. See Abu-Lughod, J. 'Demographic characteristics of the Palestinian population'.

34. In August 1976 a Palestinian was deported for planting a bomb outside the Syrian Airline office in Kuwait. MEED, vol. 20 (34) 20 August 1976, p. 34. For a background to the events of August 1976 see MEED, vol. 20 (36) 3 September 1976, p. 3-4 'Social and economic tensions bring Kuwaiti clampdown'. See also: The Middle East, October 1976, no. 24, pp. 63-5, 'The pressure behind the curbs in Kuwait'.

35. Arab News, 30 August 1976 and 1 January 1978. The Kuwaitis have not reneged on their decision (1967) to allow the PLO to collect 5% of the salaries paid to Palestinians in the public sector; see Arab News, 17 February 1976, p. 8, 'Kuwait's Palestinian workers contribution to PLO'.

36. MEED, vol. 20 (49) 3 December 1976, p. 22. The growing restrictions and sense of alienation felt among Palestinians are discussed by Ryan, S. and Stork, J. (1977) 'Palestinians and the political situation in Kuwait', MERIP, vol. 7 (1), pp. 14-17.

37. MEED, vol. 22 (25) 23 June 1978, p. 35.

38. MEED, vol. 22 (39) 29 September 1978, pp. 6-9, 'Palestinian groups: the divided front'.

39. MEED, vol. 25 (28) 10 July 1981, p. 27.

40. MEED, vol. 25 (34) 21 August 1981, p. 16.

41. Financial Times, 29 March 1982, p. 2, 'Palestinian students clash with Kuwait police over Israel'.

42. Al-Attar, A.H. (1975) 'Kuwaitization v. Egyptianization' Kuwait Daily News, 6 November 1975.

43. A series of agreements signed by Qatar with Arab labour-exporting countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan) which aim to re-adjust the balance between Asian and Arab labour, could be the pattern for other labour-importers to follow. The Qatari government has feared that Qatar's Arab and Islamic identity could be 'swamped' by the growth of a non-Arab community. MEED, August 1982, 'Special Report: Qatar', p. 40, 'Wanted - more Arab labour'.

44. Financial Times, 22 January 1980, 'Special Report: Arab Construction'. On Kuwait see MEED, vol. 26 (42) 15 October 1982, pp. 38-43, 'Kuwait cushioned against falling revenues'; vol. 26 (18) 30 March 1982, p. 15, 'Cabinet passes deficit budget'.

Table 5.1

Kuwait: Work permit issues by national group 1975-1981

Year	Work Permit Issues: Arab Nationalities		Asian Nationalities		Arab/Asian Ratio	Total work permit issues*
	No.	% change	No.	% change		
1975	-	-	-	-	-	74,743
1976	-	-	-	-	-	86,290
1977	58,334	-	56,970	-	102.4	119,849
1978	51,976	-10.9	58,417	+2.5	89.0	113.667
1979	51,342	- 1.2	51,093	-12.5	100.5	105,659
1980	53,907	+ 5.0	54,301	+ 6.3	99.3	111,083
1981	52,427	- 2.7	57,246	+ 5.4	91.6	112,786

Source: Ministry of Labour, Kuwait (1977 and successive years) 'Annual report on work permit issues'. Various tables. (Unpublished, Arabic.) Author's compilation.

* : Note that total work permit issues include those to non-Arab/Asian nationalities.

Table 5.2

Kuwait: New work permit issues by national group 1977-1981

Year	Arab Nationalities			Asian Nationalities			Total	
	No.	% total	% change	No.	% total	% change	No.	% change
1977	29,522	49.3	-	30,400	50.7	-	59,922	-
1978	17,666	38.4	-40.2	28,325	61.6	-6.8	45,991	-30.3
1979	16,934	40.0	- 4.1	25,372	60.0	-10.4	42,306	- 8.0
1980	22,530	41.6	+33.1	31,627	58.4	+24.7	54,157	+28.0
1981	17,684	36.6	-21.5	30.637	63.4	- 3.1	48,321	-10.8

Source: As table 5.1 (Author's compilation).

Table 5.3

Kuwait: Renewed work permit issues by national group 1977-1981

Year	Arab Nationalities			Asian Nationalities			Total	
	No.	% total	% change	No.	% total	% change	No.	% change
1977	28,812	52.0	-	26,570	48.0	-	55,382	-
1978	34,310	53.3	+19.1	30,092	46.7	+13.3	64,402	+16.4
1979	34,408	57.2	+ 0.3	25,721	42.8	-14.5	60.129	- 6.6
1980	31,377	58.1	- 8.8	22,674	41.9	-11.8	54,051	-10.1
1981	34,743	56.6	+10.7	26,609	43.4	+17.4	61,352	+13.5

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation).

Table 5.4(a)

Kuwait: New work permit issues, 1977-81, Arab nationalities

	1977 No.	1978 No.	1978 % change	1979 No.	1979 % change	1980 No.	1980 % change	1981 No.	1981 % change	1977-81 % change
Yemeni	382	286	-25.1	273	-4.6	327	+19.8	266	-18.7	-30.4
Iraqi	318	559	+76.0	2,248	+302.1	2,781	+23.7	1,833	-34.1	+476.4
'Jordanian'	4,758	2,379	-50.0	2,034	-14.5	2,038	+0.2	1,722	-15.5	-63.8
Syrian	3,530	1,930	-50.0	1,706	-1.4	2,085	+22.2	1,687	-19.1	-52.2
Lebanese	2,574	1,516	-41.1	1,281	-15.5	949	-25.9	955	+0.6	-63.0
Egyptian	17,665	10,851	-38.6	8,909	-17.9	13,669	+53.4	10,720	-21.6	-39.3
Others	295	345	+16.9	483	+40.0	681	+41.0	501	-26.4	+601.8
Total Arab	29,522	17,666	-40.2	16,934	-4.1	22,530	+33.0	17,684	-21.5	-40.1

Table 5.4(b)

Kuwait: Renewed work permit issues, 1977-81, Arab nationalities

	1977	1978		1979		1980		1981		1977-81
	No.	No.	% change	No.	% change	No.	% change	No.	% change	% change
Yemeni	1,483	1,418	-4.4	1,274	-10.2	1,010	-20.7	1,015	+0.5	-31.6
Iraqi	2,366	1,239	-9.3	1,280	+3.3	1,585	+23.8	2,100	+32.5	+53.7
'Jordanian'	8,961	9,047	+0.9	8,198	-9.4	7,146	-12.8	7,590	+6.2	-15.3
Syrian	4,570	5,260	+15.1	4,768	-9.4	4,049	-15.1	4,134	+2.1	-9.5
Lebanese	2,853	3,361	+17.8	3,109	-7.5	2,394	-23.0	2,586	+8.0	-9.4
Egyptian	9,247	13,550	+46.5	15,390	+13.6	14,754	-4.1	16,708	+13.2	+80.7
Others	332	435	+31.0	389	-10.6	439	+12.9	610	+38.9	+83.7
Total Arab	28,812	34,310	+19.1	34,408	+0.3	31,377	-8.8	34,743	+10.7	+20.6

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation).

Table 5.5

Work permits issued to 'Jordanians' working in Kuwait 1977-1981

Year	(a) New work permits				(b) Renewed work permits				(c) Total work permits		
	No.	% total new issues to Arabs	% total issues	% change	No.	% total renewed issues to Arabs	% total issues	% change	No.	% work permits to Arabs and Asians	% change
1977	4,758	16.1	7.9	-	8,961	31.1	16.2	-	13,719	11.9	-
1978	2,379	13.5	5.2	-50.0	9,047	76.4	14.0	+0.96	16,426	10.4	-16.7
1979	2,034	12.0	4.8	-14.5	8,198	23.8	13.6	-9.4	10,232	9.9	-10.4
1980	2,038	9.1	3.8	+0.2	7,146	27.8	13.2	-12.8	9,184	8.5	-10.2
1981	1,722	9.7	3.6	-15.5	7,590	21.8	12.4	+6.2	9,312	8.5	+1.4

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation).

Table 5.6(a)

Kuwait: New work permit issues, 1977-81, Asian nationalities

	1977 No.	1978 No.	1978 % change	1979 No.	1979 % change	1980 No.	1980 % change	1981 No.	1981 % change	1977-81* % change
Pakistani	6,618	4,677	-29.3	5,092	+8.9	5,628	+10.5	4,400	-21.8	-33.5
Bangladeshi	n.a.	991	-	975	-1.6	2,043	+109.5	3,097	+51.6	+212.5
Indian	9,972	9,056	-9.2	6,563	-42.1	7,289	+11.1	7,051	-3.3	-29.3
South Korean	n.a.	7,442	-	8,016	+7.7	9,629	+20.1	7,511	-22.0	+0.9
Filipino	n.a.	1,867	-	987	-47.1	842	-14.7	1,582	+87.9	-15.3
Others*	8,075	1,700	-	2,238	+31.6	3,604	+61.0	4,910	+36.2	+188.8
Total (1)	30,400	28,325	-6.8	25,372	-10.3	31,627	+24.7	30.637	-3.1	+8.2
Total (2) (excluding Iranians)	24,670	25,733	+4.3	23,871	-7.2	29,035	+21.6	28,551	-1.7	+11.0

Table 5.6(b)

Kuwait: Renewed work permit issues, 1977-81, Asian nationalities

	1977 No.	1978 No.	1978 % change	1979 No.	1979 % change	1980 No.	1980 % change	1981 No.	1981 % change	1977-81 % change
Pakistani	6,697	8,349	+24.7	7,693	- 7.9	6,807	-11.5	7,257	+ 6.6	+ 8.4
Bangladeshi	n.a.	439	-	782	+78.1	1,145	+46.4	1,361	+18.9	+210.0
Indian	7,815	8,883	+13.7	8,858	+ 0.3	8,696	- 1.8	9,916	+14.0	+26.9
South Korean	n.a.	386	-	136	-64.8	822	+504.4	1,095	+33.2	+183.7
Filipino	n.a.	66	-	141	+113.6	102	-27.7	448	+339.2	+578.8
Others*	918	405	-	395	- 2.5	671	+69.9	1,591	+137.1	+292.8
Total (1)	26,570	30,092	+13.3	25,721	-14.5	22,674	-11.8	26,609	+17.4	+ 0.1
Total (2) (excluding Iranians)	15,425	18,528	+20.1	18,005	- 2.8	18,333	+ 1.8	21,668	+18.2	+40.5

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation).

* : Note that for 1977 only the category 'Other' includes South Koreans, Filipinos and Bangladeshis. In these cases percentage change is calculated for the 1978-81 period.

Table 5.7

Kuwait: Labour force stability, 1977-81

Nationality	% renewals in total work permit issues: 1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Yemeni	79.5	83.2	82.4	75.5	79.2
Iraqi	81.1	68.9	85.1	36.3	53.3
'Jordanian'	65.3	79.2	80.1	77.8	81.5
Syrian	56.4	75.3	73.6	66.0	71.0
Lebanese	52.6	68.9	70.8	71.6	73.0
Egyptian	34.4	43.4	63.3	51.9	54.9
Total Arab	49.4	53.8	67.0	58.2	66.3
Pakistani	50.3	64.1	60.2	54.7	62.3
Bangladeshi	n.a.	30.7	44.5	35.9	30.5
Indian	43.9	49.5	57.4	54.4	58.4
Iranian	66.1	81.7	83.7	62.6	70.3
South Korean	n.a.	4.9	1.7	7.9	12.7
Filipino	n.a.	3.4	12.5	10.8	40.9
Other Asian*	10.2	14.2	13.0	16.7	25.8
Total Asian	46.6	51.5	50.3	41.7	46.5

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation).

* : Note that for 1977 only the category 'Other Asian' includes South Koreans, Filipinos and Bangladeshis.

Table 5.8

Kuwait: work permit cancellations and departures 1976-81

Year	Number	% change
1976	2,731	-
1977	3,348	+22.6
1978	10,527	+214.4
1979	15,619	+48.4
1980	16,890	+8.2
1981	19,928	+18.0

Source: Ministry of Labour, Kuwait (various years) 'Annual report on work permit issues'. Table 10.1 (Author's calculation).

Table 5.9

Kuwait: work permit cancellations and departures 1979-81 by national sub-population

	1979		1980		1981	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Arab	3,290	21.1	3,648	21.6	3,759	19.0
Asian	11,576	74.1	12,613	74.7	15,390	77.6
Other	753	4.8	629	3.7	682	3.4
Total	15,619	100.0	16,890	100.0	19,831	100.0

Source: Ministry of Labour, Kuwait (1982) 'Annual report on work permit issues 1981'. Table 10.3 (Author's calculation).

Table 5.10

Kuwait: Labour force turnover 1979-81, by nationality

Nationality	1979		1980		1981	
	No. of cancellations	Turnover (%)	No. of cancellations	Turnover (%)	No. of cancellations	Turnover
Yemeni	47	3.0	31	2.3	48	3.7
Iraqi	85	2.4	100	2.3	246	6.2
'Jordanian'	402	3.9	429	4.7	483	5.2
Syrian	218	3.4	251	4.1	282	4.8
Lebanese	222	5.1	257	7.7	232	6.7
Egyptian	2,239	9.2	2,381	8.4	2,312	8.4
Other Arab	77	8.8	199	17.8	156	14.0
Total Arab	3,290	6.4	3,648	6.8	3,759	7.2
Pakistani	1,626	12.7	1,437	11.6	1,364	11.7
Bangladeshi	211	12.0	152	4.8	293	6.6
Indian	2,810	18.2	3,508	21.9	3,396	20.0
Iranian	80	0.9	178	2.6	373	5.3
Korean	5,008	61.4	6,039	57.8	7,013	81.5
Filipino	1,004	92.3	279	29.6	745	36.9
Other Asian	800	32.6	1,020	29.4	2,206	34.6
Total Asian	11,576	22.7	12,613	23.2	9,080	15.9
TOTAL	14,866	14.5	16,261	15.0	12,839	11.7

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation).

Table 5.11

Kuwait: labour force turnover by economic sector, 1980

Economic Sector	Work Permit Issues	Work Permit Cancellations	Rate of Turnover (%)
Agriculture and fishing	1,697	135	8.0
Mining and quarrying	820	47	5.7
Manufacturing	13,022	585	4.5
Construction	71,190	11,865	16.7
Wholesale and retail trade	25,900	1,504	5.8
Transport, storage and communications	4,847	331	6.8
Financial services	4,217	201	4.8
Community and personal services	3,966	196	5.8

Source: Ministry of Labour, Kuwait (1981) 'Annual report on work permit issues, 1980'. Various tables. (Authors's compilation)

Table 5.12

Kuwait: Labour force turnover by wage rates, 1980

Wage rate (KD. per month)	Labour force turnover rate
0-49	51.6
50-99	12.4
100-149	13.0
150-199	18.4
200-249	14.5
250-299	2.1
300+	10.2

Source: Ministry of Labour, Kuwait (1981) 'Annual report on work permit issues, 1980'. Tables 25-27. (Author's compilation).

Table 5.13

Kuwait: distribution of new work permit issues by sector of employment, 1978 and 1981

Sector of Employment	1978				1981				% change 1978-81	
	Arab		Asian		Arab		Asian			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	Arab	Asian
Agriculture	277	1.6	397	1.4	455	2.6	806	2.6	+64.3	+103.0
Oil	106	0.6	66	0.2	59	0.3	114	0.3	-44.3	+72.7
Manufacturing	2,561	14.5	1,613	5.7	2,273	12.9	2,163	7.0	-11.2	+34.1
Construction	8,331	47.2	21,586	76.4	7,358	41.6	18,745	61.1	-11.7	-13.2
Trade	4,327	24.5	3,108	11.0	4,876	27.6	4,419	14.4	+12.7	+42.2
Transport	606	3.4	1,102	3.9	905	5.1	2,343	7.6	+49.3	+112.6
Financial Services	742	4.2	154	0.5	667	3.7	308	1.0	-10.1	+100.0
Personal and social services	716	4.2	229	0.8	1,091	6.2	1,839	6.0	+52.4	+703.1
TOTAL	17,666	100.0	28,255	100.0	17,684	100.0	30,637	100.0	-	+8.4

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation)

Table 5.14

Index of employment diversification 1978-81*

Nationality	1978	1979	1980	1981
Yemeni	0.78	0.77	0.75	0.75
Iraqi	0.78	0.75	0.72	0.73
'Jordanian'	0.71	0.74	0.71	0.73
Syrian	0.66	0.71	0.71	0.71
Lebanese	0.61	0.69	0.71	0.71
Egyptian	0.69	0.69	0.72	0.72
Total Arab	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.73
Pakistani	0.58	0.55	0.67	0.69
Bangladeshi	0.78	0.78	0.77	0.78
Indian	0.40	0.58	0.74	0.62
Iranian	0.59	0.69	0.69	0.61
South Korean	0.10	0.05	0.03	0.02
Filipino	0.07	0.71	0.73	0.66
Total Asian	0.41	0.49	0.60	0.59

Source: Author's calculations.

* : This uses the simple Gibbs-Martin index. With eight categories the maximum value attainable is 0.87.

Table 5.15

Kuwait: New work permit issues to 'Jordanians' by economic sector, 1978-81

Economic Sector	1978		1979		1980		1981		% change 1978-81
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Agriculture	32	1.3	32	1.6	11	0.5	14	0.8	-56.3
Mining and Quarrying	57	2.4	32	1.6	22	1.1	32	1.9	-43.9
Manufacturing	257	10.8	298	14.7	230	11.3	190	11.1	-26.1
Construction	1,043	43.8	755	37.1	901	44.2	698	40.5	-33.1
Trade	662	27.8	614	30.2	573	28.1	486	28.2	-26.6
Transport, storage and communications	88	3.7	75	3.7	58	2.8	86	5.0	-2.3
Financial services	133	5.6	159	7.8	152	7.5	138	8.0	+3.7
Community and personal services	107	4.6	69	3.4	91	4.5	78	4.5	-27.1
TOTAL	2,379	100.0	2,034	100.0	2,038	100.0	1,722	100.0	-27.6

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation)

Table 5.16

Kuwait: New work permit issues by occupation groups and nationality, 1980 (% distribution)

(a) Arab)	'Jordanian'	Yemeni	Iraqi	Syrian	Lebanese	Egyptian
Professional, technical and related	19.6	3.4	9.2	7.1	11.8	7.7
Administrative and managerial	0.9	0.3	0.4	0.2	1.8	0.2
Clerical and related	18.7	22.3	10.9	5.7	12.5	7.9
Sales	8.3	11.0	5.5	12.0	10.2	2.8
Services	2.1	15.9	4.0	4.0	9.0	9.3
Agriculture and fishing	0.1	0.6	1.8	0.7	0.2	2.0
Production and process labour	50.2	46.5	68.2	70.2	54.5	70.1

(Table 5.16 (continued)

(b) Asian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Indian	Iranian	Korean	Filipino
Professional, technical and related	2.9	0.9	9.5	5.3	3.6	5.0
Administrative and managerial	0.2	-	0.3	-	0.3	-
Clerical and related	4.6	1.0	12.0	4.2	3.4	2.5
Sales	2.5	0.5	5.2	7.3	0.2	0.2
Services	2.4	12.6	9.4	2.3	1.2	17.6
Agriculture and fishing	5.1	6.4	0.8	0.7	0.1	-
Production and process	82.3	78.6	64.2	80.1	91.2	74.7

Source: Ministry of Labour, Kuwait (1981) op. cit. Table 12/6 (Author's compilation)

Table 5.17

Kuwait: Employment rate of 'Jordanians' in 1975 and 1978-81

Occupation Group	Employment rate 1975 (per '000)	New work permit issues: 1978 No.	1978 rate	1979 No.	1979 rate	1980 No.	1980 rate	1981 No.	1981 rate	% change 1978-81
A-1	72.8	221	93.1	182	89.5	215	106.5	192	111.5	-13.1
A-2	28.7	191	80.3	179	88.0	178	71.2	123	71.4	-35.6
B	207.4	118	49.8	85	41.8	141	41.7	134	89.4	+30.5
C-1	254.8	386	162.1	439	215.8	781	252.2	662	384.4	+71.5
C-2	238.1	619	260.0	540	265.5	387	182.5	399	231.7	-35.5
D	198.2	844	354.7	609	299.4	336	345.9	192	111.5	-77.3

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation)

Table 5.18

Kuwait: Occupation specific employment rates (per 1000) 1975

Nationality	A-1	A-2	B	C-1	C-2	D
'Jordanian'	72.8	28.7	207.4	254.9	238.1	198.2
Iraqi	19.5	11.8	40.5	126.9	408.0	393.3
Lebanese	40.3	37.7	175.1	264.8	278.0	204.3
Syrian	17.4	15.8	88.7	213.9	402.3	262.0
Egyptian	72.3	32.6	210.7	79.0	255.6	349.8
Yemeni	2.6	6.8	8.6	349.2	66.0	566.7
Indian	36.2	9.9	90.3	215.8	129.5	518.1
Pakistani	20.8	10.4	54.5	116.9	595.3	202.0
Total Arab	51.6	24.7	154.3	193.7	272.2	303.3
Total Asian	17.2	6.2	54.6	162.5	377.4	382.4

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation)

Table 5.19

Kuwait: New work permit issues by occupation group and nationality, 1980

Nationality	% Distribution:					
	A-1	A-2	B	C-1	C-2	D
'Jordanian'	10.6	7.1	4.2	25.2	18.3	34.6
Iraqi	3.8	3.2	3.3	14.6	11.1	64.1
Lebanese	4.5	7.1	3.5	20.7	28.5	35.7
Syrian	2.6	3.3	1.7	17.2	12.0	63.3
Egyptian	3.2	3.7	1.4	9.5	10.2	72.0
Yemeni	1.2	1.8	0.6	25.4	5.8	65.1
Other Arab	1.6	5.9	1.6	20.7	19.2	51.1
Iranian	0.6	0.1	3.7	11.1	14.6	69.8
Indian	4.3	1.1	1.9	16.0	17.9	57.5
Pakistani	1.1	1.1	0.9	6.7	18.2	72.0
Bangladeshi	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.5	13.0	85.6
South Korean	3.1	0.5	0.2	3.5	9.7	83.0
Filipino	2.7	0.7	1.8	2.7	30.9	61.2
Other Asian	1.3	0.7	0.5	1.9	13.6	81.9
Total Arab	3.8	4.1	2.0	13.3	12.2	64.6
Total Asian	2.4	1.0	1.1	7.3	14.7	73.5

Source: Ministry of Labour, Kuwait (1981) op. cit. Tables 12.1-12.24 (Author's compilation)

Table 5.20

Kuwait: New and renewed work permits issued to Palestinians (identified), 1977-81

Year	New work permits	% change	Renewed work permits	% change
1977	472	-	845	-
1978	53	-88.8	814	-3.7
1979	46	-13.2	713	-12.4
1980	42	-8.7	575	-19.4
1981	45	+7.1	594	-3.3

Source: as table 5.1 (Author's compilation)

PART III : THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION ON JORDAN'S DOMESTIC LABOUR MARKET

CHAPTER SIX

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION AND THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTION

6.1 Preface

6.1.1 The previous part of this thesis (II) examined in some detail the evolution and characteristics of Jordanian emigration for employment over the period 1920-83. In that analysis particular attention was paid to the period 1974-83 in which labour emigration both peaked (circa 1977-78) and later began to decline. Here (part III) the labour outflows of this period (post 1973) will be put into perspective by a brief examination (chapter six) of the main structural elements of the Jordanian economy and the effects of international labour emigration on those macro-economic features.

In subsequent chapters (seven and eight) we will examine in detail the domestic labour market from which labour outflows have been drawn. The employment problems engendered by large scale emigration for employment will be explored, focussing in particular on skilled manpower shortages. Returning to our opening theme (see chapter 1.4) we examine the formulation and implementation of Jordanian 'emigration policy', in its broadest sense. The government's changing perception of international migration for employment and the utility of its policy response is assessed.

6.1.2 The radical changes witnessed in Jordan's economic structure since the 1948 Palestine war are well known and have been examined comprehensively by a number of recent works (Mazur, 1979; Fariz, 1978; Saket, 1976).[1] Here we

will briefly outline the principal characteristics and developments in the economy, particularly since 1973.

Two interrelated features have characterized the Jordanian economy since the country's creation in 1921. Firstly a chronic and persistent trade deficit; and secondly, the financing of that deficit by foreign budgetary support and more recently by workers' remittances. We will examine each of these principal features in turn.

6.2 Macro-economic features of the Jordanian economy: the trade deficit

6.2.1 Jordan's continued trade deficit reflects to a large extent the meagre natural resource endowment which resulted from the country's largely artificial creation to satisfy short-term geo-political exigencies.[2]

During the period of the British Mandate (1921-46) Transjordan's economy was overwhelmingly agricultural; the restricted cultivable area (less than 100,000 ha. receive over 500 mm. of rainfall per annum) produced only a small and highly variable surplus for export. Formal industrial activity was almost non-existent. As a result trade deficit has been a continuous feature of the Jordanian economy. In the period 1936-40 the value of exports (over 60% of which came from cereals) averaged less than 40% of imports. Furthermore exports were directed overwhelmingly to Palestine (which accounted for 94% in 1938).[3]

This concentration on limited export commodities and destinations has remained. During the 1970's the commodity structure of exports became increasingly dominated by phosphates (table 6.1) which, since 1975, have averaged 34% of total export value. By 1982 earnings from phosphates

accounted for 42% of total export income. At the same time export destinations have remained spatially concentrated; since 1977 over 60% of Jordanian exports have gone to neighbouring Arab states, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alone accounting for more than 35% of export value.

Thus while the value of exports has increased steadily through the 1970's and there has been an increase in the proportion of manufactured exports, there is nevertheless a real danger of export instability arising from this concentration of both products and destinations. In particular Jordan's export earnings are closely related to the world phosphate price. The latter has remained relatively stable since 1980.

6.2.2 The increased level of domestic exports has been outpaced by the growth in imports (table 6.2). The latter increased by 388% over the period 1975-82 compared to a 364% increase in export value. As a result the visible trade imbalance has continued to worsen. In 1972 the trade gap was JD. 83Mn., by 1982 this had reached JD. 957 Mn. with domestic exports financing only 16% of import value.

In the mid-1970's imports were dominated by consumer goods which accounted for over one-third of their total value. Notable increases in consumer goods imports occurred, particularly in 1976-77 when consumer durables grew by 48%, an increase related to the sudden growth in workers' remittances (see below 6.4). At the same time the effect of the 1973-74 oil price increase was substantial; oil increased from less than 5% of import value in 1972 to over 20% in 1982. Recently capital goods have become more important and, since 1979, have been the single largest

commodity import. The latter grew from 20% of imports in 1972 to 35% in 1982. This is a reflection of the scale of capital investment in Jordan under the 1976-80 and 1981-85 development plans. Despite this, the fastest growing element in the import bill remains current and durable consumer goods which increased by 32% between 1980 and 1981.

6.2.3 Jordan's poor natural resource base (the main resources, phosphate and potash mineral reserves, were not exploited on a significant scale until the 1970's) and the relatively small size of its economy are reflected in the national income accounts (table 6.3). The sectoral origin of GDP illustrates the small productive base of the economy and the dominance of its tertiary sector. The latter, dominated itself by public administration and defence, accounts for over 65% of GDP. This strong service sector orientation can be traced back to 1948 when the influx of refugees from Palestine demanded a commensurate growth in public services. The effects of this increasing service sector orientation on the pattern of employment will be considered below (chapter 6.6). A second notable feature of the GDP account is the declining share of agriculture, falling from 10% in 1972 to under 7% in the early 1980's (non-drought years). Despite increased production real earnings from phosphate exports have also fallen with the drop in the world phosphate price.[4] In real terms GDP has remained static since the late 1970's, nevertheless GNP has continued to increase primarily because of the effect of external transfers (and indirect taxation).

6.2.4 In this section we have shown that the Jordanian

economy has a small productive base which is particularly vulnerable to external factors (such as the world phosphate price and the level of precipitation). This vulnerability is increased by the economy's extensive reliance on external transfers to finance the trade imbalance and the government's deficit budget. These external transfers are of two main types: (i) foreign grants, primarily in the form of unrequited budget support, together with specific loans and borrowings; (ii) remittances from Jordanian workers abroad. Each of these external sources will be considered in turn.

6.3 External transfers: foreign aid

6.3.1 Jordan's meagre natural resource base together with her geopolitical importance has ensured a continued reliance on, and availability of, foreign budgetary aid and grants. Indeed Saket (1976) characterizes Jordan as an 'aid economy'. This dependance on budgetary support began during the British Mandate when the establishment and maintenance of public security forces became a significant drain on public revenues.[5] Between 1924/5 and 1939/40 Britain's 'grants-in-aid' accounted for over 30% of Jordan's total revenue.[6] This dependence on foreign aid was increased by the 1948 Palestine war and the need to provide for the influx of refugees.

After 1948 a major aim of British, and later American, aid to Jordan was to promote its independence vis-a-vis the radical Arab states (particularly Egypt and Syria) and to reduce its threat to Israel. Britain's financial support for Hussein was significantly reduced after the

1956 crisis culminating in the dismissal of General Glubb from his post as commander of the Arab Legion. Gaitskell argued (March 1956) that if the British subsidy had continued then Britain could find itself: "... subsidizing the maintenance of a force which might well go into action against Israel in circumstances in which we have to go to the defence and assistance of Israel."[7] In the post-1956 period the role of chief aid donor was assumed by the Americans.[8]

6.3.2 Following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the loss of the West Bank, the Khartoum Agreement pledged Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya to provide Jordan with an annual subsidy of JD. 37.7 Mn. Since then Arab aid to Jordan has accounted for an increasing proportion of total aid, reaching to more than 88% of the government's total foreign receipts in 1982. This Arab support has come principally from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The growth in Arab aid followed the formalization of aid commitments at the Baghdad Arab Summit (November 1978) when the oil-rich Arab states pledged Jordan US $ 1.2 Bn. per annum for ten years.[9] Foreign grants have typically been as large as, and invariably greater than, domestic revenues (table 6.4). Jordan has received these large external funds primarily from her role as a 'front-line' state, a role which has entailed an over-large defence expenditure (table 6.4).

Fariz (1978) has argued that the availability of such funds has made it more difficult for the government to undertake the fiscal reform outlined in the 1976-80 Five Year Plan. The latter proposed the introduction of capital gains tax and an improved enforcement of income

tax collection.[10] In reality increased domestic revenues reflect the imports boom and consequently the government's customs receipts, together with the rise in phosphate exports (the government benefitting from profits on its shareholdings, corporate income tax and royalties). In recent years there has also been a notable growth in foreign borrowings to finance specific projects. Recent developments in the local money market aim to reduce the need for external borrowing through the growth in domestic bond issues and syndicated loans.[11]

The importance of foreign aid (and workers' remittances) relative to imports and to GDP over the period 1975-82 is shown on table 6.5 while the ratio of aid to GDP has been maintained, at circa 30%, the ratio of foreign receipts to imports has fallen (from 56% in 1972 to 25% in 1982) with the rapid growth in imports. This shortfall in the domestic import capacity has been increasingly bridged by workers' remittances which, ironically, have themselves spurred the growth in consumer goods imports. With the inclusion of remittances, actual import capacity continues to exceed the level of imports, leaving surplus funds for debt servicing and for the maintenance of high levels of capital investment (in the period 1978-82 gross fixed investments have averaged 32% of GNP).

6.4 External transfers: workers' remittances

6.4.1 The inflow of aid to Jordan has been supplemented by growing levels of workers' remittances. The size of these remittances, as provided by the Central Bank of

Jordan's (CBJ) balance of payments data for the period 1960-82, is portrayed on table 6.6. The latter shows a marked increase since 1973 when they amounted to JD. 14.7 Mn. compared to JD. 382 Mn. in 1982 (see figure 6.1). Moreover the data recorded here are considered by the CBJ's foreign exchange department to be an under-estimate of the real remittance level. The CBJ calculates invisible income from the foreign exchange record (of commercial banks and licensed money changers), an estimated proportion of which is ascribed to remittances based on the number of Jordanians working abroad (estimated by the Ministry of Labour) and assumptions regarding their propensity to remit earnings. The foreign exchange department readily admits that a large proportion, if not the majority of remittance transactions are conducted outside the official market through unlicensed money changers.[12] In the recent survey of worker remittances by the RSS almost 61% of migrants exchanged remittances via non-bank methods, and only 30% of those currently working abroad were sending remittances through the banking system.[13]

The growth in remittances over the 1970's reflects a number of factors:

(i) the increased number of Jordanians working abroad;

(ii) the growth in real wages and salaries paid to those working abroad;

(iii) a change in the propensity to remit savings (this may reflect the increased proportion of unaccompanied workers in recent years);

(iv) the CBJ believe that a higher proportion of workers abroad are now transferring remittances through official

FIG.6·1 JORDAN: WORKERS' REMITTANCES, 1960-82.



SOURCE: table 6·6

FIG.6·2 JORDAN: FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INCOME, 1972-82.



SOURCE: tables 6·4 and 6·5

channels; thus to some extent the increase is illusory, simply reflecting a switch in methods of transfer and exchange. This is particularly the case since 1978-79 when, as we have seen, the number of emigrant workers and their real wages have been falling. At the same time it reflects the political stability in Jordan since the 1970's and the maintenance of the Jordanian dinar's value;

(v) the CBJ has attempted to 'capture' a greater proportion of total remittances by easing currency controls.

Expanding on the latter point, the limit on foreign currency holdings was doubled in 1979 to JD. 10,000, at the same time nationals living abroad were given the option of depositing foreign currency in local banks for up to five years.[14] Incentives for Jordanians working abroad to invest in commercial banks have been increased by a growth in interest rates for time-deposit accounts.[15] This has stimulated a growth in the number of commercial bank deposits held by non-residents. The latter have grown as a proportion of total deposit accounts from 2.7% in 1972 to 14.7% in 1982 (table 6.7).

6.4.2 The principal effect of remittances on the macro-economy has been in terms of the balance of payments. Since 1975 worker remittances have been significantly higher than domestic exports. The existence of this large positive balance in invisible earnings transforms the balance of trade deficit into a relatively strong balance of payments surplus. Nevertheless it is immediately apparent that Jordan's strong balance of payments position is illusory; a change in the propensity to remit or the withdrawal of aid payments would rapidly turn the balance of payments

surplus into a deficit. This unpredictability in Jordan's main income factors is apparent in table 6.6; during the crises of the June 1967 war and the subsequent 1970-71 civil war recorded worker remittances fell by 61% (1966-68) and 28% (1969-71) respectively. Similarly the reassertion of Jordanian control over the Palestinian guerillas in 1970-71 led both Libya and Kuwait to suspend aid payments.

The availability of both external budget support, which has been rapidly monetized by the government through its commitments to public administration, defence personnel, investments and subsidies, together with the high propensity to expend remittances on consumer goods, has led to a rapid increase in money supply (M2) (table 6.6). The latter is stimulated by growing credit demands from merchants to finance the demand for imports, and by the conversion of foreign currencies (workers' remittances) into Jordanian dinars.[16]

This rapid increase in money supply has been a significant factor in the stimulation of high rates of inflation throughout the mid and late 1970's.[17] Clearly the expression of national income at current prices is of limited significance given the variations in the value of money. There are no national income accounts at constant prices and it is difficult to measure price changes in the economy using the cost of living index (because of changes in the weightings attached to different groups of items and the effects of subsidies). Nevertheless, although an unsatisfactory measure (since it excludes some price changes in national income constituents, for example export goods) the cost of living index does provide

an indication of the underlying trend in prices over the late 1970's and can be used to derive an inflation rate series. The latter confirms the IMF's estimate that prices were increasing at 10-12% per annum over the 1978-81 period.[18] Applying this deflator to the GDP (factor cost) over the 1975-81 period reduces the nominal rate of growth from an average 23% per annum to 10.3%; similarly the annual average increase in remittances falls to 67%.

The influx of remittances has not stimulated an expansion in domestic manufacturing and agricultural production because of the low supply elasticities of these sectors. Indeed remittances have been directed overwhelmingly into non-productive investment (land and real-estate) or into financing the growing consumer imports boom illustrated above. The RSS survey has shown that the government's aim of increasing the productive investment of remittance income has been largely unsuccessful.[19] The 44% increase in the number of land transactions recorded by the Land Registration Department in 1975 is an indication of the extent to which remittances were directed into speculative investment. By 1976 the Land Registration Department's revenue (10% of the value of land) had increased by more than 365% over its 1974 value, indicating the extent of inflated land values. Over the same period construction permits for residential building in Amman-Zarka increased in number by 220% and in area by over 120%.[20]

Although Clark (1977) envisaged remittances replacing foreign aid as the main external transfer this has not been the case.[21] Only in 1976 did remittances exceed aid payments. Nevertheless there has been a steady

increase in the remittance: aid ratio to levels approaching parity (fig. 6.2). The availability of these large external transfers has enabled a continuous expansion in imports and prevented the adverse balance of trade from having its usual deflationary effect on money supply and demand. Fariz (1978) argues that their availability has entrenched the service sector orientation of the economy; a point emphasised by Asfour and Smadi (1979) who show that the distribution of bank credit was heavily biased, in the late 1980's, in favour of the property and commerce sectors which absorbed over 60% of available credit in both 1977 and 1978.[22]

6.5 International labour migration and the Jordanian economy: some preliminary conclusions

6.5.1 In this introductory chapter we have examined the macro-economic framework within which Jordanian labour outflows have occurred and within which emigration policy must be assessed. The Jordanian economy is both small and extremely vulnerable to external influences, in particular the maintenance of external budgetary support and the propensity of its workers abroad to remit earnings. Clearly a collapse in either of these elements would effectively paralyse the Jordanian economy.

The amelioration of this external dependence and the expansion of the domestic productive base have been the principal aims of Jordan's development strategy as evidenced by successive development programmes since the mid-1960's. The aims of the two most recent development plans (1976-80 and 1981-85) can be summarised as:

(i) achieving a structural change in the Jordanian

economy through the development of the commodity producing sectors;

(ii) reducing the trade deficit through the expansion and diversification of exports and the strengthening of the balance of payments account;

(iii) the development of domestic revenues as the main source of government income.

The short and medium term aims of this strategy are clearly incompatible since the expansion of the economy's productive base must result in an increase in the trade imbalance (because of increased capital-goods imports) and hence increase the reliance on external transfers. The extent to which Jordan can maintain her relations with the major aid donors has thus become a primary element in domestic development planning. Concomitantly this has had important implications for labour emigration policy. The coincidence of major export destinations and the origins of external budget support with the primary countries of employment for Jordanians abroad, has essentially proscribed Jordanian emigration policy to meet the requirements of those economies. A decision by the Jordanian authorities to restrict labour outflows could have a negative impact on the level of external transfers, not simply through a reduction in workers' remittances but also in terms of budgetary support.

The level of aid is of course not simply a function of Jordan's continued participation in the international labour market. Nevertheless such a relationship cannot be entirely dismissed. In 1977 Jordan was instrumental in

proposing the establishment of an international labour compensation facility (ILCF) to provide financial aid to labour-supplying economies disrupted by their participation in international labour migration.[23] Although there would be considerable difficulties in instituting such a facility the major factor behind its rejection has been the complete lack of support from the labour-importing countries themselves. What is relevant here is that Jordan's claims to such compensation were explicitly rejected on the grounds that she already receives considerable financial support from those labour importing states.[24] Hence the implicit relationship between labour migration and aid. This is clearly recognized by Anani and Jaber (1980) who state that international labour migration has had: "... a positive return to Jordan only as a factor in regional economic and technical co-operation ..."[25] Thus despite the emergence of considerable labour market problems engendered by labour emigration (see chapter 7 below) Jordan has been obliged to maintain its passive participation in the international labour market. Rather than diminishing external dependence by creating an additional source of foreign exchange, reliance on employment abroad has increased Jordan's external dependence and emphasised the economy's service sector orientation.

In the following chapter (7) we will examine in detail the adverse consequences of large scale emigration for employment on the domestic labour market and the government's policy response to those problems and to the increased uncertainty introduced in economic planning. As a preface to that discussion the second half of this introductory chapter

will establish the determinants of labour supply during the 1970's. That analysis will utilise unpublished data from the 1979 census.

6.5.2 At this point it is worth re-iterating that statistical data on manpower characteristics and trends in Jordan are extremely limited. Data from the 1961 census of population and from the multi-purpose household surveys (MPHS) of the early and mid-1970's must be used with caution because of statistical deficiencies within the sample frames themselves and the demographic repercussions of political developments during the inter-censal period.

The sample structure of the MPHS series (1972, 1974 and 1976) include a number of sources of bias. Firstly, Amman and other urban areas are over-represented in the household sample (accounting for 79%, 70% and 78% of the sample population in 1972, 1974 and 1976 respectively).[26] Secondly, the sample frame excludes three important sub-groups, namely: nomadic households; households including members of the security forces; households living abroad. Thirdly, since the sample was based on property tax records, it ignores those living in 'informal' housing. Clearly these deficiences will distort the principal indicators in which we are interested, namely: school enrolment rates; labour force participation; the pattern of employment and rate of unemployment.

Other sources of data on employment used here are the labour force censuses of 1970 and 1975, the agricultural census of 1975, the thrice-annual surveys of employment in 'large' establishments and the unpublished results of a 2.1%

sample of the 1979 census returns. In each case interpretation is subject to a number of caveats which are introduced where appropriate. Despite these data misgivings it is essential to establish at least the broad outline of labour market trends in order to assess the impact of labour emigration.

6.6 The changing pattern of employment, 1961-79

6.6.1 Changes in the sectoral distribution of employment have mirrored the trends in sectoral origin of gross domestic product discussed previously (section 6.2), reflecting in particular the growing service sector orientation of the economy. Although this can be traced to the events of 1948, there was still a relatively large agricultural sector employment in 1961 (of over 73,000 permanent workers) which accounted for 36% of total East Bank employment (203,000). The most significant change in the subsequent period has been the collapse in both the relative and absolute size of the agricultural workforce. This decline continued throughout the 1960's and 1970's, reaching an estimated 58,000 (20% of total employment, 292,000) in 1970 and 49,000 (13.5% of total employment, 355,000) in 1975. Preliminary results from the 1979 census indicate a further fall (to 42,000) to only 10% of total employment (421,000). This unrestrained decline in agricultural sector employment matches its falling share in GDP and the lack of both private and public sector investment in agriculture (outside the major irrigation projects). In addition a prolonged drought which affected the 1975-79 seasons, combined with the availability of alternative employment opportunities

for unskilled labour (particularly in the urban construction sector), has encouraged substantial out-migration from rural areas.

In contrast the high levels of investment and of imports, facilitated by the surplus external transfers, have enabled a considerable expansion in tertiary activities. Employment in community, social and personal services has increased by almost 200% in the 1961-79 period to represent some 43% (178,800) of total employment (compared to 29% in 1961). A large proportion of this service sector employment is accounted for by public administration and defence personnel. It is estimated that almost 39% of all Jordanians in employment (1979) were engaged in the public sector. Nevertheless the public sector has been plagued by high rates of labour turnover because of its uncompetitive salary structure. Although the government has attempted to control this through additional employee incentives, it remains a significant problem. There is a strong pattern of public sector employment among the younger age groups, who later transfer to private sector employment once they have acquired some experience. Given the rapid increase in output from general secondary education (see below 6.7.4), there may be mounting pressure on the government to expand public sector employment, particularly in the civil service, beyond the level that can either be afforded or is necessary. At the same time the continued drift of skilled and experienced professionals into the private sector and abroad will mean a continued shortage of experience.

Employment in other tertiary activities has also

increased significantly, the most notable growth coming in wholesale/retail trade, finance and business services, which have over 50,000 employees (12% of total employment). However the second largest employer (after services) is the construction sector with 67,000 employees in 1979. In fact this may be under-stated because of the omission of its large casual labour component. This growth in, and predominance of, construction sector employment reflects the considerable investment in infrastructural projects during the 1976-80 development plan. In addition the private construction sector experienced a considerable boom with the influx of workers' remittances and the investment of capital funds flowing out of Lebanon since the mid-1970's.

Although investment in mining and manufacturing exceeded expectations during the 1976-80 plan, that investment concentrated on the country's large phosphate and potash reserves which have relatively limited manpower requirements. The manufacturing sector received an initial boost with the prolongation of the Iran-Iraq conflict, with many industrial plants increasing capacity and doubling in the number of shifts to accommodate the Iraqi market.[27] However manufacturing employment still only accounts for 10.8% of non-farm employment (table 6.8). Moreover the Iraqi decision, in April 1982, to restrict import commodities to war essentials as part of its austerity programme, has hit Jordanian manufacturing hard.[28] Indeed the index of industrial production rose by less than 3% in 1982 (compared to 18% and 13% in 1980 and 1981 respectively). As a result the export of consumer goods to Iraq has slumped, threatening to bankrupt many of the smaller firms

which predominate in Jordan's manufacturing sector. The Iraqi decision has also severely damaged the transport and insurance sectors which had been relying on the increased volume of transit trade through Aqaba.

6.6.2 In sum the rapid growth of employment demand in Jordan is, like the macro-economy in general, largely dependent on the maintenance of external conditions over which she has little control. Clearly a sustained drop in general budget support would have severe implications for public sector employment. Despite the government's emphasis on increasing the industrial share of GDP, the employment structure is increasingly dominated by non-productive service sector employment. The following section concludes this discussion of basic parameters in the Jordanian labour market with a consideration of the determinants of labour supply. This is particularly important since, as we will see later (chapter 7), manipulation of labour supply is the major element in the government's approach to labour emigration.

6.7 The determinants of labour supply in Jordan

6.7.1 Jordan's labour supply has been influenced by two sets of factors: (i) demographic and (ii) social/ institutional. The following section will first briefly outline the effects of recent population growth on the domestic labour supply. Subsequently we will consider changes in the age-sex specific participation rates which have modified the impact of these demographic developments. In particular attention will focus on the role of women and changes in education enrolment levels.

6.7.2 Labour supply and population growth

Between the respective census enumerations of November 1961 and 1979 the resident population of Jordan (East Bank) increased from 0.9 Mn. to 2.1 Mn. A population series (based on back-cast estimates from the 1979 enumeration) indicates an increase in the population growth rate from 3.5% p.a. in the late 1960's to 4.4% by the mid-1970's.[29] East Bank population growth has however been far from smooth with considerable refugee inflows following the June 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank sub-districts. In the mid-1970's Jordan also received a large refugee inflow following the intensification of sectarian conflict in Lebanon. During the mid and late 1970's Jordan received an increasing number of West Bank Palestinians. Since 1982 the latter has been severely restricted by the Jordanians following the collapse of the Hussein-Arafat talks.

These recent population inflows have augmented the prevailing high rates of natural increase and contributed to a disproportionate growth in the 'urban' (defined by the Department of Statistics as settlements with at least 10,000 inhabitants) component of the population. The primacy of Amman and the role of internal migration in aggravating that primacy are discussed in some detail by Samha (1979).[30] Preliminary results from the 1979 census confirm that growth has been concentrated in the Amman-Zarka conurbation; the Amman governorate increasing its share of the East Bank population to 55%. However an objective analysis of rural-urban migration patterns is precluded by the sensitivity with which birth place data is treated.

High rates of rural out-migration are related (Dajani and Murdock, 1978) to the continued social, economic and political marginalisation of rural society.[31] The problems imposed by the long drought of the mid-1970's combined with the withdrawal of manpower (due, for example, to military conscription and international labour migration) are exacerbated by the exclusion of small villages from the improvement programmes of the Municipal and Village Loan Fund (MVLF) because they have fewer than 180 taxpayers. In addition rural-urban migration is undoubtedly stimulated by the existence of a strong earnings gradient. Assaf (1979) shows that, in the mid-1970's, rural incomes averaged only 46% of those in urban Amman, a differential likely to have been exacerbated by the subsequent boom in workers' remittances (Dajani, 1982).[32]

Continued rural out-migration has important implications for both rural labour supply (see chapter 9) and for the urban labour market, in addition to its effect on associated demographic parameters.

6.7.3 Substantial improvements in infant and child mortality over the last two decades (May'ata, 1975) have combined with marked improvements in access to curative health facilities (Westinghouse, 1977) to reduce the crude death rate from an estimated 19 per thousand in 1961 to 12 per thousand in 1976 (Abu Jaber, 1979).[33] Over the same period the crude birth rate has remained consistently high (50.8 live births per thousand population in 1961 and 47.6 in 1976). In addition there has been only a limited trend towards later marriage (in 1976 50% of women were married at age 19.5 years) and the use of efficient birth

control techniques.[34]

The combination of high fertility and falling infant/child mortality rates has contributed to Jordan's markedly young population age structure. The proportion of the population under 15 having increased from 45.4% in 1961 to 51.8% in 1979 (Jordanians only). At the same time however labour force participation rates have fallen, from 24.2 (per thousand) in 1961 to 20.3 in 1979. If we consider the participation rates of the out-of-school population only, then it is apparent that this fall is primarily a result of rising school attendance and the expansion of post-compulsory cycle education.[35] The following section briefly outlines that commitment to human capital investment.

6.7.4 School enrolments

In 1921 Transjordan had inherited a minimal Ottoman public education system supplemented by the Kuttabs (religious schools) and the work of various missionary groups. Serious attempts were made during the British mandate period to increase the regional coverage of education provision. Between 1921 and 1941 the number of pupils increased from less than 3,000 to over 15,000 with the establishment of some 73 public and 92 private schools. The former included a number of secondary schools to cater for students after the 'compulsory' five years of primary schooling (1939 Education Act). This crude expansion in education facilities and attendance was given added impetus by the influx of Palestinian refugees in 1948-49 and the establishment of more than 180 UNRWA schools in the early 1950's.

In 1964 the basic structure of the education system

was refined to accommodate a nine year compulsory cycle (six years elementary and three years preparatory) followed by a three year secondary cycle.[36] Although the growth in enrolments continued unabated during the 1960's and 1970's, the most significant expansion has been in the post-compulsory cycle. Between 1971/2 and 1980/1 secondary school enrolments increased by 13.7% p.a. (compared to 9.9% p.a. and 4.7% p.a. in the preparatory and elementary cycles respectively). Increasingly then, those who complete the compulsory grades proceed to some form of secondary education (either academic or vocational). The promotion rate has grown from 70% in 1971/2 to 89% in 1979/80.[37]

The most rapid increase in enrolments, and the most significant in terms of short term labour supply problems, has been in tertiary education. The post-secondary institute enrolments have increased at over 33% p.a. since 1971/2. It is also important to note that the share of females in these institutions has increased from 32% to 46%. This is a reflection in particular of the growth in teacher training enrolments which account for the majority (76%) of all post-secondary institute enrolments and for over 87% of female enrolments.

There has also been a substantial growth in the number of university students, particularly since the opening of the new Yarmouk University in 1976/7. University enrolments have grown by 21% p.a. from 2,900 in 1971/2 (32% female) to 14,900 in 1980/1 (40% female). In addition an increasing number of Jordanians are enroled in higher education institutes abroad. By 1980/1 the latter was estimated at 66,500, compared to 25,200 in 1969/70.[38]

A second important feature which emerges from an examination of enrolment data is that the growth in female school attendance has outpaced that of males at all educational levels throughout the period 1971/2 to 1980/1. This growth in female attendance has brought enrolments in the compulsory cycles almost to equity (in urban areas at least) and has increased the female share of total enrolments from 42% in 1971/2 to 47% in 1980/1.

This continuous growth in school enrolments has not been without its critics. In 1971 the first World Bank education project appraisal report was strongly critical of the 'uncontrolled' expansion in primary and secondary school enrolments which were not being matched by a parallel improvement in physical infrastructure nor in the provision of qualified teaching staff. Despite the continued recognition of these problems in successive education plans (Sha'ban, 1979) the position has changed little since 1971.[39] In 1981/2 over 40% of class-units are still in rented premises while an additional 22% of class-rooms operate on a double shift system. Some 32% of teachers in the compulsory grades are under-qualified. Finally there is still a considerable regional imbalance in the provision of educational facilities between urban and rural areas. For example almost all secondary vocational schools (except the two agricultural schools) and trade training centres are located in urban areas. As a result secondary school pupils in rural areas tend to opt for general secondary schools rather than boarding at the vocational schools in urban areas. Additionally however those general secondary schools in rural areas are only able to offer the first and

second grades of the cycle.

More important was the criticism of the characteristics of education in Jordan. With the achievement of high rates of school enrolments in both the compulsory and secondary cycles during the early 1970's (attendance in the former reached 76% of the target population by 1972), the main concern of educationists has been with the external efficiency of the system, that is its relevance to the domestic and international labour market.

Critical discussion was prompted in the early 1970's by the high rates of unemployment among general secondary (7.3% in 1972) and university graduates (8.4%). It was claimed that this attested to a serious over-investment in tertiary education (Jaber, 1972) at the expense of vocational education and training.[40] At the same time there was a growing awareness of prevailing manpower shortages in skilled and technical occupations. Indeed the 1973-5 Three Year Plan, although primarily concerned to reduce unemployment, also foresaw manpower shortages at the sub-professional and technical levels, together with a shortfall in the supply of skilled manual labour.

In sum the pattern of expansion in school enrolments outlined above, has been achieved with minimal regard for the needs of the labour market. In the early 1970's less than 10% of secondary school enrolments were in the vocational stream. Although the 1973-5 development plan gave due emphasis to the promotion of vocational education little real progress towards that end was realized during the plan period (see chapter 7.5.2). At the same time the Ministry of Education established (1974) a National

Vocational Training Scheme (NVTS) under the newly created Directorate of Industrial Education and Training, with the aim of formalising vocational training in industry. This was also a failure and was replaced in 1977 by the Vocational Training Corporation, a semi-autonomous unit linked directly to the Ministry of Labour (see chapter 7.5.3). It is important to recognize however that attempts to instil a greater proportion of vocational studies into Jordan's traditionally academic education system and to develop vocational training courses in industry began during the early 1970's, before the onset of large scale labour emigration and the appearance of critical skill scarcities. This early commitment (albeit unsuccessful) to vocational training is indicative of the government's recognition of the potential for human capital exports.[41]

In this section we have examined the characteristics of the expansion in school enrolments. The effect of the rapid increase in compulsory cycle enrolments has been to delay the entry of a significant proportion of the population into the labour market. In addition however it is clear that the majority receive only a general secondary education which does not improve their utility to that labour market. Share's (1980) cost-benefit analysis of rates of return to education in Jordan has shown convincingly that the demand for general secondary and tertiary education is, for the individual, an economically rational choice since public (and to a lesser extent private) sector salary schedules are determined primarily by educational attainment (table 6.9).[42] Share concludes that the expansion in enrolments at the preparatory and general

secondary levels reflects a derived demand. Preparatory and general secondary education are seen primarily as intermediate stages, prior to higher education, rather than as ends in themselves; yet for the majority they are the terminal grades. Before discussing the impact of emigration on attempts to re-align the education and training systems the following section will consider the characteristics of female labour force participation.

6.7.5 The labour market participation of Jordanian women

The low crude participation rate induced by escalating enrolments in education is further compounded by the notoriously low levels of female labour force participation. Despite sustained increases over the past two decades, female labour force participation has remained relatively low, rising from 4.4% in 1961 (as a percentage of the female population aged 15 and over) to 8.0% in 1976. Preliminary results from the 1979 census suggest that the rate has fallen during the late 1970's to 6.7% (see chapter 7.4).

A major restraint on female labour force participation in the Arab world, at least in the non-agricultural sector, has been the contemporary interpretation of Islamic values.[43] In this respect Jordan is no exception. The 1976 Fertility Survey reported that while only 9.4% of ever-married Muslim women were in employment; the corresponding figure for non-Muslim women was 16.8%. Similarly Jaber et al. (1977), in a survey of working women, found that 32% were Christians; a proportion far higher than their share of the total female population (6.1% in 1979).[44]

Although the overall female participation rate is

low, there are significant variations according to age, marital status and educational attainment. Female participation declines rapidly from a peak of 22.6% of the age cohort 20-24 to only 8.6% of those aged 30-34 (1976). At the same time participation rates are, without exception, higher for single women than those ever-married. In 1976 the participation rate for single women was 8.6% (aged 9 years or more) compared to only 3.2% for ever-married women. Layne's (1981) survey of women's employment in Amman manufacturing establishments found that 88% were single (and 76% aged under 30 years).[45]

There are two main reasons for this low participation of married women. Firstly, as we have seen there is a high fertility rate of women aged 15 plus, with the consequent restriction on labour force participation imposed by child bearing and rearing.

Secondly there is an explicit policy by employers to discriminate against married women because of high labour turnover induced by the fertility rate (Jaber et al., 1977). Similarly Malki's (1982) survey of 115 establishments employing women (2,090) reports that 32% employ single women only, because, it is claimed of high rates of turnover and absenteeism among married women.[46] Indeed it is common practice for women to be made redundant automatically on marriage.

Women's labour force participation also varies significantly with educational attainment. Empirical studies have established that female labour force participation rates tend to increase significantly with increased education. This occurs not least because of the influence

of education on reproductive behaviour, that is its tendency to delay marriage and to reduce fertility preferences. At the same time education exposes women to new opportunities and alternative roles. The 1976 MPHS has shown that crude participation rates rise slowly from 2.9% for those with less than complete preparatory to 5.1% for less than secondary education completion. For those with the tawjihi (secondary education completion certificate) however participation leaps to 45.9% and to 84% for those with tertiary education.

The growing level of female school enrolments and the increased supply of tawjihi and post-secondary graduates has substantially increased the potential for female labour force participation. Nevertheless the traditional division of labour and definition of sex roles that has prevailed in Jordan continues to limit the recruitment and participation of women despite the growing parity in access to education.

Table 6.10 shows the small range of female employment. In 1975 for example a mere 16 occupations accounted for over 88% of all non-agricultural sector civilian employment among women.[47] A comparison of the sectoral structure of female employment over the period 1974-79 indicates a strong and growing concentration in professional and clerical employment. Their sectoral shares having risen from 69.3% in 1974 to 78.5% in 1979. At the same time the relative share of those in production and in service sector activities fell from 28.5% to 17.7%. Turning to the available occupational data the overwhelming predominance of women in teaching and in clerical occupations is immediately apparent. Between 1971/2 and

1980/1 the share of women in the teaching profession increased from 48.6% (5,688) to 52.6% (14,634). Indeed the 1979 census results indicate that over 50% of all economically active women (outside agriculture) were in teaching. Over the period 1974-79 (table 6.11) an increasing proportion of employed females were engaged in teaching and clerical occupations. As a result the proportion of females employed in the public sector is particularly high, rising to 69% in 1979 (compared to 37% of non-agricultural male employment). In contrast there has been a sustained fall in the 'traditional' areas of non-agricultural sector female employment, namely services and manufacturing (particularly textiles). In 1961 the latter accounted for more than one-third of female employment compared to less than 10% in 1979. The annual employment surveys of large establishments (five or more employees) show a falling proportion of women in manufacturing. In 1974 the latter accounted for 10% of employed women, by 1980 this had fallen to 5.4%; women's share of employment in manufacturing declined from 12.3% to 9.6% over the same period.

The tentative conclusion from this data appears to be that rising school enrolments among females are changing attitudes towards the appropriateness of employment for women. This is confirmed by a recent survey of third year preparatory cycle girls (1,091) in the Amman-Zarka area (Malki, 1982).[48] In response to questions regarding the type of employment desired, 47% of girls cited teaching, 18% clerical and 14% nursing occupations.

It is important to note that the recorded participation

rates of women have been consistently higher in urban (9.3% in 1976) as opposed to rural (3.0% in 1976) areas, a result not least of the concentration of 'appropriate' employment in urban areas. In addition however the differential is the result of inconsistent definition and measurement of female labour force participation. In particular the MPHS have tended to minimise female participation in the agricultural sector (in addition to the urban bias of the sample). Successive MPHS record a low proportion of women in the agricultural labour force (declining from 3.1% in 1972 to 2.9% in 1974 and 1.9% in 1976). In contrast the 1975 Agricultural Census showed that women represented 32.8% of the sector's workforce. Significantly however 80% of women were unpaid family workers, primarily employed on a temporary or occasional basis. The 1978 Agricultural Census of the Jordan Valley shows a decline in the female share of the workforce to 26.3% (again more than 60% were unpaid and over 50% were occasional or temporary, see chapter 9.5 below). If the agricultural labour force is so defined as to exclude unpaid and impermanent labour then females would constitute less than 3% of the agricultural sector workforce. In addition both the MPHS and the 1975 and 1978 agricultural census results indicate a declining participation of women in the agricultural sector, this appears to reflect increasing education attainment and changing social attitudes (see below, chapter 9.4).

The conclusion which can be clearly drawn at this stage is that the participation of women in Jordan's labour market is characteristically restricted in both the type

of employment and in terms of the women employed. Rising school enrolments among girls are changing attitudes regarding the nature of 'appropriate' employment for women and this change may indeed by restricting the range of occupations available to them. Malki's survey of preparatory school girls appears to confirm this hypothesis. Although almost 90% regarded employment outside the home as appropriate (only 62% of their parents/guardians would give support to this), almost 80% said they would seek employment in teaching or clerical occupations. Without an expansion in occupational options it is apparent that the contribution of women to the non-agricultural labour force will remain limited.

6.8 Concluding comments

The first half of this introductory chapter examined the macro-economic constraints within which labour outflows have occurred and illustrated the basis for Jordan's continued commitment to the international labour market. Given the small size and vulnerability of the Jordanian economy, manpower outflows have featured large.

In the second part of the chapter we have drawn on a variety of secondary source material in illustrating the characteristics of the Jordanian labour market. This is an essential background against which international migration for employment must be assessed and labour migration policies evaluated. Before taking up that task we will summarise the main points made above. Firstly, the Jordanian labour market has been characterised by a rapidly declining level of agricultural employment and, at the

same time, a considerable growth in tertiary activities, particularly in the public sector which accounts for some 36% of employment. In addition the mid and late 1970's have seen a considerable boom in construction sector employment, much of which is on a temporary or casual basis. The rapid decline in unemployment and the buoyance of the Jordanian labour market as a whole is seen to be largely artifical and dependent on external conditions (particularly the maintenance of aid and workers' remittances). Secondly, despite the growing demand for manpower, labour force participation rates remain low, primarily because of the escalation in education enrolments, especially at the post-compulsory levels. The latter has acted to delay the entry of an increasing proportion of the population into the labour force. Although graduate unemployment was recognised as a serious structural problem in the Jordanian labour market in the early 1970's, and an increasing commitment to vocational education was promised, that expansion remained an elusive goal. The onset of large labour outflows has reduced the pressure, from unemployment, for a restructuring of the education system. At the same time however this has increased the shortages of skilled labour which were seen in the early 1970's as a supply side problem. Finally, low participation rates were shown to reflect the restricted employment opportunities available to women. Ironically, it appears that growing female school enrolments may have further restricted those opportunities. Examining the effective utilization of the potential labour force (that is, the ratio of actual labour force to the labour force plus those expressing

'no desire' to work) in 1976 shows (table 6.12) that the greatest potential for increasing labour supply lies with women aged 20-44 who comprised over 65% of those expressing no desire to work.

In the following chapter (7) we consider the impact of labour emigration on this domestic labour market during the mid and late 1970's, focussing in particular on the manifestation of skill shortages and on the government's policy response.

Notes

1. Mazur, M.P. (1979) Economic growth and development in Jordan; Fariz, Z. (1978) 'Some aspects of the balance of payments problem in Jordan'. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Keele); Saket, B. (1976) 'Foreign aid to Jordan 1924/5-1972/3, its magnitude, composition and effects'. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University Keele).

2. For a discussion of the factors involved in the emergence of Transjordan and the British mandate see: Klieman, A.S. (1970) Foundations of British policy in the Arab world: the Cairo conference of 1921; and Aruri, N.H. (1972) Jordan: a study in political development, 1921-65.

3. Naval Intelligence Division (1943) Palestine and Transjordan. pp. 497-501.

4. MEED, vol. 24, 'Special report: Jordan'. pp. 21-2.

5. The establishment and role of the security forces is discussed in: Vatikiotis, P.J. (1967) Politics and the military in Jordan: a study of the Arab Legion 1921-57.

6. Naval Intelligence Division (1943) op. cit.

7. For Gaitskell's statement see: Royal Institute of International Affairs, (1956) Documents on International Affairs. p. 15. The multiple political crises of the 1956-57 period are reviewed in: Shwadran, B. (1959) Jordan: a state of tension.

8. See Armstrong, H.F. (1957) 'Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq - report on U.S. foreign assistance programs'.

9. MEED, vol. 23 (3) 19 January 1979, pp. 3-5, 'Arab aid boosts budget as planners seek even growth'.

10. Increased rates of income tax (or indirect taxation) could have a negative effect by increasing real income differentials between Jordan and the oil-rich states, thus leading to greater out-migration. For details of the proposals see: MEED, vol. 25 (5) 11 December 1981, p. 20, 'Jordan's tax draft gets mixed reception'.

11. Financial Times, 25 November 1981, 'Domestic capital market blooms'; and 13 August 1982, 'Innovation sets tone for banking system'. Jordan's recent applications for Euromarket funds are detailed in: MEED, vol. 26 (45) 5 November 1982, p. 4, 'Jordan seeks Euromarket loan'.

12. Not all these remittances remain on the East Bank. The pattern of remittance flow is complicated since an unknown proportion of remittances passing through the Jordanian banking system are destined for the Occupied West Bank where the Jordanian Dinar remains legal tender. Additionally, non-Jordanian workers also send remittances home thus reducing net remittances.

13. Royal Scientific Society (Forthcoming, 1984) 'Worker migration abroad: socio-economic implications for households in Jordan'.

14. MEED, vol. 23 (37) 14 September 1979, p. 35. This enables them to earn higher interest rates.

15. Increased commercial bank deposit rates are:

Year	Rate (%) of interest:		
	Demand	Savings	Notice and Time
1972	4.00	4.50	5.50
1973	4.00	4.50	5.50
1974	4.00	4.50	5.50
1975	4.00	4.50	5.50
1976	5.00	5.25	6.05
1977	5.60	5.50	6.10
1978	2.60	5.50	6.10
1979	2.00	5.50	6.10
1980	2.00	5.50	6.40
1981	2.00	5.50	6.50
1982	2.00	5.50	6.50

Source: CBJ (various issues) Monthly statistical Bulletin. Table 13.

16. On credit rates and domestic liquidity see: MEED (May 1980) vol. 24, 'Special report: Arab banking', pp. 79-8), 'Authorities intervene to mop up Jordan's liquidity'.

17. A large proportion of Jordan's inflation is undoubtedly imported together with the strong regional demand for Jordanian products (agricultural and manufacturing) and manpower.

18. Rate of inflation based on the cost of living index:

Year	COLI	Inflation rate
1975	100.0	-
1976	111.5	11.5
1977	127.7	14.5
1978	136.6	7.0
1979	156.0	14.2
1980	173.3	11.1
1981	192.5	11.1
1982	206.7	7.4

19. To date there is no evidence of migrants investing on the recently (1978) opened Amman Stock Exchange.

20. Inflated real estate values in the mid-1970's were also induced by the influx of Lebanese capital.

21. Clark, J. (1977) 'Jordan: a labour receiver - a labour supplier.'

22. Fariz, Z. (1978) op. cit.; Asfour, B.J. and Smadi, M.A. (1979) The economy of Jordan in 1978: a review. p. 21.

23. Böhning, W.R. (1977) Compensating countries of origin for the out-migration of their people. Böhning examines the problems and possibilities of instituting such a facility. The extent to which Jordan would benefit from ILCF is now complicated by the large inflows of labour to Jordan, see below chapter 8.

24. Personal communication, Mansour Otoum, Ministry of Labour March 1983.

25. Anani, J. and Jaber, T.A. (1980) 'Jordan's experience and policies in the field of reverse transfer of technology'. p. 64.

26. Preliminary results from the 1979 Census show that 62.7% of the population are in 'urban' locations, that is in settlements of 10,000 or more inhabitants.

27. See: MEED, vol. 24 (50) 12 December 1980, pp. 4-6 'Jordan gears itself to Iraq's war effort'; Benton, G. 'Iraq's part of call abroad', The Middle East, no. 74, December 1980, p. 64; Robins, P. 'Enterprising manufacturers seek new partners'. Financial Times, 26 September 1983, p. 15.

28. See: MEED, vol. 26 (8) 30 April 1982, p. 8 'Low priority projects frozen in Iraq's economy drive'.

29. Department of Statistics (1981) Statistical Yearbook, 1980. Table 2.

30. Samha, M.A. (1979) 'Migration to Amman: patterns of movement and population structure'. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham). Samha found that 44% of the enumerated population in a survey of 1,740 households, were born outside Amman. In addition the majority (82%) of internal (East Bank) migrants were moving to Amman because of job opportunities (a further 6.6% came to undertake military service).

31. Dajani, J.S. and Murdock, M.S. (1978) Assessing basic human needs in rural Jordan.

32. Assaf, G. (1979) 'The size distribution of income in Jordan in 1973'.
Dajani, J.S. (1982) 'Poverty and income distribution in Jordan'.

33. May'ata, A.R. (1976) 'A study of mortality in Jordan with special reference to infant mortality'. For a comprehensive discussion of health service facilities see: Westinghouse (1977) National health planning in Jordan, phase two: health policy strategy. Abu Jaber, K. et al. (1979) 'Levels and trends of fertility and mortality in Jordan'.

34. Department of Statistics (1979) Jordan: fertility survey, 1976. Mean age at first marriage was shown to rise with educational attainment from 15.5 years at 'no school' to 17.6 years at secondary school completion. With regard to birth control the survey shows that only 23.6% of exposed women were using an efficient contraceptive method.

35. This has been accompanied by a significant drop in the employment of 'child' labour. The recorded labour force participation of males aged 9-15 fell from 40 per thousand in 1961 to 22 per thousand in 1976.

36. For a general account of education in Jordan see: Dirani, E. (1977) 'The history of education in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Arkansas).

37. The 'promotion' rate compares third year preparatory school enrolments with first year secondary enrolments (excluding repeaters) in successive years. Note that female promotion rates increased from 62.7 (1971/2) to 89.8 (1979/80).

38. Data for 1970/1 is not available.

39. Sha'ban, I.S. (1979) 'Development of a plan for evaluating the secondary education system: the diversification programme in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan'.

40. Jaber, T.A. (1972) 'Education as an investment in Jordan'.

41. Vocational training has of course been central to UNRWA's operation in Jordan since the early 1950's. Two vocational and teacher training institutes are in operation on the East Bank, at Wadi Seer (from 1960) and in Amman (from 1969) with a combined intake of over 1,750. The focus of these centres is however regional. A placement service is offered and over 90% of graduates are reported to work abroad.

42. Share, M.A.F. (1980) 'A rate of return analysis of the education of Jordanian workers' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wales).

43. For a discussion of women's employment in the Arab world see: Shaw, R.P. (1983) Mobilizing human resources in the Arab world. pp. 130-52.

44. Jaber, K., Ati, S.A. and Gharaibeh, F. (1977) 'Conditions of some working women in Jordan'.

45. Layne, L. (1981) 'Women in Jordan's workforce'. MERIP, March/April, pp. 19-23.

46. Malki, A. (1982) 'Survey study on training and job opportunities for women in Jordan'.

47. For an extended discussion of female employment characteristics in Jordan see: Malallah, M. ed. (1978) Proceedings of the second symposium on manpower development: the role of the Jordanian woman.

48. Malki, A. (1982) op. cit.

Table 6.1

Composition and destination of domestic exports 1972-82 (JD.Mn.)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982*
Consumer Goods	6.2	6.8	13.9	16.0	25.4	32.2	32.6	42.0	54.2	76.7	88.1
Foodstuffs	5.0	4.7	10.0	10.7	16.4	18.5	16.9	21.6	24.3	34.0	40.1
Current goods	1.1	2.0	3.6	4.3	7.2	11.2	11.0	14.2	22.6	28.9	31.6
Durable goods	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.0	1.8	2.4	4.7	6.2	7.3	18.8	16.4
Raw Materials	3.9	5.3	20.8	21.5	22.0	20.6	23.3	29.7	51.3	76.7	79.0
Phosphates	3.5	4.0	19.5	19.6	19.2	17.3	19.5	26.3	47.2	54.8	78.9
Capital Goods	2.5	1.8	4.7	2.5	2.1	7.5	8.2	10.9	14.6	15.5	18.4
Construction Materials	2.0	1.3	4.1	1.9	1.2	6.4	7.4	9.8	13.0	10.0	13.3
Others	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-
Total	12.6	14.0	39.4	40.0	49.5	60.3	64.1	82.6	120.1	169.0	185.6
% total to Arab States	72.6	71.9	46.7	42.2	48.3	59.9	66.5	67.5	60.7	67.7	66.5

Source: derived from Central Bank of Jordan. (Various issues) Monthly statistical Bulletin. Tables 26 and 29.

*Note : All 1982 data presented in these tables is preliminary.

Table 6.2

Composition of domestic imports and level of trade imbalance 1972-82 (JD.Mn.)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982*
Consumer Goods	46.3	50.6	60.6	90.5	133.3	147.2	175.7	215.2	240.2	325.2	368.3
Foodstuffs	27.6	30.8	42.4	49.3	81.5	72.2	85.6	100.6	112.6	156.5	177.3
Current goods	12.8	13.4	18.0	26.9	28.8	42.6	47.0	62.7	69.5	91.7	117.3
Durable goods	5.9	6.4	9.2	14.3	23.0	32.4	43.1	51.9	58.1	77.0	73.7
Raw Materials	18.8	22.2	30.0	57.2	90.0	121.2	117.3	179.5	227.1	305.5	380.3
Oil	4.6	4.2	5.2	24.8	37.1	43.0	46.8	74.0	122.2	176.1	231.9
Capital Goods	18.6	20.2	40.9	82.9	114.6	154.1	161.2	193.6	246.7	415.0	391.4
Others	11.6	15.2	16.0	3.4	1.6	1.9	4.6	1.2	2.0	1.8	2.5
Total	95.3	108.2	147.5	234.0	339.5	424.4	458.5	589.5	716.0	1047.5	1142.5
Trade Imbalance	-82.7	-94.2	-108.1	-194.0	-290.9	-364.1	-394.7	-506.9	-595.9	-878.5	-956.9

Source: ibid. table 30.

* Preliminary

Table 6.3

National Income Accounts by sector 1975-82 (JD.Mn.)

	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1980		1981		1982	
	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP
Agriculture	26.0	8.3	37.3	9.6	41.7	9.2	58.6	10.4	43.6	6.4	64.6	7.1	69.4	6.5	85.3	6.9
Mining and Quarrying	16.3	5.2	17.8	4.6	19.9	4.4	22.9	4.1	27.5	4.0	39.9	4.4	46.5	4.3	46.3	3.8
Manufacturing	39.7	12.7	50.0	12.9	58.2	12.9	71.4	12.7	94.1	13.8	129.2	14.0	154.0	14.3	170.6	13.8
Construction	19.2	6.1	3.9	1.0	5.5	1.2	7.2	1.3	10.1	1.5	17.1	1.9	21.0	2.0	119.2	9.7
Utilities	3.1	1.0	26.6	6.9	36.8	8.2	51.0	9.0	70.5	10.3	97.5	10.7	104.3	9.7	20.4	1.7
Transport and Communications	24.9	8.0	80.1	20.7	94.2	20.9	102.6	18.2	123.6	18.1	166.5	18.4	210.0	19.5	145.0	11.7
Trade	66.9	21.4	32.5	8.4	35.9	8.0	59.3	10.5	62.9	9.2	79.7	8.8	96.4	9.0	221.3	17.9
Financial Institutions	42.1	13.5	45.5	11.8	59.0	13.1	79.5	14.1	105.3	15.4	124.8	13.8	158.7	14.8	173.8	14.1
Community, social and personal services	6.1	2.0	8.5	2.2	8.8	2.0	10.2	1.8	12.0	1.8	14.9	1.6	16.9	1.6	22.5	1.8
Other Services including Public Administration	68.0	21.8	84.9	21.9	90.9	20.1	101.0	17.9	133.2	19.5	175.1	19.3	196.7	18.3	229.7	18.6

Continued ...

Table 6.3 (continued)

	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1980		1981		1982*	
	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP	JD. Mn.	% GDP
GDP (at factor cost)	312.3	100	387.1	100	450.9	100	563.6	100	682.8	100	907.3	100	1074.3	100	1234.1	100
Indirect tax	9.0		43.2		74.3		81.0		84.4		91.1		124.8		132.5	
GDP (market price)	321.3		430.3		424.2		644.6		767.2		998.4		1199.1		1366.6	
Net factor income from abroad	63.9		140.8		145.9		148.8		168.3		200.9		267.0		345.0	
GNP (market price	385.2		571.1		671.1		793.4		935.5		1199.3		1466.1		1711.6	
GNP (constant price)	385.2		505.4		573.8		737.9		802.5		1066.2		1303.4		1584.9	

Source: ibid. various tables.

* Preliminary

Table 6.4

Government foreign receipts, foreign borrowings, domestic revenues and expenditure 1972-82
(JD.Mn.)

Year	Foreign Receipts	% as budget support	% from Arab sources	Foreign borrowing	Domestic Revenues	Government expenditure	% expenditure on defence & security**
1972	53.0	83.0	44.7	7.4	42.6	101.5	44.6
1973	57.0	76.3	53.5	11.4	46.1	119.5	40.5
1974	61.9	85.6	66.2	8.9	63.2	151.5	34.7
1975	109.0	79.4	65.0	19.0	84.2	209.4	30.5
1976	122.7	54.0	63.3	19.9	110.5	222.9	30.2
1977	180.7	67.6	74.2	58.5	142.3	337.8	28.7
1978	172.4	47.4	71.8	90.7	158.5	361.5	29.2
1979	247.9	84.8	88.2	37.6	187.9	515.7	26.7
1980	280.9	72.2	80.9	71.6	226.2	563.1	25.4
1981	360.3	73.6	83.7	88.8	296.6	654.1	25.7
1982*	283.0	77.0	88.6	64.2	359.2	722.3	26.2

Source: ibid. various tables.

* Preliminary
** Excludes capital expenditure

Table 6.5

Foreign grants and remittances as a proportion of imports and GDP, 1972-82 (JD.Mn.)

Year	Foreign Receipts	As % imports	As % GDP	Net remittances	As % imports	As % GDP
1972	53.0	55.6	29.0	7.4	7.8	4.1
1973	57.0	52.7	30.2	14.7	13.6	7.8
1974	61.9	42.0	25.5	24.1	16.4	10.0
1975	109.0	46.6	34.9	53.3	22.8	41.5
1976	122.7	36.2	34.2	129.6	38.2	36.1
1977	180.7	42.6	40.1	139.8	32.9	31.0
1978	172.4	37.6	30.6	139.4	30.4	24.7
1979	247.9	42.1	36.3	156.4	26.5	22.9
1980	280.9	39.2	31.0	190.7	26.6	21.0
1981	360.3	34.4	33.5	288.9	27.6	26.9
1982*	283.0	24.8	22.9	319.5	28.0	25.9

Source: ibid. various tables.

* Preliminary

Table 6.6

Worker remittances (1960-82) and money supply (1972-82)
(JD.Mn.)

Year	Remittances: Credit	Deficit	Money Supply (M2)	% annual increase
1960	6.23	-		
1961	5.25	-		
1962	6.20	-		
1963	6.17	-		
1964	9.30	-		
1965	9.10	-		
1966	10.60	-		
1967	6.60	-		
1968	4.10	-		
1969	6.92	-		
1970	5.54	-		
1971	4.97	-		
1972	7.41	-	146.5	-
1973	14.70	-	176.1	20.2
1974	24.13	-	216.7	23.1
1975	53.25	-	277.7	28.1
1976	136.41	4.8	378.3	36.2
1977	154.75	15.0	467.6	23.6
1978	159.38	20.0	606.7	29.8
1979	180.42	24.0	773.1	27.4
1980	236.68	46.0	984.8	27.4
1981	340.89	52.0	1179.9	19.8
1982*	381.87	62.4	1403.3	18.9

Source: ibid.

* Preliminary

Table 6.7

Worker remittances and commercial bank deposits 1972-82
(JD.Mn.)

Year	Remittance Credits	Total commercial bank deposits	Non-residents bank deposits	Non-residents deposits as % total deposits
1972	7.4	72.9	2.0	2.7
1973	14.7	85.8	2.1	2.5
1974	24.1	112.0	3.6	3.2
1975	53.3	158.0	8.6	5.4
1976	136.4	227.2	17.7	7.8
1977	154.8	283.8	17.1	6.0
1978	159.4	448.5	47.5	10.6
1979	180.4	593.1	67.1	11.3
1980	236.7	808.5	133.5	16.5
1981	340.9	977.7	143.6	14.7
1982*	381.9	1169.5	171.6	14.7

Source: ibid. tables 10 and 25.

* Preliminary

Table 6.8

Sectoral distribution (%) of non-agricul tural employment in 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1979

Sector of employment	1972	1974	1975	1976	1979
Commercial services and public administration	47.5	48.1	41.5	45.0	47.2
Financial services	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.7	2.5
Transport and storage	8.2	8.5	10.9	10.1	8.5
Trade	20.7	19.6	19.6	19.0	10.7
Construction	9.7	9.3	6.6	10.2	17.8
Utilities	0.6	0.7	1.6	1.1	1.4
Manufacturing	10.5	10.9	15.3	11.1	10.8
Mining and quarrying	0.8	0.8	2.0	0.8	1.1
Estimated total employment (thousands)	314.4	339.7	355.2	371.0	421.1

Source: Data for 1972, 1974 and 1976 are derived from the Department of Statistics' MPHS series (various tables); data for 1975 is from the Labour Force Census (table 2) and data for 1979 is taken from unpublished tables of the 2.1% sample returns.

Table 6.9

Grade, entry qualification and basic salary in the public sector 1981 (classified employees)

Qualifications	Entry position: Grade	Year	Monthly Salary (JD)
Secondary school certificate	10	1st	36.00
General secondary certificate	10	3rd	39.00
One year post-secondary	10	4th	40.50
Two year post-secondary	9	1st	44.00
Three year post-secondary	8	1st	52.00
B.A./B.Sc.	7	3rd	63.00
M.A./M.Sc.	6	1st	68.00
B.Sc. in engineering, pharmacy, vetinary, dentistry	5	1st	78.00
M.Sc. and Ph.D. (in the previous subjects)	5	3rd	87.00
Doctor (7 year study)	5	5th	86.00
Doctor (8 year study)	4	1st	90.00
Doctor (with diploma)	3	1st	102.00
Doctor (specialist)	2	1st	114.00

Source: Civil Service Commission (1982) 'Civil service pay schedules, 1981' Various tables (Arabic).

Table 6.10

Occupational distribution of females, 1976

Occupation	% distribution
Teachers	46.6
Pre-elementary	2.1
Elementary	26.7
Preparatory	10.7
Secondary	3.5
Other	3.6
Typist	8.1
Seamstress	7.7
Clerks	6.6
Maids, caretakers and cleaners	5.2
Nursing personnel	5.0
Trade proprietors and shop assistants	2.3
Accountants, book-keepers and related	1.6
Hairdressers	1.5
Telephone operators	1.5
Other medical	1.3
Textile workers	1.0
Other workers	11.6

Source: derived from the Department of Statistics (1977) Multipurpose Household Survey, 1976. Table 15.

Table 6.11

Sectoral distribution (%) of employed women in 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1979

Occupational Group	1974	1975	1976	1979
Professional and technical	55.0	57.0	57.7	63.0
Administrative and Managerial	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.9
Clerical	14.3	11.4	19.4	15.5
Sales	1.4	1.2	2.4	1.9
Production and related workers	19.1	20.6	11.3	8.7
Services	9.4	9.0	8.4	7.0

Source: As table 6.8 (various tables)

Table 6.12

Effective utilization (%) of potential labour force by age and sex in 1974 and 1976

Age group	1974		1976		% distribution of females expressing 'no desire' to work, 1976
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
12-14	78.6	4.9	80.3	5.9	2.2
15-19	92.3	8.3	92.6	9.7	10.5
20-24	95.8	20.8	96.8	25.2	13.0
25-29	98.6	12.9	98.8	18.2	13.7
30-34	98.8	7.2	99.1	8.6	13.8
35-39	97.7	3.7	97.9	4.4	13.9
40-44	95.2	2.8	97.1	3.6	12.0
45-49	91.5	2.3	92.6	2.3	9.2
50-54	87.1	2.4	89.4	1.7	7.1
55-59	87.4	0.9	81.6	1.5	3.8
60-64	82.8	3.7	98.7	8.3	0.6
65+	85.9	9.0	98.6	20.5	0.2
Total	93.7	8.4	95.3	10.4	100

Source: Original data was derived from the Department of Statistics' MPHS for 1974 and 1976 (various tables). Efffective utilization has been calculated as a ratio of the active labour force to the active labour force plus those expressing 'no desire' to work.

CHAPTER SEVEN

LABOUR EMIGRATION AND THE DOMESTIC LABOUR MARKET: FROM UNEMPLOYMENT TO LABOUR SHORTAGE

7.1 Preface

7.1.1 The previous chapter examined the impact of labour emigration on the Jordanian economy in general and outlined the factors which have contributed to Jordan's continued commitment to the international labour market despite seemingly adverse macro-economic consequences. In this chapter we expand on that argument and demonstrate the effect of emigration for employment on the Jordanian labour market. In particular discussion will focus on the appearance of significant manpower shortages. Using data on apprenticeships and job vacancies we attempt to identify the areas of manpower shortfall. Government efforts to increase the domestic supply of labour are assessed and deficits in labour market management outlined.

7.1.2 The 1973-5 Three Year Development Plan, echoing previous development priorities, stated as its major goal the reduction in under-employment and unemployment then estimated at over 8% nationally. By expanding enrolments in vocational secondary education (to 15% of total secondary cycle intake by 1975) it was hoped firstly to reduce the over-supply of academic secondary school leavers and secondly to increase the supply of technical and skilled manual labour.[1] Over the following three years however these priorities were to be reversed as, with the rapid surge in emigration for employment, the whole complexion of the Jordanian labour market was dramatically altered. According

to Yasin (1976) "The employment and manpower situation which had existed at the time of the preparation of the Three Year Plan had completely changed during the plan period, not so much as a result of successful plan implementation but due to the huge outflow of Jordanians ..."[2] By the time of the 1976-80 Five Year Plan's introduction in June 1976, unemployment was reportedly less than 3% nationally and the major concern of manpower planners was to prevent critical manpower shortages from becoming an impediment to the projects envisaged. The following section will first consider the major manpower problems which labour emigration gave rise to, and secondly will examine the government's response to those problems.

7.2 Wage inflation and skill scarcity

7.2.1 There is clear, though limited, evidence that in the mid-1970's a growing 'tightness' was experienced in the Jordanian labour market. As we have already seen (chapter 3), a considerable volume of labour was withdrawn from the Jordanian economy by the acceleration in labour demand from neighbouring oil-rich states. At the same time the capital investment and aid disbursements to Jordan following the 1974 Rabat summit had, together with the growth in workers' remittances, substantially increased aggregate demand and employment within Jordan. The initial impact of labour emigration was to effect a sustained fall in the level and rate of unemployment. The MPHS series of 1972-76 show a significant decline in unemployment from over 15% in 1961 to 3% in 1974 and less than 2% in 1976. While these rates of unemployment are unrealistically low (not least because

of the distortions in the sample frame discussed earlier, (see section 6.5.3) the trend is consistent with the pattern of reconstruction and investment in the post civil war period and with the timing of large scale labour outflows.

The highest unemployment rates recorded in the MPHS series were consistently among the younger age cohorts (15-19) and were primarily of short duration (three months or less), characteristics which suggest that this was primarily 'frictional' unemployment among first-time job-seekers entering the labour market. Additionally however there was still an element of 'structural' unemployment in the continuing over-supply of 'academic' secondary school leavers and university graduates. Among the former the rate of unemployment was disproportionately high (at 32% in 1976), as it had been in the 1960's. Note that the MPHS data also show a strong decline in rural unemployment despite the effects of prolonged drought. This may be taken as further evidence of out-migration from rural areas and of the increasing employment opportunities within Jordan's urban economy. The stimulation of domestic labour demand is confirmed by the improvement in labour force utilization rates registered in the mid-1970's, as the proportion of the potential labour force expressing 'no desire to work' fell in all age groups.

The downward trend in unemployment is supported by additional evidence of labour shortages at almost all skill levels. Traditionally, labour has been recruited in Jordan through an informal structure of personal contacts (Antoun, 1979).[3] During the mid-1970's however an increasingly formal

labour recruitment structure was sought by employers. The outlet for this demand was largely through media advertisements. In the three years 1974-76 local newspapers carried over 12,200 job vacancy advertisements, some 53% of which were for employment within Jordan.[4] The number of vacancy advertisements increased by over 45% during the three year period, and by 67% in the twelve months ending December 1976. Although the majority (83%) of domestic vacancies were for skilled occupations (see table 7.1) there was a marked increase by 1976 in the number of advertisements for unskilled manual workers (particularly in the construction sector). Clearly then employers were finding it difficult to recruit manpower of all types in sufficient volume to meet demand.

The increasing use of the media by employers to recruit Jordanians for work abroad prompted a government ban on such labour recruitment from December 1976 as part of its short-lived attempt to restrict labour emigration. A second aspect of that policy was the imposition of selective restrictions on the mobility of specific industrial skills (primarily those connected with the oil refinery) and employees in the public sector who were to obtain prior permission before taking up employment abroad.[5] The government has also attempted to channel the emigration of public sector employees through an increasing number of secondment schemes, negotiated mainly for teachers.[6] However the number of secondment agreements remains small while the selective restrictions were easily circumvented and are effectively dormant.

7.2.2 Although there is only limited and highly aggregate

FIG.7.1 JOB VACANCIES ADVERTISED IN JORDANIAN NEWSPAPERS 1974 - 1976.



SOURCE : NPC, 1977

wage rate data available for Jordan, that data (drawn from the thrice annual survey of employment in large, five or more employees, establishments) indicates that substantial wage rate inflation accompanied the growing labour shortfall. Between August 1973 and August 1976 average daily earnings of the male workforce rose by more than 153% in money terms, increasing by over 24% in 1976 alone. Unfortunately there is at present no wage data by occupation, however sectoral wage rate increases show particularly high rates of increase among workers in financial services, utilities and construction. Significantly the only sectors in which wage rate increases were below the national average were those absorbing large numbers of general secondary school graduates, namely public administration, commercial and personal services. This is confirmed by an RSS survey of wage trends over the 1967-76 period which shows a lower increase among government employees (4.3% p.a.) than in the private sector (6.7% p.a.).[7] At the same time the survey indicates a higher rate of increase among manual workers (7.9% p.a.) than white collar workers (4.7% p.a.) in both the government and the private sectors. Note that in real terms the survey suggests a fall in wages by 4.7% (public sector) and 2.3% (private sector) over the ten year period.

Rapid wage inflation was accompanied by persistent complaints of skill shortages, particularly in the construction sector. In a survey of manufacturing establishments conducted in 1976, Alawin (1978) found wage inflation, skill scarcity and high labour turnover, to be the most significant problems facing employers.[8] In the

construction sector labour shortages and the reliance on inexperienced workers were manifested in the significant delays experienced on all major construction projects. As a result the number of repeat operations which had to be undertaken increased markedly. Shortages of skilled operators and maintenance mechanics were responsible for low effective utilization rates on heavy and light duty plant; for example, on the East Ghor Canal Project it was estimated (1976) that such shortages meant that some equipment was inoperative for up to 70% of the working day.[9] The problems of high labour turnover, of increased recruitment costs and wage rate inflation all added to rising project costs and completion delays. In the following section we examine the government's response to these problems.

7.3 The government response: manpower planning 1976-80

7.3.1 The reaction of the Jordanian government to the problems engendered by burgeoning manpower outflow was constrained by the recognition of Jordan's geopolitical position and by her dependence on regional support (see chapter 6.5). At the same time the Jordanians realised that attempts to forcibly prevent labour emigration would be almost impracticable and politically naive when a large proportion of those seeking employment abroad were Jordanian citizens by default. These constraints are clearly recognized by Tayseer Abdel Jaber (then Secretary General of the NPC) when he stated (as Chairman of the ad hoc committee on labour emigration) that: "No matter how adverse the labour situation might become we must not

resort to 'police' restrictions. Such measures are not in conformity with the private free enterprise system to which we adhere."[10] Given these basic constraints how did the government evolve its approach to the growing manpower crisis?

By including within its planned manpower requirements an estimated outflow of 30-40% of available labour supply over the 1976-80 period the government implicitly accepted Jordan's role as a regional labour-supplier and showed itself prepared to plan at least superficially for emigration. Despite this pragmatic assessment of Jordan's international manpower commitment and the recognition that such a role would be inimical to domestic labour requirements (a large outflow of technical manpower, some 29% of the total, is projected), there have been no systematic attempts to define or monitor labour outflows.

A crucial document which sets out the government's position in this period is the labour force supply and demand assessment for 1976-80 prepared by the NPC's Manpower Planning Section (MPS) in 1976.[11] This report confirms the government's acceptance of the labour-supplier role. The projected manpower supply provides for a net labour outflow of some 44,244 over the five year period, that is an average annual net outflow of 8-9,000.[12] Neither the basis for this estimate nor for its distribution by broad occupational group (see table 7.2) are made explicit. Furthermore the assumptions and methodology of the report are biased towards minimising the projected labour shortfall. As a result the subsequent policy proposals are both superficial and over-optimistic. Here

we will briefly demonstrate those flaws.

7.3.2 The MPS analysis of the likely effect of manpower outflow on the domestic labour market is marred by a number of implausible labour demand and supply assumptions. At the outset the MPS projections remove from the labour supply in the base year (1975) all casual or non-permanent workers. The projections assume therefore that net growth in demand for such labour will be zero. This removal of a substantial proportion of the workforce (in 1975 such workers accounted for 43% of total employment) from the calculations has the effect of improving labour force output ratios and thereby dampening manpower demand projections to what are, in some cases, patently absurd levels. This flaw is compounded by the inadequacies of the 1975 Labour Force Census on which the projections rely. The latter is known to have seriously under-enumerated small scale employers (those with less than five employees) and casual employment. Thus, for example, the majority of small sub-contractors in the construction sector were ignored. As a result employment in construction was recorded as only 8,427, a marked contraction from its 1961 census level of 22,000 (East Bank only). The MPS projections show an increase in construction sector employment of less than 3,000 over five years, despite the planned 22% increase in sectoral value added. Finally, productivity (output per employee) is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 5.1% compared to its historic rate (for 1973-5) of 2%. This combination of assumptions regarding output and productivity yields an estimate of additional labour demand (net of attrition) of 109,267 by 1980.

Comparing the MPS labour demand projections with a contemporary study by the United States Department of Labour (USDL) suggests that this was a highly conservative estimate.[13] The USDL report, based on the same projection of growth in output but revising the employment data for 1975, indicates a net growth in labour demand of 180,000 workers. Similarly Mazur (1979) suggests that even with optimistic productivity assumptions, the aggregate labour demand implications (including casual labour) of the plan projections were an increase in labour demand of 7-8% p.a. (compared to the MPS projection of 4.1% p.a.).[14]

On the supply side the MPS study also makes a series of unsupported assumptions. The report estimated that total labour supply would be 147,414, a figure which includes an input of some 22,129 Jordanians from institutions of higher education abroad. This assumes, optimistically, that over half of all students enroled abroad would return to work in Jordan. Zarour (1976), in a survey of 'Jordanian' students and professionals in the USA has shown that only 40% would return even if political and economic conditions improved substantially.[15] Furthermore the MPS study assumes implicitly that all 'Jordanians' studying abroad will return to the East Bank (thus ignoring the fact that many originate either from the West Bank or from the 'Jordanian' communities already abroad, particularly in the Gulf).

Rather more crucial to the projection was the assumption that during the plan period between 80% and 90% of female school leavers would enter the domestic labour market. The achievement of the latter would clearly amount

to little more than a revolution in social attitudes. As we have already seen (section 6.7.5) the labour force utilization rate for women aged 15-19 was only 9.7% (in 1976) and 25.2% for the 20-24 year old cohort.

Finally the MPS study (like the USDL and Mazur papers) fails to account for the impact of re-introducing military conscription (proposed in 1976) on the supply of manpower to the civilian labour force. The military conscription law came into operation in January 1978, compelling all 'Jordanian' males to undertake a minimum of two years military service at the age of eighteen (unless exempted by higher education commitments).[16] Conscription removes an estimated 3-5,000 males from the labour supply each year.[17] In later years this withdrawal will be matched by the return to civilian life of those completing conscription service. However in the initial years of operation such a replacement would obviously not occur.

By understating future labour demand and overstating future labour supply the MPS report is able to neatly balance aggregate labour requirements and the planned growth targets. A net shortage of only 6,000 workers, primarily in skilled manual and technical categories, was predicted (table 7.2). The report concludes that: "Although Jordan will still be running short of 6,000 workers (in both the farm and non-farm sectors) it is believed that this fact would not create serious problems. On the contrary, Jordan might achieve some labour surpluses at the end of the Plan as a result of its social policy."[18] There seems little doubt however that the growth targets of the 1976-80 plan were incompatible with the available labour supply over

the plan period.

7.3.3 The real importance of the MPS report lies not in its quantitative manpower projections, which are of limited value given their extreme sensitivity to unpredictable external influences, but in its illustration of government attitudes towards labour outflow and as an indication of policy proposals. In the first place it clearly confirms Jordan's acceptance of the role of regional labour-supplier, particularly of skilled and technical manpower. Secondly, in its labour supply projections the report illustrates the administration's belief that a substantial manipulation of labour supply could be effected in the short term. This supply side policy response was constructed around two central tenets:

(i) that labour force productivity could be increased rapidly to counterbalance the absolute loss of manpower;

(ii) that remaining shortfalls in labour supply could be ameliorated by the promotion of increased labour force participation among women.

These two elements of the government's response were predicated on a greater commitment to vocational education and training, a commitment which was recognized and elaborated in the development plan. In the following section we will examine the implementation of this policy and assess its achievements over the plan period, considering first the labour force participation of women, and secondly progress in the development of vocational education and training. Finally, the MPS report is illustrative of the data vacuum within which manpower planning and policy formulation occurred. Although recognizing, albeit

conservatively, broad areas of expected manpower shortages, the MPS fails to define such shortages at the occupational level in this and in subsequent reports. It is apparent that a more comprehensive definition of labour shortages is an important stage in the efficient disposition of limited vocational training resources. The problems of defining and monitoring labour shortages will be examined later (section 7.6).

7.4 Increasing the domestic labour supply: (i) the role of women

7.4.1 Despite an absolute increase in the number of women employed in the non-farm sector (of about 65%) since 1975 and the professed commitment by the government to attaining higher levels of female labour force participation, preliminary results from the 1979 enumeration show contrary trends. The out-of-school participation rate appears to have fallen from the recorded 9.5% in 1976 (MPHS) to 7.6% in 1979. This decline is repeated in almost all age cohorts and is clearly apparent in the target cohorts (20-34) identified earlier (see table 7.3).

Although the decline in participation rates may be somewhat exaggerated by the urban bias exhibited in the MPHS sample frame, supporting evidence suggests that a real decline in female labour force participation rates has been registered. In particular there has been a significant growth in the rate of unemployment amongst Jordanian women. The 1979 sample results indicate that the unemployment rate amongst Jordanian women (aged 15 plus) has increased to 11.9% from its low level of 2.7% in 1976. This recent increase in the rate of unemployment is particularly

striking amongst the younger cohorts; almost 82% of unemployed women were aged 15-24 and the unemployment rate among the 15-19 age cohort was 49.5%. It is also important to note that there has been a significant change in the educational attainment of the unemployed. During the early 1970's the highest rates of unemployment were recorded among secondary school and university graduates. By 1979 this position had been reversed and the highest rates of unemployment were found amongst those with less than secondary school completion.

It is apparent from the expansion in school enrolments (section 6.7.4) that the number of women becoming available for employment in the formal labour market has expanded rapidly over the 1975-80 period. The number of women leaving the education system in the post-compulsory levels has increased from under 3,000 in 1975 to over 7,000 in 1980. However the availability of 'appropriate' jobs for women has not matched this growth in supply. While the more highly educated are able to find employment in the public sector, for an increasingly large number the alternative (largely service or manual) employment opportunities are deemed inappropriate. High initial rates of unemployment among the 15-19 age group (particularly in rural areas where the supply of 'appropriate' jobs is most limited and female unemployment as high as 29%) subsequently give way to lower participation rates as discouraged women withdraw from the potential labour force and abandon the search for employment. This contention is supported by the fact that over 42% of unemployed women were recorded as first time unemployed (compared to 31% of men) which, given

their age distribution, is a surrogate measure of first-time job-seekers. Thus while economic necessity, educational attainment and government encouragement have led a greater number of women to seek employment there has not been a comprehensive attempt to direct women's employment into sectors experiencing labour shortages. Rather, as we saw earlier (section 6.7.5) women's employment has become increasingly concentrated into a smaller number of occupations. As a result the main impact of increasing female employment has been to partially ameliorate the problems of labour turnover in the public sector (due to the strong drift ot the private sector).[19]

Whether or not the government has had any appreciable impact in encouraging increased female employment is debatable. In 1977 a Women's Department was set up in the reformed Ministry of Labour for this purpose, however after only two years it was re-assigned (1979) to the newly created Ministry of Social Development. In the latter the department's main concern has been with the promotion of village societies and the upgrading of the traditional handicrafts industry rather than with the promotion of women's formal sector employment. In the short term at least, the department's limited budget and small staff (16) preclude any comprehensive attempt to tackle the problems of women's recruitment and conditions of emplcyment, particularly now that it has been isolated from the Ministry of Labour.

Government initiatives have been primarily directed towards removing the barriers to women's employment, through encouragement rather than legislation. There has been

a programme to encourage employers to provide appropriate sanitary facilities together with segregated work and rest areas for women. A major campaign has been directed at the provision of day nurseries for employees' children. The latter has met with little success; the recent VTC survey of employers in Amman-Zarka indicated that less than 2% were providing nurseries. While there is a provision in the draft labour law to require employers of 30 or more women to provide nurseries the Ministry of Labour recognizes that compulsion may discourage the recruitment of women (because of added costs) rather than enhance their employment. Other proposals in the draft labour law may be similarly ambivalent in their impact, for example the proposed increase in maternity leave (from 42 to 49 days) and in maternity grants (from 50-75% of salary in the preceding three months). At the same time a major restriction on women's employment in manufacturing establishments, that is their prohibition from night (7 p.m.-6 a.m.) work, is to remain unchanged.[20]

7.4.2 Finally it is important to consider the opportunities for women in vocational education. It is clear from the Malki survey that a major problem lies in promoting awareness of the VTC apprenticeship schemes particularly among women. Over 47% of third year preparatory school girls were unaware of the existence of the VTC programme. Concomitantly the choice of vocational options at the secondary school level for girls remains narrow and traditionally orientated. Furthermore, while female enrolments in vocational secondary courses increased, from 1,893 in 1975/6 to 4,189 in 1980/1, their share of total female secondary enrolments has remained low at 9.5% in 1980/1 compared to 10.2% in 1975/6 (table 7.4).[21]

Although the number of vocational options available for girls has been increased from three to five this contrasts with the twenty-one options for boys and continues to be dominated by the traditional courses in commerce, nursing and so-called 'women's education' (primarily sewing classes) which accounted for 95.6% of enrolments in 1980/1. Table 7.5 compares students' preferences for secondary education options with actual placements, showing that vocational courses were severely under-subscribed (for example only 37 students applied in the first instance for the 370 places on the secondary nursing programme). Tracer studies by the Directorate of Educational Planning have shown a poor relationship between vocational courses and subsequent occupations adopted by students.[22]

7.4.3 The problems of labour shortage and wage inflation identified in the mid-1970's, which acted as a catalyst for government policy pronouncements encouraging greater participation of Jordanian women in the labour force, have not been accompanied by policies to facilitate such an increase. In the context of those labour shortages it is somewhat ironic that female labour force participation rates have actually fallen. Vocational education opportunities for women remain traditionally oriented and there has been insufficient emphasis on the attitude of employers towards female employment. It is apparent that the structure and emphasis of the formal education programme have increasingly directed women into largely clerical and teaching occupations. While this has contributed to the relatively large number of women professionals, it circumscribes the role of education in augmenting the supply of women to skilled and

semi-skilled manual occupations in which critical skill shortages exist. Thus despite labour shortages, inflation and growing educational attainment, the government has had only limited success in increasing women's employment, indeed it can be argued that the government itself embodies many of the barriers and reservations towards increased women's participation (Layne, 1981).[23] Clearly then women have not, and are unlikely to, fill the labour shortages pinpointed in the analysis of labour supply and demand.[24]

The following section turns to the second major element of the government's manpower policy, that of vocational education and training.

7.5 Increasing the domestic labour supply: (ii) vocational education and training

7.5.1 The period since 1976 has seen a number of significant innovations in Jordan's vocational education and training system. There has been both an increased emphasis on vocational education within the formal education structure and the development of a centralized training organization to co-ordinate and promote informal training activities. In this section we will briefly examine both of these developments.

7.5.2 Developments in vocational education

The expansion of vocational education has, as we have seen, been an important aim of the Jordanian education system since the early 1970's. The gross imbalance between general secondary and vocational secondary enrolments was highlighted in 1971 by the first World Bank education project's appraisal report. In 1971/2 vocational secondary

enrolments accounted for only 9.1% of total secondary cycle enrolments. By 1975/6 this had increased to 13.3% and the 1975-80 Development Plan foresaw an increase to 30% by 1980. However this has been far from realised and vocational secondary enrolments have increased only marginally (to 13.7%) by 1980/81 (table 7.4).[25] There are still only 3,000 graduates each year from vocational secondary education compared to the annual production of 27,000 academic secondary graduates. Further, the Ministry of Education (MOE) budget allocation shows a declining commitment to vocational education since the mid 1970's, when it represented 8.6% (1975/6) of recurring costs, to only 5.6% in 1980/81.

Comparison of third year preparatory students preferences for secondary education options with the actual allocation of places indicates the maintenance of this negative attitude towards vocational courses (table 7.5). Only 16.5% of students stated a vocational course as their first preference. Furthermore it is apparent that over 50% of students allocated to the commercial, agricultural and postal courses as well as to the women's craft institutes, were not enroled in courses of their choice. The implications of this for performance are obvious. It is clear that the vocational option continues to be regarded as a second-best alternative. The second World Bank education project's appraisal report (1975) concluded that: "In spite of growing shortages of sub-professionals and technicians ... vocational and technical education have been seriously neglected; enrolments are still too low and maladjusted to manpower needs, insufficient efforts have been made to

adapt curricula to the changing functional content of occupations in Jordan."[26]

In the post 1976 period the Ministry of Education has adopted a number of innovations designed to improve vocational secondary enrolments. In particular the Ministry is introducing vocational studies in the compulsory (both elementary and preparatory) grades. Two periods of practical activities per week have been allocated to the curricula of the first four elementary grades (ages 6-9) with a full programme of pre-vocational courses for the later elementary and preparatory grades (ages 10-14). The aim of these courses is to develop a positive attitude towards both manual labour and vocational education from an early age, thus encouraging a larger proportion of preparatory school graduates to opt for vocational secondary courses. The results of this programme will of course not be visible in the short term.

In the meantime the Ministry of Education has been expanding and diversifying its 'traditional' vocational secondary programme with the addition of options for postal training and hotel management. The target of achieving 30% enrolments in vocational secondary education is re-iterated in the 1981-85 plan which provides for a further expansion in vocational education facilities. Twenty-three new vocational schools are planned (including 14 for girls).

The second innovation designed to overcome traditional antipathy to vocational courses, particularly for women, is the establishment of comprehensive secondary schools. These offer options in science, literary and technical courses within one institution and are designed to enable

students to sample a variety of vocational options. However UNESCO have recently (1980) criticised the operation of these comprehensive schools which have effectively maintained the division between the three streams rather than integrating them.[27] Proposed reforms to re-align the comprehensive programme will provide a compulsory core of literary, vocational and science courses for all students.

Despite the attention which has been paid to the expansion of formal vocational education within the framework of the education system there is some doubt over the efficacy of vocational courses to respond to the needs of the labour market. As we have already seen the 1977 Tracer study showed only a limited correlation between such courses and students' employment. Bukhari's (1968) examination of industrial secondary graduates came to similar conclusions; the specific skills acquired by graduates were used in employment by only a minority. Furthermore Bukhari's follow-up survey of employers revealed that vocational graduates required the same on-the-job training as general secondary graduates, indeed some employers were found to prefer the latter because of greater flexibility.[28]

In the absence of accurate manpower requirement forecasts and the additional unknown factor of labour outflows, secondary vocational schools cannot respond effectively to labour market requirements. The system is inflexible (since enrolments cannot be manipulated to meet short term changes in market demand) and tends to ossify around specific courses irrespective of labour market conditions. Furthermore the structure of the formal

vocational course prohibits their use in 'upgrading' schemes for currently employed workers. Finally there is no guarantee that graduates will find appropriate employment, as shown by the tracer studies. This level of wastage from the system ensures a high social cost per graduate.

7.5.3 The development of vocational training

The establishment of the Vocational Training Corporation (VTC) in 1976 goes some way to recognizing that formal secondary vocational education cannot meet immediate labour market demands. Operative from May 1977 the VTC is a semi-autonomous organization (attached to the Ministry of Labour) charged with the provision of non-formal vocational education. Its aims, set out in the VTC development plan, are to:

(i) respond to requirements for manpower training at the limited skill level through short term training and crash course provision;

(ii) to improve manpower performance through skill-upgrading programmes.

The VTC catchment focuses on labour market entrants at the preparatory school level, combining on-the-job training, through its apprenticeship schemes, with formal classroom training on a day-release basis over a two to three year period.

The operations of the VTC are closely determined by demand from employers. That is, the VTC will not establish a particular course unless there is sufficient demand for such training by employers. As a result the programme is both flexible and responsive, but it is also dependent on employer awareness, a problem highlighted in the recent VTC

survey (Malki, 1982). By focussing on those who are already in employment wastage is minimized.

In its short operating history the VTC has negotiated apprenticeship contracts with an ever increasing number of firms and groups of firms, expanding enrolments from 420 in its first full year of operation (1978) to almost 1,600 in 1982 (table 7.6).[29] The short-term upgrading courses offer a similar range of vocational courses as demanded by employers. These courses, (150-160 hours) which aim to increase the efficiency of employees, have also increased their intake substantially.

The establishment of the VTC has filled a significant gap in Jordan's manpower training efforts by providing a mechanism for responding directly to employers' needs. In doing so it also provides an indication of extant manpower shortages. In the following section we consider the problem of identifying scarce skills in more detail.

7.6 Identifying scarce skills

7.6.1 As we have already seen, labour shortages have been recognized by government planners as a serious impediment to the execution of development projects from the early 1970's. Despite this recognition there has been no systematic attempt to monitor the level of skill outflow nor, until recently, to identify manpower shortages in any detail. Both the 1976-80 and 1981-85 manpower plans recognize that shortages are most likely to occur in the sub-professional, technical and skilled manual sectors but do not detail occupation-specific shortages. Policy decisions regarding both vocational education and training cannot hope to be effective in this vacuum. The identification of skill scarcity

must therefore be piecemeal. Currently there are three sources with which such identification can proceed, none is particularly satisfactory.

7.6.2 In 1979 the VTC completed a survey of manpower requirements which represents an important attempt to establish labour shortages.[30] The survey, conducted over the year April 1977-78, contacted some 1,500 industrial establishments in all five governorates. Employers were requested to evaluate their manpower training requirements for the 1979-81 period in some fifty specified occupational categories, under eight major headings. There are clearly a number of limitations with such an approach, firstly it was restricted to the industrial sector (on which VTC efforts focus), and within that sector only the larger (more than 5 employees) establishments were contacted. The 1975 Labour Force census (which itself under-enumerated small employers) records that over 60% of manufacturing establishments had less than five employees. As a result the survey does not present an accurate assessment of manpower requirements in this sector, particularly in construction where small sub-contractors predominate. Furthermore the specified occupations are restricted to lesser manual skills, which the VTC caters for, it does not include skilled office or technical occupations. Finally, there are of course problems in relying on employers 'expected requirements' and a static survey can only be of limited use in monitoring skill scarcity (by providing an initial indication of areas of shortage). The importance of the VTC survey lies not so much in its specific results as in the recognition of the need for such data. Despite these drawbacks the survey

is a useful starting point in identifying the areas, if not the size, of skill scarcity in the industrial sector.

The preliminary results of this survey combined with an estimate of VTC output under its current capacity, indicate the scale of shortfall in training facilities (table 7.7). The most significant areas of shortfall identified are in machine operatives and supervisory staff, metal workers and auto-mechanics. This is similarly the case in the demand for upgrading courses. Smaller deficits in carpentry, electrical, general mechanical, plumbing and heating skills reflect, to some extent, the predominance of small sub-contractors in these fields.

7.6.3 A second indication of areas of skill scarcity can be obtained by examining the enrolment on courses provided by the VTC since these reflect direct employer demand. Again however this data suffers from similar problems, in particular it relies on employer awareness of the VTC's capability. The rapid expansion in the latter's coverage will make this an increasingly important source of data on skill scarcity. Appendix IV lists apprenticeship courses demanded by employers (and implemented by the VTC) since 1977. According to this data the major skill shortages are in terms of electricians, mechanics (particularly auto-mechanics), welders and other metal workers, central heating and air conditioning technicians. A similar pattern of demand is apparent among the up-grading courses.

7.6.4 The third source of data by which manpower shortages may be identified is the Ministry of Labour's record of job vacancies. In October 1982 the Amman Employment Office began to request that employers supply them with data regarding

vacancies and salary levels. This appears to be a local initiative which is not repeated at all the employment offices. The data collection is at present piecemeal; the request for such data is invariably made only when a company or individual applies for work permits to hire non-Jordanian workers (see chapter 8). The aim of the employment office in this regard is not data collection as such but a greater structuration of the labour market, in particular to provide an increasingly formal procedure for recruitment and for job-search practices. The collection and dissemination of vacancy data by the employment office will, in the long run, encourage the unemployed and first time job seekers, to register at the employment office.

At present the collation of vacancy data is almost random, requests have not been sent out systematically and there is no programme for regular follow-up. Furthermore the employment office is not necessarily notified when vacancies are filled nor indeed when new vacancies arise. Equally important is the variation in data quality received from different employers. Data is often not occupationally specific, making reference instead to broad occupational groups, such as: 'construction workers' or 'labourers'. Alternatively occupations are specified but without any indication of the number of vacancies which exist. In many cases there is simply no reply to the request since employers are wary of MOL intentions.[31] The latter is also evident with regard to stated salary levels, these are often put at very low levels in order to discourage prospective Jordanian employees and ensure the unhindered recruitment of non-Jordanian manpower (see chapter 8). Despite these

drawbacks it must be recalled that this exercise has only recently been implemented and will undoubtedly gain momentum with time. It is apparent that the MOL recognizes the need to formalise labour market processes and this initiative may provide the basis for a more comprehensive data collection framework.

Vacancies recorded in replies to the Amman Employment Office over the period October 1982 to January 1983 have been tabulated by the author and are presented in appendix V. The latter consolidates the replies from more than 200 employers, specifying 64 occupations and 1,080 job vacancies. The importance of the vacancy data is that it covers a much broader range of employers in terms of both establishment size and occupational requirements than the two VTC sources. Indeed the results show a large number of vacancies in those construction sector occupations which we suggested earlier had been omitted from the VTC study. Furthermore this data reveals a considerable number of vacancies in relatively unskilled occupations, particularly in the service sector in which very low wage rates were being offered.

7.6.5 In this section we have identified three sources of information on labour shortages in Jordan and outlined the limitations of those sources. Although skilled labour shortages have been recognized as a significant constraint on the Jordanian labour market since the mid-1970's, hitherto there has been no attempt to measure such shortages in detail. Clearly improvements in the identification, consolidation and co-ordination of such data is an essential pre-requisite to sound manpower planning and tne elaboration of training priorities. This is a problem to which we will

return in our concluding chapter (10) below.

7.7 Conclusion: labour market management under conditions of enhanced uncertainty

7.7.1 The rapid growth in emigration for employment from Jordan in the early 1970's had a substantial impact on the availability of manpower in the domestic labour market. Between 1972 and 1975 the focus of labour market management changed dramatically from ameliorating unemployment to coping with skill scarcity. By 1976 the Jordanian labour market was characterized by rapid labour force turnover and shortages at almost all skill levels, as evidenced by the rate of wage inflation and the increased reporting of job vacancies.

Although establishing the socially optimal level of emigration (at which the marginal increase in workers' remittances equals the marginal cost in human capital investment) is impossible in practice, indirect evidence, such as the Jordanian calls for an international labour compensatory facility (ILCF), implies that labour emigration had exceeded that theoretical threshold. In response the government's manpower options were severely constrained by Jordan's political economy and history. Given these constraints the Jordanian response has been largely confined to enhancing the quality and quantity of labour available (both domestically and internationally).

This considered commitment to the international labour market has added an additional variable of unknown dimension into labour market management. This is made clear by the superficiality of manpower analyses presented in successive development plans, despite the existence of a specialised

Manpower Planning section within the NPC since 1969.[32] Furthermore there appears to have been little attempt at integrating manpower requirements and over-all planning. Thus crude estimates of labour market demand are made without realistic provision for meeting those requirements.

The government's pronouncement that labour shortages could be overcome by greater emphasis on vocational education and the increased labour force participation of women was in reality more a rhetorical commitment to allay the fears of potential (foreign) investors than a practical policy outline. Indeed the ILO's manpower strategy study for Jordan (1977) suggests that a primary role of the MPS was not manpower planning as such but rather to: "... devise sometimes excessively ambitious ways to provide the manpower needed to implement projects. MPS efforts have largely been to provide support for projects (and the foreign aid sought for them) and to avoid the embarrassment of the acknowledgement of manpower shortfalls."[33]

Over the five year period 1976-80 the expansion of vocational education within the formal education system has proved elusive. Moreover vocational secondary education appears, in its current form, to be ill-suited in meeting labour market requirements. Although the VTC programme of apprenticeship training and skill up-grading appears much more responsive to those needs, it remains on a limited scale. The expansion of that programme is clearly justified given the changing nature of the demand for Jordanians abroad (see chapter 5) and the country's unfavourable natural resource endowment. In addition the government's commitment to increase the total labour supply, through greater female

participation has been equally difficult to achieve. Ironically, the rate of labour force participation among Jordanian women may be declining because of an intensified focus on teaching and clerical occupations. The role of women in ameliorating labour shortages engendered by labour emigration has been limited.

In the short term the government's labour supply policy has met with little success and the only practical solution to the problems of labour shortage remains the importation of immigrant workers from abroad. Jordanian (and non-Jordanian) employers have resorted to this extensively. Although such a policy was foreseen in the 1976-80 Five Year Plan as occurring on a limited and strictly controlled scale, the reality, which we examine in the following two chapters (8 and 9) has been far from orderly.

Birks and Sinclair (1980) suggested that extensive vertical (occupational) mobility within the Jordanian labour market had reduced the impact of labour emigration on skill scarcity in Jordan.[34] However the evidence presented here of labour shortages at various occupational and skill levels, and of growing unemployment among Jordanians suggests that there are limits to that mobility. Earlier (section 7.4) we examined the recent rise in unemployment among Jordanian females. Preliminary data from the 1979 enumeration also indicates an unexpected rise in the rate of unemployment among Jordanian males (to 8.9%).[35] As in the MPHS series of the early and mid-1970's (see table 7.8) unemployment was most marked among the younger age cohorts (15-24). While 34% of unemployed males were first-time job-seekers that proportion rises to over 50% of unemployed males aged 15-24

(compared to only 7% in the age groups over 35). Again then there is evidence of 'frictional' unemployment, in other respects however the unemployment of the late 1970's differs from that of the earlier period. The highest rates of unemployment are now among those with less than secondary school completion (see table 7.9). The latter account for more than 78% of unemployed Jordanian males. The coexistence of labour shortages and increasing unemployment may be explained firstly in terms of the rapid increase in school enrolments over the last ten years (section 6.7.4 above). As a result of this expansion the disadvantaged have fewer opportunities on the domestic labour market. In the mid 1970's the international labour market provided a major outlet for unskilled Jordanians, however as we saw earlier (chapters 3 and 5), the international opportunities for unskilled Jordanians are increasingly reduced. Secondly however the growth in domestic male unemployment is an outcome of Jordan's ready access to an elastic supply of foreign labour during the mid-1970's, a contention we consider further in the following chapter (8).[36]

7.7.2 The limitations of manpower planning in Jordan and the sensitivity of those projections to changes in the international labour market, are further emphasised by the current manpower assessment for 1981-85. The latter projects an increase in total employment from 470,000 to 668,000 by 1985.[37] As in the 1976 manpower plan however a number of implausible assumptions have been made while domestic and international labour market signals are ignored. In the first place an optimistic projection of annual GDP growth (11% p.a. at factor cost) and in productivity (3.6% p.a.)

which do not correspond to the historic rates achieved during 1976-80 (when GDP increased at 8.5% p.a. and producitivity at 2.2%). Secondly, labour supply assumptions are again complicated by uncertainty in the level of manpower outflow; a constant net outflow from the East Bank of 9-12,000 p.a. is assumed. By ignoring base year unemployment and assuming high rates of GDP growth and net labour outflow, the plan assumptions are all strongly biased towards a domestic labour shortage, estimated at 57,000 by 1985. In a notable policy re-alignment it is argued that this deficit must be filled by the use of immigrant labour in the short term.

If domestic labour supply is re-calculated, allowing for lower rates of labour emigration (as shown in chapter 3 above) and for domestic unemployment, but retaining the growth and output assumptions of the plan, then there would be a domestic labour surplus of over 10,000 by 1985. However if GDP growth is at its historic rate that surplus would rise to 85,000 and to 110,000 if labour emigration continues at its 1982 level. Any significant increase in return migration would aggravate this scenario further. Thus if Jordan cannot achieve the high growth targets she has set herself, and if the demand for Jordanian workers abroad continues to diminish, then there could be a rapid return to the problems of labour surplus experienced in the late 1960's and early 1970's, complicated by the presence of a large immigrant workforce.

Notes

1. Optimistically the Three Year Plan predicted that improvements in the Jordanian economy would lead to substantial return migration, thus filling any shortfall in skilled labour supply.

2. Yasin, M. (1976) 'The manpower situation and prospects in Jordan'. p. 2.

3. Antoun, R.T. (1979) Low-key politics: local-level leadership and change in the Middle East. (in passim).

4. MPS (1977) 'An analysis of job vacancies advertised in local newspapers between 1974 and 1976'. (Arabic).

5. Other indirect measures taken by the Jordanian government include the reduction (in 1978) of passport validity from five to three years and the imposition of higher renewal fees (JD. 15.00). See: MEED, vol. 24 (34) 25 August 1978, p. 30, and 1 September 1978, p. 23. In addition Jordanians leaving to work abroad were requested to have their passports stamped by the Ministry of Labour.

6. Secondments can be equally unstable. In June 1983 for example, the UAE cancelled its agreement to employ some 200 Jordanian teachers. See: MEED, vol. 27 (24) 17 June 1983, p. 83.

7. Economic Research Department, RSS (1977) 'Survey of wages 1967-76'. (Arabic).

8. Alawin, A.A. (1978) 'The structure and performance of the manufacturing sector in Jordan and its reflection on the economy' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Keele).

9. Salt, A. and Keeley, W. (1976) Manpower development in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with special reference to the East Jordan Valley. pp. 121-2.

10. See Anani, J.A. (1977) 'The labour situation in Jordan'. p. 8.

11. MPS (1976) 'Labour force in Jordan'.

12. Note that in chapter 3.3 we established that net outflow in this period was circa 12,500 p.a.

13. Salt, A. and Keeley, W. (1976) op. cit., chapter 2.

14. Mazur, M.P. (1979) Economic growth and development in Jordan. pp. 258-62.

15. Zarour, T.A. (1976) 'Factors influencing the emigration of highly educated persons from Jordan to the United States' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University Florida).

16. Ammendments to the military service law in 1983 allow students to continue education un-interrupted to the postgraduate level and extend the age limit for service to 27. See: Jordan Times, 25 January 1983, 'NCC ammendments to conscription law'.

17. Major Fawzi, General Mobilisation Department, personal communication, February 1983.

18. MPS (1976) op. cit. p. 15.

19. In 1981 females represented 58% of all applicants for public sector appointments, 68% of whom were placed. Civil Service Commission (1982) 'Personnel Affairs, 1981'. (Arabic).

20. For legal restrictions on women's employment see: Kawar, G.N. (1977) 'Labour law of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan'. Particularly sections 47, 50 and 51.

21. It is the intention of the new comprehensive schools to provide rather more innovative courses in vocational education and to make these available to girls.

22. Ministry of Education (1977) 'Follow-up analytical study, of graduates of educational institutes in Jordan'. (Arabic). The 1977 tracer study covered graduates from the 1971/2-75/6 period from the Salt teacher training centre, the girls technical institute in Amman and the nursing section of the girls comprehensive school in Amman. Of 220 graduates from the Salt centre only 51 were subsequently employed as teachers, including 26 abroad. Similarly 57% of secondary nursing graduates were not employed in nursing. Although the success rate was slightly higher in commercial training, the survey revealed that secondary vocational education was inefficient and often irrelevant; the majority of graduates reported that subsequent on-the-job training was required.

23. Layne, L. (1981) 'Women in Jordan's workforce' MERIP (March/April) p. 23.

24. Despite the failure to increase women's participation at the anticipated rate over the 1976-80 period the new five year plan (1981-85) assumes that all girls leaving the education system over the plan period will enter the formal labour market. See: MPS (1982) 'Supply and demand for labour to 1985'. (Arabic).

25. To some extent this is the result of rapid growth in rural secondary enrolments where vocational secondary classes are largely unavailable.

26. Quoted in: Harrell, P.S. (1978) 'Vocational education and training in Jordan.

27. UNESCO (1980) 'Education and training for manpower development'.

28. Al-Bukhari, N.M.A. (1968) Issues in occupational education and training: a case study in Jordan.

29. The VTC's main problems are the fact that it continues to rely on shared (with the MOE) facilities and has a limited number of trained instructors. These restrictions have prevented a more rapid expansion of enrolments. See: USAID (1979) 'Jordan: vocational training'.

30. VTC (1979) 'Manpower study of industrial establishments in Jordan'. (Arabic).

31. The number of non-repliers was estimated by employment office staff at 25-30%; the actual number is unknown since there are no records of the requests sent out. The filing of replies is also chaotic and without substantial re-organisation can be of little use even for its intended purpose.

32. The fact that manpower planning is under the control of the NPC rather than the MOL leads to problems in co-ordination and interpretation. See for example their differing interpretation of the 1979 unemployment data, note 35 below.

33. ILO (1977) 'Jordan: manpower strategy study'. p. 2.

34. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980a) International migration and development in the Arab region. pp. 91-4.

35. The MPS now accept the estimate of unemployment based on the census (9.1%) as being accurate though they ignored unemployment in making their labour supply projections for 1981-85 (Dr. Yasir Sarah, MPS, personal communication, March 1983). However the figure is rejected as far too high by the MOL (Dr. Mansour Otoum, MOL, personal communication, March 1983). The MOL's own data is however of limited significance since few unemployed workers register at the employment offices which have only a limited placement service. The number of Jordanians registered and placed by the Amman office over the 1978-81 period was:

Year	Registration	Placements
1978	3,401	1,299
1979	1,647	505
1980	1,298	141
1981	1,964	883

36. Unemployment among young school leavers with less than secondary education may additionally have resulted from the re-introduction of conscription, with employers preferring immigrant workers to inexperienced Jordanians who will be leaving for conscription after one or two years. In addition there have been an increasing number of public sector redundancies with the country's worsening economic situation. In December 1982 the Jordanian Phosphate Mine Company laid off 350 workers

because of falling demand. See: MEED, vol. 26 (50) 10 December 1982, p. 32.

37. MPS (1982) op. cit.

Table 7.1

Job vacancies advertised in the Jordanian press 1974-76 by occupation and location

Occupation	Internal	Abroad	Total	% distribution
Technicians	792	913	1705	13.9
Engineers	652	954	1606	13.2
Unskilled manual workers	1079	469	1548	12.7
Mechanics	534	490	1024	8.4
Administrative officials	379	413	792	6.5
Draughtsman	316	377	693	5.7
Accountants	359	328	687	5.6
Tawjihi*	417	249	666	5.5
Electricians	411	244	655	5.4
Secretary/typist	491	152	643	5.3
Teacher	243	367	610	5.0
Construction labourer	283	230	513	4.2
Carpenters	242	128	370	3.0
Blacksmiths	177	131	308	2.5
Physician (M.D.)	42	188	230	1.9
Pharmacist	33	112	145	1.2
Total	6,450	5,745	12,195	100.0
1974	1,444	1,509	2,953	
1975	2,635	2,295	4,930	
1976	2,371	1,941	4,312	

Source: Collated from data in MPS (1977) 'An analysis of job vacancies advertised in local newspapers between 1974 and 1976'. (Arabic).

* Note that no occupations are specified here, simply the education level of

Table 7.2

Manpower demand and supply projections 1976-80

Occupational Category	Total expected supply	Projected net outflow	% distribution of outflow	% total supply in outflow	Residual domestic supply	Additional demand*	Net surplus (+) and shortage (-)
A-1	5,500	2,440	5.5	44.4	3,060	1,780	+1,280
A-2	21,296	9,811	27.2	46.1	11,485	7,426	+4,059
B	22,956	12,767	28.8	55.6	10,189	11,528	-1,339
C-1	45,518	7,393	16.7	16.2	38,125	17,251	+20,874
C-2	9,390	4,243	9.6	45.2	5,147	23,969	-18,822
D	42,754	7,590	17.2	17.7	35,164	24,694	+10,470
Total	147,414	44,244	100.0	100.0	103,170	86,648	-

Source: MPS (1976) 'Labour Force in Jordan'. (various tables)

* Note that 'additional demand' refers to non-farm employment only, total additional demand is 109,267.

Table 7.3

Participation rates (%) for out-of-school females, 1976 and 1979

Age group	1976	1979
15-19	9.6	7.4
20-24	25.1	17.1
25-29	18.2	14.1
30-34	8.6	7.4
35-39	4.4	4.6
40-44	3.6	3.5
45-49	2.3	2.9
50-54	1.7	0.9
55-59	1.5	1.4
60-64	1.1	1.2
65+	0.6	0.7
Total	9.5	7.6

Source: Data for 1976 are derived from the 1976 MPHS, tables 1 and 5; 1979 data is taken from unpublished preliminary tables of the 2.1% sample of the 1979 census.

Table 7.4

Proportion of secondary school enrolment in general and vocational sections by sex, 1971/2-1980/1

Year	% in General Secondary		% in Vocational Secondary		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total
1971/2	90.3	92.1	9.7	7.9	9.1
1972/3	89.1	91.0	10.9	9.0	10.3
1973/4	87.5	90.4	12.5	9.6	11.5
1974/5	85.7	89.6	14.3	10.4	12.9
1975/6	84.8	89.8	15.2	10.2	13.3
1976/7	85.3	91.1	14.7	8.9	12.4
1977/8	86.0	89.9	14.0	10.1	12.4
1978/9	87.4	90.8	12.6	9.2	11.2
1979/80	83.0	91.5	17.0	8.5	11.0
1980/81	83.0	90.5	17.0	9.5	13.7

Source: derived from MOE (annual) Statistical Education Yearbook. Various tables.

Table 7.5

Comparison of student course preferences and actual allocations 1979/80

School/course	Male		Female	
	Preference	Allocation	Preference	Allocation
General Secondary	16,445	15,886	16,680	13,815
Industrial Secondary	4,636	1,050	-	-
Commercial Secondary	236	930	442	815
Agricultural Secondary	111	200	-	-
Postal Secondary	27	80	33	40
Trade Training	743	845	-	-
Women's Craft	-	-	214	500
Nursing	-	-	59	370
Total	22,198	19,991	17,428	15,540

Source: UNESCO (1980) 'Education and training for manpower development'. p. 12.

Table 7.6

VTC apprenticeships and up-grading course enrolments 1977-82

Year	2-3 year apprenticeships		150-160 hour up-grading courses	
	Enrolment	No. of contracts	Enrolment	No. of courses
1977	156	5	155	9
1978	438	15	204	16
1979	450	17	259	20
1980	679	31	289	22
1981	832	39	865	27
1982	1,599	54	761	33

Source: VTC (annual) 'Report of the Vocational Training Corporation'. Various tables (Arabic).

Table 7.7

Training requirements by broad occupational groups, 1979-81

Occupation Group	Requirements of current establishments	Requirements for planned expansion	Available supply from VTC	Deficit in apprenticeships	Upgrading to 'skilled' requirement	Upgrading to 'craftsman' requirement
Electrical	856	44	280	620	574	222
Auto-mechanic	1,796	-	220	1,576	1,103	322
General mechanic	605	33	15	623	251	96
Metalworker	2,581	256	242	2,595	1,077	355
Woodwork	484	138	139	483	270	109
Construction labour	539	252	86	705	393	21
Plumbing and heating	443	-	257	186	106	-
Machine operators	3,501	314	-	3,815	382	98
Total	10,805	1,037	1,239	10,603	4,156	1,223

Source: VTC (1979) 'Manpower study of industrial establishments in Jordan'. Various tables. (Arabic).

Table 7.8

Unemployment by age group (15+) in 1972, 1974, 1976 and 1979

Age group	% total unemployment				Unemployment rate (%)			
	1972	1974	1976	1979	1972	1974	1976	1979
15-19	18.9	19.7	21.7	35.7	5.9	4.1	3.4	27.7
20-24	46.2	40.5	37.7	19.9	8.4	5.6	3.7	10.2
25-29	13.6	18.2	13.5	6.4	2.4	2.4	1.4	4.4
30-34	6.1	6.1	7.3	4.3	1.4	1.0	0.9	3.1
35-39	3.7	4.4	4.2	4.5	0.8	0.8	0.6	3.5
40-44	5.0	4.2	5.6	4.3	1.4	0.9	0.8	3.9
45-49	3.7	2.7	3.7	4.5	1.3	0.7	0.7	5.2
50-54	1.4	2.7	2.8	4.9	0.7	1.0	0.7	7.4
55-59	1.0	0.6	2.3	6.0	0.9	0.4	1.1	14.3
60-64	0.3	0.8	1.1	4.0	0.3	0.6	0.7	13.2
65+	-	0.2	-	5.6	-	0.1	-	20.6

Source: Data for 1972, 1974 and 1976 are derived from the Department of Statistics', MPHS series (various tables); data for 1979 (Jordanians only) was taken from unpublished tables of the 2.1% sample from the 1979 census.

Table 7.9

Distribution (%) and rate (%) of unemployment by educational attainment, 1972, 1974, 1976 and 1979

Educational attainment	1972	1974	1976	1979
less than primary	11.6	15.2	12.0	43.1
(rate in parenthesis)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(9.8)
Primary	20.1	21.1	26.3	22.7
	(1.9)	(1.6)	(1.3)	(8.4)
Preparatory	9.5	8.5	11.2	13.0
	(3.9)	(2.5)	(2.4)	(9.8)
Secondary	35.5	39.1	31.6	13.8
	(7.3)	(6.3)	(3.5)	(12.4)
Post-secondary	6.0	4.9	5.9	3.2
	(6.9)	(4.0)	(2.3)	(4.7)
University	16.6	11.2	12.3	4.2
	(8.4)	(4.5)	(3.1)	(6.3)

Source: As table 7.8

Note that totals may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

CHAPTER EIGHT

JORDAN AS A LABOUR IMPORTER: THE GROWTH IN IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT

8.1 Preface

8.1.1 The contention that international labour exports can stimulate secondary, internal, population migration is familiar. Thus, for example, Paine (1974) and Abadan-Unat (1976) identify a close relationship between labour migration to Western Europe and internal population re-distribution in Turkey.[1] Similarly Findlay and Findlay (1982) consider the repercussions of changes in international labour flows on patterns of internal migration in the Maghreb.[2]

The hypothesis that a similar hierarchy of labour flows may exist on an international scale, has received negligible attention. In this chapter we will explore this question further; that is, to what extent does primary international labour emigration (as discussed in part II above) act as a catalyst for further international labour flows into the original labour exporting economy?

8.2 Introduction: some preliminary notions of 'replacement' migration

8.2.1 A number of writers, particularly those concerned with international labour migration in its European context, have identified this phenomenon. As early as 1973 the ILO, in its Second European Regional Conference, alluded to labour imports by traditionally labour exporting economies.[3] A finding which led Salt and Clout (1976) to suggest, rather prematurely, an incipient second stage in the development of European labour migration patterns.[4] Böhning (1975) suggested that such immigration was a necessary adjunct to

the indigenous population's increasing "... reluctance to take up arduous and unpleasant jobs ..."[5] That is, such immigrants were performing a similar role to departed nationals working abroad. On this basis Böhning questioned the validity of assumptions regarding perfect mobility and inter-changeability among the unskilled labour cohorts of 'traditional' labour-exporting economies.

By the mid-1970's such secondary labour flows were affecting all the major Mediterranean basin labour-suppliers. Baucic (1972) notes an inflow of service sector workers from Poland and Czechoslovakia into Yugoslavia; Poinard (1972) and Stahl (1979) comment on labour inflows from Capo Verde to Portugal; Thompson (1978) discusses the effects of emigration from Corsica and concomitant inflows of foreign workers from the Maghreb and the Mezzogiorno; Papademetriou (1979) identifies selective labour shortages in Greece from the mid-1960's and suggests that by 1973 some 40,000 immigrants, primarily from Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia, were in active employment; Caldo (1975) and Taamallah (1981) examine Tunisian immigrant workers in Sicily and Federici (1979) considers foreign labour migration into mainland Italy; Findlay et al. (1979) suggest that up to 80,000 Moroccans have been clandestinely employed in Spain and that such immigrants "... have taken up positions released by Spaniards who themselves have migrated to France in search of more lucrative employment."[6]

8.2.2 Nevertheless the labour market impact of such inflows has been largely ignored or seen as insignificant, presumably because of their small volume (and frequently short duration) relative to the scale of primary labour emigration. In

1972-73 labour inflows accounted for only 10-15% of primary labour emigration from the major sending countries. Böhning (1975) saw no need to revise his conclusion that: "... the continuation ... of the unemployment situation in most sending countries would appear to make unskilled emigration a desirable long term strategy."[7]

Although these studies have recognized the occurrence of 'secondary' labour inflows such comments have been predominantly subordinate to their main concern and almost entirely divorced from general theoretical notions regarding the structure and functioning of internatiocnal labour markets. Neither has there been any concern with the implications of such movements for the domestic labour markets of the receiving (or sending) countries.

The postulated development of a 'second stage' in European labour migration has remained largely dormant. The imposition of restrictive immigration policies from 1973-74 following the onset of economic recession has increasingly directed attention to the problems of second generation immigrants and to the patterns and implications of return migration. Additionally the largely clandestine nature of secondary labour inflows has prevented their accurate representation in official statistics.[8]

8.2.3 In the Arab region however the massive upsurge in primary labour flows during the mid and later 1970's has stimulated a similar inflow of labour into certain labour 'exporting' countries. Birks and Sinclair (1980a) have outlined the movement of 'replacement' manpower into Jordan, the Yemen Arab Republic and Oman during the late 1970's. They present the first attempt to explain such labour inflows

into labour 'exporting' economies within a generalised model of the international labour market which recognizes that the traditional labour-sender/receiver dichotomy is inadequate.

Birks and Sinclair identify a "... spontaneous movement of labour ..." which they characterise as 'replacement migration'. This is formally defined as "... the filling of a vacancy created by the movement of a migrant who has left his country for a job opportunity abroad by the immigration of a national of another country. This latter person is called a replacement migrant" (emphasis added.)[9]

The essential feature of this process is the initial emigration of elements of the domestic labour supply, a movement which we have characterised earlier as primary labour emigration. This withdrawal increases labour demand within the primary labour-exporting economy, a demand which is additionally fuelled by the investment of remittances, particularly in the private construction sector. Rising wage rates, stemming from the growing labour supply/demand imbalance and the inflationary impact of remittances, are seen to attract the so-called 'replacement' migrants.

In sum we have a spontaneous movement of labour caused simply by the replacement of already departed nationals by the inflow of immigrant workers attracted by rising wage rates. In effect this labour inflow maintains, but does not change, the total labour supply available to the economy. As a result it is postulated that real wage rates will stabilise or even fall.

Replacement migration appears to be an anomaly in the

pattern of international labour flows. Why, if overt labour shortages and increasing wage rates encourage 'replacement' inflows, has such 'replacement' manpower not migrated directly to the primary labour markets (that is the capital-rich states) where rewards are significantly higher?

In order to explain this apparent discrepancy the author's invoke the 'selectivity' of international migration, that is they seek an explanation couched in terms of the characteristics of the migrants and the demands of the labour-importers. Labour demand in the Arabian Peninsula is, they suggest, in the first instance for Jordanians (rather than say Egyptians) because of their assumed higher marginal productivity. Thus not only is international labour migration selective from within the domestic labour market of the labour-supplier but it also selects between different national labour markets, that is there is a perceived hierarchy of labour-exporters. It is the rejection of certain groups by the primary labour market which leaves them available for less rewarding secondary destinations.

Finally it is argued that although accepting replacement migrants involves some social costs (because of their lower marginal product and added social overhead costs), it does enable the primary labour-exporter to overcome absolute manpower shortages and thereby to maintain the development momentum, albeit at a slower pace.

8.3 Case studies of 'replacement' migration

8.3.1 A number of recent studies (Abdalla Ali, 1980; Seccombe, 1981; Caldo, 1982; Kofman, 1983) have examined,

either directly or indirectly, the characteristics and role of immigrant workers in traditionally labour-exporting states. The following section will outline the findings of these case studies and consider their implications for the concept of 'replacement' migration as detailed by Birks and Sinclair.

8.3.2 Abdalla Ali (1980) examines the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of a small sample (250) of Sudanese immigrant workers in Sana'a (Yemen Arab Republic).[10] He attributes the primary motive for such migration (which dates from 1978) not to conditions within the Yemeni labour market, but to the tightening of immigration regulations in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf labour markets. Ali's observations led him to conclude that it was "... only when Sudanese found it difficult to enter the oil-rich Arab countries did they attempt to drift into the YAR." The latter may serve as an alternative destination to the primary labour markets of the oil-rich states, or act as an indirect route of entry to that labour market across the largely unmarked Saudi-YAR frontier.[11]

A high proportion (46%) of the sample were residing in YAR illegally, indeed one may suspect that the overall figure would be greater than this since a further 50% of the distributed questionnaires were not returned. Although Ali terms this 'replacement' labour migration, the idea of replacement as conceptualised by Birks and Sinclair is not confirmed. A large majority of the sample (68%) reported that employment was difficult to find and frequently temporary in nature. Indeed some 27% claimed that obtaining employment had been their major problem whilst

in YAR. It is apparent that in many cases this arose because Sudanese immigrants (who were predominantly unskilled labour from Central and Western Sudan) were competing with, rather than replacing, Yemeni labour.[12]

The survey also casts some doubt on the idea that 'replacement' immigration is spontaneous. Although Ali suggests that the labour market for Sudanese immigrants was highly disorganised, some 18% had private contracts with Yemeni businessmen arranged in the Sudan and a further 5% were recruited via the Sudanese labour office in Khartoum. The majority however had secured employment through personal relations in the YAR.

8.3.3 The second case study (Seccombe, 1981) provides a preliminary account of Egyptian immigration into the East Jordan Valley.[13] Although this will be treated in depth later (chapter 9) two important points can usefully be noted at this stage. Firstly, as in Ali's study, immigrants were shown to be concentrated in largely unstable or casual employment and secondly, to be employed at wage rates lower than those of nationals working in the same sector. This finding would dispute the role assigned to rising wage rates in the attraction of 'replacement' labour.

8.3.4 Although Kofman (1982) is only indirectly concerned with immigrant labour she identified a similar disparity between the sectors of immigrant employment and of domestic labour outflow.[14] The development of viticulture and tourism were seen to have generated only short term seasonal employment opportunities and have not stemmed the continued emigration of Corsican nationals and a growing reliance on immigrant labour. By 1979 Corsica had the highest rate of

employment of foreign workers in France.[15] Kofman relates the development of new employment opportunities to an influx of capital with the French repatriates from the Maghreb during the period 1962-66. The settlement of an estimated 15,000 repatriates in Corsica provides an important link in the later introduction of Maghrebin labour to the island. Again then 'replacement' migration is neither entirely spontaneous nor is it directed simply to sectors of indigenous labour outflow.

8.3.5 Finally, Caldo (1982) describes the socio-economic characteristics of Tunisian and Eritrean immigrant workers in Sicily and examines their impact on the local labour market.[16] An initially restricted occupational distribution was later replaced by a more generalised inflow of unskilled labour, dominated by marginal occupations offering only seasonal or casual employment. Caldo shows that the origins of Tunisian immigration began in 1968 when the Belice earthquake had stimulated an exodus from the Trapani region. Tunisians were recruited by landowners to replace their former day labourers and sharecroppers.[17] However, Caldo regards the subsequent diversification of their employment structure as a mechanism used by employers to avoid increased investment in fixed capital assets. Furthermore, Caldo has shown that the inflow of immigrant labour continued to expand during the late 1970's despite the recession in the local economy and the growth in return migration.

This continued growth in labour inflows contradicts the view of Findlay et al.(1979) who, in the Spanish case, predicted that the imposition of immigration restrictions by France from 1973-4 would curtail Spanish worker immigration

and consequently reduce the opportunities for Moroccan 'replacement' migrants to work in Spain.[18] The return of large numbers of Spaniards from France, it was postulated, would have a knock-on effect leading to the active expulsion of Moroccans from Spain. However, since this phase of the Konjuncturpuffer theory (the demand-determined international circulation of labour) had manifestly failed to appear among the European core labour-receivers there was no reason to expect that it would occur among the secondary or replacement labour-importers.

8.3.6 Although limited, these four case studies suggest a number of areas in which the current model of 'replacement' migration requires further iteration. That revision will be made in the light of the remainder of this chapter which develops a more comprehensive analysis of labour immigration into Jordan, focussing particularly on the period 1978-82 covered by extant Ministry of Labour records.

8.4 Jordan as a labour importer: the growth in immigrant employment, 1973-81

8.4.1 Establishing the scale and characteristics of labour inflows to Jordan presents a series of problems similar to those encountered in estimating the volume of primary Jordanian emigration. This section will first examine the data collected by the Ministry of Labour since 1973, using this to establish trends in the size of the immigrant labour force over the period 1973-81. The subsequent discussion (section 8.5) will present a more detailed analysis of the employment characteristics of immigrants in the 1978-82 period. Official data will be supplemented with material obtained from the records of, and in interviews with,

major contractors in the Amman construction sector together with the author's survey of work permits issued by the Amman Employment Office over the period October 1982 to January 1983.[19]

8.4.2 Jordan's 1960 Labour Law requires employers to obtain prior permission from the Ministry of Labour before importing foreign manpower. Prospective immigrants would only be granted a work permit if the Minister of Labour, in consultation with the Minister of National Economy, deemed their employment to be: "... beneficial to the national income ...", and provided that such: "... expertise and qualifications ... are not available among Jordanian workers ..."[20] The law clearly envisages the controlled importation of skilled manpower where there are critical shortfalls in the domestic labour supply. However, since the Ministry of Labour had no authority to take sanctions over contravention of this provision it remained largely impotent, indeed the bulk of immigration and employment was effectively clandestine until legislative changes in the current decade (see section 8.4.4). Inevitably therefore, in the period prior to 1980, work permit data tends to understate the scale of non-Jordanian immigration and employment.

Prior to 1973 there is no extant data regarding labour immigration to Jordan. It can however be reasonably assumed to have been on a small scale and primarily of the nature envisaged by the 1960 Labour Law, Jordan's high domestic unemployment rate precluding any appreciable inflow of unskilled or even semi-skilled manpower. During the early 1970's the volume of work permits issued remained low

but the trend was significantly upward, expanding from 376 in 1973 to 803 by 1975. Some measure of the scale of clandestine employment can be ascertained by comparing the latter with the results of the 1975 labour force 'census'. This recorded some 2,228 non-Jordanians of whom the majority (84%) were Arabs. Although immigrant workers represented less than 2% of total employees enumerated this is a significantly greater number than that suggested by work permit issues.[21] In addition a substantial number were undoubtedly working in the agricultural sector and in the small construction sector establishments omitted from the 'census'. A recent report (USAID, 1980) suggests that there had been significant shortages in the availability of hired labour, particularly in the dryland agriculture sector, from as early as 1973.[22] Similarly Salt and Keeley (1976) cite the evidence of rapid wage rate inflation (increasing by 67% between 1971 and 1975) in the Jordan Valley as evidence of labour shortages in the irrigated agriculture sector.[23] The employment of immigrant workers in the agricultural sector went unrecorded and uncontrolled since agricultural employment was specifically excluded from the 1960 Labour Law and its amendments.

Anani (1977) suggests there may have been as many as 25,000 immigrant workers in Jordan by 1975-6.[24] Indeed an influx of Syrian workers can be traced to this period when employment opportunities (particularly in agriculture and construction) in the Lebanon were abruptly severed by the civil war. This was an important factor in the sharp increase (497%) in work permit issues between 1975 (803) and 1976 (4,790). Labour demand within the Jordanian economy

increased with the infusion of private capital from Beirut and from accelerating workers' remittances following the parallel growth in Jordanian labour emigration. Salt and Keeley's review of progress on three major construction projects in the East Jordan Valley noted that from 1975 all three projects had begun to rely on large inputs of foreign labour. In December 1975 an initial group of 15 foreign workers were recruited for the East Ghor Canal Extension project; by mid-1976 non-Jordanians contributed more than 54% of the project work-force and almost all of its skilled workers.[25]

It is clear then that by the mid 1970's labour immigration was already on a significant scale. The 1976-80 Five Year Plan recognized that shortages of skilled manpower were: "... bound to exercise a negative impact on the implementation and management of development projects in general ..." As a short-term solution the NPC called on the newly established Ministry of Labour to: "... undertake the task of organizing the importation of labour for various purposes, in accordance with labour agreements signed with the countries concerned and subject to the needs of Jordanian firms as relayed to the Ministry of Labour by such firms."[26] Given the lack of a mechanism for that liaison, the uncontrolled and rapid expansion of non-Jordanian immigration and employment is perhaps not surprising; over the next three years (1976-79) work permit issues increased by over 450% to reach 18,785 in 1978 and 26,415 in 1979 (see table 8.1).[27]

8.4.3 In addition to the predominantly clandestine nature of labour inflows, available data is also distorted by the

discriminatory procedures adopted in the allocation of employment opportunities. This discrimination was instituted by the 1960 Labour Law which provides for priority to be given to Arab over 'Ajnabi' (non-Arab) labour.[28] This distinction has encouraged a high rate of clandestine employment and illegal recruitment among Asian workers particularly in the service sector (see section 8.6).

Growing concern over the scale of clandestine labour inflows led the Prime Minister, Mudar Badran, to set up a special committee (the 'Ad hoc committee on non-Jordanian labour') to examine the policy implications of, and measures to regulate, continued labour inflows.[29] Issam Ajlouni (then Minister of Labour) who headed this committee saw its task as ensuring: "... that they [the immigrant workers] are complementing the Jordanian labour market and not taking our labourers jobs." The committee's report makes a number of important recommendations:[30]

(i) it reaffirms the principle that 'priority' should be given to Arab over Ajnabi labour, if no suitable Jordanian can be found;

(ii) the onus of responsibility for compliance with residence and other regulations must lie with the employer of the immigrant labour;

(iii) Ajnabi labour cannot be hired within Jordan (that is, they must have prior approval);

(iv) immigrant workers cannot change jobs without the prior approval of <u>both</u> the Ministry of Labour and the Department of Public Security.

These recommendations formed the basis for the ratification of a bilateral labour agreement signed with

Pakistan in May 1978 which sought to institutionalize the inflow of Pakistani labour. This agreement represents an important stage in the development of Jordan's labour immigration policy since it established the principle of 'Advanced Approval'. The latter provision requires prospective employers of Pakistani (or any Ajnabi) labour to obtain the necessary certification from both the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Interior prior to the arrival in Jordan of their employees.[31] In June 1980 the advanced approval regulation together with the other recommendations of the 1977 committee were extended to all Ajnabi workers.[32]

In 1982 the Ministry of Labour signed similar labour agreements with Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan and Turkey (the latter two are however unratified), in addition to general understandings reached with the Philippines (November 1981) and Bangladesh (October 1982).[33] These agreements provide for the exchange of information, the stipulation of standard contract conditions and recruitment procedures. While such agreements are an important step in the rationalization of international labour flows their significance is limited since less than 6% of non-Jordanians came from these countries (1982). A similar agreement with Egypt (the main labour-supplier) is of course precluded by the Arab League's post-Camp David boycott.

8.4.4 In contrast to the restrictions on Asian labour inflows, Arab manpower is permitted to enter Jordan, and may reside for up to twelve weeks, while 'seeking work'. Only having obtained such work does the Arab immigrant require a residence permit from the Ministry of Interior. Thus obtaining a work permit is an essential pre-requisite

to the granting of a residence permit by the Ministry of Interior. In June 1980 a fine of JD.20 per month was instituted for violation of the residence (and by inference work permit) regulations; in addition employers hiring such 'un-certified' manpower were liable to a fine of JD.50 per month for each employee.[34] It was this Ministry of Interior move which led to the surge in work permit issues during the second half of 1980.

Work permit issues in 1980 registered a 201% increase over the number in 1979, with the second half figures representing a 270% increase on the same period in 1979 (see figure 8.1). A two month (June 21 to August 21) amnesty period was decreed during which foreign workers were encouraged to either regularise their status or to leave the country.[35] As a result work permit issues increased by more than 30,000. The majority of clandestine workers were Arab nationals, the number receiving work permits in the second half of 1980 represents a 304% increase over the 1979 figure, compared to the Asian increase of 203% (see table 8.2).

This high level of clandestine employment suggests that the number of work permit issues in 1979 (26,415) is a marked understatement of the level of labour inflow. In December 1978 the Ministry of Labour had warned that work permits would not be issued to immigrants who were known to have abused the 'three month rule', that is who had been employed within the three month period without a work permit, or who had been employed for more than three months prior to their work permit application.[36]

Despite this warning the number of work permits

FIG. 8.1 JORDAN: WORK PERMIT ISSUES, 1977-82.



Source : tables 8.2 and 8.11. Note 1982 data is estimated.

issued in 1979 (26,415) is markedly smaller than the number of immigrant workers suggested by preliminary results of the 1979 census (43,500). In 1980 the Census department produced a series of statistical tables based on a 2.1% sample of enumeration cells which indicated that 10.3% of the total employed population were non-Jordanian. On a national scale this implies a total active non-Jordanian employed population of 43,500, some 65% greater than the number of work permit holders.[37] The 2.1% sample is itself a conservative estimate. Since the distribution of immigrant workers is spatially discrete (that is there are distinct pockets of non-Jordanian employment) the 2.1% sample could not provide an accurate representation of their numbers. Additional evidence to support this view comes from the sectoral distribution of employment according to the sample results. The latter suggest that only 3,100 non-Jordanians were employed in the agricultural sector, only 7.1% of total non-Jordanian employment. This low proportion is at variance with Birks and Sinclair's contention (1980) that Jordanian agriculture was reliant on 'replacement' labour and that without a <u>substantial</u> input of foreign labour "... the rural sector in Jordan would have crumbled virtually completely."[38] Additionally the Ministry of Labour has itself estimated that by 1978 there were up to 20-25,000 non-Jordanians engaged in the agricultural sector (almost 34% of the estimated 60,000 non-Jordanian workers).[39] Later (chapter 9.5), we show that there were at least 9,600 non-Jordanians working in the Jordan Valley alone.

It is concluded therefore that by late 1979 there were

considerably more than 43,500 non-Jordanians in employment. Work permit records for the second half of 1980 together with those for 1981 are believed to be more representative of prevailing labour flows, with one notable exception. Since 1975 Syrian nationals have been exempted from the 'Aliens law' and are not therefore subject to residence permit regulations. Although Syrian immigrant workers are supposed to obtain work permits if resident in Jordan for more than twelve weeks the number who do so is very limited. In 1979 for example the Ministry of Labour estimated that there were about 30,000 Syrians in active employment, but only 190 had received work permits. According to Sales (1978) Syrian labour migration to Jordan is on two bases; first the maintenance of a traditional pattern of short distance seasonal labour migration (primarily harvesting labour) and secondly the onset of 'replacement' migration which may also be on a short term basis.[40] The deterioration in relations between Jordan and Syria since 1980 has resulted in a tightening up on the Syrian presence in Jordan (Syrian work permit receipts increased from 190 in 1979 to 3,639 in 1980 and 3,092 in 1981) and may have reduced its rate of growth.[41] Indeed the increased monitoring of the immigrant presence in Jordan from early 1981 (including the request that landlords inform the police of tenants' names and nationalities) was directly related to the arrest of a Syrian group charged with planning sabotage operations in Jordan.[42]

8.4.5 Labour inflows to Jordan have, until recently, been predominantly from other Arab states. In 1973, 75%

of those receiving work permits were Arabs, primarily Egyptian and Syrian. Similarly the 1975 labour force census recorded that 83% of immigrant workers were Arabs; significantly however a further 5.5% were Pakistani (the only identified non-Arab nationality). The Arab share of work permit issues (and particularly the importance of Egyptians within that total) has remained consistently high at 70-80% during the late 1970's. Between 1979 and 1980 the share of Arabs increased from 69.3% to 77.9%, an indication that a greater proportion of Arabs had been engaged clandestinely.

Recent evidence suggests a more rapid growth in Asian immigration. During the second half of 1980 the number of work permits issued to Asians increased by 96.5% compared to a 60.3% increase among Arabs. Further, in 1981 the number of Arabs receiving work permits fell by 35.0% during the second half, compared to a continued growth (44.5%) among Asian immigrant workers.

8.4.6 The spatial distribution of immigrant workers, as evidenced by the proportional share of each Employment Office issuing work permits, is dominated not surprisingly by the Amman-Zarka conurbation which accounted for 75.6% of total work permit issues in 1981 as it had done in 1980 (table 8.3). The second major pole of attraction has been the Ma'an/Aqaba region which issued 14.5% of work permits in 1981 and 13.0% in 1980. This pattern of work permit distribution has remained almost unchanged since 1978 (the first year in which the spatial distribution of work permits is available) despite the opening of four new employment offices. The first new office, opened in Karak (1980) has

increased its share of total work permit issues from 2.2% to 3.7% in 1981 (an absolute increase of 92.5%) the majority of workers being employed on construction projects connected with the Dead Sea Potash works.

A further two offices were opened in mid-1980 in the East Jordan Valley (at Dier Alla and North Shuna) with the aim of increasing the registration of foreign agricultural labour. The results however have been poor, only 1,313 (1.4%) work permits being issued at the two offices. In late 1981 a fourth Employment Office was opened at Es-Salt, to serve the Balqa region.

A detailed consideration of the distribution of immigrant workers cannot be made until more material is available, particularly regarding the agricultural sector. The following section considers recent (1980-82) developments in immigrant labour inflows, utilising the results of the author's survey of work permits issued in Amman to provide further details of their demographic and economic characteristics.

8.5 Recent trends in labour immigration, 1980-82

8.5.1 Despite the stricter application of residence regulations from mid-1980 the inflow of immigrant workers continued to increase throughout 1981. By the year-end some 93,402 work permits (new and renewed) had been issued, an increase of 17.4% on the 1980 total. The bulk (72.6%) of this immigrant workforce were, as in previous years, Egyptian (67,796), their number having increased by 22.1% over the 1980 figure. The Asian sub-population (15,559) accounted for only 16.6% of the total number of immigrant

workers, despite their more rapid rate of increase, of whom Indians (5,217) were 33.5% and South Koreans (2,114) 13.6%. Significantly, in view of developments among other labour-importing states (see chapter 5.2), the number of immigrant workers from South-East Asia was growing rapidly. The category of 'Other' Asian had increased by 31.3% in 1980-81 compared to the overall Asian increase of 11.5%. This group was dominated by Filipino (1,475), Sri Lankan (1,110) and Chinese (1,091) manpower (table 8.4). There were also a large number (1,351) of Turkish workers.[43]

8.5.2 Since 1981 there has been a significant deterioriation in the quality of Ministry of Labour records relating to the inflows of non-Jordanians. Available data for 1982 (which covers the Amman Employment Office only) indicate a 43.6% reduction in work-permit issues, a decline which is contrary to all informal evidence. The fall in work permit issues is undoubtedly more apparent than any real decline in immigrant employment.

In December 1981 the Minister of Interior (Suleiman Arar), overruling Ministry of Labour opposition, lifted residence permit requirements from Egyptian immigrants.[44] The latter are now simply required to obtain an appropriate entry visa prior to leaving Egypt or at the point of arrival in Jordan. In theory this decision does not affect the Ministry of Labour's requirement regarding work permit regulations. In practice, as we have seen in the preceding Syrian case, it removes the incentive to work permit acquisition (particularly since such violation incurs a minimal fine of only JD. 2.00) and encourages clandestine employment.

Comparison of monthly work permit receipts by Egyptians in Amman during the first six months of 1981 and 1982 indicates a decline of 70.4% in recorded employment (table 8.5). The dominance of Egyptian workers in the market for non-Jordanian labour has already been emphasised; in 1981 they had represented almost 73% of immigrant workers, by 1982 this had seemingly fallen to only 40%. A shortfall in the supply of Egyptian manpower of this magnitude (over 30,000) could not have occurred without generating widespread labour shortages and official comment.

In contrast to official statistics, Ministry of Labour officials contend that the rate of Egyptian immigration and employment was maintained at its 1981 level and suggest that there were circa 80,000 Egyptians working in Jordan.[45] That is, the change in regulations had the effect of reverting the propensity for clandestine employment to its pre-June 1980 level when only 34% of immigrants held work permits.

Assuming that the Ministry of Labour estimate of 80,000 is relatively accurate and that the spatial distribution of Egyptian workers held constant from 1978-81, as seems likely, then the recorded level of Egyptian employment in Amman (14,284) can be revised upward to circa 53,120.

Adding the latter to the recorded level of non-Jordanian work permit receipts for other nationalities leads to a total non-Jordanian workforce in Amman of around 74,434 of whom 71.4% were Egyptian (table 8.6). This implies a slight increase in the rate of labour inflow to Amman, the 1981-82 increase of 18% being marginally higher than that

of 1980-81 (15%). More importantly it is clear that this increase has been primarily among the Asian sub-population which increased by 32.3% over the 1981 level (compared to a 14.2% increase among Arabs). Overall the Asian share of the Amman labour market is shown to have increased from 16.6% to 18.8%. In particular there has been a marked increase in the share of South-East Asian manpower. Data for Amman indicate that the four nationalities, Thai, Chinese, Filipino and Sri Lankan, accounted for almost half (49.8%) of the work permits issued to Asians (compared to 29% in 1981 for all Jordan), and their numbers increased by more than 70% between 1981 and 1982 (table 8.7).

8.5.3 Hitherto we have discussed the characteristics of, and trends in, labour inflows as indicated by aggregate work permit statistics. However, as in other labour-importing states, Jordanian work permits are renewable annually. It is important therefore to distinguish between new and renewed work permits since, as in the Kuwaiti case (see chapter 5.2) aggregate work permit issues can present a misleading picture of annual labour inflows. Such an analysis is hindered by the failure of Ministry of Labour records to distinguish between new and renewed work permits. This distinction is only available for work permits issued since December 1981 by the Amman Employment Office. The latter provides some, albeit limited, data regarding the number and composition of work permit renewals.

In 1982 renewals accounted for 33.5% (11,210) of all work permits issued to Arabs and Asians in Amman. Disaggregation of this by nationality indicates that a

high proportion, 41.6%, of Asian (6,540) work permit receipts were renewals compared to only 26.4% of Arabs (4,670), see table 8.8. It is clear however that the apparently low rate of turnover among the latter may reflect the change in residence permit regulations. This is confirmed by comparison of work permit renewals to Egyptians in December 1981 of 585, with subsequent months in 1982 which averaged only 290, indeed the December 1982 figure shows a fall of 66% on 1981.[46] It is suggested therefore that the low level of work permit renewals among Egyptians (and hence Arabs, since Egyptians account for 74.7% of renewed work permits received by Arabs) is a result of increased 'clandestine' employment after December 1981. A similarly low share (28.6%) of renewals in total work permit issues to Syrians is also noted. In contrast Lebanese and other Arab immigrants, who are not exempted from residence regulations, show a higher share of renewed work permits.

Low levels of renewals (8-10%) prevail among the Maghrebin immigrant workers. This is the result of their recent, and limited, penetration of the Jordanian labour market. It was only in March 1982 that the Ministry of Labour signed a bilateral labour agreement with the Tunisian Department of Employment which facilitated their employment in Jordan. As a result of which some 115 Tunisian bus drivers were recruited for work in Amman.[47] Similarly the majority of Moroccan workers were introduced in 1982 by French sub-contractors working on the new Queen Alia airport.

Asian nationalities account for 58.3% of all renewed

work permits and the share of renewals among total issues to Asians is generally high, varying from 32% for Sri Lankan to 66% for Chinese workers. Variations within the Asian sub-population stems from their differing roles in the Jordanian labour market.

A high proportion of Asian manpower is engaged by contracting companies from their country of origin to work on projects in Jordan. This applies particularly to South Korean and more recently to Chinese construction companies. In these cases the rate of renewal is determined primarily by company or national policy. Thus all South Korean workers abroad are engaged on a standard labour contract (first introduced in 1977) which specifies that contracts are for one year only, therefore all workers must return home even if they intend to renew their contract.[48] In recent years South Korean contractors have compensated for increasing labour costs among their South Korean labour force by substituting more foreign or 'third country nationals' (TCN's), particularly Filipino, Thai and Indonesian workers, the latter receive the same one year contract. In contrast Chinese immigrant workers, the majority of whom are engaged by CATIC on the Abu Nuseir housing project, receive an initial two year contract.[49] As a result a relatively high proportion of Chinese work permit receipts are renewals (65.9%) compared to South Koreans (40.3%) and Filipinos (38.2%). Similarly British and West German construction companies employ third country nationals en bloc, primarily from the Indian sub-continent. Much lower renewal rates are found among those on

individual contracts, primarily in the services sector, for example only one-third of work permits issued to Sri Lankan and to Bangladeshi workers are renewals.

The prevalence of collective contract labour recruitment among Asian nationalities explains the temporal pattern of their work permit renewals. For example work permit renewals to Chinese immigrants peaked in the three months September to November 1982, accounting for more than 90% of all Chinese work permit renewals (and almost one-third of all renewals in this period). This is clearly related to the commencement of work on the Abu Nuseir housing project in October 1981.

By comparing work permit issues in the six month period January-June 1981 with subsequent renewals in December 1981-May 1982 (and similarly for July-December 1981 and January-November 1982) it is possible to construct a crude labour force turnover index (table 8.9). Overall only 18.4% (11,288) of work permits issued in 1981 were subsequently renewed. This confirms informal evidence of high labour force turnover among immigrant workers.[50] Clearly the majority remain in Jordan for less than one year. Such high rates of turnover are an important factor in maintaining a high crude participation rate and in minimizing the rate of demographic settling among immigrant workers. It also reveals the considerable difference between the Arab and Asian sub-populations. Among the latter over 60% of work permits issued in the second half of 1981 were renewed in 1982, compared to only 10.8% of those issued to Arabs. This high rate of labour force turnover among Arabs compared to Asians contrasts with the

situation in the oil-rich labour-importing states (see chapter 5.4) where Asians were shown to have the higher turnover rate. There are a number of reasons for this:

(i) the distorting effect of clandestine Egyptian and Syrian employment;

(ii) the contract nature of the bulk of Asian immigrants;

(iii) the use of Jordan as an inter mediate destination, prior to further migration to the primary labour markets, by Arab immigrants.[51]

8.5.4 Before proceeding to examine the characteristics of non-Jordanian labour immigration we will use data on work permits issued by the Amman Employment Office to provide an estimate of the total number of work permits issued in 1982. The distribution of work permits by nationality in Amman for 1981 and their ratio to the total number of work permits issued is shown on table 8.10. In the majority of cases Amman accounts for more than 65%, and in some over 95%, of total work permit issues to particular nationalities. As we have already seen the predominance of the Amman region has been a continuing feature of labour inflows, this is unlikely to have varied in 1982. Applying 1982 ratios to the known (and for Egyptians, estimated) level of work permit issues in Amman, provides a crude estimate of the total immigrant labour force in 1982 of 109,670.[52] The latter represents an increase of 17.4% on the 1981 figure, thus maintaining the rate of increase noted for 1980-81. This increase has been markedly greater among Asian immigrants. The benefits of Asian manpower to contractors working in Jordan are undoubtedly similar to those which have encouraged their

extensive penetration of the labour markets of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. This proliferation of Asian manpower in Jordan has occurred despite the government's restrictive policy against Ajnabi labour.[53]

8.5.5 The evidence presented here, of continued growth in the level of non-Jordanian employment directly contradicts the prediction of the World Bank Study (Serageldin, I. et al., 1983) that: "... between 1980 and 1985 it is ... likely that the number of non-nationals working in Jordan will fall. In the projections they are shown to fall to 21,000 from 28,000. This fall is projected because, as potential unemployment in Jordan is registered, so expatriates are returned to their countries of origin" (emphasis added).[54] In contrast the 1981-85 Five Year Plan predicted a continued increase in the number of immigrant workers, by more than 57,000 (to 150,000), over the same period.[55] The following section will discuss the labour market characteristics of immigrant workers in Jordan in more detail, suggesting why these projections are at variance.

8.6 The characteristics of immigrant employment in Jordan

8.6.1 Available data concerning the characteristics of non-Jordanian employment suffer from considerable limitations. Firstly, such data is based on Ministry of Labour work permit issues which, as we have seen, are incomplete both in composition by nationality and in sectoral coverage. Secondly employment statistics are handicapped by false reporting and by the use of a coarse occupational classification. The latter groups occupations of widely differing

skill content under broad occupational headings which, in a number of cases, make them effectively meaningless. In 1973 for example, the seventeen recorded occupations included: 'office boys and managers'; 'mechanics and drivers'; 'shop assistants and accountants'. Similar problems arise in 1978 and 1979 the only other years for which work permit data is disaggregated by occupation. Although the 1978 data is grouped under twenty-five relatively discrete occupational types, 47% of immigrants were recorded as unskilled workers in 'unspecified' occupations. In 1979 forty-four occupations were specified, again however more than 45% of those receiving permits were recorded as 'ordinary workers' or were unclassified.[56]

In sum the presentation of available data makes it difficult to identify, with any accuracy, the occupational structure of the non-Jordanian labour force (appendix VI). Additionally such data considers immigrants as a homogeneous group, failing to distinguish between nationalities. This severely circumscribes interpretation of the aggregate sectoral data which is available for the 1978-81 period (table 8.11). In general terms however the latter indicates a predominantly unskilled labour flow directed to construction, services and agriculture. Indeed the extent of this bias is understated because of the limited registration of agricultural workers. Comparison of the 1979 and 1980 distributions reveals particularly large increases (of more than 200%) in these categories, an indication that they were (and are) the main sectors of clandestine employment prior to the 1980 amnesty. In contrast the inflow of professional, technical and clerical

manpower remained at low levels, accounting in 1980 for only 7% of immigrant workers, with their apparent share of total immigrant employment having fallen over 1979-80. Earlier we established that Jordan's critical skill shortages lay precisely in these areas of skilled and technical manpower and it was clear from the Kuwait employment data that such occupations constituted a very high proportion of Jordanian emigrant workers. There appears therefore to be a distinct mismatch between sectors of employment of so-called 'replacement' migrants and the outflow of Jordanian manpower. Table 8.12 compares sectoral employment data for non-Jordanian immigrants in 1980 with 'Jordanian' work permit receipts in Kuwait, clearly illustrating this discontinuity.

8.6.2 In order to develop this argument further more detailed employment data is required. The Amman Employment Office files for 1982 provide details of 243 occupations recorded on work permits in Amman. Despite the large number of occupations detailed the degree of occupational specification varies greatly. For example, four categories of glass production workers are specified while there is no within group disaggregation of 'teachers', 'managers' or 'administrative workers'. In addition several occupations have been ambiguously placed within employment sectors. Thus the glass production workers have been classified as service sector workers, while translators, journalists and editors are grouped under production and process manpower. Similarly clerical workers are included in three (administrative, clerical and production) different categories.[57]

The major occupations (52) recorded by the Employment Office in 1982 have been extracted (appendix VI) and this data has been used to re-classify immigrant workers on the basis of usual skill/education requirements. This re-classification is compared with a parallel occupational classification of Jordanians in Kuwait (table 8.13). The latter confirms the discontinuity in employment structure suggested above. It is clear from this that the majority (77.3%) of immigrant workers were engaged in unskilled (D) occupations while less than 6% were in professional, sub-professional and technical occupations (A-1, A-2 and B). The latter compares with 21.9% of 'Jordanian' emigrants. A relatively large number of immigrants (12.1%) were engaged in skilled and semi-skilled manual occupations, again however the proportion of Jordanian emigrants at this skill level was higher (18.3%).

Comparing the 1982 occupational structure of immigrant workers with that recorded by the 1975 labour force census results (which enumerated 2,228 non-Jordanians) suggests that the proportion of skilled and technical workers among the immigrant labour force has declined since the mid-1970's. The 1975 data shows that more than 37% of recorded immigrant workers were in skilled or semi-skilled manual occupations and almost 14% were sub-professional and technical. In contrast less than 25% of immigrants were enumerated as unskilled (D) workers.[58]

8.6.3 Disaggregation of occupational data by nationality reveals significant differences in the characteristics and

role of Arab and Asian sub-populations. The author's 1982 work permit survey of Amman identified some 21 nationalities (Arab and Asian only) and 76 occupations (for a cross classification see appendix VII). A summary of this data is provided by tables 8.14 and 8.15. The former, comparing Asian and Arab sub-populations indicates that Asian immigrants account for the majority (69%) of skilled manual and technical labour. Further, more than 33% of Asian immigrants have been classified in such occupations (compared to only 18% of Arabs). At the same time Asians also account for a disproportionate share (73%) of service sector employment. The latter represents some 25% of Asian employment in Amman.

The occupational structure of Arab immigrants is markedly less bipolar, with almost 57% recorded in unskilled labouring occupations, including 35% in construction alone. As expected Arabs are most firmly represented in clerical employment (accounting for 75% of all clerical workers) and professional/managerial occupations (55%), although these sectors account for only a small proportion (6.9%) of total immigrant employment.

A cross-tabulation of employment sector by major nationalities (12) is provided by table 8.15. This shows an important distinction within the Asian sub-population between service sector and skilled manual occupations. Thus 84% of Asians in the service sector were Sri Lankan or Filipino, indeed 79% of Sri Lankans were service sector workers. In contrast over 50% of Indian, Thai and South Koreans were skilled and semi-skilled manual workers.

This distinction relates to the recruitment of the latter as contract labour.

Overall, the higher skill content of Asian immigrants is not unexpected, since the costs of recruiting and employing such labour are high.[59] In 1980 the average cost of importing construction workers from India was JD.372 per employee. Table 8.16 provides comparative wage data for selected occupations and nationalities in the October 1982-January 1983 period. In the majority of cases skilled Asians received higher wage rates than their Arab counterparts. Employers attributed this wage differential to the higher productivity and experience of Asian labour supplied by official recruiting agencies. A similar differential applies to unskilled construction sector workers where the Asians are contract labourers living on site. In the case of unskilled service sector employees such a differential is not apparent.

8.7 Secondary labour immigration

8.7.1 Although large numbers of non-Jordanian immigrants, particularly Asians, are fulfilling a replacement role in filling critical labour shortages for technical and skilled manpower this examination of employment data has clearly shown that the majority of immigrant workers are employed in unskilled occupations, primarily in construction, services and agriculture (see chapter 9 below). It has been shown that this pattern of labour inflow does not correspond to the occupational structure of primary Jordanian emigration. Thus, if the majority of non-Jordanians are not directly substituting for Jordanian

emigrants, it is necessary to seek an alternative explanation for their immigration and employment.

Birks and Sinclair (1980a) postulated that large numbers of 'replacement' migrants would be directed to unskilled employment in the urban construction sector and in agricultural employment since strong rural-urban migration and assumed rapid vertical occupational mobility among the domestic labour force would create labour shortages in these areas.[60] However the recent evidence of growing unemployment (which in the 1979 census was over 9.1%) among unskilled Jordanians must lead us to question the validity of this rapid occupational mobility assumption. In a recent study of five low income areas of the Amman-Zarka conurbation the consultants concluded that: "... although rates of unemployment are low nationally they can be high in low income areas. The five-slum study ... found that 21% of heads of households in one neighbourhood had no work ..." In another area only 46% of the economically active males were in permanent employment.[61] It is clear that large numbers of immigrant workers are employed in sectors for which suitable Jordanian labour is available.

8.7.2 The major factor responsible for the surge in immigrant employment has been their lower reserve price. As we saw earlier, available data suggests that wage rates in the construction sector increased by more than 30% per annum over the 1976-80 period. However non-Jordanian labour has been recruited at wage rates well below the Jordanian market price. Anani and Jaber (1980) suggested that: "... foreign workers accept nominal wage levels that range from 30 to 60% of those commanded by Jordanians ..."[62]

Unfortunately Jordan has no systematic wage statistics with which to examine this point in detail. Nevertheless recent records of the Social Security Corporation (SSC) provide a crude aggregate wage differential for the 36,882 insured workers (which included 5,778 non-Jordanians) employed in establishments of 20 or more employees in December 1980.[63] The latter confirms Anani and Jaber's postulated wage differential. Average monthly wages for Jordanian males were 40% (JD.37.00) higher than their non-Jordanian counterparts (for whom the average was JD.90.00 per month). However this data is not available by occupation. Table 8.17 presents comparative wage rates for selected occupations in the construction sector derived from interviews with employers. Wage differentials here are rather less extreme, ranging up to 21% for unskilled labourers but showing little or no difference for the high skill occupations. Employers confirm that higher wages received by Jordanians are not a reflection of greater productivity, indeed the reverse was often the case.

This evidence suggests firstly that non-Jordanian manpower in areas of critical skill shortage can secure wages similar to their Jordanian counter-parts. It is these workers who should be designated 'replacement' migrants, in that they fill such vacancies at prevailing wage rates and may indeed reduce the rate of wage inflation. It is apparent that such employment at least reduces the negative aspects of primary labour migration.[64] Secondly there is a large inflow of unskilled workers representing an <u>alternative</u> labour supply; it is this movement which should be of concern to the government. Their employment leads not to a

stabilisation of wage rates but to the institution of discriminatory wage rates. As a result of this inflow the total labour supply is increased and employers may choose between alternative labour supplies. It is suggested here that it is the availability of this unskilled labour force together with the shrinking employment opportunities abroad which has increased the rate of unemployment among unskilled Jordanians. We will distinguish this labour flow as secondary labour immigration.[65]

8.7.3 The majority of immigrant workers in Jordan, particularly Arabs, fall into the latter category. Typically their employment, if not residence in Jordan is effectively clandestine. Such employment, once established, appears to have little relationship whatsoever to primary labour emigration. The employment of 'secondary labour' is characterised by high rates of job turnover. Hiring, usually by verbal contract, may be on a daily or even hourly basis. Short term jobs are interspersed with periods of temporary unemployment during which immigrant workers congregate at well-known labour hiring 'pools'.[66] High rates of job turnover encourage clandestine employment since work permits are issued for specific jobs. In order to change employer non-Jordanians have, in theory, to obtain a certificate of release from the initial employer and to obtain a new work permit from the Ministry of Labour. Agricultural workers and domestic servants are supposedly not permitted to change their sector of employment once admitted to the country. Additionally, the majority of secondary labour immigrants are un-insured and do not pay contributions to the social security fund. Indeed the provisions of the

1978 Social Security Law explicitly excludes those whose: "... relationship with their employer is irregular ..." in addition to those working as domestic servants or in agricultural employment.[67] It is at this level that employers make the largest savings in labour costs. The wage differential appears to be greatest for those with least skill and at the same time the employer does not pay accommodation, travel and recruiting costs where the majority of workers are Egyptians migrating without pre-arranged contracts and living either on site or in shared accommodation. Since such employment is irregular the employer also avoids making contributions (equivalent to 10% of monthly wages) to the Social Security Corporation.

In addition to forming a cheap, mobile and casual labour force secondary labour immigrants perform low status service sector tasks regarded as socially demeaning by nationals. It is clear from available data that the majority of immigrant women are employed in such tasks. In recent years there has been a growing number of immigrant women workers, a movement which perhaps typifies secondary labour migration. The following section will briefly outline the characteristics of this neglected aspect of international labour migration.

8.8 The characteristics and role of immigrant women workers in Jordan

8.8.1 In 1978 only 562 non-Jordanian women are recorded as having received work permits. Although this increased sharply to 932 in 1979 it is in all probability a considerable under-estimate as evidenced by the 220% increase (to 2,993) following the 1980 tightening up of immigration regulations.

Nevertheless even in 1980 women accounted for less than 4% of recorded non-Jordanians.

By 1982 the number of immigrant women workers had increased enormously, rising to 4,468 in Amman alone, with women accounting for 12.6% of all work permit issues (table 8.18). The latter however must be adjusted for unregistered Egyptian female immigrant workers. Assuming that 2.8% were female (as in the recorded Egyptian population), suggests a total employed female population in Amman of 5,566 (7.5% of total immigrant workers).[68] In 1981 91% of recorded women immigrant workers were registered in Amman, applying that ratio to the 1982 figure provides a total female worker inflow of 6,117. The latter represents an increase of 104% over the 1980 figure (compared to a total non-Jordanian increase of 37.8% during the same period).

8.8.2 Data concerning female immigrant workers is extremely limited in both volume and quality, indeed prior to 1978 there is no statistical evidence for such an inflow. Nevertheless it is clear that women were imported for specific occupations, notably nursing, from the early 1970's. Indeed by 1975 non-Jordanians accounted for 13.3% of registered professional nurses. Their numbers increased dramatically in the mid and late 1970's, reaching 23.6% of the total in 1977 and 29.5% in 1981.[69] The majority of foreign nurses came from India and, more recently, the Philippines. Arrangements were first made in 1976 for the recruitment of Indian nurses through the Indian embassy in Amman which negotiated contract terms. Westinghouse (1977) estimate that at this time 26-33% of trained Jordanian nurses were lost to the domestic health manpower supply,

primarily through emigration to the oil-rich states.[70] It is clear then that these immigrant women were playing a 'replacement' role. More recently the significance of nursing in the occupational structure of immigrant women has declined, falling from over 7% in 1979 to only 2.6% in 1982.[71]

In addition to changes in the employment structure of immigrant women, to which we return in more detail below, there has been a dramatic change in their nationality composition (table 8.19). In 1978 Arab women (notably Egyptians) accounted for 71.7% of all female immigrants. By 1982 however their share had slumped to only 12.8% while Asians increased from 8.7% to 76.8% (3,430). Even allowing for the under-enumeration of Egyptians, this is a marked increase. The 1982 data reveal that employed females are overwhelmingly from South-East Asia, indeed almost 52% (2,318) were Sri Lankan (indeed Sri Lankan females greatly outnumber males at 527) and a further 19.5% (871) were Filipino.

8.8.3 A broad classification of occupations is available for 1978 and 1979 which shows the limited range of female employment and their concentration in unskilled service sector occupations, with a smaller but significant proportion in clerical work (table 8.20). The service sector accounted for 47.7% and 53.6% in 1978 and 1979 respectively. By 1982 however more than 85% of immigrant women were in the service sector and over 65% were housemaids (in addition to 13% classified as children's nannys).

Data from the 1982 survey shows that housemaids are overwhelmingly from South-East Asia, Sri Lankans (224) and

Filipinos (65) representing almost 96% of the total, indeed 94% of Sri Lankan women were housemaids. With a characteristically young (60% under 29, see table 8.21) and ill-educated profile (86% had received less than preparatory education, including some 73% with no education) Sri Lankan women have been subject to clandestine employment, prostitution and crude exploitation by employers and unofficial recruiters alike. Even among those with work permits rates of pay are very low. The 1982 survey indicated that some 65% of Sri Lankan women received monthly wages of JD.40.00 or less.

The Ministry of Labour estimate that in 1982 more than 4,000 women, most of them South-East Asian, were employed illegally as housemaids.[72] Attempts by the Ministry to control the practice is circumscribed by the exclusion of domestic servants from the general provisions of the labour law. Filipino women are, on the whole, more highly educated, some 32% having received secondary schooling and only 26% having had no education. This movement has also caused problems. Well educated Filipino girls frequently enter Jordan as housemaids but are subsequently (and illegally) employed in clerical (particularly as secretaries and typists) and administrative occupations.[73] The availability of relatively cheap and experienced non-Jordanian women is seen as a disincentive to the promotion of Jordanian female employment in such occupations. With this in mind the Ministry of Interior imposed, in September 1982, a ban on the recruitment of Filipino women as domestic servants.[74]

8.9 Conclusion: a re-appraisal of 'replacement' migration

8.9.1 From the evidence presented here it is clear that non-Jordanian immigrant workers perform a variety of roles within the Jordanian labour market. Three such roles have been identified:

(i) replacement labour; the employment of professional, technical and skilled manpower at non-discriminatory wage rates induced by domestic labour shortages.

(ii) international contract labour; manpower employed by companies from their country of origin or by third country companies on specific projects.

(iii) secondary labour; largely performing semi-skilled and unskilled tasks at discriminatory wage rates or employed in low status occupations that Jordanians are increasingly unwilling to perform.

These three levels of labour immigration are shown, together with primary labour emigration, on figure 8.2, and compared with Birks and Sinclair's (1980) schematic representation of Jordan's participation in international labour flows. This tri-partite division of labour flows into Jordan clearly illustrates Portes' (1981) argument that structurally distinct modes of immigrant incorporation could be identified. Here the simple dualist division adopted by Portes is avoided and it has been shown further that these 'distinct modes' can occur at various levels of the labour market structure (see chapter 1.3.3).

Importing foreign manpower has not been a solution to domestic labour market problems, indeed it may have caused new problems to emerge.[75] It is argued here that replacement

FIG. 8·2 ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF JORDAN'S INTERNATIONAL LABOUR FLOWS.



NOTE: this diagram does not purport to show accurate proportions, it is merely schematic.

migration is only one aspect of a more diffuse labour inflow which has far-reaching implications for the Jordanian economy in general and for the labour market in particular. It is the characteristics of secondary labour immigration which have facilitated the continued expansion in non-Jordanian employment despite the recession in primary (Jordanian) labour emigration and the re-emergence of domestic unemployment.

8.9.2 Birks and Sinclair's 'model' of replacement migration has five central tenets. In the final section of this chapter we briefly review the implications of these findings for that model, findings which suggest that those central elements have been misconceived.

(i) Firstly, 'replacement' labour inflows cannot be characterised as spontaneous movements. In his case study of Sudanese migrants in the Yemen Arab Republic, Abdalla Ali showed the importance of pre-arranged contracts and the role of personal contacts (relatives and friends) already living in the country.[76] Kofman related the influx of Maghrebin labour into Corsica directly to the presence of repatriate French colonists from North Africa.[77] Similarly Caldo cites the relationship between former Italian colonial territories and the presence of Somali, Eritrean and Ethiopian manpower, additionally large numbers of Italian landowners were themselves former colonists in Tunisia.[78] In the Jordanian case immigrant manpower has been directly recruited by contractors and recruiting agents in the country of origin or through embassies in Amman. More recently attempts have been made to formalise labour inflows through bilateral labour agreements. It is clear that

active employer recruitment is an essential catalyst in the evolution of so-called replacement migration as, earlier, it has been shown to determine the timing and pattern of primary labour outflows. Furthermore, it is the prior development of a migration stream through the recruitment of replacement manpower, which prepares the way for secondary labour immigration. It is the latter which has the appearance of spontaneity.

(ii) The term 'replacement' is itself misleading in that it suggests perfect mobility of, or inter-changeability between, immigrant and domestic manpower. In the case outlined above it is clear that any initial and specifically 'replacement' role has been followed by a subsequent general inflow of labour. That is, labour demand has expanded beyond simple replacement and immigrant labour may be found in sectors which have not experienced labour outflows or shortages in supply.

The role of primary labour emigration in stimulating such inflows may become irrelevant over time. Furthermore so-called replacement migrants have been shown to conflict with the domestic labour force (cf. Ali; Caldo) or to move into expanding sectors, notably in irrigated agriculture (cf. Kofman). Labour inflows have not diminished as primary labour outflows have reduced, on the contrary available evidence indicates a continued growth in immigrant inflows. In addition of course international contract migration is an increasingly significant input of manpower at several levels of the Jordanian labour market. In this continuing 'internationalisation' of the labour market, Jordan is not unique.[79] Such international contract migration relates

more to the organizational re-structuring of capitalist production than to specific labour shortages.

(iii) In its initial conception the inflow of 'replacement' labour was seen simply to maintain the total supply of labour and to have a dampening effect on the rate of wage inflation. In contrast the labour movements detailed here comprise an additional supply of labour which may distort not only the wage structure but also the relationship between capital and labour in production. Here then we suggest the need to distinguish the limited and initial inflow of replacement labour from subsequent secondary labour immigration and from international contract migration.

(iv) The mechanism of 'selectivity' in international labour migration, by which certain groups of potential migrants are excluded from the primary labour market (Saudi Arabian and the Gulf States) and proceed as an alternative to secondary labour markets appears to be broadly confirmed. Indeed the imposition, since 1978, of stricter immigration regulations in the primary labour market can be seen as an important formalisation of that selectivity which, by reducing opportunities in the primary labour market, has enhanced entry to less stringent labour markets. To some extent Jordan's secondary labour market with its considerable ease of entry for Arab manpower (and particularly for Egyptians) is the initial step in securing entry to the primary labour market, either clandestinely or through recruitment from within Jordan.

As a result of this selectivity there is a surplus of potentially mobile labour which, when actively recruited, becomes available for employment in the secondary

labour market initially as replacement, and later as casual or marginal labour.

Although broadly appropriate the 'selectivity' thesis does require some qualification. According to Birks and Sinclair: "The marginal productivity of Jordanians is higher than that of the labour which is replacing them. Hence the demand in the Peninsula in the first instance is for Jordanians and not for Egyptians and Pakistanis."[80] This is an oversimplification, assuming homogeneity within particular expatriate-occupational groups and that employers choose between alternative employees on the basis of nationality. Evidence from the Jordanian case indicates that the immigrant labour market is itself highly segmented both between and within different nationalities and occupational groups. Selectivity appears to operate <u>within</u> the labour market through the imposition of a range of wage differentials, rather than by direct exclusion from that labour market of specific nationalities. There is little doubt that a similar process also operates within the primary labour market since the enormous surge in labour demand within those economies and the inelastic supply of highly productive manpower ensures that labour demands could only be satisfied by the utilisation of more marginal (in productive terms) labour.

(v) Finally, the 'replacement' model concludes that such immigration plays a crucial role in <u>maintaining</u> the 'development momentum' and thus reducing the negative impact of primary labour emigration. The following chapter (nine), examining evidence from the East Jordan Valley, demonstrates that the supply of a characteristically cheap,

mobile and casual labour force is an important element in changing the direction and nature of that development.

Notes

1. Paine, S. (1974) Exporting workers, the Turkish case. Abadan-Unat, N. et al. (1976) Migration and development: a study of the effect of international migration on Bogazilyan district.

2. Findlay, A.M. and Findlay, A.M. (1982) The geographical interpretation of international migration: a case study of the Maghreb.

3. ILO (1974) Some growing employment problems in Europe. pp. 82-3.

4. Salt, J. and Clout, H. (1976) Migration in post-war Europe: geographical essays. pp. 162-3.

5. Böhning, W.R. (1975) 'Some thoughts on emigration from the Mediterranean Basin'. ILR, vol. III (3) pp. 251-77.

6. Baucic, I. (1972) The effects of emigration from Yugoslavia and the problems of returning migrant workers; Poinard, M. (1972) 'La stagnation de la population portugaise, 1960-70'. Revue géographiques des Pyrénées et du Sud-Ouest, vol. 46, pp. 111-35; Stahl, H-M (1979) 'Portuguese migration and regional development'; Thompson, I.B. (1978) 'Settlement and conflict in Corsica'. TIBG, vol. 3 (3) pp. 259-73; Papademitriou, D. (1979) 'Greece', pp. 187-200 in: Krane, R.E. (ed.), International labour migration in Europe; Caldo, C. (1975) 'Esodo agricolo e immigrazione nordafricana in sicilia occidentale'. Atti del XXII Congresso Geografico Italiano, vol. II, pp. 637-46; Taamallah, K. (1981) 'L'emigration Tunisienne en Italie'. Revue Tunisienne de Sciences Sociales, vol. 18, no. 66, p. 171-77; Federici, N. (1979) 'Italy', pp. 147-55 in: Krane, R.E. (ed.), op.cit.; Findlay, A.M. et al. (1979) 'Moroccan emigration: a national and regional problem'. The Maghreb Review, vol. 4 (3) pp. 86-9.

7. Böhning, W.R. (1975) op. cit.

8. Caldo, C. (1982) 'The effects of African migrants on labour markets in Italy and Sicily'. Caldo found that 93% of economically active Tunisians in Mazara del Vallo were employed clandestinely.

9. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980a) International migration and development in the Arab region. p. 87.

10. Abdalla Ali, A. (1980) Foreign labour in the Yemen Arab Republic: a case study of the Sudanese migrants.

11. Some 34% of the sample travelled indirectly to YAR having worked first in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Jordan first. Furthermore some 25% still intended to travel on to Saudi Arabia. The main route into Saudi Arabia being a mountainous crossing on foot at Khamis Misheit.

12. To some extent this conflict may have arisen because the survey was conducted in Sana'a while the main labour shortages have been felt in rural Yemen. See Swanson, J.C. (1979) Emigration and economic development: the case of the Yemen Arab Republic.

13. Seccombe, I.J. (1981) Manpower and migration: the effects of international labour migration on agricultural development in the East Jordan Valley, 1973-80.

14. Kofman, E. (1982) 'Internal colonialism, dependency and regional development in Corsica'.

15. Hommes et Migrations, no. 1019, 15 October 1981, pp. 34-6 provides Maghrebin immigrants in France at 31 December 1980 by department. Corsica had 17,000 Moroccans of whom 93% were males.

16. Caldo, C. (1982) op. cit.

17. On former Italian settlement in Tunisia see: Russell, J.A. (1977) 'The Italian community in Tunisia, 1861-1961: a viable minority'. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University).

18. Findlay, A.M. (1979) op. cit.

19. Data on non-Jordanian immigration was not available for 1982 on a national basis at the time of the research. However the author was given access to the monthly records of the Amman Employment Office for 1982. This provided basic data on the nationality composition and employment characteristics of immigrant workers. More detailed data, including occupation, wage rates, educational level, job experience and date of birth, was obtained for the period October 1982-January 1983 by a sample survey of the 10,438 work permits issued to Arab and Asian immigrants by the Amman Employment Office. A sample of 3,751 work permits were examined (35.9% of issues). This was selected by taking every second work permit, rejecting those issued to non-Arab/Asian nationalities. Illegible and incomplete work permits were also rejected. The majority of work permits were at least partially incomplete, the sample rejected those which provided less than 5 of the 8 variables required (out of a maximum 15 on a complete permit). The distribution of work permits by nationality (below) corresponds well with that for the whole of 1982 (see table 8.8). In the text data from this survey is referred to as the Amman 1982 work permit sample survey.

Nationality	Number in sample	% distribution
(1) Arabs		
Egyptian	1441	38.4
Syrian	77	2.1
Lebanese	96	2.6
Iraqi	28	0.8
Sudanese	24	0.6

Palestinian	9	0.2
Ethiopian	1	
Eritrean	3	
Algerian	5	0.5
Tunisian	8	
Moroccan	24	
(2) Asians		
Turkish	53	1.4
Indian	458	12.2
Pakistani	124	3.3
Bangladeshi	48	1.3
Sri Lankan	428	11.4
Thai	212	5.7
South Korean	129	3.4
Filipino	196	5.2
Chinese	386	10.3
Afghan	1	-
Total	3,751	100

20. Kawar, G.N. (1977) 'Labour law of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan'. See also Labour Law no. 21 of 1960, Official Gazette no. 1491 21 May 1961, Section 13.7 (c). (Arabic)

21. Department of Statistics (1976) Results of the labour force census, 1975. pp. 161-72.

22. USAID/University of Jordan (1980) 'Agriculture sector assessment'. pp. 6-7.

23. Salt, A. and Keeley, W. (1976) Manpower development in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with special reference to the East Jordan Valley. pp. 123-7.

24. Anani, J. (1977) 'The labour situation in Jordan'.

25. Salt, A. and Keeley, W. (1976) op. cit. p. 119.

26. National Planning Council (1976) Five year development plan, 1976-1980. p. 346.

27. Ministry of Labour (1980) Annual Report, 1979. p. 22 (Arabic)

28. The Arabic term 'Ajnabi' is used here when reference is made to non-Arab foreign labour, and in particular to Asian immigrants. This usage is common in Jordanian statistics and government reports.

29. A typical inflamatory comment, reflecting fears rather than realities comes from the Amman daily Ad-Dustour, 14 April 1977, stating that Jordan was being over-run by 'Ajnabi' labour and that "... half-a-million workers have entered Jordan during the current year ..." (Arabic).

30. Internal report of the Technical Committee on Manpower Migration, May 1977 (Arabic).

31. Agreement on manpower between the Government of Pakistan and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1978 (Arabic).

32. See MEED, vol. 24 (23), 6 June 1980, p. 34. Despite this the agricultural sector remained exempt, because of its exclusion from the Labour Law. This exemption remains a major loop-hole in existing legislation by which employers or labour recruiters can bring Asian labour into Jordan.

33. On the Tunisian agreement see MEED, vol. 26 (11), 12 March 1982, p. 11; vol. 26 (44), 29 October 1982, p. 33, on the visit of the Bangladeshi Minister of Labour to Amman and vol. 25 (47) 20 November 1981, p. 25 on the pact signed with the Philippines.

34. MEED, vol. 24 (23) 6 June 1980, p. 34.

35. MEED, vol. 24 (32) 8 August 1980, p. 22.

36. MEED, vol. 22 (49) 8 December 1978, p. 35.

37. Unpublished tables of the 2.1% 1979 Census sample supplied by the Department of Statistics to the National Planning Council.

38. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980a) op. cit. p. 91.

39. Graham-Brown, S. (1980) 'Labour: a unique labour market'. MEED, vol. 24, Special Report: Jordan, June 1980.

40. Sales, M.E. (1978) Country case study - Syrian Arab Republic. pp. 58-63.

41. On the crisis in Jordan-Syria relations see Financial Times, 26 January 1982.

42. MEED, vol. 25 (14) 3 April 1981, p. 18.

43. For a discussion of Turkish worker migration to the Arab region in general see: Barchard, D. (1982) 'Demand for Turkish workers grows'. MEED, vol. 26 (5) 29 January 1982, p. 55-7.

44. See MEED, vol. 26 (1) 1 January 1982, p. 8. Residence regulations on Egyptians were lifted from 15 December 1981. Ministry of Labour misgivings over unregulated Egyptian labour immigration were expressed by the under-secretary, Tayseer Abdel Jaber who had earlier called for the imposition of stricter controls on such immigration; "We feel there is a lot of redundant labour from Egypt, especially daily workers. This is not the development we feel is needed." Reported in MEED, vol. 24, Special Report: Jordan, June 1980.

45. Internal memo, Department of Employment, Ministry of Labour (Arabic).

46. Note that December 1981 is the only other month for which renewals data was available.

47. MEED, vol. 26 (11) 12 March 1982, p. 11.

48. Kim, S. (1982) Contract migration in the Republic of Korea. pp. 20-44.

49. The award, in May 1983, of a further major contract to a Chinese Company (CATIC) for infrastructure and public building construction in the Marka urban renewal project, is likely to increase the inflow of Chinese labour to Jordan. See MEED, vol. 27 (20) 20 May 1983, p. 28.

50. Al-Fanik, F. (1978) 'Labour turnover in Jordan'. Al-Amal, vol. 1 (2) pp. 51-4 (Arabic).

51. Restrictions on entry to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf labour markets may be responsible for increased migration into Jordan with its unrestrictive regulations (for Arabs). Once in Jordan immigrants may then be recruited for work in other labour markets. Although such a process is not reflected in official statistics the Ministry of Labour are aware that labour recruiters (particularly Iraqi) have been operating in Jordan for some years, hiring Egyptian labour. This idea of 'step' migration at an international scale may explain the significant mismatch between immigrant workers educational status and their occupation in Jordan observed in a number of cases. The Amman 1982 work permit sample survey recorded large numbers of Egyptians with post-secondary education working as construction labour and in unskilled service sector occupations. Abdalla Ali (1980) op. cit., points to a similar 'intermediate' role for the labour immigration to North Yemen.

52. This simply attempts to correct the number of Egyptians but does not estimate other clandestine workers.

53. Nevertheless some 21,000 applications for Advanced Approval were turned down. Mansour Otoum, Ministry of Labour, personal communication.

54. Serageldin, I. et al. (1983) Manpower and international labour migration in the Middle East and North Africa. p. 199.

55. National Planning Council (1982) Five year development plan, 1981-85. pp. 293-307.

56. Lack of job specification on work permits is in some respects a result of Ministry of Labour demands that jobs be first offered to Jordanians, if none are forthcoming then non-Jordanians may be hired. Employers circumvent this by advertising for 'general labours'. Few unskilled Jordanian workers however are

registered at the Department of Employment. In the case of skilled and semi-skilled occupations employers detail wage rates that are unacceptably low to Jordanians, thus ensuring that non-Jordanians can be hired.

57. Unpublished classification of occupations used by the Department of Employment (Arabic).

58. Department of Statistics (1976) op. cit. The 1975 Labour force census data must however be interpreted with caution because of its under-enumeration of establishments in the construction sector and exclusion of agricultural employment.

59. The additional costs to the employer of importing and employing immigrant workers are shown below on the basis of the author's survey of construction sector employers. This data refers to Indian and Sri Lankan employees for 1982:

Item	Cost (JD) per worker
Recruitment fee	35.00
Visas/processing	22.00
Return air fare	313.00
Food and accommodation (p.a.)	360.00
Sundry expenses	2.00
Total	730.00

Cost advantages to the employer are primarily the lower average wages and longer working hours of immigrant labour. In addition non-Muslim will be paid at normal rates during Ramadan, while Jordanian and other Muslim workers are paid for six hours work when only on site for four hours or less.

60. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980a) op. cit., pp. 91-9.

61. Halcrow-Fox (1978) Health in the Amman-Zarka slum areas. Interim sector report II. p. 34.

62. Anani, J. and Jaber, T.A. (1980) 'Jordan's experience and policies in the field of reverse transfer of technology'. pp. 53-4.

63. Social Security Corporation (1981) 'First annual report'. (Arabic).

64. It has been suggested that replacement migration may have a detrimental effect, by reducing employers incentive to support in-plant training schemes (see Anani, J. and Jaber, T.A. (1980) op. cit.). However there is no empirical evidence to support this contention and the continued expansion of the VTC's training and apprenticeship schemes would suggest that any such effect was limited. Nevertheless it was a factor, together with the growing unemployment among nationals, behind the decision in October 1979 by which 25% of the workforce recruited by foreign contractors were to be

Jordanians (MEED, vol. 25 (19) 8 May 1981 p. 22). However this has simply been passed on to local sub-contractors. The NCC has recently (June 1983) debated legislation by which the number of construction contracts awarded to foreign companies will be reduced and the minimum share of Jordanian labour to be hired by such companies would be raised from 25% to 40%. MEED, vol. 27 (24) 17 June 1983, pp. 27-8.

65. The term 'secondary labour migration' has been adopted to distinguish such movements from the earlier migration to primary labour markets which stimulated the chain of migration. In reality there are not simply two levels of international labour migration. Thus for example the Sudan supplies labour to both primary (Saudi Arabia and Libya) and secondary (Jordan and YAR) labour markets. At the same time the Sudan is a labour importer herself. In 1980 the Khartoum Labour Department issued work permits to some 5,100 immigrant workers (excluding Europeans/Americans and refugees) primarily from Egypt, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India and Pakistan. A high proportion (over 55%) were in administrative and clerical occupations, with a further 27% in skilled manual work. (The author's work on recent trends in, and characteristics of, Sudanese participation in the internation labour market (derived from a field study in Khartoum, November-December 1981) will be the subject of a future working paper.) Similarly Sales, M. (1978) op. cit. p. 67, suggests that Syria has also begun to experience labour shortages due to her role as a supplier of primary and 'replacement' migrant labour, and that: "... it seems inevitable that replacement migrants ... will appear in Damascus before long ..." Hill, E. (1983) 'Multinationals and the movement of labour into and within the Arab world, with special reference to the construction industry and Egypt', provides an anecdotal account (pp. 15-24) of the use of foreign labour in the Egyptian construction sector.

66. The largest of which appears around the Grand Mosque in central Amman. The 1979 Census sample results show that 2.8% of economically active non-Jordanians were unemployed.

67. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, (1978) 'The Social Security Law no. 30 of 1978'. (Arabic) see article 4.

68. This accords well with data for 1978 showing 2.6% of Egyptian immigrant workers to be female. This is the only other year for which disaggregated data is available.

69. Department of Statistics (1982) Statistical Yearbook, 1981. Table 12, p. 20.

70. Westinghouse Health Systems (1977) National Health Planning in Jordan phase two: health policy strategy. See appendix D.

71. Kawar, S. (1981) 'Finger in the dike: coping with the nursing shortage'. Jordan Times, 27 October 1981, p. 2. Kawar describes the problems of immigrant nurses working in Jordan, ranging from language difficulties to high income tax payments which reduce the monetary incentive of such migration. It is reported that few immigrant nurses renew their annual contracts and many re-migrate to the Gulf.

72. Mansour Otoum, Ministry of Labour, personal communication, March 1983.

73. 28% of Filipino immigrant women had secondary or post-secondary education completion.

74. MEED, vol. 26 (36) 3 September 1982, p. 31 and vol. 25 (49) 4 December 1981, p. 32. The Ministry of Labour objects to such restrictions because of the boost it gives to illegal recruiters.

75. In addition to the employment problem, the growing level of out-remittances from Jordan reduces the level of net remittances:

Year	Estimated out-remittances (JD million)
1975	not estimated
1976	4.8
1977	15.0
1978	20.0
1979	24.0
1980	46.0
1981	52.0
1982*	62.0

* Annualised from data for the first nine months

Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, March 1983, vol. 19 (3), table 25.

76. Abdalla Ali, A. (1980) op. cit.

77. Kofman, E. (1982) op. cit.

78. Caldo, C. (1982) op. cit.

79. See for example: Gibson, K.D. (1983) 'Political economy and international labour migration: the case of Polynesians in New Zealand.' New Zealand Geographer, vol. 39 (1) pp. 29-42.

80. Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980a) op. cit. pp. 87.

Table 8.1

Work permit issues to non-Jordanian labour 1973-82

Year	Number of work permits issued*	% change
1973	376	-
1974	519	38.0
1975	803	54.7
1976	4,790	396.5
1977	7,778	62.4
1978	18,785	141.5
1979	26,415	40.6
1980	79,566	201.2
1981	93,402	17.4
1982	(109,671)	(17.4)

Source: Ministry of Labour (1980) Annual Report 1979, p. 10 and Annual Report 1981, table 3 (Arabic).

* : Note that this includes renewed work permits.

** : 1982 data are estimated, see text for details.

Table 8.2

New and renewed work permits issued to non-Jordanians by nationality, 1978-82

Nationality	1978		1979		1980		1981		1982*	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Arabs	13,310	70.8	18,287	69.3	61,967	77.9	74,839	80.2	17,698	49.7
Egyptian	11,796	62.8	16,522	62.6	55,544	69.8	67,796	72.6	14,284	40.2
Syrian	103	0.5	190	0.7	3,639	4.6	3,092	3.3	1,185	3.3
Lebanese	1,179	6.3	1,000	3.8	1,172	1.5	1,077	1.2	966	2.7
Sudanese	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,425	1.5	398	1.1
Iraqi	-	-	-	-	-	-	910	1.0	222	0.6
Other Arab	232	1.2	575	2.2	1,612	2.0	529	0.6	643	1.8
Asian	4,623	24.6	5,836	22.1	13,954	17.5	15,559	16.6	15,725	44.2
Pakistani	1,334	7.1	1,206	4.6	2,385	3.0	1,440	1.5	1,154	3.3
Indian	1,001	5.3	1,248	4.7	3,737	4.7	5,217	5.6	3,816	10.7
S. Korean	1,441	7.7	1,427	5.4	3,681	4.6	2,114	2.3	1,503	4.2
Thai	172	0.9	126	0.5	690	0.9	962	1.0	1,505	4.2
Bangladeshi	-	-	-	-	-	-	220	0.2	283	0.8
Chinese	195	1.0	60	0.2	-	-	1,091	1.6	2,043	5.7
Filipino	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,475	1.6	2,043	5.7
Sri Lankan	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,110	1.2	2,845	8.0
Turks	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,351	1.4	1,056	3.0
Other Asian	480	2.6	1,769	6.7	3,461	4.3	579	0.6	85	0.2
European	523	2.8	2,068	7.8	3,430	4.3	2,637	2.8	) 2,175	6.1
Other	329	1.8	224	0.8	215	0.3	366	0.4	)	
TOTAL	18,785	100	26,415	100	79,566	100	93,402	100	35,598	100

Source: idem. (1981) Annual Report, 1980, table 1 and Annual Report, 1981, table 5 (Arabic).

* : Data for 1982 refer to Amman only and were collated by the author from employment office files.

Table 8.3

Distribution of work permit issues 1979-81 issuing office

Employment Office	1979 number	%	1980 number	%	1981 number	%
Amman	19,109	72.3	55,002	69.1	63,134	67.5
Zarka	1,822	6.9	5,834	7.3	7,548	8.1
Irbid	1,037	3.9	4,495	5.7	4,371	4.7
Deir Alla	-	-	2,154	2.7	472	0.5
North Shuna	-	-			841	0.9
Karak	-	-	1,784	2.2	3,434	3.7
Es-Salt	-	-	-	-	132	0.1
Ma'an/Aqaba	4,447	16,9	10,297	13.0	13,602	14.5
Total	26,415	100	79,566	100	93,534	100

Source: idem. (1982) Annual Report 1981, table 2 and p. 23 (Arabic).

Table 8.4

Distribution (%) of work permits by issuing office and nationality, 1981

	Egyptian	Syrian	Lebanese	Other Arab	All Arab	Pakistani	Indian	South Korean	Thai	Other Asian	All Asian
Amman	66.4	66.2	83.4	52.0	66.1	57.0	68.1	96.7	96.5	78.0	76.9
Zarka	8.7	4.8	4.8	3.3	8.3	15.4	2.2	3.2	2.6	3.6	4.1
Irbid	5.9	3.5	3.3	2.0	5.6	3.8	0.1	-	0.9	1.5	1.0
Deir Alla	0.7	0.1	-	0.3	0.6	0.3	-	-	-	-	0.1
North Shuna	1.0	0.2	-	0.2	0.9	3.3	2.3	-	-	0.1	1.1
Karak	3.8	0.7	-	2.0	3.6	3.2	5.2	0.1	-	5.5	4.1
Ma'an/Aqaba	13.5	24.5	8.5	40.2	14.9	17.0	22.1	-	-	11.3	13.2
Total	67,796	3,092	1,077	2,874	4,839	1,440	5,218	2,114	962	5,826	15,560

Source: ibid. table 7 (Arabic).

Note : data for the Es-Salt office is not available by nationality.

Table 8.5

Work permits issued to Egyptians by the Amman Employment Office during the first half of 1981 and 1982

Month	1981	1982
January	4,640	1,455
February	3,850	1,196
March	5,948	1,461
April	4,961	1,632
May	4,702	1,458
June	3,867	1,076
Total	27,968	8,278

Source: unpublished monthly records Amman Employment Office (Arabic) Author's compilation.

Table 8.6

Work permits issued by the Amman Employment Office in 1981 and 1982, by nationality

Nationality	1981 number	1981 % total	1982 number	1982 % total
Egyptian	45,044	71.4	14,284	40.1
Syrian	2,048	3.2	1,185	3.3
Lebanese	898	1.4	966	2.7
Other Arab	1,490	2.4	1,263	3.6
Pakistani	821	1.3	1,154	3.3
Indian	3,552	5.6	3,816	10.7
South Korean	2,044	3.2	1,503	4.2
Thai	928	1.5	1,505	4.2
Other Asian	4,544	7.2	7,747	21.8
European	1,467	2.3	2,175	5.9
Other nationalities	293	0.5		
Total	63,134	100.0	35,598	100.0

Source: Ministry of Labour (1982) op. cit. table 7 and for 1982 unpublished monthly records, Amman Employment Office (Arabic).

Table 8.7

Non-Jordanian work permit receipts in 1981 and estimated level of worker in-migration for 1982 in Amman governorate, selected nationalities

Nationality	1981	1982	% change
Arab	49,485	(56,534)	(+14.2)
Egyptian	45,044	(53,120)	(+17.9)
Syrian	2,048	1,185	-42.1
Lebanese	898	966	+ 7.6
Other Arab	1,495	1,263	-15.5
Asian	11,889	15,725	+32.3
Pakistani	821	1,154	+40.6
Indian	3,552	3,816	+ 7.4
South Korean	2,044	1,503	-26.5
Thai	928	1,505	+62.2
Other Asian	4,544	7,747	+70.5

Source: as table 8.6.

Note : figures in parenthesis are estimated, see text.

Table 8.8

New and renewed work permits issued by the Amman Employment Office in 1982 by sex and nationality

Nationality	New work permits	Renewed work permits		Total work permits:		
		No.	% total issues	male	female	total
1. Arab						
Egyptian	10,795	3,489	24.4	13,895	389	14,284
Syrian	846	339	28.6	1,179	6	1,185
Lebanese	557	409	42.3	873	93	966
Iraqi	134	88	7.2	199	23	222
Sudanese	194	204	51.3	395	3	398
Palestinian	36	63		90	9	99
Saudi	2	3		2	3	5
Yemeni	4	5		9	-	9
Ethiopian	2	4	51.6	2	4	6
Eritrean	36	19		33	22	55
Djibouti	4	1		5	-	5
Somali	8	3		11	-	11
Mauritanian	8	-		8	-	8
Libyan	7	4		11	-	11
Algerian	36	4	9.5	35	5	40
Tunisian	182	19		195	6	201
Moroccan	177	16		186	7	193
Total	13,670	4,670	26.4	17,128	570	17,698
2. Asian						
Turkish	614	442	41.9	1,045	11	1,056
Indian	2,119	1,697	44.5	3,698	118	3,816
Pakistani	647	507	43.9	1,117	37	1,154
Bangladeshi	188	95	33.6	267	16	283
Sri Lankan	1,930	915	32.2	527	2,318	2,845
Thai	993	512	34.0	1,471	34	1,505
South Korea	897	606	40.3	1,496	7	1,503
Filipino	1,262	781	38.2	1,172	871	2,043
Chinese	490	945	65.9	1,423	12	1,435
Afghan	17	12		29	-	29
Iranian	4	10		10	4	14
Malaysian	1	1	47.1	2	-	2
Indonesian	4	1		5	-	5
Taiwanese	19	16		33	2	35
Total	9,185	6,540	41.6	12,295	3,430	15,725

Source: as table 8.5.

Table 8.9

Crude labour force turnover among immigrant workers, Amman 1981-82

Nationality	Work Permits: Issued Jan.-June 1981	Renewed Dec. 1981-May 1982	% renewed	Issued July-Dec. 1981	Renewed June-Nov. 1982	% renewed
Egyptian	27,968	2,457	8.8	17,076	1,406	8.2
Syrian	1,098	150	13.7	950	194	20.4
Lebanese	451	175	38.8	447	226	50.6
Other Arab	700	185	26.4	795	256	32.2
Total Arab	30,217	2,967	9.8	19,268	2,082	10.8
Pakistani	280	145	52.5	541	325	60.1
Indian	1,583	517	32.7	1,969	1,044	53.0
South Korean	867	422	48.7	1,177	248	21.1
Thai	491	75	15.3	437	410	93.8
Other Asian	1,633	767	47.0	2,911	2,284	78.5
Total Asian	4,854	1,928	39.7	7,035	4,311	61.3

Source: as table 8.5.

Table 8.10

Work permits issued by the Amman Employment Office as a proportion of total work permit issues in 1981 and estimated work permit issues in 1982 by nationality

Nationality	1981		1982	
	number of work permits issued in Amman	% of total work permits issued	number of work permits issued in Amman	estimated total work permit issues
Egyptian	45,044	66.4	(53,120)	(80,000)
Syrian	2,048	66.2	1,185	1,790
Lebanese	898	83.4	966	1,158
Other Arab	1,495	52.0	1,263	2,429
Total Arab	49,485	66.1	(56,534)	(85,377)
Pakistani	821	57.0	1,154	2,025
Indian	3,552	68.1	3,816	5,604
South Korean	2,044	96.7	1,503	1,554
Thai	928	96.5	1,505	1,560
Other Asian	4,544	78.0	7,747	9,932
Total Asian	11,889	76.4	15,725	20,582
Other nationalities	1,760	58.6	2,175	3,712
Total	63,134	67.6	(74,434)	(109,671)

Source: as table 8.6.

Note : figures in parenthesis are estimated, see text.

Table 8.11

Sectoral distribution of non-Jordanian employment, 1978-82

	1978		1979		1980		1981		1982*	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Professional and technical	490	2.6	1,531	5.8	2,742	3.5	5,660	6.1	2,236	6.3
Administrative	405	2.1	945	3.6	1,306	1.6	2,479	2.7	1,368	3.8
Clerical	577	3.1	618	2.3	1,603	2.0	2,395	2.6	645	1.8
Sales	141	0.7	269	1.0	1,383	1.7	1,341	1.4	453	1.3
Services	1,499	8.0	3,414	12.9	9,620	12.1	12,784	13.7	6,475	18.2
Agriculture	1,345	9.2	2,022	7.7	7,142	9.0	4,103	4.3	607	1.7
Production and process labour	11,695	62.3	7,209	27.3	24,214	30.4	39,756	42.6	11,408	32.0
Unclassified labour	2,633	14.0	10,407	39.4	31,566	39.7	24,884	26.6	12,406	34.9
Total	18,785	100	26,415	100	79,566	100	93,402	100	35,598	100

Source: Ministry of Labour (1981) Annual Report 1980 and 1981. Table 2 (Arabic).

* : Note that 1982 data refer to Amman only, author's compilation from employment office records.

Table 8.12

Comparison of employment by sector for Jordanian emigrants and non-Jordanian immigrants, 1980
(% distribution)

Employment Sector	'Jordanians' in Kuwait 1980	Non-nationals in Jordan 1980
Professional and technical	19.6	3.5
Administrative and managerial	0.9	1.6
Clerical	18.7	2.0
Sales	8.3	1.7
Services	2.1	12.1
Agriculture	0.1	9.0
Production and process labour	50.2	70.1

Source: table 8.11 and table 5.16 above.

Table 8.13

Comparison of employment by skill level for 'Jordanians' abroad and non-Jordanian immigrants
(% distribution)

Occupational Category	'Jordanians' in Kuwait, 1980	Non-nationals in Jordan, 1982	Non-nationals in Jordan, 1975
A-1	10.6	1.2	2.6
A-2	7.1	1.7	7.0
B	4.2	2.9	13.6
C-1	25.2	4.8	15.8
C-2	18.3	12.1	37.4
D	34.6	77.3	23.6

Source: 1975: Department of Statistics (1976) Labour Force Census, 1975. Table 20.
1980: drawn from table 5.17 above.
1982: based on appendix VII.

Table 8.14

Summary occupational distribution of non-Jordanian immigrant workers in Amman, October 1982-January 1983

	Total		Arab		Asian	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Professional and Managerial	129	3.4	71	4.1	58	2.9
Engineers and surveyors	32	0.9	15	0.9	17	0.8
Accountants	11	0.3	5	0.3	6	0.3
Teachers	28	0.7	28	1.6	-	-
Managers	13	0.3	6	0.3	7	0.4
Nurses	24	0.6	-	-	24	1.2
Others	21	0.6	17	1.0	4	0.2
Clerical workers	130	3.5	98	5.7	32	1.6
Administrative officials	13	0.4	8	0.5	5	0.3
Clerks	53	1.4	46	2.7	7	0.3
Secretaries/typists	23	0.6	15	0.8	8	0.4
Others	41	1.1	29	1.7	12	0.6
Skilled and semi-skilled manual	992	26.4	315	18.3	677	33.1
Technicians	26	0.7	14	0.8	12	0.6
Electricians	64	1.7	20	1.2	44	2.2
Painters	23	0.6	17	1.0	6	0.3
Bricklayers/stone-masons	39	1.0	20	1.1	19	0.9
Tilesetters	34	0.9	21	1.2	13	0.6
Blacksmiths/steel fixers	76	2.0	6	0.3	70	3.4
Carpenters	341	9.1	75	4.4	266	13.1
Plasterers	17	0.5	5	0.3	12	0.6
Drivers	128	3.4	54	3.1	74	3.6
Fitters/welders	52	1.4	11	0.7	41	2.0
Foremen	23	0.6	6	0.3	17	0.8
Mechanics	106	2.8	38	2.2	68	3.3
Plumbers	21	0.6	5	0.3	16	0.8
Others	42	1.1	23	1.3	19	0.9
Service workers	678	18.1	181	10.6	497	24.4
Housemaids/nannys	402	10.7	13	0.8	389	19.1
Cooks	32	0.8	21	1.2	11	0.5
Waiters	116	3.1	52	3.0	64	3.2
Bakers/confectioners	35	1.0	35	2.1	-	-
Others	93	2.5	60	3.5	33	1.6
Unskilled labourers	1,686	45.0	973	56.7	713	35.1
Construction labour	1,244	33.2	600	35.0	644	31.7
Factory labour	231	6.2	220	12.8	11	0.5
Others	211	5.6	153	8.9	58	2.9
Agricultural workers	136	3.6	78	4.6	58	2.9
TOTAL	3,751	100.0	1,716	100.0	2,035	100.0

Source: Appendix VII.

Table 8.15

Summary occupational distribution of non-Jordanians in Amman, October 1982-January 1983

Employment Sector	Egyptian		Syrian		Lebanese		Other Arab		Indian		Pakistani		Sri Lankan		Thai		South Korean		Chinese*		Filipino		Other Asian	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Professional and Managerial	45	3.1	11	14.2	8	8.3	7	6.9	14	3.1	17	13.7	6	1.4	-		6	4.7	9	2.3	6	3.1	-	-
Clerical	64	4.4	4	5.2	17	17.7	13	12.8	9	2.0	4	3.2	-	-	-		7	5.4	-	-	9	4.6	3	2.9
Skilled and semi-skilled manual	216	15.0	30	39.0	30	31.3	39	38.2	263	57.4	52	41.9	22	5.1	111	52.4	116	89.9	7	1.8	84	42.9	22	21.6
Services	127	8.8	18	23.4	18	18.8	18	17.6	60	13.1	2	1.6	338	79.0	4	1.8	-	-	-	-	81	41.3	16	15.7
Agricultural	73	5.1	5	6.5	-	-	-	-	8	1.7	26	21.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	23.5
Production & process workers	916	63.6	9	11.7	23	23.9	25	24.5	104	22.7	23	18.6	62	14.5	97	45.8	-	-	370	95.9	16	8.1	37	36.3
TOTAL	1,441	100	77	100	96	100	102	100	458	100	124	100	428	100	212	100	129	100	386	100	196	100	102	100

Source: Appendix VII.

* : Note that the bulk of Chinese workers are simply recorded as 'construction labour', no occupational details nor wage rates are provided.

Table 8.16

Non-Jordanian wage rates (mode) in Amman, October 1982-January 1983, for selected occupations and nationalities (JD./month)

Occupation	Egyptian	Syrian	Lebanese	Maghrebin	Turks	Indian	Pakistani	Sri Lankan	Thai	Filipino	Bangladeshi
Clerical workers	80	80	80	-	90	70	145	-	-	-	-
Secretary	100	-	150	-	-	-	-	-	-	150	-
Office labour	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60
Cook	90	200	150	200	-	95	-	-	150	180	-
Waiter	60	90	70	-	-	65	-	-	-	68	-
Laundry worker	90	-	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	120	-
Electrician	90	90	180	100	-	95	120	-	-	150	135
Painter	80	-	80	120	-	-	80	-	-	100	-
Brick-layer	105	180	110	-	-	100	-	-	130	-	-
Tile-setter	100	135	-	-	140	-	-	-	-	150	-
Blacksmith/steel fixer	-	-	110	-	-	100	100	100	150	120	-
Carpenter	80	120	95	-	90	100	100	95	110	150	-
Plasterer	90	-	-	-	150	105	-	-	-	-	-
HD/LD driver	120	100	160	150	-	120	110	-	150	-	-
Fitter	-	90	150	-	100	95	140	-	150	-	-
Welder	-	170	195	-	-	140	140	-	150	-	-
Foreman	-	-	250	-	-	190	200	-	-	-	-
Auto-mechanic	100	-	-	90	-	120	-	-	-	-	-
Other mechanic	105	125	-	-	90	-	110	140	135	-	95
Plumber	-	-	-	-	-	66	-	-	-	-	-
Housemaid	-	-	60	50	80	60	35	40	45	50	-
Agricultural labourer	50	45	-	-	60	50	55	-	-	-	60
Unskilled construction labour	50	60	60	90	50	80	80	65	90	-	50

Continued ...

(Table 8.16 continued)

Occupation	Egyptian	Syrian	Lebanese	Maghrebin	Turks	Indian	Pakistani	Sri Lankan	Thai	Filipino	Bangladeshi
Unskilled factory labour	70	-	90	-	75	-	90	-	-	-	-
Hotel cleaners	40	-	45	45	-	-	35	65	-	75	55

Source: author's survey of work permits issued in Amman.

Note : wage rate data for Chinese and South Korean labour is not disclosed on work permits, such contract workers receive deferred payments in their country of origin.

Table 8.17

Comparative wage rates for Jordanian and non-Jordanian construction sector employees, selected occupations (1982)

Occupation	Average monthly wage (JD): Jordanian	Non-Jordanian
Carpenter	94.00	89.00
Bricklayer/stone-mason	110.00	98.00
Steel erector	92.00	78.00
Welder	178.00	178.00
Plumber	75.00	66.00
Painter	78.00	70.00
Plasterer	n.a.	104.00
Electrical fitter	82.00	72.00
Light duty plant operator	133.00	121.00
Heavy duty plant operator	150.00	136.00
Foreman	114.00	98.00
Unskilled labourer	70.00	58.00

Source: author's interviews with selected employers in Amman, January and February 1983.

Table 8.18

Non-Jordanian women receiving work permits, 1978-82

Year	Number of work permits issued to women	Women as a proportion of total work permit issues
1978	562	3.0
1979	932	3.5
1980	2,993	3.8
1981	1,934	2.1
1982*	4,468	12.6
(adjusted	6,117	5.6)

Source: Ministry of Labour (1979) Annual Report 1978, table 2(b) and 1981 table 4 (Arabic).

* : Note that data for 1982 refer to Amman only. Figures in parenthesis are adjusted for the under-enumeration of Egyptians and extrapolated to an all-Jordan figure. The 1982 data was extracted from Employment Office records by the author.

Table 8.19

Non-Jordanian women receiving work permits, by nationality, 1978 and 1982

Nationality	1978 number	1978 %	1982* number	1982* %
Egyptian	297	52.9	389	8.7
Syrian	4	0.7	6	0.1
Lebanese	89	15.8	93	2.1
Iraqi	n.a.	-	23	0.5
Eritrean	n.a.	-	22	0.5
Maghrebin	n.a.	-	18	0.4
Other Arab	13	2.3	20	0.5
Total Arab	403	71.7	571	12.8
Pakistani	18	3.2	37	0.8
Indian	10	1.7	118	2.7
South Korean	1	0.2	7	0.1
Thai	2	0.4	34	0.8
Sri Lankan	n.a.	-	2,313	51.9
Filipino	n.a.	-	871	19.5
Bangladeshi	n.a.	-	16	0.4
Chinese	n.a.	-	12	0.3
Turks	n.a.	-	11	0.2
Other Asian	18	3.2	6	0.1
Total Asian	49	8.7	3,430	76.8
Other nationalities	110	19.6	467	10.4
TOTAL	562	100.0	4,468	100.0

Source: ibid. table 4.

* : Note that 1982 data refers to Amman only, author's compilation from employment office records.

Table 8.20

Occupational distribution of non-Jordanian women in 1978, 1979 and 1982

Occupation	1978 number	1978 %	1979 number	1979 %	1982 number	1982 %
Professional, managerial and technical						
Accountants (and related)	13	2.3	33	3.5	19	0.4
Teachers	15	2.7	28	3.0	43	1.0
Doctors	-	-	-	-	1	-
Nurses	-	-	63	6.8	100	2.2
Midwives	-	-			44	1.0
Pharmacist	-	-	3	0.3	3	0.1
Translator	-	-	-	-	5	0.1
Draughtsman	-	-	-	-	3	0.1
Laboratory technicians	-	-	-	-	13	0.3
Other skilled and professional workers	25	4.4	25	2.7	19	0.4
Clerical and administrative						
Clerks	-	-	-	-	30	0.7
Typists/secretaries	103	18.3	125	13.4	160	3.6
Cashiers and book-keepers	-	-	-	-	11	0.2
General office workers	32	5.7	47	5.1	34	0.8
Sales						
Salesmen	7	1.2	23	2.5	32	0.7
Shop assistants	-	-	-	-	27	0.6
Services						
Housemaid/children's nanny	179	31.9	325	34.9	3,518	78.8
Air stewardess	-	-	-	-	141	3.2
Seamstress	10	1.8	4	0.4	18	0.4
Cooks	-	-	-	-	42	0.9
Bakers	2	0.4	12	1.3	-	-
Caretaker	-	-	28	3.0	-	-
Hairdresser	6	1.1	3	0.3	1	-
Hotel cleaners	-	-	-	-	9	0.2
Ancillary hospital workers	-	-	-	-	51	1.1
Waitress	-	-	-	-	49	1.1
Guide	-	-	-	-	4	0.1
Other service workers	71	12.6	127	13.6	-	-
Unskilled labour						
Manufacturing labour	-	-	-	-	85	1.9
Other unskilled labour	98	17.4	84	9.0	6	0.1
Unknown	1	0.2	2	0.2	-	-
TOTAL	562	100	932	100	4,468	100

Source: As Appendix VI.

Table 8.21

Age-sex structure of employed non-Jordanians in Amman, October 1982-January 1983

Age Group	Male number	%	Female number	%
15-19	380	11.2	36	10.2
20-24	516	15.2	84	23.6
25-29	788	23.2	97	29.2
30-34	665	19.6	67	18.7
35-39	549	16.2	36	10.2
40-44	306	9.0	32	8.9
45-49	132	3.9	3	0.9
50-54	45	1.3	-	-
55-59	6	0.2	1	0.3
60-64	2	0.2	-	-
65+	4		-	-
TOTAL	3,395	100	356	100

Source: Author's survey of work permits issued in Amman.

CHAPTER NINE

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE EAST JORDAN VALLEY

9.1 Preface

The discussion so far has considered various aspects of Jordanian labour emigration and of non-Jordanian immigration as separate entities. This chapter will attempt to link these two themes by examining labour market development in the East Jordan Valley over the period 1973-80.[1] This area provides a unique opportunity, in the Jordanian context, to examine the response of an expanding regional labour market to the national labour supply constraint.

A number of recent studies have examined the relationship between international labour emigration and essentially deteriorating agricultural regions where, predictably, labour emigration has exacerbated those problems.[2] Here we take a contrary case. The East Jordan Valley is an area of considerable investment (much of it foreign) in agriculture and its systematic development has remained a cornerstone of Jordanian economic policy since the appointment of Transjordan's first Director of Development (M.G. Ionides) in the early 1930's.[3]

As a result of this concerted attention there exists a variety of demographic and agricultural data sources. These are used here in examining the relationship between the labour demands of a developing agricultural region and international labour market pressures. This will provide an insight into the implications of participation in the international labour market for agricultural development

and demonstrate the evolution, characteristics and implications of secondary labour immigration. With regard to the latter, the analysis will examine Sinclair's contention that the presence of such immigrant labour is merely indicative of short-term labour shortages and that in-migrants are playing a purely supplementary role, filling jobs left vacant by domestic labour and maintaining the development momentum.[4] In particular this provides an opportunity to focus on alternative explanations for labour immigration, namely labour scarcity and social control.

Discussion of the regional labour market's evolution cannot be divorced from an examination of the productive base. This chapter begins by examining components of change in the regional economy, emphasising the implications of each component for manpower requirements. (Figures 9.1 and 9.2 refer to the main population settlements and to the enumeration units/administrative subdivisions of the region, respectively.)

9.2 Agricultural change in the East Jordan Valley, 1973-80

9.2.1 This section briefly examines the agricultural economy of the East Jordan Valley and its development over the period 1973-80, focussing in particular on projected manpower requirements. A series of questions which have a bearing on the demand for, and characteristics of, manpower in the regional labour market will be introduced.

In a major study of the manpower requirements for the agricultural sector that would accompany implementation of the Jordan Valley Development Plan 1975-82 (USDL, 1976), Salt and Keeley projected a two-fold increase in 'farm

FIG. 9.1 MAIN SETTLEMENTS IN THE EAST JORDAN VALLEY.



FIG. 9.2 EAST JORDAN VALLEY: ENUMERATION DISTRICTS.



SOURCE : various.

worker' requirements from 20,300 in 1973 to 64,250 by 1987/88 (on irrigated land).[5] This would require an increase in the agricultural labour force from 10,300 to 32,700. The difference between 'farm workers' and the labour force in agriculture arises from the fact that labour inputs are made in a variety of combinations of permanent, temporary and occasional labour components. Thus the 1973 social and economic survey of the East Jordan Valley (SESEJV) reveals that the labour force in agriculture (15,734) was significantly smaller than the number of workers employed on agricultural holdings (28,967) because a large number of workers are engaged on more than one farm holding.[6]

The predicted growth in manpower requirements (table 9.1) is attributed to three main factors:

(i) an expected increase in irrigated area from 114,600 dunums (d.) in 1973 to 360,000 d. by 1983;

(ii) an increase in the number of agricultural holdings from 4,475 in 1973 to 9,647 by 1983 as a result of the land redistribution programme, in addition the mean holding size would fall from 40.6 d. to 37.3 d.;

(iii) an increase in cropping intensity, from 106% to 132%.[7]

Two additional factors would act to reduce the overall growth in labour demand:

(i) changes in cropping pattern involving the introduction of less labour intensive fodder crops and the reduction in vegetable production;

(ii) improved productivity as a result of mechanization and technological change.

In addition to projecting this growth in the agricultural workforce the USDL study also predicted changes in its composition. In particular, higher productivity was expected to result in a lower proportion of wage workers, while the land reform programme would increase the proportion of self-employed workers. In sum the development of intensive small-scale family farms would reduce the wage-worker component of the farm workforce.

Taking each of the five major variables affecting manpower requirements in turn, the following sections will examine changes in each variable since 1973 and assess the extent to which these projections have been realised.

9.2.2 The expansion of irrigation

The projected expansion in irrigated area accounts for the bulk of the growth in farm worker requirements to 1982/3. Assuming other factors to be constant the proposed growth in irrigated area would increase manpower demand by 184% over the period.

In 1954 the Baker-Harza report established a cultivable area in the East Jordan Valley of some 364,000 d.[8] By 1961 completion of the East Ghor Main Canal (EGMC) had brought 115,000 d. under irrigation, an area which increased further to 159,000 d. by 1973. Variations in water availability and conveyance efficiency meant that the area which actually received sufficient water to be productive, was only 114,000 d. In addition a fluctuating area, averaging about 16,000 d., was dependent on winter rainfall levels. The 1973-5 and subsequent 1975-82 plans proposed an expansion in the irrigated area to some 360,000 d.[9] This would result from the introduction of sprinkler

irrigation throughout the East Jordan Valley. The latter was considered as the most cost-effective irrigation system, with high efficiency in water conveyance and field application.[10] Furthermore it could be applied to un-graded soils, an important consideration in an area of shallow soil cover.

The completion of the majority of 'stage I projects' by late 1979 (see fig. 9.3) brought an additional 106,470 d. under irrigation, raising the total irrigable area to 221,470 d.[11] However, continued water shortages have delayed the introduction of sprinkler equipment and have led the government to re-allocate available water supplies from irrigation to industrial and municipal uses, primarily in Amman. As a result the target irrigable area has been reduced to 310,000 d.[12] Between 1976 and 1979 there was a 30% expansion in irrigation capacity following the completion of the 18 km. canal extension and the Zarka Triangle development. However the effects of continued drought and the failure to complete the land re-distribution programme mean that most of the new area remains uncultivated. Between 1975 and 1980 the total cultivated area (including rainfed and fallow areas) of the East Jordan Valley, grew by only 5.3% (from 220,140 d. to 231,740 d.).

Development of the additional irrigable area depends on the completion of further storage facilities on the Yarmouk river. The latter, referred to as the 'stage II (1978-83) projects', comprise completion of the Maqarin dam and a further 14 km. extension of the EGMC to the northern shore of the Dead Sea. It also proposes the conversion of 117,000 d. of 'stage I' lands from surface to

FIG 9.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRRIGATION IN THE EAST JORDAN VALLEY



Source: JVC 1972,1975

sprinkler irrigation.[13]

In these circumstances it is difficult to evaluate the impact of irrigation on manpower requirements. However the total should be revised downward to account for the reduction in the target irrigated area. Using the USDL report's assumptions, an irrigated area of 310,000 d., with no land redistribution, would still require an increase in the labour force to almost 28,000.[14] Similarly the currently irrigated area would require a labour force of some 20,000 (and 39,200 farm workers). As we show later, the current labour input appears to fall far short of this figure and moreover has been declining since the mid-1970's.

9.2.3. Land reform and redistribution

The promotion of land reform was an integral part of development proposals in the Jordan Valley even before the establishment of the EGC Project in 1959. Walpole (British Resident in Amman) writing to the Foreign Office in March 1949 suggests that: "... Transjordan can do little towards settling refugees on the land unless large scale purchasing from the bigger owners is carried out for the execution of the scheme ... I doubt if any government would dare put either of these schemes through in view of the powerful opposition that would be organized, unless His Majesty, the biggest landowner of the lot, was prepared to make the gesture ... I can't see either the UK or USA providing loans for the benefit of 421 large landowners ..."[15]

The provisions of subsequent land reform programmes have had two primary aims:

(i) to rationalize the layout of holdings, maximizing the efficiency of water distribution by reducing fragmentation

and raising the minimum size of holdings;

(ii) to ensure wider participation in the scheme by encouraging the emergence of owner-operated small family holdings and diminishing the power of the large landowners.[16]

The 1962 Land Reform Law (no. 31) provides for a minimum (30 d.) and maximum (200 d.) holding size on irrigated land. Holdings above and below these limits would be appropriated by the authorities and redistributed within the law's provisions. The redistribution process allows those land-holders with more than 200 d. to select the land which they will retain, provided that this is in a contiguous holding. Excess land is then redistributed to new holders (from those with less than 30 d.) selected by the Farmer's Selection Committee. Those receiving new lands would pay for them over a twenty year period at 4% interest.[17]

The 1962 law established the following priority for redistribution of the appropriated lands:

(i) owners cultivating their own land in the EGCP area;

(ii) professional farmers living in the EGCP area;

(iii) professional farmers living in the same district;

(iv) professional farmers living in other districts;

(v) holders utilizing their lands by lease or share-cropping within the EGCP area.

This clearly seeks to establish a system of small farms which would be owner-operated, hence the relegation of sharecroppers to the lowest priority. In 1977 however revisions to the land reform law altered the priority in favour of sharecroppers (rising to second place), relegating absentee landowners (particularly those living abroad).[18]

The land reform programme has done little to alter the socio-economic structure of dependency prevailing in the area. The limited mobility of the traditional residents within the region has hindered their willingness to purchase land away from their village while there the large landowners would not make land available because it had largely been distributed within the nuclear or extended family. This redistribution of land within families was made possible by a 1960 ammendment to the original land reform law (1959) which broadened the definition of land-holder to include individual members of a single family. Thus large landowners were able to circumvent the provisions of the law by re-registering sub-divisions of their holdings in the name of other family members.[19] This clause remained in force until 1975 and has significantly reduced the impact of the reform programme by a de jure, but not de facto, reduction in the number of large holdings. This has reduced the land available for redistribution to smallholders and the landless while also increasing the number of farm units below the minimum recommended size.[20]

Although some redistribution occurred in the mid-1960's in the EGCP area, only 500 previously landless farmers received holdings. Moreover some 60% of those receiving new units in the project area received holdings of less than 30 d. in size. A second round of land redistribution was begun in the 18 km. extension project area during 1978. In the pre-reform period 2% of landowners had held some 23% of the project area while 78% had less than 40 d. each and only 32% of the total area. Again however there was extensive transfer of ownership within families and the

impact of reform has been slight. The mean size of holdings has only fallen by 2 d. (to 29 d.) and the number of land-holders increased by only 7% (81). In the Valley as a whole there has been an increase in the relative share of holdings under 20 d. in area, from 38% in 1975 to 44% of total holdings in 1978.

In sum, the reform programme has created only a modest number of new landowners (less than 600) and, although the number of excessively large landholdings has been reduced, there has been a growth in the number of small holdings. Greater success may be achieved in the southern region where the 1975 freeze on land transfers was announced before the area's inclusion in the stage II project.

The USDL projections argued that changes in the structure of land holding in accordance with the plan's aims would increase manpower requirements 23% by 1982/3. Full implementation of the programme would reduce the average holding size from 41 d. to 34 d. and increase the number of irrigated holdings from 4,475 (in 1973) to 10,608 (1982/3). By 1978 however there were still only 5,266. Salt and Keeley concluded that: "The smaller the average size of holding the higher the proportion of labour supplied by self-employed and family farm workers."[21] The implications of what can, at best, be described as a partial success are difficult to assess in terms of farm worker requirements. Certainly the failure to reduce fragmentation and the redistribution of holdings among family members may have acted to increase labour demand but this cannot be quantified nor can its composition be

inferred without a consideration of the characteristics of land tenure.

9.2.4 Land tenure

In the East Jordan Valley there are three major land tenure forms:[22]

(i) owner-operation; the landowner may farm the holding personally, using family labour supplemented with hired manpower. More recently there has been a trend towards the use of professional farm managers who run the holding and employ wage labourers;

(ii) sharecropping; under this system the absentee landowner leases the holding to a sharecropper in return for a specified share of the output.[23] Sharecropper and landowner also share the variable input costs, apart from the cost of labour which is invariably borne by the share-cropper alone. In the past this was predominantly family labour, increasingly however this has been replaced by hired manpower;

(iii) fixed fee rental; the farm holding is leased for a fixed rent paid in advance (rents range from JD. 15-30 per dunum). This is frequently used by small-holders to supplement the area of their holding.

In the 1975-8 period the proportion of owner-operated holdings has increased from 35% to 40%, particularly in the Agwar Shamalya district (to 47%) and Dier Alla (44%). In the latter the proportion of sharecroppers has also increased (from 30% to 37%) at the expense of fixed rental holdings. The south continues to be dominated by sharecroppers, which increased from 42% to 52%. Overall the high level of sharecropping has been attributed to the

high rate of absentee landownership (estimated at 37% in 1975) and the profitability of leasing land, rather than hiring labour. Additionally the large number of refugees, from Palestine and later the West Bank, settling in the area between 1948 and 1967 had insufficient capital for land purchase.[24] As a result there was an increase in sharecropping from 54% (1961) to 59% (1973) of holdings. The relative proportion of sharecropped holdings remained high in 1978 as a result of the failure to prevent the leasing of farm units by beneficiaries of the land re-distribution.[25]

Changes in tenancy pattern reflect the level of agricultural development. Thus in the north where completion of the EGC and the land re-distribution programme has already taken place, owner-operation dominates (see table 9.2). In the middle valley also, the availability of irrigation water is increasing the trend towards owner-operation with increased capital investment. In contrast the southern area remains largely sharecropped and has only limited irrigation development. This form of tenancy minimizes the risks to the landowner.

Changes in tenancy are reflected in a restructuring of labour inputs. In both the Agwar Shamalya and Dier Alla sub-districts the growth in owner-operated holdings has been accompanied by an increase in the proportion of work carried out by hired labour, while work by the land-holders household has declined substantially.

The increase in owner-operation (either directly or through a farm manager) is likely to continue with the growing sophistication of inputs and agricultural technology.

Steitieh and Musa (1981) show that 63% of holdings using 'plastic greenhouse' cultivation and drip irrigation are 'owner-operated'. With an average capital investment of JD. 1,700-2,000 per dunum and the high rate of return to such systems landowners are less willing to 'share' the profits. The decline in fixed rent leases (with rents at JD. 15-30 per dunum) has been most rapid since these offer the lowest return to the landowner.[26]

Tenants and small-holders find it difficult to obtain sufficient capital or credit to compete with such investments. Sharab (1975) shows that tenant farmers relied on informal credit sources, the majority (43%) on 'commission agents' charging excessive interest rates and taking control of the farmers marketing. Only 7% received credit from institutional sources.[27] The Agricultural Credit Corporation (ACC) lends only to borrowers with sufficient land to act as collateral. The inauguration of the Jordan Valley Farmers Association (JVFA) credit programme in 1978 has done little to ameliorate the inequitable access to credit since membership of the JVFA requires at least a three year written lease.[28] Sharab (1975) demonstrated that over 90% of leases are for one year only and that some 84% are oral. Quashair (1980) claims that less than 10% of JVFA loans have gone to share-croppers.[29]

In conclusion it appears that land reform and more importantly changes in the pattern of land tenure, are acting to increase the proportion of hired labour rather than leading to a growth in family workers.

9.2.5 Cropping intensity

The 1975-82 plan assumed an increase in cropping

intensity from 106% to 132% over the 1975-88 period.[30] Accepting this Salt and Keeley (1976) project an increase in farm worker requirements of 26%. Available data shows no clear trend in cropping intensity. Between 1975 and 1978 the latter increased to 118% but has subsequently fallen to 108% (1980). This may reflect the effects of drought in the mid-1970's and the consequent reduction in rainfed areas.

Despite the expansion in irrigated area production levels continue to fluctuate annually (figure 9.4). Although the trend appears to be markedly upward for the main vegetable crops (particularly tomatoes) there has been a decline in the yield of other field and cereal crops.[31] The presentation of average production levels and cropping intensity may be misleading because of the wide range in production techniques used in the area. Indeed the introduction of drip irrigation and 'plastic greenhouse' cultivation has increased the range of yields even within sub-areas of the Valley.

As agricultural practices have intensified with the increased cultivation of tomatoes and cucumbers under plastic covers, the traditional pattern of two harvests has increasingly given way to year-round cultivation. This growth in cropping intensity and harvesting requirements has undoubtedly increased the demand for labour but given the unreliability of production data it is not possible to quantify the effect on labour requirements.[32]

9.2.6 Cropping patterns

The USDL study (1976) claimed that the planned regulation of cropping patterns would reduce daily labour

FIG. 9.4 PRODUCTION LEVELS IN THE EAST JORDAN VALLEY 1974-80.



Tomato
Eggplant
Cucumber
Squash
Cauliflower and cabbage
Pepper
Wheat

Source: as note 32

FIG. 9.5 HARVESTED AREA OF THE EAST JORDAN VALLEY BY CROP 1975-80.



	Valley total	Northern region	Middle and Southern region
Field crops	——	——	——
Vegetables	----	----	----
Fruit crops	-·-·	-·-·	-·-·

Source: as note 32

requirements by around 4%. This would arise from the projected reduction in the share of labour intensive vegetable and fruit crops and their replacement by fodder crops. The JVC proposed an increase in field crops (cereals and fodder crops) to some 49.6% of the total cultivated area. The expansion of fodder crops was seen by the JVC as being compatible with the government's policy to increase livestock production in general and dairying in particular.[33] This section will compare the planned and actual cropping patterns of the 1975-80 period (see fig. 9.5).

(i) Field crops

The period 1975-80 saw a substantial (53%) reduction in the field crop area by over 49,000 d. The latter now represents only 19% of the cultivated area compared to 43% in 1975. This reduction has progressed down the Valley with the completion of major irrigation works. In the Northern Ghor the field crop area had fallen 48% in the 1975-8 period and by 1980 was only 18% of the cultivated area. In the Middle Ghor there had been only a 13% fall in 1975-8 but a 40% fall between 1978 and 1980 with the completion of the 18 km. canal extension.

The main component of this decline has been the collapse in wheat cultivation (56% decline in area) although it still comprises over 70% of field crop area. The JVC planned a switch from wheat to other field crops, particularly fodder crops (alfalfa, clover and maize). In reality there has been almost no fodder production in the Valley at all. In 1980 fodder crops totalled only 320 d., less than 0.1% of the total cultivated area. This contrasts

with 1975 when fodder crops were 2,250 d. (1%). By 1980 field crops accounted for less than 5% of the gross value of production, despite accounting for 19.1% of the cultivated area. Failure to develop the field crop sector reflects the bias in the existing price structure in favour of vegetable and fruit production (stimulated by high demand locally and in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula) which gives farmers little incentive to produce fodder crops. The Stage II plan goes some way in recognizing this bias against field crops and reduces their planned area to 39% (from 54%). Continued delay in the introduction of sprinkler units and the recent adoption of drip irrigation suggest a further drift away from the aims of large scale fodder production.[34]

(ii) Vegetable crops

There has been a substantial (46%) growth of 52,00 d. in the area of vegetable crop production to some 167,000 d., that is 72% of the cultivated area (compared to 52% in 1975). Again changes in the Northern Ghor appear earliest. The major increase here had occurred by 1976, when the harvested area of vegetables had increased 55% over the previous year. By 1980 vegetable production accounted for 66% of cultivation in the Northern Ghor. In the Middle Ghor this expansion was delayed until the 1976-7 season, by 1980 vegetable production accounted for 80% of cultivated area in the Middle Ghor compared to 59% in 1975. The dominance of vegetable production in this area may reflect the rapid adoption of drip irrigation and 'plasti-culture' techniques. Within the vegetable sector it is important to notice the dominance of certain labour intensive crops

in the Middle Ghors while the Northern Ghor predominates with less labour intensive crops (cabbage, cauliflower, potatoes).

(iii) Fruit trees

A rather smaller increase has been recorded with regard to fruit production. Clearly there is a lag between an increase in area of fruit crops and increased production. Furthermore the drought years (1974-9) have undoubtedly limited the investment in fruit production. Harvested area has increased from 10% to 14% and remain concentrated in the Northern Ghor.

The importance of these departures from the planned cropping pattern are their implication for manpower requirements. Rather than acting to reduce labour demand (as the USDL study predicted) the impact of the changed cropping pattern and in particular the emphasis on labour intensive vegetable crops, has been to expand manpower requirements. The implications of this change are made clear on table 9.3.

9.2.7 Technological change

The USDL study and a subsequent consultant's report (Dar-al-Handasah, 1977) both project a reduction in labour inputs as a result of technological change. The latter suggests that: "... there are significant opportunities for reducing labour inputs in the Jordan Valley while maintaining or increasing yields."[35] In particular this would result from the replacement of the traditional (dawaleeb) furrow irrigation. Average labour inputs under the traditional surface irrigation system have been estimated at 130 man-hours/d. Dar-al-Handasah suggest that this could be reduced to 88 man-hours/d. through

improved labour efficiency and an increased use of machinery, particularly the adoption of sprinkler irrigation. The replacement of the traditional irrigation furrow alone would reduce labour requirements by 25% per dunum. This planned reduction in labour inputs has been distorted by a number of factors:

(i) the failure to introduce sprinkler irrigation;

(ii) the limited success of the land reform programme has left many holdings at an uneconomic size for mechanization. The JVFA has not made such equipment available on a co-operative leasing basis;

(iii) the adoption and rapid expansion in drip irrigation and 'plasti-culture' cultivation. The latter involves the intensive production of cucumber and tomato crops under plastic tunnels and greenhouses in combination with drip irrigation.

Drip irrigation appeared on an experimental basis in 1975 and was rapidly taken up from 1978-9, particularly in the southern region (beyond the 18 km. EGC extension) where water supply was primarily from on-farm private wells. In 1979 the government had banned the drilling of new wells because of the severe drought. The main advantage of 'drip' are its high water conveyance efficiency and the possibility of increasing yields through direct liquid fertilizer application.[36] The adoption of 'plasti-culture' cultivation offers a number of additional advantages:

(i) it permits the production of sensitive crops during the frost-risk months (December-February);

(ii) promotes crop yields by lengthening the production and harvesting period;

(iii) enables the marketing of produce during the early season of peak prices, thus increasing returns to the landowner.

The rapid growth in the area under such cultivation since 1977/8 is shown on table 9.4. The number of plastic greenhouses increased from 456 in 1977/8 to 2,774 in 1979/80, over 62% of which are located on owner-operated holdings.[37]

Production costs under the plasticulture system are approximately 62% higher than with traditional cultivation (Steitieh and Musa, 1980), in particular the labour input is up to 30% higher (with plastic tunnels). The latter has a high labour demand since the tunnels require ventilation, weeding, spraying, irrigation and harvesting in addition to their installation. These various tasks entail opening and replacing the plastic covers. The production cost of cucumbers (1977-8) was JD. 99/ton under plastic tunnels and JD. 61/ton under open-field conditions. Of that increased cost labour was JD. 53/ton and JD. 39/ton respectively. Furthermore the increased crop yields (up to 9 tons/d. for cucumbers under plastic houses/drip conditions compared to 0.9 tons/d. under traditional system) and extended harvesting season increase the demand for harvesting labour substantially.

In 1979/80 some 87% of plastic tunnels were located in the southern region and 80% of plastic houses in the middle valley. This spatial distribution reflects a number of factors:

(i) the location of private wells and the effects of the drought;

(ii) proximity to the Amman market;

(iii) innovation diffusion, plastic covers and drip irrigation were first introduced in the Dier Alla area;

(iv) the traditional crop pattern of the area.

Steitieh and Musa (1980) predict that if current market and price conditions for these crops continue then the area planted under plastic covers with drip irrigation are likely to expand dramatically over the next few years.[38] The private sector adoption of drip irrigation raises the question of the viability of a state-backed sprinkler irrigation programme and the increasing likelihood that the latter may be abandoned with clear implications for the fodder production policy and for labour demand.

It is clear then that rather than contributing to a reduction in manpower requirements, changes in technology, particularly the rapid diffusion of plastic covers and drip irrigation, have significantly increased labour requirements.

9.2.8 This section has reviewed developments in the agricultural sector over the period 1973-80. Although the irrigated area has expanded and labour demand has increased, developments in the technical and social organization of production have also been responsible for a change in the composition of that labour force, with a growing emphasis on <u>hired</u> labour. These developments are contrary to the aims of the 1975-82 Jordan Valley Plan and of the characteristics of employment as outlined by the USDL study.

Later in this chapter (section 9.5) we will examine changes in the pattern and structure of agricultural employment in some detail. Before proceeding to that

discussion it is important to establish the recent demographic history of the area since this determines, in part, the labour supply base and its composition.

9.3 Demographic change in the East Jordan Valley, 1948-80

9.3.1 The following section sub-divides the recent demographic history of the East Jordan Valley into three relatively distinct phases:

(i) 1948-66 steady growth;

(ii) 1967-73 demographic upheaval;

(iii) 1974-80 recovery and growth.

9.3.2 1948-66 steady growth

Prior to the 1950's the population level of the Jordan Valley was both low and unstable, subject to the vagaries of water supply and the effects of malarial infestation. This small permanent population was augmented by the annual influx of seasonal harvesters and nomadic winter grazers.[39] Nevertheless the potential for settlement and agricultural development had long been recognized. Between 1912 and 1953 at least sixteen comprehensive irrigation schemes were proposed.[40]

The influx of Palestinian refugees in the post-1948 crisis renewed the demands for systematic agricultural development and population settlement. By 1953 the Valley population had been inflated to around 37,000[41] of whom UNRWA records show over 29,000 were refugees. During the 1950's the rate of population inflow fell; 1961 census data shows a Valley population of 40,225.[42] During the 1960's population growth was stimulated by the malaria eradication programme and by the completion of the first stages of the

EGMC which, by 1961, brought 37,000 d. under irrigation.

Data on housing unit construction during the 1961-7 period provides a basis for determining the pattern and rate of population inflow during this period (see table 9.5). Between 1960-4 there was a 150% increase in the number of units built compared to the 1955-9 period. This building boom peaked in 1965-6 with the completion of over 1,500 units. Population growth was clearly concentrated in the northern and middle sectors of the Valley, showing that in-migration to be consequent upon extension of the EGMC. The southern region remained largely unaffected by this in-flow.

The 1961 census results confirm that this was a recently immigrant population. Age-sex ratios (fig. 9.6) show a preponderance of males, particularly in the 15-49 age groups and in the northern and middle areas of the valley. In sum the 1960's saw a relatively large scale movement into the Valley, predominantly to the north which accounted for 73% of the Valley population in 1961. According to the social and economic survey of 1961 less than 5% of households had lived in the area for more than 15 years and the great majority had arrived since 1952.[43]

9.3.3 1967-73 demographic upheaval

Israeli occupation of the West Bank (including the northern side of the Yarmouk) in June 1967 terminated progress in agricultural development and heralded in a period of considerable demographic upheaval in the East Jordan Valley. Initially, the outflow of refugees from the West Bank inflated the Valley's population dramatically. Harris (1978) suggests that by early 1968 the latter had risen

FIG.9.6 EAST JORDAN VALLEY: M/F SEX RATIOS (JORDANIANS) BY REGION

NORTHERN REGION



MIDDLE REGION



SOUTHERN REGION



NOTE: 1978 values are for Dier Alla and Shuna Janubia combined (Middle and Southern regions)

SOURCE: (i) 1961, Department of Statistics (1964) First Census of Population and Housing (various tables).

(ii) 1973/8, as table 9.8.

to over 150,000.[44] This concentration of refugees served as both a recruiting ground for the Palestinian resistance movement and as a springboard for their incursions into metropolitan Israel.

Israeli reprisals, beginning with artillery bombardments in February 1968 and leading to the so-called War of Attrition, drove the population from the conflict zone. In the second week of February alone, some 70,000 refugees fled the camps for the relative safety of Amman and the East Bank highlands. At the same time the agricultural population began to desert the Valley as Israeli attacks reduced the EGC intake on the Yarmouk to less than 10% of its capacity. By mid-1968 less than 5,000 remained in the Valley (most of whom were in the south).

Demographic recovery in the post-September 1970 period was surprisingly rapid given the level of destruction (it was estimated that over 70% of all housing had been destroyed). This return was encouraged by the clear commitment of the Jordanian authorities to integrated development in the area as expressed through the 1972 'Rehabilitation and Development Plan'.

By March 1973 the population size had risen to 64,000, close to its pre-war level. The bulk of this return was directed to the north and middle of the Valley (table 9.6). In 1973 83% and 54% (respectively) of the population in these two areas had been resident for less than three years; in contrast the comparable figure for the south was 36%. Between March 1970 and March 1973 almost 41,000 persons had returned to the Valley. However, age-sex ratios (fig. 9.6) for 1973 are lower for the age groups 15-35 than in 1961

and show a preponderance of women. The non-return of young males may be an early reflection of alternative employment opportunities in Amman and abroad.

9.3.4 1974-80 recovery and growth

By 1974 the return of population to the Valley was in all probability complete. In mid-1974 the Valley population was estimated (by the JVC) at 67,920, an increase of only 3,900 over the 1973 figure. The 1975-82 Jordan Valley Development Plan envisaged a doubling of the East Jordan Valley's population to 123,600 by 1981. It was argued that high income opportunities and improved social service provision in the Valley would attract about 8,000 new settlers to the area each year. This additional manpower would be required for 'optimal' exploitation of the planned expansion in irrigated area. Recent evidence produced by the JVA purports to show that this policy has been successful.[45] The JVA claims that the 1978-9 population growth, seen in concurrent enumeration results, represents substantial immigration and settlement. Available data are however nothing less than confused. According to the 1978 pilot census the East Jordan Valley population had reached 76,676, an increase of 12,664 over 1973. This represents an annual growth of 3.2%, marginally smaller than natural increase at 3.5% and implying nil net in-migration. In contrast the 1979 census records a population of 86,662, an annual increase over 1973 of 4.7% and implying substantial in-migration.[46] If we are to accept both census figures then we must account for a rapid acceleration in the population growth rates which, for 1978-9, was 13%.

The following section will examine this data in

some detail and present contrary evidence which suggests that the Jordanian population of the East Jordan Valley is probably at a stable level and may be declining in certain areas.

9.4 Recent immigration and population change in the East Jordan Valley

9.4.1 Introduction

The varying administrative units used for census enumeration make the identification of specific patterns of growth particularly difficult. Furthermore an accurate comparison of individual settlement growth rates is virtually impossible since a different set of village names appears in each enumeration. Azar (1973) commenting on this problem suggests that: "A common characteristic of population settlements in the Valley is the existence of numerous names for the same locality or of its quarters ... one of the difficulties in identifying the population localities is the absence of known village or settlement geographic limits."[47]

In order to disaggregate available data, each settlement identified in the three 'censuses' of 1973, 1978 and 1979 have been located and assigned to one of six village groupings. This spatial disaggregation reveals that growth rates have varied significantly within the Valley (table 9.7). The latter shows that recent population growth has been concentrated in the Middle Valley, particularly the Dier Alla area, and to a lesser extent in the south.[48] However if we consider the Jordanian population in isolation then it is clear that in a number of areas, particularly Kreiymeh/Balawina and Wadi Yabis/Sleikhat, there has been relative population decline and in the former an absolute

fall (table 9.8). This seems to confirm Ware's (1978) observations that: "There is a constant migration of single people from the Valley ... to seek employment elsewhere."[49] Ware attributes this emigration to: low wages; limited non-agricultural employment opportunities; poor living conditions; under-employment and seasonal unemployment.

Examining the Jordanian population by sex and location (table 9.9) demonstrates that out-migration has been confined to the male population. The female population shows a significantly higher growth rate in all areas, hence the falling sex ratio (fig. 9.6). The evidence for the 1973-9 period shows an absolute fall in the Jordanian male population of the Wadi Yabis/Sleikhat and Kreiymeh/ Balawina areas. Furthermore the deficit of males appears to be confined to the younger, 15-40, working age cohorts (see table 9.10 and fig. 9.7). Unfortunately there is no data by which we could identify the destination of such movements, that is whether they remain in the Valley or leave it altogether.

Rhoda's (1980) analysis of population change in the Valley is misleading. Relying on the aggregate data he states that: "Males outnumber females in almost all age cohorts. This is particularly true for the working age cohorts between the ages of 20 and 59 ..."[50] However this is only the case if the non-Jordanian population, with its highly skewed age/sex distribution, is included. The latter increased by 126% between the 1978 and 1979 enumerations, primarily in the Dier Alla and Shuna Janubia areas. The implications of this data are clearly contrary to Rhoda's assertion that: "... wages have increased and, in response agricultural

FIG.9.7 AGE/SEX STRUCTURE : JORDANIANS IN THE EAST JORDAN VALLEY, 1978.

a. Agwar Shamalya



b. Dier Alla and Shuna Janubia



Source : table 9.10

labour, both Jordanian and non-Jordanian has moved into the Valley."[51] The following section will examine the inflow of non-Jordanians in detail.

9.4.2 Non-Jordanian immigration, 1978-79

Having examined the spatial component of population change in the Valley and demonstrated the relative decline in the number of Jordanian males, we are still left with the disparity between the 1978 and 1979 census results. Given the decline in the Jordanian male population and the relatively low level of non-Jordanian immigration, the acceleration in growth rates for 1978-9 appears unlikely.

The veracity of the census results is also questioned by the apparent fall in participation rates. The active population (15,310) in 1978 appears far too small when compared with the 1973 level (13,475), suggesting a decline in participation from 30.5% to 19.9%. At a time of expanding employment opportunities in construction, commerce and agriculture, this seems unlikely. Furthermore it is readily apparent that the 1978 enumeration considerably underestimated female employment, at 487, compared to the 1973 figure of 5,481. With a relatively constant male:female employment ratio, Jordanian female employment would have been approximately 5,200 in 1978.[52] Actual Jordanian employment in 1978 was probably 18,300. Adding this to the recorded active non-Jordanian population (1,788) brings total employment in 1978 to only 20,100. With a population of 76,700 and a relatively constant crude participation rate since 1973, expected labour force size would be around 23,000. It is suggested here that the deficit between the expected and recorded employment levels, some 3,000,

represents unrecorded non-Jordanian employment. That is we estimate that there were some 4,750-5,000 non-Jordanians employed in the Valley, implying a total non-Jordanian population of approximately 6,600 (given the recorded participation rate of 79%). This implies a 1978 Valley population total of 80,500, thus reducing the 1978-9 growth rate to 7.5%.

Evidence to support the contention that the 1978 pilot census inaccurately enumerated the non-Jordanian population is largely circumstantial:

(i) the pilot census was carried out by inexperienced enumerators (students);

(ii) non-Jordanians were enumerated only in the main settlements, this is at variance with their accepted status as agricultural labourers;

(iii) the enumeration was conducted on a household basis, this provides considerable opportunities for under-enumeration since the majority of non-Jordanians live in 'informal' households, frequently in makeshift tents and outlying farm huts;

(iv) the census was conducted in early November, closely following the Arab Summit's condemnation (September) of Egypt's participation in the Camp David accords; deliberate evasion could be an additional factor in under-enumeration. A number of farmers informed the author of their fears in this period that their Egyptian labour would be expelled;

(v) further support comes from the University of Jordan's survey of labour in drip irrigation. The latter recorded 457 Egyptians in this sector during the 1978-9 season. In this context a total Valley population of 628 Egyptians,

as recorded in the census, appears far too small. Steitieh's (1980) comment on the: "... critical importance of Egyptian labour in the economy of the Valley", implies a much larger Egyptian labour force since the drip irrigation sector accounted for less than 3% of the cultivated area.[53]

Some of these conditions for under-enumeration prevailed into the 1979 count. It is perhaps not surprising that only 5,128 non-Jordanians were recorded. Steitieh's survey for the 1979-80 season shows an increase in the number of non-Jordanians employed in drip irrigation by 111% (to 963).[54] For the whole Valley an estimated non-Jordanian population of 8-10,000 in 1979-80 seems appropriate.[55]

The 1979 result for Jordanians may also be misleading. With natural increase at 3.5% p.a. and limited in-migration we could expect a Jordanian population of 81,534. This increase over the expected population can be explained by the fact that the census was conducted over a full week which coincided with the major public and religious holiday of Eid al-Adha during which the permanent families of the Valley would have been inflated by visiting friends and relatives from Amman and the highlands.[56] This may further account for the high growth rate between 1978 and 1979.

9.4.3 In this section it has been argued that the East Jordan Valley experienced only limited in-migration and settlement by Jordanians in the post-1973 period, and that in some areas population (particularly the male population) may be static or declining. Secondly it has been argued here that the census results represent a substantial under-enumeration of non-Jordanian immigrants in both 1978 and

1979. The latter account for the bulk of in-migration that has occurred in this period, and which has been directed to the middle and southern Valley. The bases of these trends inevitably lies in the employment opportunities available in the area. The following section considers developments in the labour market over the period 1973-80 which have stimulated the in-migration of non-Jordanians.

9.5 Labour market developments in the East Jordan Valley, 1973-80

9.5.1 The structure of agricultural employment

Agricultural employment dominates the labour market of the Valley. In 1973 some 82% of the total labour force (19,200) were engaged in agricultural activity. Despite the subsequent growth in non-agricultural enterprise over 75% of employment is still in this sector. However, the structure and pattern of agricultural employment has changed considerably since 1973.

Rhoda (1980) states that: "Between 1975 and 1978 paid farm employment grew by an average of about 4% p.a. ..."[57] He fails to point out however that unpaid labour, which in 1975 accounted for 54% of agricultural employment, was declining at 9% p.a. In the three years 1975-8 there was a 27% fall in unpaid agricultural labour, and total agricultural employment fell by 3.2% p.a. (table 9.11). Within this decline are a series of important changes in the characteristics and spatial pattern of employment which will be considered in detail.

In the early 1970's female labour provided a major source of unpaid workers. In 1973 'family' labour represented 27% of the Valley's labour force (all sectors)

and of this 76% were women, most of whom were in the younger age groups (30% were under 19 compared to 11% of males). This reflects the low school enrolment of women in the early 1970's. In the compulsory grades female enrolment in 1973 was only 50% compared to the male rate of 78%. In addition the age range of female employment was restricted by the high rate of early marriage. In 1973 29% of women aged 15-19 and 72% of those aged 20-24 were married (compared to 2% and 30% of males). After marriage most women are employed as unpaid family labour and as such may be under-enumerated in the 1973 census data on female employment. Women tend to be the majority of workers in those agricultural sub-sectors which are highly labour intensive and which offer least security, for example women are 58% of orchard, and 65% of nursery farm workers.

The following section will examine changes in the structure of agricultural employment in the three sub-districts between 1975 and 1978.

9.5.2 Local labour market developments, 1975-8

Analysis of local labour market developments can be facilitated through data present in the 1975 and 1978 Agricultural censuses. These provide detailed employment data for the three sub-districts of Agwar Shamalya, Dier Alla and Shuna Janubia. The employed population is classified into three categories:

(i) permanent labour: labour employed on a regular basis throughout the year;

(ii) temporary labour: labour employed for more than 4 months but less than 8 months p.a.;

(iii) occasional labour: labour employed for less than 4 months p.a.

In order to facilitate comparison this data will be standardized by converting temporary and occasional employees into 'permanent employee equivalents' (PEE's). This is done on the crude assumption that the labour input from a temporary worker is equivalent to two-thirds, and an occasional employee to one-third, that of a permanent employee (see table 9.12 a/b).[58]

(i) Agwar Shamalya

Agricultural employment in the northern sub-district fell by 16% in the 1975-8 period. The bulk of this decline is accounted for by the collapse of the unpaid labour force by some 33%. In contrast the size of the paid labour force fell by only 1%. This is nevertheless significant since the other sub-districts show an increase in paid employment. In Agwar Shamalya however paid employment was already dominant (at 54% of employment) in 1975, a reflection of the earlier arrival of irrigation water and of land redistribution. Although the fall in male employment accounts for most of the overall decline, a 20% drop in women's employment is also highly significant.

While paid male employment declined by only 102% there are significant changes in the composition of that employment. Both permanent and occasional paid labour were reduced (by 26% and 62% respectively), however temporary paid male employment grew by 103% to 69% of total male employment (compared to 34% in 1975). Unpaid male employment fell by 33%.

Despite an overall decline of 20% in women's employment, paid female labour fell only 1% and within that group temporary paid labour increased (by 182%) from 22%

to 62% of all paid female labour. As with the male workers, unpaid labour fell by 32% (permanent unpaid labour falling 40%) although the temporary and occasional components show an increase.

In sum then there have been two major developments, firstly a significant increase (both absolute and relative) in paid temporary labour at the expense of permanent and occasional employment. Secondly, the collapse of unpaid family labour (paid labour having increased to 64% of employment) is evident. Within the unpaid sector women have become dominant (62% of the total). These trends are consistent with the growth in hired labour. The number of holdings on which the bulk of agricultural work is done by members of the household has fallen by 45%.

(ii) Dier Alla

In the middle Valley agricultural employment has also fallen, here by 14%. In 1975 however unpaid labour had still been dominant (61% of the labour input), but has now fallen by 31%. Growth in paid employment, of 13%, has led to the paid sector assuming a dominant position in the local labour market.

Paid male employment shows a surprisingly small increase (1.6%) given the arrival of in-migrants in the area, accounting for 55% of total male employment. Both permanent and temporary paid employment show a significant increase while occasional paid workers declined (by 15%). As in the northern sub-district permanent unpaid male labour has fallen (by 34%).

Overall, female employment fell by 12% in Dier Alla. Despite this, paid female employment increased (by 56%)

across all sectors but primarily in the occasional component (85% of the total). Permanent unpaid female labour has declined by 35%, falling from 92% of unpaid female labour to only 67%. Significantly, the employment of girls under age 15 as paid labour (mainly occasional) increased to 21% of female employment, while unpaid females under age 15 increased to 16%.

In sum the Dier Alla area shows the same major trends as in Agwar Shamalya. In particular there has been a collapse in the unpaid labour force, particularly among women. The number of holdings using hired labour only has increased by 163% to 12% of all holdings, while those dependent on family labour fell by 40%.

(iii) Shuna Janubia

In contrast to the previous two cases agricultural employment in Shuna Janubia has increased, by 15%, over the 1975-8 period. Unpaid family labour remains predominant, although this has fallen from 67% to 53% of the total, in line with developments in the more developed areas. The fall in unpaid labour (by 9%) was mainly due to the collapse of female unpaid workers (by 17%).

Male employment increased by 31%; paid male employment growing by 78% to account for 44% of all labour in the area. Although all three categories of paid labour have increased, occasional (50%) and temporary workers (29%) account for the majority. With relatively limited irrigation development the demand for permanent paid labour does not yet exist. Unpaid permanent male employment still accounts for 40% of all male labour.

The female labour market of Shuna Janubia is rather

limited and small absolute changes are probably insignificant, particularly in the paid sector which employed only 132. Overall there was a 19% fall in employment, primarily as a result of the 27% drop in permanent unpaid female employment. Nevertheless the latter still accounts for 75% of total female employment. Again there has been a notable increase in both absolute and relative terms of the under 15 age group.[59]

Although somewhat smaller in absolute terms the trends noted in Shuna Janubia are consistent with those in the previous two case studies. Particularly notable is the decline in female, especially unpaid female, employment. In 1975 only 2.4% of holdings relied on hired labour, by 1978 this had increased to 25%.

9.5.3 Non-agricultural employment

Before examining the development of secondary labour migration to the Valley this section will briefly examine the rapid expansion of non-agricultural employment during the 1970's.

In order to compare data on non-agricultural employment in 1973 and 1978 the available census data must be adjusted since the latter accounts only for married Jordanians over the age of 15, while the former includes all Jordanian males. This correction has been made in two stages:

(i) 1973 data are reduced by 2.5% to account for employed males under age 15;

(ii) 1978 data is increased by 46% to account for unmarried Jordanian males (there being 46% more males over age 15 than married males over 15).

Clearly this adjustment is rather crude (since age distributions by occupation sector are not available) and the results must be interpreted with caution.

Over the five year period there have been a large growth in non-agricultural employment in almost all sectors. In particular utilities have expanded dramatically from a small base in 1973 when few settlements had access to such services. Similarly trade, transport and communications, and the services sector in general show a large growth in employment. The latter clearly reflects the substantial public sector investment in social infrastructure provision that occurred during the post-1973 period.

Given the high level of infrastructural work being conducted the construction sector appears to employ only a small proportion of the non-agricultural workforce (7.7%). However it will be shown later that the bulk of construction work was being carried out by immigrant workers in 1978. Similarly in 1976 the USDL study found few Valley residents engaged in construction and regarded the lack of local construction skills as a critical problem for the completion of irrigation and infrastructural projects. As early as 1975 more than half the workforce on the 18 km. EGCP extension project were immigrants.[60] By 1978 we estimate that non-Jordanians accounted for at least 65% of the construction sector labour force (in a total sector employment of circa 1,350) in the Valley.

By 1978 employment of male Jordanians in the non-farm sector had risen by 91% (over 1973) to 6,070. This growth was markedly faster than that projected by the USDL

study which projected a non-agricultural employment level in 1978 of 5,515 (for both sexes).

The 1978 pilot census contains little data on female employment. Subtracting the recorded number of paid women workers in permanent agricultural employment (158) from total female employment (487), implies that only 329 women were engaged in non-agricultural work. This is consistent with the low level (213) of non-agricultural employment among women in 1973. The occupational distribution of the latter (primarily in traditional handicraft industry and in elementary level teaching) is unlikely to have altered significantly.

It is evident then that non-agricultural sector employment has attracted manpower, particularly in the northern region which accounts for over 60% of service employment in the Valley. This data can be used to further demonstrate an absolute and relative decline in the share of agricultural employment among Jordanians. The 1978 pilot census shows some 13,252 Jordanians in active employment, of whom 7,114 are employees and 6,071 are in non-agricultural employment. Thus the number of Jordanian agricultural labourers was only 1,043 and agricultural employment (7,181) accounted for only 54% of active Jordanian males.[61] This contrasts with 1973 when the agricultural sector accounted for 76% (10,282) of Jordanian male employment.

Available data does not enable us to determine whether those taking up the new non-farm employment opportunities were formerly engaged in agricultural employment in the Valley or are in-migrants from other areas. Such a population movement within the Valley may be a partial

explanation for the population outflow from areas such as Kreiymeh/Balawina. Nevertheless, the evidence clearly supports the contention that Jordanian labour has been leaving the agricultural sector.

9.6 Secondary labour immigration and employment in the East Jordan Valley

9.6.1 This section attempts to reconstruct the socio-economic characteristics and role of secondary (non-Jordanian) immigration to the East Jordan Valley. Despite the reservations expressed earlier (section 9.4) the 1978 pilot census provides the only source of demographic and socio-economic data for non-Jordanian immigrants. Although we have disputed the absolute number of non-Jordanians, there is no evidence to suggest that their under-eunumeration was the result of any systematic ethnic bias. The results should therefore be regarded as an indication of actual characteristics rather than as a precise statement of them.

9.6.2 Demographic characteristics of immigrant workers

The recorded non-Jordanian population shows a marked male bias and its skewed age distribution establishes its employment orientation (see fig. 9.8). In 1978 less than 10% of non-Jordanians were women and only 10.3% were under the age of 15 (table 9.13). Spatial disaggregation of this data reveals however that there were significant differences within the Valley. The middle and southern regions have a relatively large female population (12%) and a more youthful structure (12.3% under 15) compared to Agwar Shamalya (6.6% female and 6.4% under 15). This spatial difference relates primarily to the characteristics of the Pakistani community, 98% of whom were enumerated in the

FIG.9-8 AGE/SEX STRUCTURE: NON-JORDANIANS IN THE EAST JORDAN VALLEY, 1978.

a. Agwar Shamalya sub-district.



b. Dier Alla and Shuna Janubia sub-district.



c. East Jordan Valley: Egyptians.



Source: tables 9-13 and 9-14

southern half of the Valley (table 9.14). The latter have a relatively mature population structure (including 40% female and 49% under 15) compared to the other immigrant populations. Large numbers of Pakistanis had been resident in the area for three or more years and many have become sharecroppers.

In contrast the Egyptian community represents a more or less classic migrant worker population (see fig. 9.8c). Characteristically it shows a strong male bias (94% of the total) with very few dependents (only 2% of the population were aged under 15). It is likely that under-enumeration was greatest amongst this population for the reasons outlined above (section 9.4.2), observers agree that the Egyptians are the main component of the immigrant population. The Indian population represents a more extreme form of the classic migrant model, with 288 males in a population total of 289.

The largest immigrant group, according to the census results, were the South Koreans (851) representing 37% of the total. This figure is likely to be accurate since the South Koreans are international contract workers from the Cho Suk and Shin Seung Corporations, engaged on specific construction projects (such as the El-Arda marketing centre).

The data clearly show that the non-Jordanian population is not homogeneous. A number of forms of in-migration can be identified:

(i) immigrant agricultural labourers: predominantly single males but with some females and dependents; short term migrants usually of less than one year, the majority are

Egyptians though there are some Indian and Pakistani workers. Estimated crude participation rate 93%.

(ii) immigrant sharecroppers: a relatively mature demographic structure, predominantly Pakistanis and confined to the southern Valley; long term immigrants of more than one year. Estimated crude participation rate of 45-60%.

(iii) international contract migrant labour: South Korean construction labour brought in by South Korean firms contracted by the JVA. Other contractors have recruited primarily Indian nationals. Entirely active male populations with a crude participation rate of 100%. The employment of such workers on a variety of construction sites explains their more widespread distribution within the Valley.

9.6.3 Occupational characteristics and wage rates of secondary labour migrants

The spatial distribution of the immigrant population shows a marked southerly bias in both 1978 and 1979 (with over 65% of non-Jordanians being recorded in the Dier Alla and Shuna Janubia sub-districts). If we ignore the contract migrant workers then that bias is more pronounced, with over 75% of secondary labour immigrants in the southern Valley (see table 9.14). This spatial distribution reflects the increased demand for agricultural labour in the region with the adoption of intensive plasti-culture techniques. As Steitieh's survey showed, the labour force in this sub-sector is almost entirely non-Jordanian. Over 97% of active non-Jordanians were engaged in the agricultural sector.

The secondary labour market has two components:

(i) 'permanent' labour, those workers employed on a regular basis for three months or more by the same employer;

(ii) 'temporary' labour, those workers hired on an hourly, daily or weekly basis.

The majority of immigrants fall into the category of temporary workers, their earnings are seldom more than JD. 35-40 per month. Such labourers may experience short periods of frictional unemployment, during which they return to the 'labour pools'. The latter exist in the main Valley settlements, particularly Dier Alla where many immigrants arrive directly from Amman and which is the main marketing centre for the middle and southern Valley. Farmers wishing to hire a number of workers, for a particular task or for a certain period, will go to these pools and collect the workers after negotiating a wage for the day's work. In some cases a relationship will be established and a temporary worker will become a more permanent employee.

Characteristically then migrants move within the Valley, frequently holding several jobs during their stay, often on a daily basis. Few have work permits since their chief advantage is mobility and availability at short notice. Work permit regulations would require them to obtain a certificate of release from each employer. The majority remain in the Valley until the low season (June to August) when labour demand is more than halved, and many migrants return to Amman.

9.6.4 Data on wage rates for the Jordan Valley are, given the informal hiring procedures, particularly limited. Salt and Keeley (1976) reported a rapid rise in farm wages

(for Jordanians) over the period 1971-76. Wages had risen from JD. 0.150/hour in 1971 to JD. 0.200/hour in 1973; and to JD. 0.250/hour in 1975/76, rising to JD. 300-0.350/hour during harvesting and other peak periods.[62]

A more recent survey conducted by USAID (Hyslop, 1979) suggests a subsequent rise in the wage rate for Jordanian daily workers to JD. 0.300-0.500 (see table 9.15). This survey also shows wage rates for foreign daily-hired labour to be somewhat lower, in the range of JD. 0.300-0.400 per hour. Moreover Hyslop suggests that: "... wages this spring were the same or lower than a year ago. This was attributed to the large inflows of Egyptian workers."[63] Although this survey reveals a differential between Jordanian and non-Jordanian wage rates (of JD. 0.100) that differential is likely to be depressed by the large number of women in the Jordanian sample.[64]

In March 1980 the author conducted a similar survey, in the Dier Alla area, of wage rates for Jordanian and non-Jordanian male labour. The latter showed non-Jordanian temporary labour wage rates to range from JD. 0.250-0.350 per hour (JD. 1-1.750 per day). For Jordanians the range was from JD. 0.500-0.625 per hour (JD. 2.000-3.250 per day). Jordanian females were paid at a similar or slightly lower rate than the non-Jordanian labourers.[65] Dajani et al. (1980) argue that the availability of relatively cheap foreign labour has been a major factor in the decline of unpaid female employment.[66]

It should be recognized that very few Jordanian farm workers are engaged on a daily basis. The majority are employed more permanently (three or more months) and may

earn JD. 80-100 per month. Non-Jordanian labour hired on a similar medium term basis received only JD. 50-55 per month. Despite these low wage rates non-Jordanian labourers minimize living costs, the majority live in makeshift shelters, relying on a minimal diet of bread and tea which may be provided by the employer and supplemented with vegetable produce from the fields. It is only through such personal deprivation that these immigrants are able to survive and to save.[67]

The evidence presented here suggests that current wage rates for immigrant workers have been forced below their 1978-9 levels while those for Jordanians have been maintained or even increased. This contention is confirmed by Firky (1979) who suggests that: "... if two years ago the Jordanian labourer may have accepted a JD. 1.000 for his services, today he does not accept less than JD. 3.000 or JD. 4.000 a day ..."[68] We will return to the implications of these wage rate differentials later.

9.7 Conclusion: the demand for immigrant workers, labour scarcity versus social control

9.7.1 This chapter has examined three related aspects of development in the East Jordan Valley: (i) agricultural development; (ii) demographic change; (iii) labour market evolution. Developments in the agricultural sector, the expansion of irrigated area, changes in the land tenure pattern, the predominance of vegetable crops and the adoption of labour and capital intensive techniques have all acted to increase the demand for labour, particularly for hired labour. This has been reinforced by developments outside the Valley economy, the 'tight' national labour

market provides greater opportunities in Amman for rural emigrants (as a consequence of international labour migration) and has stimulated rapid wage inflation. This has not only reduced the potential Jordanian population willing to settle in the Jordan Valley but has also encouraged out-migration of Valley residents, particularly of young males. The result of these pressures, in particular the collapse of the unpaid (family) labour market, has been an increase in the volume of hired labour the majority of whom are non-Jordanian immigrants.[69] It is suggested here that in 1978-9 approximately 80% of agricultural employees were non-Jordanians.

The demand for immigrant workers has been seen largely in terms of labour scarcity.[70] In this view immigrant workers play a purely supplementary role, filling vacancies created by the expansion of irrigated area and the shortfall in indigenous labour supply. This view can only offer a partial explanation for the labour market development in the East Jordan Valley. In particular it ignores two important considerations: (i) wage rate differentials and (ii) the social organization of production and the rate of profit. These will be considered in the following section.

9.7.2 We have demonstrated that wage inflation has increased the average wage for Jordanian agricultural employees from JD. 0.150 per hour in 1971 to JD. 0.600 per hour in 1980. In 1975 Sharab had found that landowners preferred to lease land because this was cheaper than having to hire labourers to work it. Sharab claims that this was: "... due to the high wages of farm labour and to the scarcity of that labour especially during the peak periods

of farm activity ..."[71]

For non-Jordanians however wage rates are lower, at JD. 0.300 per hour in 1980, and falling. If non-Jordanians were merely supplementing the supply of labour there would not be such a differential. Firky's (1979) interviews with Valley inhabitants provide an interesting insight: "... in Tel el-Arbein the youth say they prefer remaining unemployed than working at the socially demeaning salaries of the foreign labourers ..."[72] Rising aspirations and wage demands from Jordanian labourers have encouraged employers to seek alternative and cheaper labour supplies.

Immigrant labourers offer further advantages beyond their remuneration levels. Agricultural employment in the Jordan Valley is predominantly seasonal. Although this seasonality is being reduced with the spread of plasticulture techniques, there are still strong peaks in demand with the installation of plastic covers and drip irrigation systems and during the extended harvesting periods. These variations in labour demand require the landowner to utilise a flexible labour supply that can be hired on an hourly or daily basis and laid off at will. Clearly the immigrant workers with few formal ties to specific locations and legally vulnerable, can be moved easily within the Valley on a short term basis. In contrast the short term local mobility of the indigenous labour force is more restricted. As Firky (1979) suggests: "The mobility of the Jordanian agricultural labourers, native inhabitants of the Ghors, is limited within the Valley, though many emigrate to the cities and outside the country for work."[73]

9.7.3 Although capital inputs into the new farming

technologies being adopted in the Valley, are high (table 9.16) the single largest production expenditure is the cost of labour (table 9.17). Labour costs vary from 39% to 54% of total input costs for the production of tomatoes and cucumbers under plastic covers. In the production of cucumbers under plastic houses with drip irrigation the labour cost in the 1978-9 season was estimated at JD. 150 per dunum. If the farmer had hired Jordanian labour this element of the variable costs would have risen to JD. 250-300 per dunum, significantly reducing the rate of profit and increasing the payback time on the initial investment. With an estimated life of only one or two years for the plastic covers the room for manoeuvring within the profit margin is particularly limited. Steitieh's survey of permanent labour working under plastic covers demonstrates that in 1978-9 some 90% of labour input came from non-Jordanians. By 1979-80 this had risen to 97% as the number of non-Jordanians increased by 111% while the employment of Jordanians fell to only 30.

The requirement of a cheap labour supply is also evident in the case of sharecropping. Dajani (1979) describes the organization of this system in the following terms: "A typical share-cropping family enters into an annual contract with the landowner. The contract stipulates that the landowner or his agent will provide the farmer with a subsistence loan or advance of between JD. 200-500 which will be repaid with interest at the end of the cropping season."[74] Interest rates are high, in the order of 10% for 6-9 months. In return for supplying all the inputs apart from labour, the owner's agent also sets the

price for purchasing the produce and the farmer is prohibited from trading on the open market. Dajani suggests that few farmers manage to break-even and thus continue in debt with no alternative but to continue to work the land and to accept the terms dictated. The sharecroppers only opportunity to reduce his outlay lies in obtaining the cheapest labour possible. Until the mid 1970's, as demonstrated above, this was largely met through the employment of unpaid family labour. Growing school enrolments and alternative employment opportunities (in the Valley's service sector and in Amman) have reduced the supply of such labour.

Some of the deficit in supply of cheap labour is made up by the employment of female labour (hence the growth in temporary paid female employment) but it is predominantly achieved by reliance on immigrant labour.

9.7.4 Tight labour market conditions in Jordan and the resultant wage inflation created the conditions for secondary labour market evolution. Employers eager to maintain their profit margins sought a cheaper labour supply through increased reliance on paid female labour and by importing Egyptian workers whose wage rates were determined more by expectations in the Nile Valley than by prevailing conditions in Amman or ultimately in Riyadh. With the expanding labour demand in the Valley non-Jordanian labour is not simply <u>replacing</u> indigenous labour but is actively <u>displacing</u> a more expensive labour force. Furthermore the availability of this cheap, mobile labour supply is itself a significant factor in the adoption of new capital and labour intensive production techniques. The landowner no

longer regards it as cheaper to lease land but finds it more profitable to hire labour. Immigrant labour cannot be said to be merely maintaining the development momentum as Sinclair claims, but is clearly an important factor in shaping the characteristics of that development.

In conclusion it appears that immigrant labour is playing a key role in keeping wages down and raising the rate of profit in the agricultural sector.

Notes

1. A review of literature referring to this region reveals considerable confusion regarding the definition of sub-areas within the Jordan Valley. This note seeks to obviate this disorder and to define the terms used in the discussion. Reference should be made to figures 9.1 and 9.2.

   The term East Jordan Valley as used here refers to the area between the river Yarmouk in the north and the Dead Sea, which lies below sea level and on the east bank of the river Jordan. This definition complies with that used by the Jordan Valley Commission (1975), the Department of Statistics Social and Economic Survey (1973), Agricultural Census of 1978 and the Pilot Population Census 1978.

   Department of Statistics agricultural sample surveys refer to the 'Ghors'. This is a broader term which includes areas south of the Dead Sea in the Lower Rift Valley. The latter comprises the 'Southern Ghors' (Wadi Ibn Hammad to Wadi al-Ghuyab) and 'Wadi Araba' (Wadi al-Ghuyab to Aqaba). The Ghors are usually subdivided into three regions:

   (1) Northern Ghors : Adasiyeh-Balawina
   (2) Middle Ghors : Dirar-Sweimeh
   (3) Southern Ghors : Hadithah-Fifah.

   The Southern Ghors and Wadi Araba are not discussed in this text since they lie outside the coverage of the Jordan Valley Development Plan.

   The Northern and Middle Ghors are themselves generally divided into three sub-districts:

   (1) Steitieh et al. (1980) -
       (a) northern region : Adasiyeh-Wadi Kufranja
       (b) middle region : Wadi Kufranja-Muthallatha al-Masri
       (c) southern region : Masri-Dead Sea

   (2) Social and Economic Survey (1973) -
       (a) northern sub area : Adasiyeh-Wadi Qarin
       (b) middle sub area : Wadi Qarin-South of Karameh
       (c) southern sub area : South of Karameh-Dead Sea

   (3) Pilot Population Census 1978 -
       (a) Agwar Shamalya : Adasiyeh-Balawina
       (b) Deir Alla : Khazmah-Dhahrat er-Ramil
       (c) Shuna Janubia : Dhahrat er-Ramil-Suweima.

   The major area of overlap between these definitions is between the 1973 survey and the 1978 census. In order to make these data sets comparable a further subdivision has been made (see table 9.7), this is discussed in the text where appropriate. Note that land measurements are quoted in dunums (d.), in Jordan 1 dunum = 0.1 ha.

2. For example see: Swanson, J.C. (1979) 'Some consequences of emigration for rural development in the Yemen Arab Republic'. MEJ, vol. 33 (1) pp. 34-44.

Abadan-Unat, N. et al. (1976) Migration and development: a study of the effect of international migration on Bogazilyan district.

Birks, J.S. and Letts, S.E. (1977) 'Diqal and Muqaydah: dying oases in Arabia'. TESG, vol. 68 (3) pp. 143-9.

3. See Ionides, M.G. (1939) 'Report on the water resources of Transjordan and their development'. Referring to the Valley he writes: "... it is here that the only opportunity for rapid economic development is to be found ..."

4. Sinclair, C.A. (1980) untitled manuscript.

5. Salt, A. and Keeley, W. (1976) 'Manpower development in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with special reference to the East Jordan Valley'. Note that the terms 'farm worker requirements" and 'labour force requirements' are not synonymous. The former refers to the total labour input on each agricultural holding. This comprises both permanent, temporary and occasional labour. Furthermore many labourers work on more than one holding. Hence farm worker requirements are larger than the total labour force engaged in agriculture.

6. Department of Statistics (1973) Social and economic survey of the East Jordan Valley, 1973. p. 27.

7. JVC (1975) Jordan Valley Development Plan, 1975-1982.

8. Baker, M. and Harza Engineering (1955) Yarmouk-Jordan Valley Project: Master Plan Report. Volume 1, p. 14.

9. JVC (1972) Rehabilitation and Development Plan of the Jordan Valley.

10. Keller, J. (1977) 'Water management technology: sprinkler irrigation, Jordan training program'. Note that Keller questions the viability of introducing sprinkler irrigation to the East Jordan Valley.

11. Stage I Projects are: Kafrein-Hisban; Zarka river project; 18 km. Extension Project and the Zarka Triangle Project.

12. Graham-Brown, S., MEED, vol. 24 (4) 25 January 1980, p. 3. 'Maqarin dam offers medium term answers'. The Maqarin Dam is now to provide 100 Mn.m^3 per annum of industrial and domestic water to Amman plus 26 Mn.m^3 per annum to Irbid, hence the reduction in water allocation to irrigation.

13. Dar-al-Handasah/Harza (1977) Jordan Valley Development Plan Stage II: Feasibility Report.

14. Seccombe, I.J. (1981) Manpower and migration: the effects of international labour migration on agricultural development in the East Jordan Valley, 1973-80. pp. 36-40.

This study presented three land re-distribution scenarios with a 310,000 d. irrigated base and re-calculated farm worker requirements. Growth in the number of farm workers was estimated at 35,377; 42,829 and 44,402 with varying land reform implementation.

15. Walpole to Crawford, 3.4.1949, PRO, FO 371/75289.

16. Spencer, J.N. (1958) 'Development principles for the East Ghor Canal Scheme'. Spencer advised that: "... landowners must be owner-operators and not absentee landowners renting their land to tenants or farming them by proxy ... the ultimate objective of the project is to create a class of owner-operators with economic size holdings."

17. For a detailed discussion of the land reform programme see: Hazleton, J.E. (1974) The impact of the East Ghor Canal Project on land consolidation, distribution and tenure.

18. Official Gazette no. 2700 (May 1977) 'Jordan Valley development Law: Temporary Law no. 18 for the year 1977'. See article 24, section 9 (Arabic).

19. Dar-al-Handasah/NEDCO (1969) The Jordan Valley Project: agro- and socio-economic study. Volume IV, appendix K, p. 92 comments on land redistribution in the original project area: "... in almost all matters left to the discretion of the various committees as well as to the discretion of the Authority, the tendency has been towards leniency than towards a strict interpretation of the provisions of the law."

20. A 30 d. holding should not be regarded as inviolable since small holdings cultivated with high yielding modern techniques can constitute a larger business than a 50 d. holding cultivated with open field irrgation methods. USAID/University of Jordan (1980) 'Agricultural sector assessment' The authors suggest (p. 25) that with wide variations in cost and return (from $ 1,800 to $30,000) even on farms varying only 10 d. in size, the conventional wisdom of using land area to represent the 'small farmer' is misleading. The 1962 Land Reform Census limited the minimum size of holdings on 'productive' lands to 30 d. and on 'marginal' lands to 50 d. was based on the recommendations of the IBRD 1957 programme. The alternative to retaining these smallholdings would however have been strict enforcement of the land reform stipulations, this dispossessing a large number of smallholders.

21. Salt, A. and Keeley, W. (1976) op. cit. p. 81.

22. Forms of land tenancy are discussed by Sharab, H. (1975) Agro-economic aspects of tenancy in the East Jordan Valley.

23. Barhoum, M. (1976) 'East Jordan Valley villagers versus social institutions'. Notes five different forms of the sharecropping relationship: 50:50 system; 67%; 60%; 33% and 25%.

24. A discussion of conditions in the pre-East Ghor Canal period is contained in: Department of Statistics, (1961) The East Jordan Valley: a social and economic survey.

25. Hazleton, J.E. (1974) op. cit. p. 38.

26. Steitieh, A.M. and Musa, A.H. (1981) 'Some aspects of technological development in the farming systems of the East Jordan Valley 1977-80'. Under a share-cropping arrangement using plastic covers and drip irrigation tenants pay a contribution of JD. 20-30 per dunum towards these inputs.

27. Sharab, H. (1975) op. cit. pp. 46-53.

28. The 1977 Law no. 18 stipulated the introduction of a three year lease, however this was not specified as a written lease and the extent to which it has been implemented is unclear.

29. Quashair, F. (1980) 'Report on the JVFA credit program'.

30. The term cropping intensity refers to the margin between the area harvested and the area cultivated.

31. In 1979 the government began promoting tomato production by offering a minimum price of JD. 50 per ton. Prices for other vegetables are set by the Ministry of Supply who establish a maximum consumer price without specifying minimum farm-gate prices.

32. Data on the yield and production of crops in this and the following section has (except for 1975) been taken from the annual sample surveys in the Ghors. These are based on a 6% sample (418 holdings) from the 1975 Agricultural Census. Results are from both the autumn and spring seasons. The 1978 Agricultural Census includes data on the autumn season only, thus making the two censuses strictly incomparable. The 1978 sample survey results, covering both seasons, have been used here. USAID regard the latter with some suspicion (see USAID/University of Jordan (1980) op. cit. p. 26) commenting that: "... across the board sharp increases in yields in 1978 for crops grown in the Jordan Valley does not, to our knowledge, reflect either changes in weather nor widespread changes in cultivation practices." However Hazleton, J.E. (1980) in: Dajani, J.S. et al. 'An interim evaluation of the Jordan Valley Development effort, 1973-80', suggests that the results may be due to the distorting effects of the drought and the impact of increased intensification with drip irrigation and plastic covers.

33. JVC (1975) op. cit. p. A19. The 1976-80 Five Year Plan calls for increased livestock production to reduce dependence on imports. This was to be based on expanded fodder production from several irrigation projects but primarily the Jordan Valley. The latter was expected to produce 38,000 tons of clover and 16,000 tons of maize by 1980. Mazur, M.P. (1979) Economic growth and development in Jordan, suggests (p. 193) that: "... the economic merit of the planned expansion in beef and dairy production has not been established" and that progress in non-poultry livestock production requires: "... the adoption of a particularly demanding package ... that would constitute a revolution in land-use practices."

34. Hazleton, J.E. (1980) op. cit. p. 6, predicts that the increased rainfall of 1979-80 would enable full irrigation of the Stage I lands in 1980-1 or 1981-2 and would facilitate the introduction of sprinkler irrigation. This was however unlikely given the growing private sector preference for drip irrigation and the predominance of vegetable crops.

35. Dar-al-Handasah/Harza (1977) op. cit. p. 81.

36. Drip irrigation and plastic covers have not received unanimous support. In particular the intensification of agriculture has been held responsible for increased disease problems, for example the spread of yellow leaf curl virus has reduced tomato yields well below potential. The diffusion of the latter has been aided by the adoption of plastic covers which enable the Tobacco whitefly (Bemesia Tabacci), the disease vector, to survive the winter. See: Stevens, M.A. (1977) 'Incidence and control of diseases in tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplants and peppers under drip irrigation in the Jordan Valley', and, Hyslop, J.D. (1979) 'Tomato production in the Jordan Valley: a report on a survey of tomato producers'. Additionally, Hazleton, J.E. (1980) op. cit. pp. 98-9, points out that there has been growing soil salinity in the southern areas of the Valley as a direct result of the year round mono-cultivation under plastic covers and suggests that this poses a serious threat to the long term viability of such agricultural production.

Despite these problems short term price incentives are clear. Average prices (fils/kg.) for the 1976-7 season show the advantages of being able to produce a larger crop during the winter months:

	Tomato	Cucumber (fils/kg.)
1976		
October	57	94
November	89	143
December	111	217
1977		
January	132	355
February	219	269

March	124	272
April	117	180
May	61	165
June	80	153
July	76	100
August	65	132

Source: derived from Steitieh, A.M. et al. (1978) A manual for the main vegetable crops grown in the East Jordan Valley. Table 9, p. 81. Data is based on average wholesale prices in the vegetable markets of Amman, Irbid and Zarka.

Also compare the average price (JD./ton for 1976-7) received for crops grown under plastic covers with those grown by traditional methods:

	Traditional	Plastic houses and drip	Plastic tunnels and surface	Open field and drip
Tomato	100	150	-	120
Cucumber	120	205	230	-

Source: ibid.

37. The size of plastic houses varies from 200-600 m^2 with a mean of 500-550 m^2. See Steitieh, A.M. and Musa, A.H. (1981) op. cit. p. 18.

38. idem. (1980) Vegetables grown plastic covers and drip irrigation systems in the East Jordan Valley.

39. In 1946 there were only eight permanent settlements in the East Jordan Valley, see Kendall, H. (1949) Village development in Palestine, p. 92.

40. Details of these plans are found in Khouri, R. (1982) The Jordan Valley: life and society below sea-level. Ch. 4.

41. Baker, M. and Harza Engineering (1953) Yarmouk-Jordan Valley Project: Appraisal Report.

42. The 1961 census shows a population of 29,357 in the northern sub-district. However disaggregated data are not available for the two southern districts in Balqa. By abstracting settlements from the Balqa data on the basis of their known location in the Jordan Valley (according to the 'Town and Village Index' published in the Official Gazette (no. 2397) of 31 December 1972, Arabic) we estimate the population of Dier Alla at 5,268 and Shuna Janubia at 5,600.

43. Department of Statistics (1961) op. cit. table 46, p. 108.

44. Harris, W.W. (1978) 'War and settlement change: the Golan Heights and the Jordan Rift, 1967-77'. TIBG, vol. 3 (3) pp. 309-30. Similarly Ware, J.A. (1978) estimates that there were 95,000 inhabitants in the Valley by late 1967, in: 'Housing for low income

families in less developed countries: a case study in Jordan' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse University).

45. Mohammad Hussein Ali, JVA (Policy Analysis Unit), personal communication, March 1980. (Note that the JVC was replaced by the JVA in May 1977, the latter took over all work formerly divided between the JVC, Jordan Rivers and Tributaries Regional Corporation and the Natural Resources Authority).

46. JVA/Department of Statistics (1980) 'East Jordan Valley pilot census, November 1978' (Arabic). Unpublished results from this and from returns to the 1979 National Census were collated by the author. Note that if we accept Ware's (1978) statement that there were 75,000 in the Valley in March 1977 then their growth rate is reduced further. Ware gives his source as an unpublished and untitled JVC document. See Ware, J.A. (1978) op. cit.

47. Azar, W. p. 17 in: Department of Statistics (1973) op. cit.

48. This pattern of population growth is confirmed by housing data from the 1978 pilot census. The latter shows that in Dier Alla 18% of housing units were built since 1976 compared to 13% in Shuna Janubia and 8% in Agwar Shamalya.

49. Ware, J.A. (1978) op. cit.

50. Rhoda, R. (1980) in: Dajani, J.S. et al. op. cit. p. 116.

51. Further evidence of population decline is apparent from the data on 'farm population' in the 1975 and 1978 agricultural censuses. The latter declined substantially in both Agwar Shamalya and Dier Alla, particularly among the female population (by 29% and 24% respectively). In Shuna Janubia however the farm population continued to increase (by 14%) as the productive base in the south became more stable. Despite this overall decline, the population living on agricultural holdings who were not members of the holders household increased, in Dier Alla by 247% (males). Although this increase was from a small base it is indicative of an important trend highlighted earlier, the increasing reliance on hired labour. The age-sex distribution of this itinerant population shows a dominance of males aged 15-54 (77% of the total).

52. A fall on the 1973 figure may be appropriate given the increase in school enrolments, particularly among girls.

53. Steitieh, A.M. and Musa, A.H. (1980) op. cit. p. 12. Note that in April 1979 Jordan broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt following the Egypt-Israel peace

treaty. In June 1980 an unknown group, the Jordanian Arab Masses Organization, carried out a bomb attack on Alia's Rome office as a protest against Jordan's continued dealings with Egypt and in particular the high level of Egyptian employment in Jordan. See: MEED, vol. 24 (25) 20 June 1980, p. 32.

54. Seitieh, A.M., and Musa, A.H. (1981) op. cit. p. 10. Note that Jordanian employment fell from 48 to 30.

55. In 1980 the Ministry of Labour's two Employment Offices in the Jordan Valley (Dier Alla and North Shuna) issued 2,154 work permits to non-Jordanians, 97% of which went to Egyptians. This may appear relatively small but it must be recalled that the agricultural sector is outside the Labour Law and that large numbers are hired on a daily basis in Amman or working without certificates (under the twelve week rule), see Chapter 8.4.

56. The Jordan Valley is particularly popular at this time of year because of its mild climate compared to the highlands. The population has also been inflated by its inclusion of those waiting to enter the West Bank.

57. Rhoda, R. (1980) op. cit. p. 116.

58. Department of Statistics (1961) op. cit. pp. 78-107 uses a similar method.

59. Increased employment of under 15 population as temporary and occasional labour need not be inconsistent with a growth in school enrolments in the Valley of 59% between 1972/3 and 1978/9. Although female enrolments increased by 76% the proportion of enroled girls still falls far short (at 59% for those aged 10-14) of the potential and of enrolments in other areas (see chapter 6.7.4). It is also apparent that the bulk of this increased employment has occurred in Shuna Janubia where enrolment rates are poorest. Despite absolute increases in the employment of those under 15, the relative proportion of under 15's in employment has fallen.

60. Salt, A. and Keeley, W. (1976) op. cit. p. 120.

61. Rhoda, R. (1980) op. cit., believes the number of Jordanian employees in the agricultural sector may have fallen to 6-800 by mid-1980.

62. Salt, A. and Keeley, W. (1976) op. cit. pp. 126-7. Ware, J.A. (1978) op. cit. attributes wage inflation in the 1971-3 period to the non-return of women and children after the war. This may be a factor in the earliest of these years but as we have shown above, the 1973 age/sex structure does not have a deficit of children or women. The 1975 agricultural census clearly reveals the importance of such labour. Ware's survey of wage rates (September 1976) in the Jordan Valley

construction sector are slightly higher than those of Salt and Keeley:

Unskilled labour
1973 JD. 0.625/day
1976 JD. 0.930-1.395/day

Skilled labour
1973 n.a.
1976 JD. 2.325/day

Note that the source gives these rates in US $, these have been converted using appropriate mid-year exchange rates.

63. Hyslop, J.P. (1979) op. cit. p. 29.

64. Personal communication, March 1980.

65. This is confirmed by the Stage II consultant's report which shows that Jordanian women were paid at about half the rate of men (at JD. 0.250/hour). Arthur D. Little Inc. (1979) 'Environmental assessment for the proposed Maqarin dam and Jordan Valley irrigation systems project'.

66. Dajani, J.S. et al. (1980) op. cit. pp. 184-5.

67. Bollinger, C. (1982) 'Jordan keeps vigil on schistosomiasis', Front Lines, vol. 21 (7) p. 13, discusses the introduction of schistosomiasis into the Jordan Valley via Egyptian workers, some 23% of whom have been found to be infected, an indication of their socio-economic status.

68. Firky, M. (1979) 'The Maqarin dam and the East Jordan Valley: social analysis for the Maqarin dam project'. p. 26.

69. In addition it is apparent from the discussion in section 9.5 that former permanently unpaid female labour has increasingly switched to temporary paid employment.

70. The labour scarcity view is propounded by Rhoda, R. (1980) op. cit. and by Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1980a) International migration and development in the Arab region.

71. Sharab, H. (1975) op. cit. p. 19.

72. Firky, M. (1979) op. cit. p. 26.

73. ibid. p. 24.

74. Dajani, J.S. (1979) A baseline socio-economic study of the Southern Ghors and Wadi Araba. p. 16.

Table 9.1

East Jordan Valley: projected change in manpower requirement on irrigated farms 1976-87/8

Influencing factor	1976	1977/8	1982/3	1987/8
Increase in irrigated area	100.0	166.0	284.1	284.1
Land re-distribution programme	100.0	115.0	122.5	122.5
Increased cropping intensity	100.0	100.0	110.8	125.9
Changed cropping pattern	100.0	97.7	96.1	96.1
Technological change	100.0	100.0	100.0	95.0
TOTAL	100.0	186.5	370.6	399.9
Farm workers	22,418	37,568	67,640	64,258
Labour force	11,438	19,167	34,429	32,707
Labour input per member	100.0	100.3	112.1	125.3

Source: derived from Salt, A. and Keeley, W. (1976) op. cit. (various tables). Author's collation.

Table 9.2

East Jordan Valley: Land tenure by location 1975 and 1978

Tenure type	AGWAR SHAMALYA				DIER ALLA				SHUNA JANUBIA			
	1975		1978		1975		1978		1975		1978	
	% holdings	% area	% holdings	% area	% holdings	% area	% holdings	% area	% holdings	% area	% holdings	% area
Fully owned	43.2	45.3	47.2	47.6	30.2	32.7	43.7	30.8	17.4	18.9	23.4	53.2
Sharecropped	10.6	7.2	10.1	7.7	30.2	24.0	36.8	24.7	41.8	28.1	51.8	25.2
Fixed rent	34.6	31.0	39.0	38.2	32.0	31.9	13.2	10.5	37.1	41.8	22.3	13.5
Others	11.7	16.4	3.7	6.4	7.6	11.3	6.4	26.0	3.7	11.9	2.5	8.1
Total (area in '000 d.)	3,162	132.6	2,546	87.1	1,720	58.3	1,200	43.5	1,125	46.4	1,250	50.1

Source: (i) Department of Statistics (1976) General results of the agricultural census, 1975. (various tables)

(ii) idem. (1981) Results of the agricultural census in the Jordan Valley, 1978. (various tables) Author's collation.

Table 9.3

East Jordan Valley: Monthly labour requirements for selected crops (man-hours/dunum)

Crop	Monthly Labour Requirements
Eggplant	161
Tomatoes	144
Peppers	126
Beans	98
Squash	95
Alfalfa*	37
Maize	32
Wheat	16
Citrus Fruits	136
Bananas	210

Source: derived from Dar-al-Handasah (1969) op. cit. Appendix E, table 14. Author's collation.

* : Labour requirement for alfalfa (using traditional irrigation) is taken from Binnie et al. (1978) 'Mujib and southern Ghors irrigation project: feasibility report'. Table VI.12.

Table 9.4

East Jordan Valley: growth and distribution of plastic houses, tunnels and drip irrigation systems 1977/8-1979/80 (dunums)

Region	Tunnels		Houses		Open field with drip irrigation
	Drip	Surface	Drip	Surface	
North					
1878/9	-	22	19	83.4	-
1979/80	-	-	75.4	76.2	-
Middle					
1978/9	67	279	241	284.6	-
1979/80	150	774	576.5	513.0	-
South					
1978/9	1,528	4,119	63.9	52.7	-
1979/80	1,504	4,799	82.3	42.9	-
Total					
1977/8	385	3,140	106	179	-
1978/9	1,595	4,420	324	421	8,514
1979/80	1,654	5,573	734	632	16,603

Source: Steitieh, A.M. and Musa, A.H. (1981) op. cit. various tables (Author's collation).

Table 9.5

East Jordan Valley: Housing units by date of completion and location, pre 1948-1973

Year	North	Middle	South	Total
Pre-1948	133	126	77	336
1948-1950	561	194	454	1,209
1951-1954	505	272	112	889
1955-1959	381	470	151	1,002
1960-1964	1,095	1,003	406	2,504
1965-1966	672	741	146	1,559
1967-1969	314	530	140	984
1970-1971	719	500	127	1,346
1972	437	739	208	1,384
Number of units existing, March 1973	4,817	4,575	1,821	11,213

Source: Department of Statistics (1973) op. cit. Table 29. (Author's collation)

Table 9.6

East Jordan Valley: Population in March 1973 by length of residence at location

Area	Since March 1972	March 1971 to Feb. 1972	March 1970 to Feb. 1971	March 1969 to Feb. 1970
Total Valley				
Total	14,975	12,130	13,770	2,097
Male	7,845	6,208	6,978	1,080
Female	7,130	5,922	6,792	1,017
Northern Area				
Total	5,850	7,851	9,631	477
Male	3,024	4,018	4,842	246
Female	2,826	3,833	4,789	231
Middle Area				
Total	7,120	3,612	3,150	1,105
Male	3,759	1,842	1,645	555
Female	3,361	1,770	1,505	550
Southern Area				
Total	2,005	667	989	515
Male	1,062	348	491	279
Female	943	319	498	236

Source: derived from Department of Statistics (1973) op. cit. Table 18. (Author's collation)

Table 9.7

East Jordan Valley: Growth in recorded population by nationality and location, 1973, 1978 and 1979

Village Group*	1973	1978				1979					annual % change**	
		Jordanian		Non-Jordanian								
	Total	Number	% annual growth	Number	Total	Number	% annual growth	Number	% annual growth	Total	1973-8	1973-9
North Shuna/ Manshiya	12,322	12,949	0.9	368	13,317	15,616	3.6	397	7.9	16,013	1.4	4.0
Mashare/ Waqqas	11,972	15,097	4.2	343	15,440	16,348	4.8	821	139.4	17,169	4.6	5.6
Wadi Yabis/ Sleikhat	4,744	4,894	0.5	31	4,925	4,848	0.3	107	245.2	4,955	0.5	0.6
Kreiymeh/ Balawinah	9,675	9,658	-0.1	36	9,694	9,652	-0.1	424	1077.8	10,076	0.1	0.6
Dier Alla/ Damiya	12,559	16,142	4.5	604	16,746	18,232	5.7	2,042	238.1	20,274	5.2	7.4
Karama/ Shuna Janubia	12,730	15,667	3.7	887	16,554	16,838	4.3	1,337	50.7	18,175	4.7	5.5
TOTAL	64,012	74,407	2.7	2,269	76,676	81,534	3.7	5,128	126.0	86,662	3.2	4.6

Source: (i) Department of Statistics (1973) op. cit. pp. 122-7 (Author's compilation);
(ii) JVA/Department of Statistics 'East Jordan Valley pilot census, November 1978' (Author's compilation);
(iii) Unpublished returns to the 1979 National Census (Author's compilation)

Continued ...

Table 9.7 (continued)

Notes

* Village groups are defined here as:

(i) North Shuna/Manshiya

North Shuna	Abu Habil
Adasiyeh	Al-Mudraseh
Manshiyeh	Majid
Buseilia	Mukhalath al-Tahta
Abu Falah	Al-Maqarin
Abu Sidu	Ma'ad
Al-Bakura	

(ii) Mashare/Waqqas

Mashare	Ziglab
Waqqas	Karakameh
Qleit al-Jasoureh	Tabquet Fahl
Zamaliah	Sil al-Hamma
Al-Azbeh	Basiylieh
Sheikh Muhamad	Abu Ziyad
Tel el Arabein	Ghadin
Harawiyeh	Mukhaltha al-Fuqa

(iii) Wadi el Yabis/Sleikhat

Wadi el Yabis	Al-Aramsheh
Sleikhat	El-Merazzeh
Kharbat Murshid	Hamma Ghor al-Arabein
El Qurn	El-Madraj
Subeira	Zour al-Muqbarah
Abu Farah	

(iv) Kreiymeh/Balawina

Kreiymeh	El-Marayheh (with El-Faqir)
Balawina	El-Sukhnat
Abu Obeideh	Shihdat
Khazmah	El-Faddiyyin

(v) Dier Alla/Damiya

Dier Alla	Basakhneh
El Arda	El-Diyat
Damiya	Tel el-Mintah
Dhurar	Al-Buquiliah
El Dhabab	Zour al-Maqbarah
Abu Zieghan	Abu Najrah
Sawalha	Tel el-Fukhar
Al-Rabi	Tel el-Ramel
Al-Atwal al-Shamalya	Maysara al-Jadida
Mu'adi	Karkamah
Dhahrat er-Ramel	Muthalath al-Masri
Maisara el-Ruweiha	

(vi) Karama/Shuna Janubia

Karama	Jawfat el-Kafrein
Shuna Janubia	El-Ramah
El-Tawda	Hajajira
Sukmat al-Shuna	Sweima
Kafrein	Ghor Nimrin

Continued ...

(Table 9.7 (continued)

Note that not all these villages appear in all three enumerations.

** Compound growth rates are calculated using 5.67 years for 1973-8 and 6.67 years for 1973-9.

Table 9.8

East Jordan Valley: Jordanian population by sex and location in 1973, 1978 and 1979

Village Group	1973 Male	1973 Female	1973 Sex ratio	1978 Male	1978 Female	1978 Sex ratio	1979 Male	1979 Female	1979 Sex ratio
North Shuna/ Manshiya	6,348	5,984	106.1	6,667	6,282	106.1	8,069	7,547	106.9
Mashare/ Waqqas	6,143	5,829	105.4	7,735	7,362	105.1	8,236	8,112	101.5
Wadi Yabis/ Sleikhat	2,410	2,334	103.3	2,481	2,413	102.8	2,395	2,453	97.6
Kreiymeh/ Balawina	5,055	4,620	109.4	4,953	4,705	105.3	4,904	4,748	103.3
Dier Alla/ Damiya	6,542	6,017	108.7	8,409	7,733	108.7	9,394	8,838	106.3
Karama/ Shuna Janoubia	6,661	6,069	109.8	8,067	7,600	106.1	8,622	8,216	104.9
TOTAL	33,159	30,853	107.5	38,312	36,095	106.1	41,620	39,914	104.3

Source: As table 9.7 (Author's compilation).

Table 9.9

East Jordan Valley: % growth rates (compound) of Jordanian population by sex and location 1973-1978 and 1973-1979

Village Group	1973-1978 Male	1973-1978 Female	1973-1979 Male	1973-1979 Female
North Shuna/ Manshiya	0.87	0.86	3.66	3.54
Mashare/ Waqqas	4.15	4.21	4.50	5.08
Wadi Yabis/ Sleikhat	0.51	0.59	-0.09	0.75
Kreiymeh/ Balawina	-0.36	0.32	-0.45	0.41
Dier Alla/ Damiya	4.53	4.53	5.58	5.94
Karama/ Shuna Janoubia	3.44	4.05	3.95	4.65
TOTAL	2.58	2.81	3.47	3.94

Source: As table 9.7 (Author's compilation).

Table 9.10

East Jordan Valley: Age/sex distribution of Jordanian population by region, 1978

Age Group	Agwar Shamalya			Dier Alla and Shuna Janubia		
	Male	Female	Sex Ratio	Male	Female	Sex Ratio
0	965	901	107	719	705	102
1-4	3,441	3,305	104	2,468	2,370	104
5-9	4,013	3,666	109	2,853	2,620	109
10-14	3,469	3,202	108	2,359	2,100	112
15-19	1,297	2,230	58	1,497	1,508	99
20-24	1,459	1,443	101	997	1,018	98
25-29	886	926	96	748	846	88
30-34	879	1,155	76	740	819	90
35-39	921	1,052	86	754	794	95
40-44	918	895	102	765	665	115
45-49	729	630	116	555	417	133
50-54	559	523	107	402	341	118
55-89	387	312	124	301	208	145
60-64	415	333	125	423	242	134
65+	744	599	124	583	435	134
TOTAL	22,082	21,172	104	16,065	15,089	106

Source: as table 9.7 (Author's compilation).

Table 9.11

East Jordan Valley: general pattern of employment change, 1975-1978 (PEE's)

Sub-District	1975		1978		% Annual average growth 1975-1978		
	Paid	Unpaid	Paid	Unpaid	Paid	Unpaid	Total
Agwar Shamalya	6,918	5,825	6,849	3,922	-0.3	-12.4	-5.5
(% distribution)	54.8	45.8	63.6	36.4			
Dier Alla	2,478	3,824	2,811	2,633	+4.3	-11.7	-4.8
(% distribution)	39.3	60.7	51.4				
Shuna Janubia	1,405	2,862	2,312	2,606	+18.1	-3.1	+4.9
(% distribution)	32.9	67.1	47.0	53.0			
TOTAL	10,801	12,511	11,972	9,161	+3.5	-9.9	-3.2
(% distribution)	46.3	53.7	56.7	43.3			

Source: as table 9.2 (Author's compilation).

Table 9.12

East Jordan Valley: Agricultural employment in 1975 and 1978 by sub-district and employment status

(a) Male

Sub-District and Status	Permanent No.	Permanent % total	Temporary No.	Temporary % total	Occasional No.	Occasional % total	Total No.	Total % change
(1) Agwar Shamalya								
(a) Paid Employees								
1975	890	15.5	1,913	33.4	2,925	51.1	5,728	
1978	655	11.6	3,883	68.6	1,124	19.9	5,662	-1.2
(b) Unpaid Employees								
1975	3,698	97.2	68	1.8	38	1.0	3,804	
1978	2,086	82.0	315	12.4	142	5.6	2,543	-33.2
(2) Dier Alla								
(a) Paid Employees								
1975	175	9.0	425	22.0	1,334	69.0	1,934	
1978	343	17.5	493	25.1	1,129	57.5	1,965	+1.6
(b) Unpaid Employees								
1975	2,188	98.4	23	1.0	12	0.6	2,223	
1978	1,441	90.4	67	4.2	85	5.3	1,593	-28.3
(3) Shuna Janubia								
(a) Paid Employees								
1975	208	17.0	245	20.0	772	63.0	1,225	
1978	461	21.2	625	28.7	1,097	50.0	2,180	+78.0
(b) Unpaid Employees								
1975	1,660	98.9	15	1.0	2	0.1	1,677	
1978	1,524	93.7	68	4.2	33	2.0	1,626	-3.0

Table 9.12 (continued)

(b) Female

Sub-District and Status	Permanent No.	Permanent % total	Temporary No.	Temporary % total	Occasional No.	Occasional % total	Total No.	Total % change
(1) Agwar Shamalya								
(a) Paid Employees								
1975	101	8.5	257	21.6	832	69.9	1,190	
1978	102	8.6	722	60.8	363	30.6	1,187	-0.3
Unpaid Employees								
1975	1,828	90.5	140	6.9	53	2.6	2,021	
1978	1,091	79.1	233	16.9	55	4.0	1,379	-31.8
(2) Dier Alla								
(a) Paid Employees								
1975	7	1.3	84	15.4	453	83.3	544	
1978	21	2.5	108	12.8	717	84.8	846	+55.5
Unpaid Employees								
1975	1,479	92.4	68	4.2	54	3.4	1,601	
1978	694	66.7	156	15.0	190	18.3	1,040	-35.0
(3) Shuna Janubia								
(a) Paid Employees								
1975	26	14.4	21	11.7	133	73.9	180	
1978	35	26.5	25	18.9	71	53.8	132	-26.7
Unpaid Employees								
1975	1,132	95.5	47	4.0	6	0.5	1.185	
1978	828	84.5	115	11.7	37	3.8	980	-17.3

Source: as table 9.2 (Author's compilation).

Table 9.13

East Jordan Valley: distribution of non-Jordanians by age, sex and sub-districts, 1978

Age Group	Agwar Shamalya				Dier Alla and Shuna Janubia				Valley Total			
	Male	Female	Total	%	Male	Female	Total	%	Male	Female	Total	%
0	2	2	4	0.5	9	3	12	0.8	11	5	16	0.7
1-4	12	9	21	2.6	31	29	60	4.1	43	38	81	3.6
5-9	7	5	12	1.5	27	28	55	3.8	34	33	67	3.0
10-14	11	4	15	1.8	39	14	53	3.6	50	18	68	3.0
15-19	10	3	13	1.6	25	13	38	2.6	35	16	51	2.2
20-24	88	9	97	12.0	156	21	177	12.2	244	30	274	12.0
25-29	161	11	172	21.3	256	15	271	18.6	417	26	443	19.5
30-34	159	4	163	20.1	230	15	245	16.4	389	19	408	17.9
35-39	145	3	148	18.3	213	8	221	15.2	358	11	369	16.2
40-44	92	-	92	11.4	162	9	171	11.7	254	9	263	11.5
45-49	45	1	46	5.7	85	6	91	6.2	130	7	137	6.0
50-54	9	-	9	1.1	30	5	35	2.4	39	5	44	1.8
55-59	7	-	7	0.9	13	2	15	1.0	20	2	22	1.0
60-64	2	-	2	0.2	3	1	4	0.3	5	1	6	0.3
65+	6	2	8	1.0	7	7	14	0.9	13	9	22	1.0
TOTAL	756	53	809	100	1,286	176	1,462	100	2,042	229	2,271	100

Source: as table 9.7 (Author's compilation).

Table 9.14

East Jordan Valley: Distribution of non-Jordanians by age, sex and nationality, 1978

Age Group	Egyptian			Pakistani			South Korean			Indian			Others		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Less than 1	1	-	1	7	3	10	-	-	-	1	-	1	2	2	4
1-4	1	4	5	30	26	56	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	8	20
5-9	1	2	3	24	23	47	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	8	17
10-14	2	2	4	34	11	45	-	-	-	1	-	1	13	5	18
15-19	8	2	10	14	8	22	2	-	2	7	1	8	4	5	9
20-24	86	12	98	13	8	21	28	-	28	100	-	100	17	10	27
25-29	139	12	151	8	6	14	180	-	180	75	-	75	15	8	23
30-34	108	1	109	14	14	28	216	-	216	45	-	45	6	4	10
35-39	94	-	94	19	7	26	210	-	210	27	-	27	8	4	12
40-44	67	1	68	16	7	23	134	-	134	24	-	24	13	1	14
45-49	45	-	45	5	5	10	68	-	68	8	-	8	4	2	6
50-54	25	-	25	2	4	6	7	-	7	-	-	-	5	1	6
55-59	8	-	8	4	2	6	6	-	6	-	-	-	2	-	2
60-64	2	-	2	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
65+	4	1	5	3	5	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	3	9
TOTAL	591	37	628	194	130	324	851	-	851	288	1	289	118	61	179
Distribution (%)															
Agwar Shamalya			31.7			2.2			43.5			52.6			45.3
Dier Alla & Shuna Janubia			68.3			97.8			56.5			47.4			54.7

Source: as table 9.7 (Author's compilation).

Table 9.15

East Jordan Valley: Wage rates for temporary hired labour, March 1979

Location	Wage rates (JD./hour) Jordanian		Non-Jordanian	
	Mean	Range	Mean	Range
North of Deir Alla	0.484	0.375-0.500	0.397	0.375-0.400
Karama-Dier Alla	0.411	0.340-0.500	0.375	-
South of Karama	0.395	0.286-0.500	0.325	0.300-0.400
All respondents	0.432	0.286-0.500	0.365	0.300-0.400

Source: Hyslop, J. (1979) op. cit. table 13.

Table 9.16

East Jordan Valley: Gross and net returns from cucumber production, varying systems (1978/9)

Farming System	Average Wholesale Price JD./ton	Yield ton/d.	Gross Returns JD./d.	Production Costs JD./d.	Marketing Costs JD./d.	Total Variable Costs JD./d.	Net Returns JD./d.	Initial Capital Investment JD./d.*
Plastic houses with drip	256.0	8.5	2176.0	337.3	313.7	651.0	1525.0	1998.0
Plastic houses with surface irrigation	266.5	6.0	1599.0	296.5	225.8	522.3	1076.7	1718.0
Plastic tunnels with drip	283.0	2.2	622.6	111.4	85.3	196.7	425.9	366.7
Plastic tunnels with surface irrigation	283.0	1.7	481.0	111.7	65.9	177.6	303.4	86.7

Source: Steitieh, A.M. and Musa, A.H. (1980) op. cit. table 17 (Author's compilation).

* : derived from Steitieh, A.M. and Abbas, M.F. (1979) 'A preliminary economic analysis of returns from producing cucumber and tomato under plastic covers and drip irrigation systems'.

Table 9.17

Production costs of cucumber and tomato under plastic covers and drip irrigation systems in the East Jordan Valley, 1978-1979 (JD./d.)

Cost Items	Cucumber				Tomato
	Plastic Houses		Plastic Tunnels		
	Drip	Surface	Drip	Surface	Drip
1. Material Inputs	187.7	156.5	68.3	68.5	37.8
2. Labour Inputs:					
(a) Sowing, replanting	4.5	6.0	1.8	7.0	4.3
(b) Fertiliser application	3.0	10.0	2.6	3.5	2.5
(c) Irrigation	0.0	13.0	0.0	5.4	0.0
(d) Spraying and fumigation	28.3	22.0	4.5	3.0	2.0
(e) Pruning	27.3	35.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
(f) Weeding and hoeing	2.5	14.2	1.8	4.0	3.0
(g) Ventilation	0.0	0.0	5.0	3.9	0.0
(h) Installing drippers and mulch	4.5	0.0	4.1	0.0	4.1
(i) Tunnel installation and removal	0.0	0.0	4.2	5.2	0.0
(j) Plastic removal in houses	5.3	6.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
(k) Harvesting	74.2	52.8	19.1	16.2	28.7
TOTAL LABOUR INPUTS	149.6	138.0	43.1	43.2	44.6
TOTAL MATERIAL AND LABOUR INPUTS	337.3	296.5	111.4	111.7	82.4

Source: Steitieh, A.M. and Musa, A.H. (1980) op. cit. table 15.

PART IV : CONCLUSION

CHAPTER TEN

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN JORDAN: CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

10.1 Preface

The principal objectives of this thesis were earlier summarised as follows:

(i) to review the problems of labour market information gathering in Jordan and of labour market management under conditions of heightened uncertainty;

(ii) to evaluate the formulation of, and constraints on, Jordanian government policy towards labour migration in general and human capital resources in particular;

(iii) to examine the role of immigrant labour in an emigrant economy;

(iv) to build a comprehensive picture of contemporary Jordanian participation in the international labour market and place this in its historical context.

The first of these objectives has been discussed at various points in our preceding analysis. Here we will draw together and review those problems in some detail (section 10.2). The subsequent sections will briefly examine the remaining objectives of the thesis and assess the extent to which those aims have been met.

10.2 A review of the problems of labour market information gathering and of labour market management under conditions of heightened uncertainty

10.2.1 Increasing concern with maladjustments in the Jordanian labour market, particularly with high rates of graduate unemployment, led the government to recognize the

need for a specialised manpower planning unit. This need was fulfilled in 1969 with the establishment of the Manpower Planning Section (MPS).[1] From the outset this unit has been firmly located within the institutional structure of the national planning organization (originally the JDB and later the NPC). This institutional location has played a decisive role in determining the mode of that manpower planning process. The MPS was charged with formulating a macro-scale manpower demand/supply assessment to accompany projected sectoral investment targets.

With the growing exodus of Jordanian workers in the mid-1970's the critical question facing the MPS was the extent to which emigration for employment would limit the attainment of the five year plan's objectives. Although the MPS was responsible for elaborating (but not implementing) a labour supply strategy to meet projected requirements, the characteristics of that strategy were constrained from the outset by the government's determination (albeit with reservation) to maintain its 'open-door policy' (Anani and Jaber, 1980) towards labour emigration.[2]

Having accepted that initial restriction the role of the MPS has been frustrated by the substantial lacuna of consistent, reliable and relevant labour market information, particularly with regard to emigration for employment.

As a result of these characteristics manpower planning in Jordan has been discontinuous, highly aggregate and operationally irrelevant.[3] Manpower 'planning' is little more than a manpower requirements forecast presented with successive development plans. Even within the limits of an aggregate manpower requirements forecast the MPS has had little success (see chapter 7.7). Given the significant

constraints under which the MPS operates it is perhaps not surprising to find a lack of direction in its work. However, the extensive participation of Jordanian manpower on a highly unpredictable international labour market ascribes an increased importance to the effective formulation, implementation and evaluation of labour market policies, rather than any diminuition of such responsibility, as the MPS have assumed. Under conditions of heightened uncertainty the need is not simply for a more accurate manpower assessment, but rather for the adoption of contingency planning and the maintenance of a flexible labour market response through education and training.

10.2.2 To be effective, labour market management (including medium term manpower planning) must be a continuous activity based on the evaluation and monitoring of continuous labour market information. At present such signals are both intermittent and confused; as a result the aims of manpower planners and the abilities of labour market managers are increasingly divorced. The present structure of labour market management, fragmented between the MPS and the MOL, substitutes the monitoring and evaluation of labour market signals by the appointment of ad hoc committees to examine successive labour market crises and to recommend remedial action. This approach has all too often been time-consuming and ineffective.

The pre-requisite for formulating an effective labour market strategy from the perspective of contingency planning must be the establishment of a continuous and reliable labour market information programme. The limitations of staff and of financial resources will

undoubtedly set narrow limits to that programme. Bearing this in mind an important preliminary step must be to determine what manpower information is really necessary for planning and operational purposes under the present circumstances and secondly to determine the most effective and economical methods of collecting and disseminating such data on a regular basis. While the elaboration of such a programme is beyond the scope of this work the following paragraphs briefly summarize the current status and major problems of contemporary labour market information in Jordan and outline the minimal requirements as they have emerged in this study.

10.2.3 In developing countries labour market information has been generated (however imprecisely, Richter, 1978) as a by-product of two main sources:

(i) the records of social security or unemployment insurance schemes;

(ii) the placement activities of the employment services.[4]

In Jordan these basic sources have been either absent or effectively inoperative.[5] As a result labour market information is primarily derived from temporally discrete household and establishment surveys conducted by the central statistical agency (DOS) and supplemented with occasional ad hoc inquiries by a variety of institutions. These surveys are unable to provide key manpower information with the speed, accuracy and continuity required for decision-making in either the short or long term. The major drawbacks of Jordanian labour market information can be summarized under two headings: (a) coverage and content;

(b) dissemination. The following paragraph briefly summarises each in turn.

(a) Coverage and content

Existing labour market information is restricted in both sectoral and spatial coverage. Indeed it is readily apparent that the majority of the working population, especially the self-employed and those in rural areas, are not covered by any contemporary data collection efforts. In addition current labour market information fails to address a number of particularly important issues:

(i) There is no regular employer/establishment labour demand survey and no national skill inventory. The need for such data became clear in 1977 with the establishment of the VTC.

(ii) There is a continued lack of time series data on the volume and characteristics of emigration (and a complete dearth of data on return migration) for employment. Systematic data collection on labour outflows is restricted to those obtaining employment in Saudi Arabia for whom the MOL obtains work permits from the Saudi embassy in Amman. This provides only aggregate occupational data.

(iii) Available data on immigrant employment in Jordan is constrained by inconsistent visa and work permit requirements for different nationalities. Again, occupational data is presented in an aggregate and often misleading form.

(iv) Unemployment and vacancy data are collected by the Employment Office but in an incomplete and ill-organized fashion. The maintenance of traditional information channels and recruiting practices makes such data of limited value in policy-making.

(v) Wage rate data is only available on an intermittent basis and then in an aggregate and ineffective form.

At present the labour market information 'programme' is restricted to the thrice annual 'Employment survey for establishments engaging 5 persons or more'. Having its origins in the early 1970's the employment survey continues to focus on the employment of tertiary education graduates. However, its failure to distinguish skill levels and to provide wage rate data on anything other than an intermittent and aggregate basis, makes the survey wholly inappropriate to current needs. DOS were unable to pinpoint either the aims of the survey or its users.

(b) Dissemination

In addition to the problems of restricted content and limited coverage, available labour market information suffers from an over-long gestation period between collection and distribution or publication. This period is seldom less than one year and frequently two or more. In many cases available data remains unpublished and is often unknown to those who most need it.

The problems of data awareness and exchange are even greater at the international level. Thus, both the MOL and MPS did not have access to the detailed work permit data issued by the Kuwait MOL (and used here in chapter 5). This apparent lack of data exchange makes the adoption of regional manpower planning in Arab countries (as advocated by Atasi, 1982 and Pennisi, 1981, among others) more of a rhetorical commitment than a realistic possibility.[6]

10.2.4 As a result of these limitations current labour market information is unable to provide the key data required

by manpower planners at either the national or local scale. Given current resource constraints and priority schedules the establishment of a comprehensive labour market information system covering all sectors of the economy can only be a progressive long term commitment. The pervasiveness of international labour migration in the Jordanian economy and the heightened uncertainty it imposes on labour market management demonstrates that the immediate priority must be an increased awareness of the characteristics, trends and implications of such migration. Given the immediacy of the problem, it is important in the first place to improve the use of existing data resources. This thesis has identified a number of important areas in which such improvements could be effected. These are briefly summarised in the following paragraphs:

(i) Monitoring emigration

At present those leaving to work in Saudi Arabia must apply through the MOL; the extension of this requirement to other destination countries would provide an opportunity for increasing data on labour outflow. The scope of the occupational classification could be enlarged. Such data should be published on a regular (monthly or quarterly) basis. An additional and simple expedient would be to expand the information required on departure/arrival cards currently used at frontier posts. This would be an initial step in assessing the extent of return migration.

(ii) Monitoring and forecasting skill scarcity

Previous discussion (chapter 7) has emphasised the need to identify and monitor skill scarcity at the occupational level if effective remedial measures are to be

undertaken. A number of sources of such data were identified earlier, notably the Employment Office's vacancy data and VTC apprenticeship enrolments. Although these sources require significant modification, they could provide an important means of monitoring skill availability and thus assessing priorities in the establishment of training facilities. An important supplement would be the preparation of a wage index of selected occupations. The establishment of the SSC makes this a possibility in the near future.

The time lag in the creation of new training facilities varies from 2-5 years, and for the re-orientation of existing schemes from 1-2 years. To make such programmes more responsive to the needs of both the domestic and the external labour markets, it is necessary to provide short term demand forecasts for selected occupations. Such forecasts need to be prepared on a regular basis (e.g. twice yearly). Given the inability of manpower planners to predict skill requirements at the national level, such forecasting must be decentralised to the establishment level and could take a form similar to that of the VTC survey. This would need to be supplemented with six-monthly forecasts of trends in the major labour-importing states produced by the Jordanian labour attachés.

(iii) Immigrant workers

There is clearly a need to monitor the level and characteristics of immigrant employment in Jordan. This can only be achieved by a rationalisation of visa and work permit requirements (most notably their extension to all nationalities and all economic sectors). This will become

increasingly important if current international labour market trends are confirmed and the opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled Jordanians to find employment abroad diminish rapidly.

10.3 Retrospect

In this final section we briefly re-iterate the remaining objectives of this research and summarise some of the findings.

10.3.1 To evaluate the formulation of, and constraints on, Jordanian government policy towards labour migration

It is frequently asserted that labour emigration occurs in default of government policy (Richards and Martin, 1983).[7] In the Jordanian case the dearth of government pronouncements on labour emigration are indicative not of the absence of policy but rather of the continuity which has characterised that policy. Since the early 1970's the government has consistently re-iterated its intention of maintaining Jordan's role as a regional manpower supplier. It has been shown here that such a consistent structural policy is a direct and logical outcome of Jordan's economic and political history. The combination of Jordan's internal political structure, in which a large proportion (if not the majority) of the population are Jordanian only by default, together with her economic, and ultimately political, dependence on her neighbouring oil-rich states, effectively precludes alternative strategies.

Although emigration policy has been consistent, its management has frequently been incoherent and contradictory. To attempt a comprehensive account of the government's policy towards emigration for employment would have been an

unrealistic project given the number of agencies involved, and the sensitivity of the decision-making process. Instead, evidence has been employed selectively to focus on one issue, that of labour shortfalls, to illustrate the difficulties of intervening effectively in a domestic labour market where manpower requirements are controlled by external events. Government pronouncements that labour shortages would be overcome by increasing the labour force participation of women and by a greater emphasis on vocational education and training were shown to be rhetorical commitments rather than practical policy outlines. While the vocational training project has been successful its operations are far too limited in scope to significantly affect maladjustments in the labour market. In the short term at least the labour supply policy has met with only limited success. The only practical compromise remains the importation of immigrant workers into Jordan.

10.3.2 To examine the role of immigrant labour in an emigrant economy

Previous research, notably that of Birks and Sinclair, has suggested that manpower shortages arising from labour exports were the stimulus for a replacement labour movement, into labour-exporting economies. This labour immigration was seen as ameliorating, in the short term, some of the negative consequences of labour exports, notably wage inflation and manpower shortfalls.

A detailed examination of labour inflows to Jordan has demonstrated a contrary position. Immigrant workers perform a complex and varied role in the emigrant economy. Three distinct roles have been defined: replacement migration;

international contract migration; secondary labour migration. The bulk of immigrant workers in Jordan were seen to fall into the latter category which consists primarily of unskilled and semi-skilled workers employed in low status occupations and at discriminatory wages that Jordanians were unwilling to accept. These characteristics have facilitated the continued expansion of immigrant employment in Jordan despite the recession in primary (Jordanian) emigration and the re-emergence of domestic unemployment. The role of emigration in stimulating labour inflows is seen to have become increasingly irrelevant over time.

Clearly, importing foreign manpower has not been a solution to domestic labour market problems and may have caused new problems to emerge. A review of developments in the irrigated agricultural sector of the East Jordan Valley has demonstrated that such labour was not simply maintaining the development momentum, but had played an important role in shaping that development by permitting a rapid expansion in labour-intensive cultivation techniques.

10.3.3 To build a comprehensive picture of contemporary Jordanian participation in the international labour market and place this in its historical context

The limitations of available labour market data, particularly in the pre-1975 period, have necessarily restricted the reconstruction of Jordan's international labour migration history. Nevertheless a series of distinct phases in that history have been identified.

The British mandate period saw the partial incorporation of Trans-jordanian labour into the Palestinian

labour market. During this period labour migration, albeit on an intermittent and seasonal basis, was seen largely as a response to repeated crises in the dryland agricultural sector.

Although the pattern and scale of emigration for employment were radically altered by the 1948 Palestine war, its characterisation as a response to crisis, both political and economic, is equally appropriate. As a result, Jordan's role as a regional labour-supplier and her parallel dependence on workers' remittances was already well established before the boom in emigration for employment of the mid-1970's. During that boom period net outflows of manpower reached 15,000 p.a. This high rate of labour loss and the skill profile of those emigrants had an increasingly negative impact on the Jordanian economy and labour market by exacerbating extant skill shortages.

Available data shows a substantial decline in emigration for employment from Jordan since the late 1970's. A detailed analysis of work permit data from Kuwait has confirmed that decline, and shown the remaining Jordanian inflow to be increasingly biased towards technical and professional skills. The basis for that decline is traced to developments in the nature of labour demand. The inability of the Jordanian labour market to adjust to the distortions induced by participation in a vacillating international labour market suggests that emigration for employment, rather than being a response to crises, has become a crisis in itself.

Notes

1. For a background to the establishment of the MPS, see: Socknat, J.A. (1970) 'Manpower planning in Jordan'.

2. Anani, J.A. and Jaber, T.A. (1980) 'Jordan's experience and policies in the field of reverse transfer of technology'.

3. When interviewed by the author in January 1983 Yasir Sarah, then Director of the MPS, concurred with this view and added that, in his opinion, there was no manpower planning in Jordan.

4. Richter, L. (1978) Labour market information in developing countries: a general review.

5. In a crude analysis of manhour distribution in the Amman Employment Office (for the third week of January 1983) the author found that only 8 manhours were spent on the vacancy/placement service (less than 4% of the available time) compared to 162 manhours on immigrant workers and 70 manhours on Jordanians emigrating to Saudi Arabia.

   The greatest potential for improving labour market information in Jordan undoubtedly lies with the expansion of the Social Security Corporation's activities. Computerised employee records include data on occupation, wage rates and job changes. At present the scheme (introduced in 1980) covers some 148,834 workers, mostly in large firms and the public sector. There are plans to extend coverage to Jordanians working abroad over the next few years.

6. Atasi, N. (1982) Manpower situation and possibilities of regional manpower planning in the Arab countries; Pennisi, G. (1981) Development, manpower and migration in the Red Sea region: the case for co-operation. pp. 210-11.

7. Richards, A. and Martin, P. (1983) 'The laissez-faire approach to international labour migration: the case of the Middle East'. Econ. Dev. and Cult. Change, vol. 31 (3) pp. 455-74.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

A NOTE ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS

The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) was designed to permit the international comparison of occupations; it identifies 1,506 occupational categories on the basis of the type of work performed. A nested hierarchy of definitions is provided: major groups (8); minor groups (83); unit groups (284) and occupations (1,506). The majority of states in the Middle East have data at the unit group (3 digit) level. Thus for example in Kuwait it is possible to distinguish between secondary education teachers (1-32) and primary education teachers (1-33), but not to isolate types of secondary or primary education teachers.

While this classification is useful in enabling the comparison of migrant and non-migrant occupational structures, it does not provide a basis for determining the extent of skill loss to labour suppliers because the classification does not take into account the educational or skill level required. In order to facilitate such comparison it is necessary to re-classify occupations on the basis of similar education or training inputs. Such a re-classification makes a number of implicit assumptions, that education and occupation are linked, that standard educational inputs can be identified and that the elasticity of substitution between occupational groups is minimal (Blaug, 1972). However the aim of transformation is not to define rigid educational requirements for particular occupations, merely to distinguish between broad categories of education and training inputs usually required by particular groups of occupations.

This problem was first tackled by Parnes (Parnes, 1962) who recommended a four-fold classification:

A : professional and higher managerial occupations which require higher education.

B : technical and semi-professional skilled occupations which require 2-3 years of post-secondary education.

C : sales, craft, proprietorial occupations requiring secondary education.

D : occupations demanding less than secondary education.

This is a rather coarse classification, in particular its failure to distinguish between arts and science based higher education is a significant omission in this region. Further, the final category is ill-suited for use in a region where a large majority of the working population have not completed secondary education. Despite these limitations it was this Parnes/OECD classification which was adapted for use in the Middle East by the Jordanian Department of Statistics in 1970 and used in

their 'Survey of Establishments' in that year (Socknat, 1970). This used a six-fold classification:

A-1 : scientific and technical occupations requiring a science or maths based University degree.

A-2 : arts based University degree.

B : technical occupations requiring two years post-secondary training.

C-1 : skilled office occupations requiring secondary education.

C-2 : skilled manual occupations requiring secondary education.

D : semi-skilled and unskilled occupations with no education specifications.

This has been further refined into a seven-fold classification by the World Bank research project on international labour migration in the Middle East (World Bank, 1981). The latter reserves class D for unskilled occupations requiring no education or training and designates C-1 as skilled office and manual occupations (requiring general secondary education completion), and C-2 as semi-skilled office and manual occupations (requiring intermediate level education or at least functional literacy). A further sub-division between B-1 and B-2 is introduced. The former are sub-professional and technical occupations requiring 1-3 years of science or maths based post-secondary or technical secondary education. Class B-2 represents other sub-professional occupations requiring 1-3 years of non-science/maths based post-secondary or vocational education.

Here we will use a compressed version of this World Bank classification. The designation of a B-1/B-2 distinction seems unjustified since available data do not permit a division between types of post-secondary (non-University) education. Further the B-2 class has only nine unit groups, most of which are not utilized in the material under consideration. Finally the mixing of office and manual occupations in the C-1 and C-2 designations is avoided.

The classification used here is a slight modification of that devised by Birks and Sinclair (1977c) and used in the International Migration Project. Use of ISCO unit groups makes it possible to transform any data set in the above classifications to our own for comparison.

The classification used here has five levels:

A-1 : professional and technical occupations usually requiring a science/maths based University degree.

A-2 : professional occupations usually requiring an arts based University degree.

B : sub-professional and technical occupations usually requiring 1-3 years post-secondary or vocational secondary education.

C-1 : skilled and semi-skilled office occupations usually requiring preparatory cycle (9 years) completion at least.

C-2 : skilled and semi-skilled manual occupations usually requiring primary cycle education completion or functional literacy at least.

D : unskilled occupations with no special education or formal training requirements.

APPENDIX II

SELECTED ESTIMATES OF 'JORDANIANS' WORKING ABROAD

	Year referred to	Estimate	Notes
1.	1970	125,327	Farrag, A.M. (1975) An apparently precise estimate of 'Jordanians' working abroad but derived from sources referring to various years between 1968 and 1973 and several crude estimates. Includes Palestinians working in Lebanon.
2.	'Early 1970's'	100,000	Pennisi, G. (1981) table II-7, p. 23, see below (9).
3.	1973-74	200,000	Azar, W. (1974) No basis for this estimate, nor clear definition is provided.
4.	1975	137,000	Department of Statistics (1976) Some 7.6% of the MPHS sample of 3,436 were abroad for employment. This ratio is applied to the 1975 East Bank population (estimated) to derive a national figure. This may understate the real rate of emigration because of the 'household' nature of the survey.
5.	1975	100,000	Salt, A. and Keeley, W. (1976) This estimate is based on the difference between actual and projected population age distribution. Compares the 1974 and 1975 MPHS results with a theoretical age distribution for 1975; the difference, it is suggested, represents those abroad. Since the latter is estimated from a weak base and the former suffers from a biased age distribution, the result is of limited value.
6.	1975	264,717	Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1978c) p. 34. See text for detailed discussion. The authors assume that 57% (150,000) were Jordanians of East Bank origin. See below (32) for later revisions.
7.	1975	250,700	Ecevit, Z.H. (1981) table 2, p. 263. Based on the same sources as Birks and Sinclair and in several cases derived from them, but reducing estimates for Qatar and the UAE on the basis of employment and work permit data (uncited).

	Year referred to	Estimate	Notes
8.	1975	139,000	Serageldin, I. et al.(1983) p. 7, table 1.2. Based on a wide variety of employing country data made available after completion of the ILO project.
9.	'Mid-1970's'	200,000	Pennisi, G. (1981) table II-8, p. 25. Argues that previous estimates have excluded clandestine emigrants. The author suggests that a margin of error of +/- 20% should be attached to this estimate.
10.	1975	198,400	Yahya, H.A. (1980) Based on Birks and Sinclair (6) but assuming that 75% of 'Jordanians and Palestinians' abroad were from the East or West Banks and that 143,300 were from the East Bank alone. See footnote 21, chapter 3.
11.	1975	150-200,000	Mazur, M.P. (1979) This refers to Jordanians abroad (including dependants) and is based on an assumed outflow of 5,000 workers per annum during 1968-75, and that 56% of those abroad were economically active (as in the 1961 census). Mazur admits that his estimates are "... extremely speculative ..."
12.	1976	300,000	Issam Ajlouni (Minister of Labour), in MEED, vol. 20 (40) 1 October 1976, p. 16. Ajlouni refers to 69,000 'Jordanian citizens' working in Kuwait, a figure which conflicts with the 1975 Kuwait census. The latter enumerated 47,102 economically active Jordanians and Palestinians.
13.	1977	150,000	Jawad Anani (Under-Secretary for Labour) in The Middle East, no. 32, June 1977, p. 99. Refers simply to 'Jordanians abroad'.
14.	1977	150-300,000	Clark, J. (1977) p. 10. This estimate is derived from the two previously cited sources.
15.	1977	225,000	Fadhil, M.A. (1979) p. 30. No basis for this estimate is provided.
16.	1977	150,000	IMF Survey, 4 September 1978, p. 260. Refers to 'Jordanians and Palestinians' working in Arab states.
17.	1978	120-150,000	Dajani, J.S. and Murdock, M.S. (1978) p. 47. No details are provided.

	Year referred to	Estimate	Notes
18.	1978	305,500	MEED, vol. 22 (9), 3 March 1978, p. 27. Estimate made by the Science and Technology Conference, Amman (February 1978).
19.	1978	300,000	Saket, B. (1978) Refers to 'official' estimates.
20.	1978	300-400,000	Arab Economist (1978) vol. 10 (no. 198), p. 19. No details are provided.
21.	1979	250,000	McClelland, D. (1979) Assumes that 50,000 of the 'official' estimate of 300,000 emigrant workers have come from the West Bank and should be excluded from East Bank emigration. This appears to be an arbitrary figure.
22.	1979	400,000	Carr, H. (1979) International Herald Tribune (14 December). No basis is provided.
23.	1979	350,000	Issam Ajlouni, estimate refers ambiguously to the number of 'Jordanians' working in the Gulf states. MEED, vol. 28 (8) 22 February 1980, p. 26.
24.	'Late 1970's'	350,000	Pennisi, G. (1981) table II-9, p. 26. See note 9 above.
25.	1979	215-325,000	Department of Statistics (1981) Derived from the sample returns of the 1979 census. An estimated 500-750,000 'Jordanians' and their dependants were abroad; assuming a crude participation rate of 43% (see text) suggests that 215-325,000 were economically active.
26.	1979	150-200,000	M'Hmd. Abdul Hadi (Ministry of Labour, Amman), personal communication, 30 March 1980.
27.	1979	200,000	UNFPA (1979) p. 21. No details are provided.
28.	1979	240,000	The Futures Group (1981) p. 20. No details are provided.
29.	1980	400,000	Ministry of Labour estimate reported in MEED, vol. 24 (36), 5 September 1980, p. 2. MEED comments that this is a 51% increase over the Ministry's estimate of 265,000 'Jordanians' working abroad in 1979.
30.	1980	305,400	Anani, J. and Jaber, T.A. (1980) p. 23. This Ministry of Labour report estimates that 261,500 of this total were in Arab countries.

	Year referred to	Estimate	Notes
31.	1980	300,000	Financial Times, 18 June 1980. Refers to 'various official estimates'.
32.	1980	250,350	Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. (1982c) p. 737. This figure for 1980 is lower than their earlier estimate for 1975 (note 6 above). The same table revises downward that earlier figure by 50,000 to 214,717, based on an examination of enrolment in schools of Palestinian and Jordanian children in Saudi Arabia.
33.	1980	116,000	Kirwan, F. (1982) Note that this refers to the net outflow during 1976-80 and not to migrant stocks and is therefore not strictly comparable to other estimates. The analysis is based on preliminary results of the 1979 census but is flawed in a number of respects which lead to an over-estimate of net worker emigration. Firstly the outdated estimate of the 1975 base population (1.9 Mn.) is used and is not adjusted for the presence of non-Jordanians. Secondly a crude participation rate for non-Jordanians in 1979 of only 45% is used. The result contradicts supporting evidence used in our own estimate.
34.	1981	250,000	National Planning Council (1982) p. 14. Refers to Jordanians working abroad.
35.	1982	400,000	Social Security Corporation announced that the '400,000 Jordanians working in the Gulf' would be covered by SSC regulations in late 1982. MEED, vol. 26 (11) 12 March 1982, p. 13.
36.	1982	310,000	Financial Times, 13 August 1982. No details are provided.
37.	1982	310,000	Ministry of Labour estimate of 'Jordanians' working abroad, of whom 266,600 were in Arab countries. MEED, vol. 26 (40), 1 October 1982, p. 38.
38.	1982	300,000	Jawad Anani (Ministry of Labour) estimated that there were 300,000 'Jordanians' working abroad at the end of 1982, a decline of 5,000 on the 1980 figure (29 above) and of 10,000 on an earlier estimate for 1982 (37 above). Reported in The Jerusalem Star, 20 January 1983, pp. 1-3.
39.	1983	310,000	Financial Times, 20 September 1983. No details.

APPENDIX III

KUWAIT: EMPLOYMENT QUOTIENTS BY OCCUPATION AND NATIONALITY, 1975-81

Nationality	A-1					A-2					B				
	1975	1978	1979	1980	1981	1975	1978	1979	1980	1981	1975	1978	1979	1980	1981
Yemeni	0.8	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.8	1.0	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.0
Iraqi	0.6	2.4	1.5	1.3	1.4	0.4	3.2	2.1	1.4	2.9	0.3	0.8	2.1	2.2	2.8
'Jordanian'	2.2	2.6	2.5	3.5	2.6	0.9	2.3	2.7	3.1	4.5	1.7	2.6	2.1	2.8	3.2
Syrian	0.5	1.1	0.8	0.8	1.1	0.5	2.8	1.5	1.4	2.3	0.7	0.9	1.8	1.2	0.8
Lebanese	1.2	1.5	1.2	1.5	2.5	1.2	1.8	2.3	3.1	4.8	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.4	3.7
Egyptian	2.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	2.2	1.8	1.2	1.2	0.9	1.3
Iranian	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.2	1.1	1.6	2.5	0.5
Indian	1.1	0.3	1.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.1	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.3	2.0
Pakistani	0.6	0.9	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.4	1.2	0.6	0.6	0.4
Bangladeshi	-	1.1	0.7	0.1	0.1	-	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	-	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4
S. Korean	-	1.1	0.8	1.0	1.1	-	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	-	0.6	0.1	0.2	0.3
Filipino	-	1.2	0.5	0.9	0.4	-	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.3	-	0.2	2.3	1.2	1.0

Nationality	C-1					C-2					D				
	1975	1978	1979	1980	1981	1975	1978	1979	1980	1981	1975	1978	1979	1980	1981
Yemeni	1.7	2.9	2.0	2.6	2.3	0.3	1.8	0.8	0.4	1.7	1.5	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.7
Iraqi	0.6	1.8	1.6	1.5	2.7	1.7	1.3	1.1	0.8	0.8	1.1	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.8
'Jordanian'	1.3	2.6	3.0	2.6	4.0	1.0	1.5	1.4	1.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
Syrian	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.8	1.2	1.7	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0
Lebanese	1.3	2.1	1.8	2.1	2.1	1.1	1.3	1.8	2.1	1.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5
Egyptian	0.4	1.2	1.1	0.9	1.2	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0
Iranian	0.7	0.5	0.7	2.3	1.5	2.0	0.9	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.1
Indian	1.1	0.8	1.3	1.6	1.2	0.5	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.9
Pakistani	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.4	2.4	1.4	1.0	1.3	0.9	0.6	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1
Bangladeshi	-	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.2	-	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.5	-	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.4
S. Korean	-	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	-	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.1	-	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.1
Filipino	-	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.7	-	1.0	1.4	2.2	1.1	-	1.2	1.0	0.9	1.0

Source: as table 5.1. Author's calculations.

APPENDIX IV

(a) VTC APPRENTICESHIP COURSES AND ENROLMENTS, 1977-82

Course	1977		1978		1979		1980		1981		1982	
	Enrolment	No. of contracts	Enrolment	No. of contracts	Enrolment	No. of contracts	Enrolment	No. of contracts	Enrolment	No. of contracts	Enrolment	No. of contracts
1. Electricians	75	1	122	2	170	5	187	5	141	4	208	5
2. Mechanics	25	1	31	1	21	1	69	4	82	5	206	10
3. Carpenters	22	1	45	3	17	1	48	3	102	4	220	5
4. Welders and smiths	18	1	98	4	90	4	293	8	234	12	479	19
5. Metal fabrication	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	1	7	1
6. Spinning machinery technicians	16	1	62	1	20	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
7. Oil refinery maintenance mechanics and process workers	-	-	20	1	18	1	-	-	31	2	-	-
8. Heating, air conditioning and plumbing	-	-	28	1	29	1	86	4	87	3	185	4
9. Construction workers*	-	-	15	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	1
0. Auto-mechanic	-	-	-	-	16	1	122	5	146	8	237	8
1. Earth-moving machinery mechanic	-	-	-	-	14	1	16	1	-	-	-	-
2. Labour supervisor	-	-	-	-	17	1	18	1	-	-	21	1
3. Sewing	-	-	17	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	156	5	438	15	450	17	679	31	832	39	1,599	54

Source: VTC (annual) Annual report of the Vocational Training Corporation. (Arabic) Author's compilation.

* : Construction skills include: painters, tilers, plasterers and reinforcers.

(b) VTC 150-160 HOUR UPGRADING COURSES AND ENROLMENTS 1977-82

Course (all locations)	Enrolment 1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
1. Electrical house wiring	46	40	51	77	315	272
2. Arc welding	25	23	20	19	51	47
3. Oxy-acetelene welding	22	8	-	-	-	-
4. Central heating	10	14	22	8	42	-
5. Plumbing	15	18	22	48	137	109
6. Auto-mechanic	15	30	22	54	193	171
7. Radio repair	10	11	-	-	10	-
8. Refrigerator repair	22	15	10	17	67	35
9. Electrical motor repair	-	13	-	10	11	-
10. Tiling and plastering	-	-	13	11	-	-
11. Shuttering	-	-	10	8	-	-
12. Cable-jointing	-	-	10	-	-	-
13. Surveying	-	-	10	-	-	-
14. Dressmaking	-	16	-	-	-	-
15. Diesel mechanic	-	10	-	-	-	-
16. Pipe fitter	-	-	15	-	-	-
17. Tractor mechanic	-	-	15	-	-	-
18. Carpenter	-	-	-	14	13	12
19. Auto-electrician	-	-	-	9	-	-
20. Tiler	-	-	-	14	26	45
21. Painter and decorator	-	-	-	-	-	23
22. Air conditioning	-	-	-	-	-	20
23. Reinforcer	-	-	-	-	-	15
TOTAL	165	198	221	279	865	761

Source: as Appendix IV(a). Author's compilation.

APPENDIX V

AMMAN EMPLOYMENT OFFICE: JOB VACANCY RECORDS, OCTOBER 1982-JANUARY 1983

Occupation	Vacancies
Professional/managerial	
Civil engineer	7
Mechanical engineer	1
Construction engineer	5
Surveyor/draughtsman	5
Architect	1
Accountant	16
Instructor	2
Clerical/administrative	
Cashier	8
Advertising clerk	3
Secretary	14*
Receptionist	14
Typist	5*
Clerks	20
Public relations	2
Store clerk	9
Sales	
Technical salesman	9

Occupation	Vacancies
Technicians, skilled and semi-skilled manual workers	
Telephone installation	6*
Computer programmer	1*
Plasterer	42*
Tile-setter	35*
Painter	16
Electrician	55*
Blacksmith	31*
Carpenter	95*
Cable-jointer	22*
Auto-mechanic	*
General mechanic	22*
Telex operator	6
Welder	16*
Printer	1
Book-binder	4
Other technicians	5*
HD/LD plant driver	55
Foreman	7*
Photographic assistant	5
Car painter	2*
Steel erector	20
Plumber	6
Pneumatic drill operator	10
Asphalt layer	5
Diesel mechanic	3
Stone mason	11
Bricklayer	93*
Air conditioning technician	11
Jeweller	1

Occupation	Vacancies
Services	
Baker	9
Tailor	1
Housemaid	1
Cook	9
Waiter	32
Hotel cleaner	89*
Kitchen labour	10
Unskilled worker	
Labourers	115*
Messenger/office boy	20
Textile factor-hand	15
Freight handlers	73*
Night watchman	1
TOTAL	1080

* Note: asterisk indicates that some employers identify vacancies in these occupations but without specifying the numbers required.

Source: Author's collation from written replies to Employment Office requests. Amman Employment Office files.

APPENDIX VI

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NON-JORDANIAN IMMIGRANTS IN 1978, 1979 AND 1982

Occupation	1978 number	1978 %	1979 number	1979 %	1982 number	1982 %
Professional and managerial						
Engineers	416	2.2	564	2.1	434	1.2
Surveyors and draughtsmen	15	-	86	0.3	128	0.4
Accountants	228	1.2	330	1.3	81	0.2
Teachers	59	0.3	85	0.3	76	0.2
Doctors	n.s.	-	111	0.4	8	-
Nurses and midwives	n.s.	-			204	0.6
Pharmacists	n.s.	-	23	0.1	11	-
Translators	n.s.	-	7	-	29	0.1
Managers and directors	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	459	1.3
Pilots	n.s.	-	83	0.3	14	-
Others	67	0.4	144	0.6	31	0.1
Clerical and administrative						
Administrative workers	405	2.2	947	3.6	367	1.0
Clerks	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	594	1.7
Typist	349	1.9	281	1.1	75	0.2
Secretary					164	0.5
Cashiers and related workers	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	427	1.2
General office labour	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	370	1.0
Sales						
Salesmen	141	0.8	269	1.0	409	1.1
Shop assistants					274	0.8
Technicians, skilled and semi-skilled manual labour						
Communications technician	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	71	0.2
Mining technician	n.s.	-	16	0.1	187	0.5
Medical equipment operator	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	57	0.2
Refinery worker	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	102	0.3
Other technical workers	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	201	0.6
Foreman	n.s.	-	426	1.6	465	1.3
Electrician	450	2.4	482	1.8	570	1.6
Cable-jointers	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	411	1.2
Mechanic	786	4.2	737	2.8	655	1.8
Fitters and welders	502	2.7	497	1.9	537	1.5
Carpenters	887	4.7	883	3.3	1,216	3.4
Other woodworkers	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	521	1.5
Smith/steel fixer	649	3.5	380	1.5	898	2.5
Tile-setters	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	653	1.8
Lathe operator	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	110	0.3
Bricklayer/stone-mason	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	796	2.2
Painters and related workers	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	242	0.7
Plasterers	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	410	1.2
Drivers	420	2.2	737	2.8	2,301	6.5
Others	162	0.9	65	0.3	86	0.2
Services						
Housemaid/nanny	276	1.5	442	1.7	2,926	8.2
Cook	715	3.8	1,136	4.3	358	1.0
Baker and confectionary maker						
Butcher	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	40	0.1
Laundry worker	n.s.	-	139	0.5	128	0.4
Tailor	358	1.9	343	1.3	332	0.9
Cobbler	163	0.9	149	0.6	128	0.4
Guard	n.s.	-	548	2.1	n.s.	-
Hotel cleaners	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	615	1.7
Barber	147	0.8	194	0.7	124	0.4
Other service workers	212	1.1	689	2.6	1,014	2.8
Unskilled labour						
Agricultural workers	1,345	7.2	2,022	7.7	607	1.7
Construction labour	1,224	6.5	1,846	7.0	7,695	21.6
Manufacturing worker	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	1,475	4.2
Street cleaners	n.s.	-	n.s.	-	845	2.4
'Unskilled' worker	6,452	34.4	n.s.	-	n.s.	-
'Ordinary' worker	n.s.	-	10,378	39.3	n.s.	-
Other unskilled worker	-	-	-	-	4,239	3.9
TOTAL	18,738	100.0	26,388	100.0	35,598	100.0

Source: Ministry of Labour, Annual report, 1979, table 5 and for 1982 unpublished monthly records, [illegible] Author's compilation.

APPENDIX VII

OCCUPATIONS RECORDED ON WORK PERMITS ISSUED IN AMMAN GOVERNORATE, OCTOBER 1982-JANUARY 1983, BY NATIONALITY

No.	Occupation	Total	Egyptian	Syrian	Lebanese	Maghreb	Other Arab[1]	Turks	Indian	Pakistani	Sri Lankan	Thai	South Korea	China	Filipino	Banglades
1.	Civil engineer	8	4	1	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2.	Electrical engineer	7	2	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
3.	Other engineer	7	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	3	-	-
4.	Surveyor	3	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
5.	Draughtsman	7	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-
6.	Accountant	11	3	2	-	-	-	-	4	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
7.	Designer (textile)	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8.	Pilot	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9.	Telephone engineer	9	-	1	2	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10.	Pharmacist	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
11.	Nurse	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	9	5	-	-	-	6	-
12.	X-ray technician	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13.	Teacher	28	26	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14.	Manager/director	13	-	1	2	2	1	-	1	5	-	-	-	1	-	-
15.	Admin. official	13	2	-	3	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-
16.	Clerical workers	53	26	3	7	-	10	2	1	2	-	-	2	-	-	-
17.	Secretary	15	7	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
18.	Cashier/bookeepers	12	5	-	2	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	1	-
19.	Typist	8	5	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
20.	Office labour	19	16	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
21.	Salesman	12	6	2	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
22.	Cook	32	15	1	3	2	-	-	9	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
23.	Waiter	116	49	1	2	-	-	-	42	-	-	-	-	-	22	-
24.	Butcher	6	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
25.	Grocer	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26.	Baker	28	17	9	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
27.	Confectionary maker	7	4	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
28.	Barber	5	1	-	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29.	Laundry worker	23	11	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-
30.	Photographer	2	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
31.	Tailor	13	1	-	1	-	1	9	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
32.	Electrician	64	10	5	2	1	2	-	8	6	-	-	3	-	21	6
33.	Painter	23	14	-	2	1	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	2	-
34.	Bricklayer/stonemason	39	12	4	4	-	-	-	10	-	-	9	-	-	-	-
35.	Tile setters	34	18	2	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-
36.	Blacksmith/steel fixer	76	5	-	1	-	-	2	30	6	7	13	-	-	12	-
37.	Carpenters	341	66	6	-	-	3	4	132	14	8	42	40	-	26	-
38.	Plasterers	17	4	-	-	-	1	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
39.	Cable-jointer	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-
40.	Heating technician	7	1	-	1	-	2	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
41.	Glass installation	4	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
42.	HD/LD driver	98	18	2	-	2	2	-	26	2	3	13	18	-	12	-
43.	Other driver	30	11	2	2	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
44.	Turner	5	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
45.	Pipe fitter	13	-	1	1	-	-	2	2	2	-	2	3	-	-	-

No.	Occupation	Total	Egyptian	Syrian	Lebanese	Maghreb	Other Arab[1]	Turks	Indian	Pakistani	Sri Lankan	Thai	South Korea	China	Filipino	Banglade
46.	Welder	39	4	1	4	-	-	-	9	1	-	8	12	-	-	-
47.	Lift technician	4	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
48.	Foreman	23	5	-	1	-	-	-	4	4	1	-	1	7	-	-
49.	Petrol pump attendant	6	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
50.	Medical equipt. workers	13	3	-	4	1	2	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-
51.	Translator	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
52.	Power line transmission	6	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-
53.	Auto-mechanic	14	6	1	1	2	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
54.	Other mechanic	92	25	3	-	-	-	2	12	4	2	24	18	-	-	2
55.	Telex operator	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
56.	Computing technician	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
57.	Mining technician	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
58.	TV/radio repairmen	6	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
59.	Plumber	21	5	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	9	-	-	-
60.	Watch repairer	2	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
61.	Timekeeper	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
62.	Housemaid/nanny	402	7	-	1	1	4	2	7	2	335	3	-	-	40	-
63.	Agricultural labourers	136	73	5	-	-	-	2	8	27[2]	-	-	-	-	-	21
64.	Cobbler/shoemaker	5	1	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
65.	Unskilled construction labs.	1244	563	6	13	7	11	19	104	8	28	97	-	370	4	14
66.	Unskilled factory workers	231	213	-	7	-	-	4	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-
67.	Guides	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
68.	Shop assistants	21	12	2	1	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
69.	Hotel cleaners	87	43	-	2	1	-	-	-	2	23	-	-	-	12	4
70.	Street cleaners	79	79	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
71.	Kitchen labour	13	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	6	5	-	-	-	-	-
72.	Hospital labour	18	8	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-
73.	Gardeners	8	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
74.	Storeman	7	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
75.	Barman	9	1	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	4	-
76.	Hotal receptionist	6	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
77.	TOTAL	3,751	1,441	77	96	37	65	53	458	124[2]	428	212	129	386	196	48

Notes : 1. 'Other Arab' includes: Iraqi (28), Sudanese (24), Palestinian (9), Eritrean (3) and Ethiopian (1).
2. Includes one Afghan.

Source: Author's sample survey of work permits issued in Amman Governorate Oct. 1982-Jan. 1983.

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Introduction

This selected bibliography includes all the principal works consulted in the preparation of this thesis; it is selective insofar as newspaper and other non-academic press articles have been excluded. Where these have made a direct contribution to the study reference will be found in the appropriate chapter notes.

The bibliography is arranged for convenience as follows:

(i) Jordanian government publications
(ii) Books
(iii) Unpublished theses and dissertations
(iv) Articles
(v) Monographs and working papers
(vi) Mimeographs and other unpublished reports.

Two annotated literature guides closely related to this work are currently in preparation by the author:

(a) Jordan (forthcoming, March 1984). Oxford, Clio Press (World Bibliographical Series).

(b) International labour migration in the Middle East and North Africa: an introductory bibliography. (forthcoming, April 1984). University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (Occasional Papers Series).

Finally, it may be noted that all of the statistical material and many of the unpublished sources used in this research have been deposited in the Documentation Section of the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (University of Durham, South End House, South Road, Durham, DH1 3TG) and may be consulted there.

List of Periodical Abbreviations

Amer. Econ. Rev. : American Economic Review.
Amer. Soc. Rev. : American Sociological Review.
Bull. BSMES : Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies.
Dev. and Change : Development and Change.
Econ. Dev. and Cult. Change : Economic Development and Cultural Change.
IJMES : International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.
ILR : International Labour Review.
IMR : International Migration Review.
Jrnl. Dev. Areas : Journal of Developing Areas.
Jrnl. Dev. Studs. : Journal of Development Studies.
Jrnl. Int. Affs. : Journal of International Affairs.
Jrnl. Pal. Studs. : Journal of Palestine Studies.
JRCAS : Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society.
JSAMES : Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies.

MEA : Middle Eastern Affairs.
MEJ : Middle East Journal.
MES : Middle Eastern Studies.
Popn. and Dev. Rev. : Population and Development Review.
PIHG : Progress in Human Geography.
TESG : Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie.
TIBG : Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers.

(i) Jordanian Government Publications

(Note that this section does not include unpublished government papers or statistics. These, together with statistical reports from other countries are fully referenced in the appropriate chapter notes.)

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